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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents an inquiry into agricultural development. More specifically it 
addresses the question: how do development agencies construct and reconstruct new 
and existing agricultural commodity chains to assist the rural poor to trade their way 
out of poverty? Growing unevenness in the development process has led to calls for 
development to become more pro-poor. An increasingly popular tool employed in 
such efforts is agricultural commodity chain development, more recently and perhaps 
more salubriously called value chain development. The key idea here is to assist poor 
rural agriculturalists (the majority of the world’s poor) to upgrade their livelihoods 
through appropriately configured commodity chains. Although conceptions vary 
about what sort of commodity chain is best engaged or how to engage it, the primary 
tenet of this approach is that given appropriate assistance the poor may trade their 
way out of poverty. As such this thesis is as much about examining the aid agencies 
enrolled to instigate commodity chain development, as it is an investigation into 
agricultural commodity chains themselves. The four case studies of this thesis: rice 
seed, organic rice, fresh vegetables and chilli sauce provide examples of the different 
ways that aid processes may interact with trade processes with varying outcomes.  
At the core of my thesis lies a philosophical discussion about the role of gifts 
and commodities relations in cross-cultural development interactions. Gifts and 
commodities are often set out as two distinct and incommensurate forms of 
exchange. I argue that they are not. In efforts to aid trade it is evident that various 
material and knowledge flows necessarily combine a range of gift and commodity 
relations that are difficult to separate. Even those development projects with the most 
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explicit market focus often find it hard to maintain the false dichotomy between aid 
and the private sector, gift and commodity relations. This is because neither gifts nor 
commodities are absolute states of being; rather they are just one manifestation of 
value in what Appadurai (1986) terms the ‘social life of things’. In this view, a 
commodity is only just one possible phase in the social life of a thing, as it travels 
within different regimes of exchange demanded by society. Things may enter and 
exit the sphere of commodities and likewise gifts may do the same. What may appear 
as a commodity in one instance can appear as a gift in another. This is especially the 
case in developing countries such as Cambodia where this thesis is set and where a 
larger proportion of the society may be considered ‘non-market’ and agriculture is 
specifically predisposed towards patron-client relations. However, current 
conceptions of how best to assist private sector development advocate strict 
separation between aid and the private sector. That is to say that private sector 
development ‘best practice’ approaches maintain a false dichotomy between gifts 
and commodities, which in reality is difficult if not impossible to maintain. This 
often leads to failure and confusion of development projects, if not decidedly anti-
poor development. Thus the primary argument of this thesis is that we need to look at 
the entirety of social relations involved in commodity chain construction, not just 
market transactions or lack thereof. This means that we need to understand gift 
relations, not just commodity relations in agricultural commodity chain interventions 
if such efforts are ever to be pro-poor. 
 viii 
Transliteration, Names and Currency  
A standardised system for rendering Khmer into Roman script is yet to be developed.  
At the present time scholars of Cambodian studies do not follow any one particular 
system. Everyone simply translates Khmer sounds into what they believe is the most 
appropriate spelling. This is not the most desirable situation and, as such, 
transcription is kept to a minimum. Where used, Khmer words are written in 
lowercase italics, except for names of people and places. I follow conventional 
spelling of place names and geographical features. For reasons of confidentiality, I 
do not identify individuals as working with specific NGOs, projects, bilateral or 
multilateral donors.  I use the term ‘consultant’ to refer to foreigners working on any 
type of project in Cambodia, irrespective of the duration of their work or institutional 
affiliation. All references to monetary values are in US dollars.  Throughout the time 
of my fieldwork, US$1 was approximately equivalent to 4000 riel, the Khmer 
currency.  
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 Chapter One  
Pro-poor Development and Agricultural Value 
Chains 
 
In recent years there has been increasing emphasis on pro-poor growth and 
development. Despite previous years of record global economic growth, increasing 
relative inequality and persistent pockets of entrenched absolute poverty have 
brought these ideas to the fore. Indeed, it is only during the last century that the gap 
in the standard of living between developed and developing countries has become so 
immense (North 2005 in Marshall et al. 2006: 4). In 1920 Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita in the developed world was roughly 1.97 times more than that in 
the developing world, yet by 1998 this figure stood at 6.92 (Marshall et al. 2006: 4). 
So while the last decade of global economic growth saw millions raised out of 
poverty, this growth was largely uneven with some countries and people left 
completely excluded. This led the United Nations Development Programme’s  
(UNDP) annual Human Development report in 2005 to conclude that the globe is 
mired in “deep rooted human development inequality” (2005: 4). Consequently, 
recent development trends now speak of pro-poor growth. 
Overall, widening inequality has occurred in step with the rise of 
globalisation, and although there is a correlation between globalisation and increased 
inequality, both between nations and within them, this correlation does not imply 
causality (Borghesi et al. 2003 in Marshall et al. 2006: 4). In fact, Marshall et al. 
(2006: 4) suggest that available evidence shows that globalisation tends to reduce the 
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gap between nations that participate in liberalised trade flows and increase the gap 
for those that remain isolated from it. Within countries, poverty is primarily located 
in rural or hinterland areas believed to be isolated from globalisation processes. Thus 
the authors conclude that, “increases in income inequality within and between 
nations during the decades of globalisation were not caused by globalisation itself 
but rather by inequality of access to that process” (Marshall et al. 2006:4). To remedy 
uneven access to the benefits of globalisation, the UNDP’s 2005 report proposes 
“dynamic processes through which poor countries and poor people can produce their 
way out of extreme deprivation” (UNDP 2005: 4).1 This, the organisation claims, 
will not diminish the wellbeing of people in rich countries.   
Pro-poor development efforts convey an implicit assumption that people 
must be helped into production and trade. That is to say, that people need to be 
assisted to take advantage of the opportunities newly arising from liberalised trade 
agreements and globalisation. The poor are assumed not to have the expertise to do 
this alone (Agrawal 1997). The aid industry is therefore enrolled to help poor people 
to trade their way out of poverty. The key avenue by which this is pursued is through 
private sector oriented projects, in a range of industries but especially in agriculture, 
in which the majority of the world’s poor work.  
Private sector oriented agricultural development is not a new phenomenon. 
The past 50 years of development history have seen various approaches, models and 
formulations of how to incorporate poor people into commodity relations. 
                                                           
1 The faith that people can trade their way out of poverty is epitomised by a 2007 New York Times article which 
details a fair trade project said to enable women to trade their way out of war zones (Tzemach 2007). 
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Agricultural value chain development represents the latest manifestation of such 
attempts. A growing proportion of agriculture allocated donor budgets are currently 
apportioned to value chain development efforts. In 2008, the head of a rural 
development department of a large bilateral development agency informed me that 
bilateral aid allocations to agricultural value chain development for that year alone 
were approximately US$800 million.2 Accompanying these funds is a large and 
growing body of development literature: ‘best practice’ manuals, handbooks, and 
guides (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000; Keane 2008; M4P 2008). 
The relative novelty of agricultural value chain development means that 
such interventions warrant serious and considered investigation. Like any 
development intervention, value chain development efforts contain inherent 
assumptions about the structure of the economy, government and society. These 
assumptions inform the various ways in which problems are identified and solutions 
formulated, beneficiaries identified and interacted with, projects structured and 
supporters enrolled. Thus, the central question of this thesis is:  
- How do agricultural development projects construct and reconstruct new and 
existing commodity chains in order to assist people to trade their way out of 
poverty? 
From this question several others flow:  
- How are such commodity chains integrated into wider rural to urban, regional 
and/or global trading structures?  
                                                           
2 Personal communication 22 April 2008 
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- Who is involved and who benefits? 
- What are the characteristics of such links? 
- Are these links sustained, transformed or abandoned and, if so, how and why? 
These research questions are relevant to broader issues pertaining to the 
‘development impasse’ (Schuurman 1993). For some time there has been a growing 
and widely recognised rift between development theory and practice; between 
development critics who charge that positivist and managerial approaches to 
development problems fail to address the historical and structural underpinnings of 
uneven growth and under-development and those that cite examples of local agency, 
empowerment and participation under the guidance of development assistance. This 
structure/agency dichotomy is unnecessary and constructed: agents and their 
structures are of course mutually constitutive.  
Global commodity chain analysis presents a theoretical escape from the 
development impasse, as it addresses equally both issues of structure and agency for 
poor producers. Taking the insights of global commodity chain analysis, value chain 
development has fast become the new orthodoxy in rural development and fits well 
within current trends in international agro-food structures and pro-poor discourses. 
However, agricultural value chain interventions to assist the poor trade their way out 
of poverty necessarily involve the aid industry.  In the logic of pro-poor development 
through value chains, aid should work to reduce inequality of access to specialisation 
in production and trade.  But the aid industry functions with its own logic and 
incentives. In short, commodity chain development cannot be viewed separately 
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from the aid chains which are enrolled to construct new trade linkages. Aid and trade 
come together in private sector-led value chain projects and at their core blur the 
lines between gifts and commodities.  There are obvious parallels to be drawn 
between aid and gifts, commodities and trade. However, what I would like to 
highlight in this thesis is how both aid and trade involve a combination of both gifts 
and commodities. The aid industry, as an industry, involves the production and sale 
of commodities such as consultancy reports as well as the provision of gifts and/or 
subsidies3 and likewise trade may be entwined with gift relations which initiate 
commodity exchange. We need to understand not just commodity relations in the 
construction of commodity chains but also gift relations and the way in which both 
forms of exchange are frequently intertwined in the pursuit of pro-poor development.  
The core contribution of my thesis to the study of pro-poor development is 
that the development impasse is predicated not just on constructed fissures between 
structure and agency but also an unnecessary and false split between gifts and 
commodities. Although commodity chain interventions present a convenient escape 
from the conundrums associated with the constructed binary of structure and agency, 
they do not address the inherently dualistic thinking between aid and the private 
sector –– gifts and commodities. Rather, there is a general tendency to privilege the 
‘natural’ structural functioning of markets over what is perceived as the perverse, 
personal incentives associated with aid. There remains a strong belief among many 
                                                           
3 Although official development assistance (ODA) often involves a combination of loans and grants, the majority 
of ODA to least developing countries is provided in the form of grants. As such this thesis parallels aid with gift 
giving to some degree. For further discussion on the gift-like dimensions of foreign aid in development 
interventions see Hattori (2001; 2003).  
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development practitioners that trade can and must be disembedded from its social 
mores in order to deliver freedom from poverty. My argument is that development 
relations, especially pro-poor interventions inevitably combine gifts and commodities 
and that attempts to separate them are fraught with contradictions. As the giving and 
receiving of gifts are often anxiety-ridden social performances imbued with 
underlying tensions of obligation and expectation, much of the construction of 
commodity chains within developing countries via gift-like aid relations is also 
inescapably imbued with such tensions.   
In seeking to understand existing and transformed commodity production 
and trade structures and those that attempt to construct, transform and resist them, 
this research sets out to trace such interventions from their institutional inception 
within the aid industry, along the aid chain, towards commodity production, 
marketing and final consumers. In simultaneously addressing the stream of activities, 
actors, structures and institutions involved along the ‘aid chain’ and towards the 
‘commodity chain’, this study throws light on the false binary of gift versus 
commodity inherent in private sector development approaches. 
Fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in Cambodia, which is a particularly 
apt location for such investigations, given its recent rapid economic growth, 
flourishing trade, high rates of rural poverty, long history of foreign intervention and 
recent intensive ‘development’ experience. Within the United Nations’ system of 
development categorisation, Cambodia falls within the unfortunate category of Least 
Developed Country (LDC) in a region well known for its economic growth and 
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prosperity. It is highly aid dependent country, with aid accounting for half the 
national budget (DAC 2008). This dependency, however, belies recent years of high 
economic growth rates, consolidating power among Cambodia’s ruling political 
party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), and ever-increasing aid efforts towards 
private sector development, specifically in trade facilitation and value chain 
interventions. What is clearly notable to anyone who has spent time in the country, is 
the distinctive blurring between the three different institutional structures that govern 
Cambodia’s political economy: government, aid and business. These institutional 
forms embody the three modes of organisational power posited by Uphoff (1993: 
611): political power based on coercion, normative power based on gift/aid relations 
and remunerative power based on commodity relations. In private sector oriented 
development conducted by aid agencies and sanctioned by government elites, 
idealised institutional modes are often fused within the everyday activities of 
commodity chain construction. Local elites are enrolled via aid activities to translate 
and mediate resource flows to the private sector while simultaneously capturing 
proportions of it. Elite capture further reinforces their capacity to dominate patronage 
networks and commodity chains. Thus the downward flow of aid assistance towards 
private sector producers is redirected up in tribute systems where material goods 
flow upwards in exchange for elite patronage and protection. This leads to a blurring 
of organisational power which is evident throughout the country’s fraught political 
history, with ongoing tensions between relations of trade and tribute, gifts and 
commodities and foreign intervention.   
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The Case Studies 
This thesis examines four private sector oriented agricultural development projects 
which aimed to assist poor farmers to trade their way out of poverty. The case studies 
–– rice seed, organic rice, vegetables and chilli sauce –– each represent different 
donor approaches to poverty alleviation through agricultural development and trade. 
Hence they denote different conceptions of poverty and of the development problem 
itself. The first, rice seed, focuses on Australian bilateral aid attempts to improve the 
volume and quality of a conventional large-scale grain crop. Through improved input 
supply via the creation of private sector rice seed companies, this project proceeded 
from the logic that in order to trade, one must have something worth trading. The one 
thing that the majority of Cambodia’s rural poor do produce is rice. However, as a 
primarily subsistence crop this rice is often not of export quality. Quality of 
production depends on quality inputs. The donor advocated the establishment of 
commercial rice seed companies, as the most efficient and sustainable way to provide 
high quality inputs over the long term. This case study therefore details development 
attempts to commoditise the input supply chain of rice seed and construct national 
seed markets to improve the quality of Cambodian rice, thus building up national rice 
exports. This case study highlights two issues. The first is that reliance on the private 
sector for rice seed distribution results in uneven access to improved rice seed. The 
second is that gift relations of development aid shapes the way in which commodity 
exchange of seed takes place. This points to the impossibility of disembedding 
commodity relations from social relations.   
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The second case study stands in contrast to efforts made at bolstering 
widespread development through conventional trade in conventional grain markets. 
Instead it investigates the coordinated attempts of international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and bilateral donors working in partnership with a local rural 
cooperative to export ‘organic’ rice to high value European and North American fair 
trade and organic markets. The emergence of organic and fair trade supply chains to 
so called ‘ethical’ markets in the developed West reflects a counter discourse to that 
of orthodox large-scale development. From this perspective conventional trade is 
proposed as inherently unfair given current global trading structures. By this 
reasoning, the poor cannot trade their way out of poverty under current trade regimes 
that are rigged in favour of multinational companies and First World farmers. 
Furthermore, attempts to compete in such markets tend to favour large-scale 
industrial farming that leave Third World communities vulnerable to social 
debasement and environmental destruction. As such, organic and fair trade projects 
seek to counter this perceived structural inequity through constructing new 
commodity chains among what is termed Alternative Trade Organisations (ATOs). 
These new constructed chains are more than material commodity chains: they reflect 
distinct ideological discourses regarding how best to achieve sustainable 
development and fulfil the elusive ‘triple bottom line’ of environmental, social and 
economic sustainability. Findings from this case study illustrate that gift exchange 
through development projects is needed to sustain ethical commodity exchange and 
that ethical commodity exchange, in turn, helps bolster aid agency claims to 
sustainability. Development charity is required to construct and often continuously 
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support ethical commodity exchange, especially given quality and labelling 
requirements. However, the very presence of ethical commodities for sale bolsters 
the public relations of the charity with which the product is associated (and often 
branded with) thus serving to ensure ongoing public donations to these organisations. 
In ethical markets gifts and commodities are fused, often with varying effects in the 
pursuit of pro-poor development.  
In the third case study, diversification is posed as the solution to the 
conundrum of poverty and agricultural development. Reliance on a single low value 
crop exposes farmers to high risks of crop failure, market volatility and 
environmental pressure through mono cropping. In contrast, diversification into 
alternative crops, it is proposed, can assist farmers and specifically women, to escape 
the ‘poverty trap’ through the cultivation of higher value crops that spread risk and 
provide a livelihood fallback. Diversification is posed as a solution to environmental 
degradation and food insecurity by encouraging agro-ecological diversity and 
improving the dietary diversity of farmers. At the national level, diversification is 
often noted as a smallholder-friendly, gender sensitive path towards economic 
development, through strengthening small-scale production, trade and local markets 
(Ali 2007; Ali 2008; Bahattacharjee 2006; Ellis and Mdoe 2002; Gari and FAO 
2003). This chapter is comprised of two development projects aimed at improving 
vegetable production and marketing as a means towards livelihood diversification 
among disadvantaged rural women. This chapter demonstrates that diversification 
efforts may be diminished by the aid industry’s propensity to co-opt the vegetable 
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trade from primarily female traders in the name of pro-poor development. For 
countries such as Cambodia, where women often dominate petty commodity 
exchange, their livelihoods may be jeopardised by the need for development agencies 
to ‘construct’ women as poor vegetable producers in order to justify pro-poor giving. 
This demonstrates that pro-poor development efforts may be overwhelmed not by the 
logic of commodity exchange but by the logic of aid relations.  
Value-added processing represents the fourth and final donor approach used 
as a case study for this thesis. An often stated reason for Third World rural poverty is 
the persistence of neo-colonial trade relations whereby low cost raw materials are 
sourced and exported from poor countries to rich countries, where they are then 
transformed into higher value processed goods. Typically processors and retailers in 
developed countries retain the highest proportion of final consumer prices while 
Third World countries and producers are locked out of high value segments of agri-
business chains and entrenched in low value production, receiving a small portion of 
the final consumer price. Value-adding through in-country processing is a strategy 
engaged to shift value-added production from wealthier industrial countries to poorer 
primary commodity producing countries thereby enabling poorer countries to retain a 
higher proportion of the final consumer price. This case study examines efforts by a 
donor to ‘construct’ business leaders thought to be essential for value chain 
construction and coordination. Here past successful aid recipients were identified as 
champions of commodity chain construction, essential to lifting their poor, 
disorganised suppliers out of poverty. Building upon past aid relations to 
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beneficiaries, new ‘entrepreneurs’ were ‘constructed’ resulting in an uneven 
economic landscape shaped as much by patterns of aid interventions as by the market 
itself. 
The construction and reconstruction of new and existing commodity chains 
in private sector oriented development projects proceeds from a range of different 
ways of thinking about the nature of poverty, trade and required charitable actions. 
The case studies presented in this thesis demonstrate the different ways that ideas 
about gifts and commodities combine to varied effect in development projects. For 
example, the assumption may be made that people are simply trapped in the inherent 
material poverty of gift-oriented societies, and that commodity exchange simply does 
not exist. In such cases, commodity chains are usually constructed from scratch, 
beginning with charitable transfer of appropriate technology to enable production. 
Another common conception is that although commodity exchange does 
exist, the nature of this exchange is inherently exploitative and therefore must be 
transformed towards a more compassionate or benevolent form of alternative trade. 
Within alternative trade, the donations of aid organisations (gifts) give greater 
credence to ethical commodities, while the sale of commodities tends to lend greater 
legitimacy to gift giving as ultimately sustainable. Thus the lines between 
commodities and gifts are purposely blurred under principles of fairness and 
sustainability.  
Yet another understanding of what it takes to deliver pro-poor growth is that 
assisting people to trade out of poverty must not ignore the dynamics of gender. As 
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women comprise a disproportionate number of the poor, efforts to assist women 
directly are viewed as essential to ensure that interventions are truly ‘pro-poor’. 
Thus, commodity chains may be built with the explicit purpose of gender-driven pro-
poor development, often through efforts to link women to markets. However, 
markets themselves may be viewed as dysfunctional due to a lack of business 
leadership. The construction of business-leaders may be advocated to produce 
‘champions’ of commodity chains robust enough to lift their poor and disorganised 
suppliers out of poverty.  
The above approaches are just some of the ways in which assistance to the 
construction or reconstruction of commodity chains may take place. In each case, 
different conceptions of the problem with the market justify different forms of 
giving. In each case, social objectives are used to justify support and resources from 
the aid industry towards building the private sector in agriculture. However, the 
support and resources available from the aid sector often far outweigh profits 
available in the agricultural sector. So while aid efforts may strengthen commodity 
production they may also perpetuate forms of giving. Key beneficiaries may be 
highly reluctant to re-orient themselves entirely away from gift relations and towards 
commodity relations.  
Constructed commodity chains may be integrated into wider rural to urban, 
regional and/or global trading structures through donor facilitation. There is a marked 
tendency by donors to preference one-way export to global markets above regional 
trade relations. Despite the fact that donors typically advocate free trade, imports are 
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frequently seen as undesirable and a threat to developing country production rather 
than complementary to it. Depending on the donor and the approach taken, trade at 
different scales (local, regional, global) may be conflated with greater poverty 
alleviation. Typically, access to donor markets is championed as pro-poor over and 
above trade relations with other countries.  
The basic public narrative of development aid found in the media is simply 
that poor people in need are given things by western donors or helped in responsible 
ways resulting in improved lives and livelihoods. While this is sometimes the case, 
such narratives conceal the complex chain of activities and actors involved in 
mediating aid flows. Development assistance requires sustained mediation and 
interpretation of its objectives. The main beneficiaries from donor attempts at value 
chain construction are foremost those relied upon to mediate this information from 
the primary donor down. The implementing aid agencies themselves and their 
consultants typically benefit the most by way of contracts, salaries and other work 
related benefits. Expatriate consultants, local NGOs and local elites are also 
important to translating how aid should be used by target beneficiaries.  
Given the reliance on expatriate consultants and local elites to translate 
donor objectives on the ground, constructed or reconstructed commodity chains tend 
to be negotiated and settled among elites. Much background work is completed in 
English to ensure accountability back to donors. Donor interventions in commodity 
chain construction tend to be sustained only if such interventions work closely with 
existing agents and structures of existing commodity chains. If this is not the case, 
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newly constructed chains tend to be sustained through additional aid flows. However, 
given donor sensitivity surrounding the creation of dependency, the nature of 
commodity chain interventions may be reconfigured to reduce the appearance of aid 
dependency.  
The history of development attests to such reconfigurations. It was 
serendipitous that my research path for each of these case studies closely mirrors the 
chronology of development trends since development was first ‘invented’ under what 
has come to be known as the global poverty construct (Rahnema 1992). Since 
President Truman’s inaugural speech, which fundamentally redefined the previously 
colonial world, into a new world divided along the lines of wealth and poverty, 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ (Escobar 1991), the practice of development 
assistance has been endlessly reconfigured. Similar to the rice seed case study 
project, initial development efforts of the 1950s proffered development via ‘top 
down’, scientific and decidedly modernist approaches of technological transfer from 
one government to another. The formation of cooperatives (such as the one engaged 
in organic rice production) to collectively produce and market agricultural outputs 
marked another turn in development thinking from state-centric approaches towards 
‘bottom-up’ farmer empowerment. The acknowledgement in the 1970s of basic 
needs and food security, led to further consideration of farmer livelihoods and the 
push for diversification. What has come to be known as the ‘lost decade’ for 
development, the 1980s era of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), increased the 
focus on private sector initiatives, specifically small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
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as engines of economic renewal through their potential to add value to rural 
agricultural outputs. Finally, the recent emergence of the new globalised agro-food 
systems has turned attention to agricultural value chain development, a 
methodological approach that many of the aforementioned case study projects turned 
to pursue. Such frequent changes in the way in which poverty is to be addressed 
speaks as much of gift relations of aid as it does to changing economic structures.  
Methodology  
I spent three years living and working in Cambodia. Formal fieldwork was 
undertaken over an 18 month period in several provinces. The main fieldwork 
provinces were Prey Veng, Pursat, Siem Reap and Phnom Penh. However, smaller 
side trips accompanying project consultants were taken to Takeo, Kampong Thom, 
Kratie, and Sihanoukville. Fieldwork efforts aimed to investigate three chains 
involved in each of the case studies outlined above. These were: the aid chain; the 
existing commodity chain; and the imagined/reconstructed agricultural commodity 
chain aimed to assist people trade their way out of poverty. Figure 1.1 gives an 
outline of these three chains.  
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Figure 1.1: Basic schematic of aid/ commodity chain methodology 
 
Source: Author. 
 
For each case study, I usually proceeded from the basis of gaining 
permission from donors to study one of their projects. For the first case study, rice 
seed, access to studying this project proved difficult. Although access was pre-
arranged between my university and the aid contractor based in Melbourne, in-
country consultants and project staff required further convincing. I undertook a pro-
bono research project with a volunteer staff member aimed at comparing the 
differential impact of the project between farmers who purchased improved seed and 
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those who did not (see Long et al. 2005). This began with on-farm surveys and 
interviews with project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Further interviews were 
conducted along the supply chain, with rice seed growers, rice seed sellers, and rice 
seed swappers, rice millers, traders and retailers. This was written up as a report for 
the project and served as the core component of data collection for this case study.  
For organic rice a similar path was followed. Through networking and 
attending different workshops, I met donor staff who agreed to let me study their 
project. In return I conducted a small study on the impact of organic rice, comparing 
farmers involved in the project and those who were not. A report was produced from 
my findings (Thavat 2006). Data from this report inform much of chapter five. 
Conducting research on this project allowed for participant observation of the 
different donors as well as the local cooperative involved as to how the project and 
new trade links were negotiated.  
Research into fresh vegetables was a far more informal process. Before I 
commenced PhD research, I had worked with a small local NGO aimed at assisting 
disadvantaged households in growing and marketing vegetables within the Siem 
Reap area. Participant observation was carried out at this time. Later I returned to the 
project to interview participants more formally. Researching the rice seed project also 
allowed access to the vegetable component of the same project. Consequently, the 
vegetable case study comprised two different projects. The research approach here 
tended towards semi-structured interviews, surveys, secondary data collection and 
analysis and attendance at project workshops and meetings. 
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For the final case study, rural agri-business, my work as a short-term 
consultant for the project presented me with the opportunity to conduct close-up 
participant observation during the formation and design of a project. Detailed 
accounts of key strategic meetings form a key segment of aid chain research. 
Research into commodity chains for vegetables and chilli sauce involved interviews 
with individual entrepreneurs who sourced a diverse range of ingredients from both 
local and imported sources. Interviews were extended to key commodity suppliers 
along the supply chain for the main ingredients.  
Throughout field research the key aim was to understand not only the 
dynamics of each aid and commodity chain but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
to understand holistically how each chain operated and influenced the other, through 
processes of negotiation, transformation, resistance and/or abandonment. That is to 
say, how efforts to rationalise and improve commodity chains were intentionally or 
unintentionally influenced by aid chains, and how the logic of commodity relations 
and private sector development impacted upon the outcomes of aid chains. Wherever 
possible, I also conducted supplementary interviews with key informants from 
different sectors of aid, government and the private sector to provide greater 
contextual background.  
The process of studying existing and constructed commodity chains was 
necessarily an evolving process. When I began fieldwork in 2005, I started with 
semi-structured interviews, to help me ascertain the basic issues at hand and how to 
approach research of this manner. After a short time, however, frustration set in with 
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the feeling that participants were working to politically scripted answers which 
glowingly reported on benefits of the aid project in question. My association with aid 
projects, while useful for gaining access to aid chain actors, necessarily cast me 
within the world of foreign aid, money and resources and therefore evoked more 
gratitude than honest answers. Over time, and as my experience in the field 
accumulated, gentle criticisms of projects were more forthcoming. Nonetheless, 
escaping the hierarchy of Cambodian social relations as a foreigner and outsider is a 
largely futile pursuit. Consequently, I decided to focus research among farmers and 
local traders mainly on tangible and measurable questions related to commodity 
production and marketing, while pursuing participant observation and ethnographic 
research among aid chain actors.  That is to say my research among farmers and 
traders was distinctly positivist, which helped me to conduct ethnographic research 
among aid workers.  
Conducting positivist research among target beneficiaries, farmers and 
traders, bestowed greater legitimacy upon my research in the eyes of in-country 
consultants and project staff, many of whom displayed a degree of suspicion and 
hostility against research into the functioning of the aid chain in question. This was a 
persistent issue throughout fieldwork. Although much of the multi-scaled analysis 
contained within this thesis is fulfilled through locating processes within wider 
global forces described within academic literature, the term ‘multi-scaled’ in this 
work also refers to different levels of power and authority up and down commodity 
and aid chains. The process of simultaneously studying up and down both aid and 
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commodity chains is socially awkward. The general and persistent distrust of 
academia that I encountered among older aid professionals meant that many of the 
key informants for this research were usually younger, recently university graduated 
women working within the projects at entry level or in volunteer positions. Similarly, 
research access among wealthier and more powerful members in commodity chains 
proved as a general rule harder to obtain. Although interviews were completed, there 
was a noticeable disinterest and reluctance to participate. This contrasted with the 
eagerness of farmers to provide me with information, often in the hope of gaining 
some aid assistance. Traders, millers and other supply chain participants above that 
of primary production were generally less available and unconvinced that 
participation could result in any tangible benefits to them. This seemed to correlate 
with wealth levels. Traversing the conceptual divide between aid chains and 
commodity chains within this research was consequently much easier when directed 
‘downward’ in chain hierarchies rather than ‘upward’, whether operating under gift 
or commodity relations.  
This, of course, has implications for those seeking to intervene in 
commodity chains to assist poor people to trade their way out of poverty. A key 
precept of value chain interventions is that efforts should not be restricted to the 
delivery of technical assistance but work towards the transformation of relationships 
along the commodity chain, especially focusing on unfair power structures that 
inhibit poor producers from taking advantage of newly arising trade opportunities. 
Understanding power relations is not just a question of understanding who has 
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economic primacy, but also who has moral primacy brought about through gift 
relations. This is especially the case in developing countries. We need to understand 
gift relations as well as commodity relations if we are to address pro-poor 
development.  
 Chapter Two 
 
Aiding Trade: Gift and Commodity Relations in 
Value Chain Development Interventions 
 
The development impasse is predicated on a false split between gifts and 
commodities. While methodologies and analysis such as global commodity chain 
analysis reconcile the structure/agency problems often associated with the 
development impasse, the impasse continues. This is because ‘chain-like’ approaches 
address the scale and not the full scope of relations enrolled in development efforts. 
Commodity chain analysis is limited to examinations of market interactions and not 
the full range of attendant relations inherent in any development undertaking, 
especially gift relations.    
Gifts and commodities are deeply intertwined and this is illustrated by 
agricultural sectors around the world which function according to a range of formal 
and informal support mechanisms to enable the production of commodities. Gifts and 
commodities are even more combined in the agricultural sectors of Southeast Asia, 
often noted for their patron-client relations and a symbiosis between market and non-
market structures. It therefore stands to reason that any attempt to separate gift and 
commodity relations in agricultural value chain development interventions 
undertaken by aid agencies in Southeast Asia is unlikely to succeed and will probably 
blur these lines further. However enforcing a strong divide between these two 
relations is what private sector approaches such as commodity or value chain 
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development attempt to do. Thus the development impasse is reproduced and 
schisms deepened.  
This chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding 
agricultural value chain interventions as conducted by development aid agencies. 
Drawing on several bodies of literature including global commodity chain analysis, 
studies of agrarian change, actor-network theory and institutional economics of aid 
and gift/commodity debates, key idea from each are highlighted and discussed in 
relation to the other. Firstly, global commodity chain analysis presages that the 
disparate approaches of dependency theory and neo-classical economics can be 
brought together and studied under the political economy view of commodity chain 
analysis which above all emphasises the role of power in determining the structure of 
a chain and therefore the behaviour of individual nodes. However, numerous studies 
of agrarian change which incorporate complex whole society views, including but 
not limited to patterns of migration, urban rural interactions, uneven rural ecological 
landscapes and uneven development patterns point to the fact that much wider 
factors beyond the scope of market interactions shape the construction of commodity 
chains. As such, actor network theory is discussed as a better approach than global 
commodity chain analysis as takes account of the range of consensus building 
activities among different stakeholders that must take place in order sustain 
commodity flows. The institutional economics of aid emphasises the roles of the aid 
industry in consensus building around development interventions. As such, 
understanding of gift/commodity debates are essential to understanding how 
development agencies try to construct and reconstruct new and existing commodity 
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chains. Much of the literature on gift theory emphasises the role of the gift in 
building and maintaining social relationships, which are essential to ensure the 
ongoing production of agricultural products often in high uncertain markets and 
environments where production may extend beyond the rationality of the market. 
Gift and commodity theories are the final section covered in this chapter, concluding 
with remarks on how both forms of exchange relations are necessarily combined in 
the construction of commodity chains by aid agencies.   
The Development Impasse 
Can the poor really trade their way out of poverty? This chapter addresses long-
standing debates surrounding this question. Within existing development literature 
the answer you get to this question usually depends on whom you ask. Political 
economists tend to answer ‘no’ given the dependence of Third World farmers on 
primary commodities which are systematically subjugated to the global market place 
and the developed world via export to notoriously volatile global commodity 
markets. Writers such as Bello (1999), McMichael (2000), Wallerstein (1974) and 
Frank (1969) draw attention to a number of structural inequities in the global market. 
These include: First World agricultural subsidies which undermine global prices and 
compromise the viability of Third World food security and peasant farmer 
livelihoods; declining terms of trade for agricultural commodities; debt and debt 
bailout schemes which enforce market liberalisation and structural adjustment 
programs; unfair tariff structures; and the freedom and flexibility of global 
commodity traders who are able to source commodities globally vis a vis 
geographically fixed farmers unable to solicit the highest price for their produce. 
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 Post-development theorists argue that although trading out of poverty is 
possible for at least some people, they also simultaneously note the ruinous impacts 
of the ‘development’ discourse as one that systematically devalues local cultures, 
social, political and economic structures and ecology. It is therefore argued that 
‘development’ places the ‘local’ at the disposal of the destructive forces of modern 
markets and predatory bureaucratic power. Post-development writers such as Escobar 
(1995), Ferguson (1994) and Crush (1995) point out the socially constructed nature 
of trade and development. In their analyses, the unequal outcomes of trade lie not in 
planned design, but rather the ‘instrument effects’ or unintended consequences of 
hegemonic discourses, which inevitably work to reconstruct less ‘developed’ 
societies towards ideals of modernity. Structural transformation and reproduction is, 
in this sense, an authorless strategy that simply follows a well-trodden path of ideals 
leading to ideals in a chain of rationalities that ultimately appears strikingly similar to 
those economic, political, social and cultural conditions prevailing in the West. At the 
extreme end, critical post-development perspectives can perhaps be summarised in a 
quote from Vanada Shiva; “the paradox of development arises from the mistaken 
identification of the culturally perceived poverty of earth-centred economies with the 
real material deprivation that occurs in market-centred economies, and the mistaken 
identification of the growth of commodity production with providing better human 
sustenance for all” (in McMichael 2000: 29). From Shiva’s perspective poverty does 
not result from subsistence livelihoods; this is merely a culturally constructed 
illusion. Rather, Shiva infers that, left to their own devices, subsistence societies are 
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socially egalitarian and environmentally benign, thereby setting up a case for 
mistaken identity on behalf of ignorant western observers.  
A key criticism of the work of post-development theorists and political 
economists has been the degree to which their studies present modernity, 
development and trade as an all encompassing and overwhelming process with a 
tendency to ignore agency. Writers such as Rigg (1997), Green (2000), and Scott 
(1976; 1977; 1985; 1998) have been critical of ‘post-development’ thinking, which 
presents no destiny other than that of ‘victim’ of development, and ever-blundering 
western thinking. Such perspectives ignore the regional and local subjectivities that 
emerge when modernity discourses encounter local social realities. These writers 
instead choose to highlight the variety of ways that local actors resist, navigate 
and/or negotiate the opportunities and dangers arising from newly penetrating global 
markets. Emphasised in much of this work is the ability of local actors to negotiate, 
control and transform processes of globalisation, foreign aid and trade to assist in 
their struggle towards improved incomes. Indeed, such writers tend to attribute the 
failure of development projects to their inherent inability to grapple with the diverse 
array of local agents and the complex social, environmental, economic and cultural 
systems which they inhabit. In this view, it is the fundamental and persistent misfit 
between inappropriately designed development projects and local cultures that 
accounts for high rates of project failure.  
Nonetheless, practitioners of development invariably answer ‘yes’, it is 
possible to trade out of poverty given the application of methods of participation and 
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empowerment of the poor. They argue that people’s lives and livelihoods can 
ultimately be improved given the appropriate approach. Such approaches may range 
from basic input provision, to incorporation into ethical niche markets, assistance 
with diversification or value adding. A range of alternative development projects 
have emerged that aim to address concerns regarding traditional development 
projects (so called ‘top-down’, ‘donor-driven’ development aid) through, in the 
words of Chambers (1997), placing people before things. Such projects aim to 
reconfigure development critiques of the market from one of free trade and 
hegemonic globalism to one of pro-poor, micro-scaled solutions. The much lauded 
micro-centric and participatory projects of fair trade, micro-enterprise, micro-credit 
and community development can be read, not only as a response to top-down, one-
size-fits-all projects, but also a reconsideration and renegotiation of market relations. 
Such projects do not champion disengagement from the market; rather they 
incorporate the aspirational ideals of those seeking to improve their standard of 
living through constructing alternative paths to market engagement. While the 
criticisms of participatory and micro-scaled projects are too numerous to mention 
here, suffice to say that the majority of them often point to the failure of participatory 
and micro-centric approaches to acknowledge the broader structural and institutional 
constraints that ensure the continued impoverishment of rural communities in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Crush 1995; van Ufford 1988; 
Arce and Long 1993). 
It has been widely acknowledged by writers such as Rigg (1997), Booth 
(1993), Schuurman (1993), Edwards (1989) and Porter et al. (1991) that development 
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debates have reached an impasse. These debates are often fraught with ideological 
and perspective-based struggles that swing predictably back and forth between scales 
of analysis that either privilege agency or structure and assess development as 
essentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Ferguson 1994). As a result, development debates have 
not only become simply boring, they also threaten to paralyse the reflexive progress 
of both theory and practice. The divide between development theory and practice is, 
according to Rigg (1997: 240), constructed and unnecessary. He states that the: 
victim-actor distinction can be explained in terms of the differing viewpoints…of each 
author: the work of those who see people as actors is often firmly based on, and 
informed by, village level research; [while] those who subscribe to the victim 
perspective tend to adopt a more structuralist stance, beginning from a macro or global 
[perspective], using this to explain local level processes…although this difference in 
view is conceptually quite fundamental in practical terms the distinction is often rather 
less marked. Both sets of authors will tend to agree that the wider economy and state act 
as facilitators or enablers in rural change and they will both also tend to accept that 
farmers do have choices and are not constrained to a single strategy dictated by outside 
events, forces and actors, the difference is one of perspective and to some extent 
ideology.  
He further points out that much of this divide is a problem of perspective and 
ideology which stems to a large degree from the politics of scales of analysis. What 
is visible at one scale may be indistinct at another. Therefore, any preference of one 
scale over another can easily over-determine the existence of an issue, its causality, 
and means for resolution. As we shall see, global commodity chain analysis presents 
a useful escape from the politics of scale especially in trade and development 
debates. However, commodity chain analysis is limited in its insight, given its sole 
focus on market transactions and its inability to theorise on the full range of social 
relations that comprise commodity chain construction, such as gift relations.  
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Beyond the Development Impasse and the Politics of Scale 
How can micro and macro perspectives be better incorporated into fields of study in 
such a way that acknowledges their inter-connectedness? While many aid projects 
may be geared towards constructing new trade links, such links must be maintained 
and sustained by local people. Clearly what is needed is a shift away from 
perspective-based research and a move towards empirical investigation that takes 
account of multiple positions and multiple scales of analysis.  
The multi-scaled and multi-sited method of global commodity chain 
analysis provides a path out of the development impasse. Global commodity chain 
analysis is primarily a heuristic tool for analysing commodity trade networks. Gereffi 
(1994: 2) describes commodity chains as: 
sets of inter-organisational network clusters around one commodity or product, linking 
households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world economy. These 
networks are situationally specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, 
underscoring the social embeddedness of economic organisation...Specific processes or 
segments within a commodity chain can be represented as boxes or nodes, linked 
together in networks. Each successive node within a commodity chain involves the 
acquisition and/or organisation of inputs (e.g. raw materials), labour power (and its 
provisionings), transportation, distribution (via markets or transfers) and consumption  
There are four main dimensions to a commodity chain: the input-output structure in 
the chain; the territory covered; its governance structure (authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain); and the institutional framework, which identifies 
how local, national and international conditions and policies shape global processes 
at each stage in the chain (Raikes et al. 2000: 3; Gereffi 1994: 96–7). Global 
commodity chain analysis emphasises networks and relationships, linking agency 
and structure in such a way that acknowledges their interdependence. As such, global 
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commodity chain analysis is useful as it represents a shift away from the long-
standing and diametrically opposed economic development approaches of neo-
classical economics and structuralist theories such as world systems theory and 
dependency theory (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1969). According to Henderson et al. 
(2001: 3) both of these types of economic analysis have been, “bedevilled by a series 
of analytical disjunctures that have resulted in work at either macro or meso levels of 
abstraction or, where empirical investigations have probed micro-level processes, the 
larger analytical picture has often been absent, merely implicit or at best weakly 
developed”. In asking the simple question, who controls trade and industry in a 
commodity chain and how it is that some agents come to be locked into lower-value 
segments of that chain, global commodity chain analysis is seen to solve this 
problem through disaggregating the chain of activities undertaken from producer to 
consumer, local to global, paying specific and even attention to local agents, 
governance structures and institutional frameworks.  
One of the clear benefits of commodity chain analysis is its ability to 
uncover and theorise on power relations. Power within a commodity chain is defined 
by profits and profits are defined by market access. Thus, particular nodes inhabiting 
positions of strategic market access within a commodity chain represent higher profit 
margins and therefore greater levels of strategic power. It is in these areas that power 
tends to accumulate. Raikes et al. (2000) argue that the central principle on which 
commodity chains are developed is the discipline imposed by complex webs of 
contracts and sub-contracts dominated by key agents inhabiting strategic nodes in a 
chain. As a result of its power focus, many commodity chain analysts consider 
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governance factors as the key determinant of the overall structure of a commodity 
chain. Gereffi (1994: 97) defines the governance structure as the “authority and 
power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain”. He distinguishes two main types of commodity 
chains: producer-driven commodity chains which are typical of capital- and 
technology-intensive industries and buyer-driven chains which are typical of labour-
intensive consumer goods such as garments and footwear and many agricultural 
products  (Humphery and Oetero 2000). 
Agricultural Value Chains and the New Rural Development Orthodoxy 
Gibbon (2001) further extends commodity chain analysis of agricultural sectors, and 
notes that most commodity chains here may be better understood as trader-driven 
chains. Factors that support trader-driven market structures include:  
––relatively low value-to-weight ratios, with labour-intensive direct raw material 
production functions and otherwise low barriers to entry to this function. 
–– a globally dispersed and locally discontinuous (including seasonal) supply patterns. 
This in turn implies major annual and seasonal variations in availability. 
–– strong tendencies towards market saturation bought about by a combination of partial 
substitution by ‘new’ agricultural or manufactured products, accelerated entry by new 
suppliers and low price-elasticity of demand. 
–– a final (or intermediate) demand side which is also either dispersed (e.g. cotton) or 
concentrated but segmented with respect to commodity variety (ibid.: 351).  
As a consequence of these factors, mobile traders, who are able to source 
commodities at numerous locations flexibly, are more likely to coordinate the 
efficient functioning of a chain. In this strategic position as supply-chain coordinator, 
traders can “institute measures which reduce costs and risks while increasing the 
speed and reliability of supply, which increases sales” (ibid.: 346). This ability is of 
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vital importance in low value commodity chains where profitability is based on 
volume rather than high margins, and supply is often seasonal while demand stays 
constant (ibid.: 351). Geographical coverage across a range of producers is therefore 
a necessity, and this tends towards a competitive advantage for those traders who can 
construct economics of scale, thereby leading to higher levels of concentration 
among traders.  
Overall, agricultural products and other labour intensive products exist in 
low value commodity chains and it is here where the poor tend to work. The World 
Bank (2008) reports that investments and interventions here are important and can 
help strengthen the position of the poor relative to other actors in the commodity 
chain and hence act to alleviate poverty. Thus, global commodity chain analysis as a 
field of study, has deeply influenced rural development studies, as scholarly 
reflection on the nature and power structures of commodity chains has helped to 
identify key constraints and barriers to smallholder agricultural development (Cook 
and Chaddad 2000).  
Commodity chain interventions have provided a sorely needed source of 
renewal for the stagnating subsector of rural development aid.4 Since the ‘golden 
years’ of the Green Revolution, agricultural development budgets have declined in 
favour of social spending on sectors such as health and education (DFID 2004). In 
total, multilateral and bilateral assistance to agriculture (expressed in 2002 prices) 
decreased from US$6.2 billion to US$2.3 billion between 1980 and 2002 (ibid.: 3). 
                                                           
4 Value chain development is not a new concept. Raikes et al (2000) explore the similarities of this concept with the French 
filiere system used during colonial rule to assist in export crop management.  
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However, recent years have witnessed a resurgence in agricultural development 
spending as new commodity chain approaches have helped to rebuke many of the 
standard criticisms once applied to traditional, ‘top-down’, rural development 
projects, exemplified by the Green Revolution. Green Revolution projects, usually 
based on agro-industrial packages of high yielding seed varieties, fertilisers, 
pesticides, irrigation systems, agricultural extension programs and mechanisation, 
stood accused of providing standardised ‘packages’ of inappropriate inputs requiring 
heavy capital investment on the part of the peasant farmer (Bray 1986). Although the 
Green Revolution was criticised for forcing a shift towards the commercialisation of 
agriculture and consequently the immiseration of poor peasants who needed to 
borrow in order to obtain the necessary capital, the outcomes of this approach were 
not as dire as many critics predicted (ibid.). Thus far, commodity chain interventions 
(often salubriously renamed value chain development) have largely escaped similar 
criticisms. Although this is probably due to their relative novelty in the field, it is also 
attributable to key tenets of value chain development best practice which advocate: 
insertion into high value markets; the empowerment of producers relative to other 
value chain actors; interventions tailored to specific products and services; 
attendance to the institutional frameworks and governance structures peculiar to a 
given value chain.  
The key question for value chain development is not whether smallholders 
should be inserted into the global market place but rather how they should be. The 
question of how is essentially a moral one. It is a question that leads to various 
conceptions of how best the market may be used to deliver pro-poor development. 
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Although the latest incantation of pro-poor development is agricultural value chain 
development, scholars of rural development and agro-industrialisation point out that 
value chain development itself is the outcome of uneven growth. 
Today fewer societies around the world today remain ‘untouched’ by global 
capitalism. Indeed, the past 50 years of trade and development history have 
fundamentally transformed many agricultural economies. This is acknowledged by 
one of the leading scholars of peasant studies, Bernstein (2003), who notes the ‘death 
of the peasantry’ due to the forces of globalisation. Bernstein further comments that 
peasantry is no longer a useful term (if it ever was), because almost all rural 
inhabitants today exist in a flux between rural and urban space, proletarianism and 
commodity production. However, differential access to opportunities within 
globalisation has led to increased inequality. It is this inequality that has largely 
driven specialisation through which value chains are constructed. Specialisation is 
largely the result of class formation among the ‘peasantry’, who according to 
Bernstein, lead increasingly tenuous livelihoods that can no longer sufficiently self-
sustain biological reproduction at the household level without some form of 
commodity production or off-farm linkage.  
Lenin’s class formation among the peasantry, who he identified as poor, 
middle and rich, is useful here. For the poorest members of agrarian societies, 
inability to meet the demands of simple biological or capital reproduction leads 
towards wage labour or proletarianism. Middle peasants are identified as those with 
the ability to meet reproduction, while rich ‘peasants’ are defined as those who can 
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not only meet those demands but expand, be it through land acquisition or 
diversification into other areas including trading, money-lending, retailing or 
providing other goods or services (Bernstein 2003: 6).  
It is this class distinction or unevenness, if you will, that Johnson and 
Berdegué (2004 in Marshall et al. 2006) attributes to the three main driving forces of 
agro-industrialisation and hence value chain construction. The income diversification 
of ‘rich’ peasants leads to a growing rural division of labour and specialisation as off-
farm opportunities linked to agriculture increase. These include opportunities in the 
areas of input supply, output processing, and surplus trading and marketing. This 
inevitably results in a supply chain that propels products from producers to 
consumers. The need to coordinate this supply chain –– to ensure timing and delivery 
–– is the second force of agro-industrialisation. Initially this stems from the demands 
associated with perishability; however, further compulsion arises from growing 
economies of scale and the need to manage market information. This, it is posited, 
leads to growing levels of integration among supply chain actors. The third factor 
involved in agro-industrialisation relates to changes in market structures, new 
technologies and products that require further more sophisticated integration (ibid.: 
2).   
In a comparative research literature review on agricultural development 
economics and agri-business studies, Cook and Chaddad (2000) point out that 
development economists tend to focus their attention on internal organisational 
strategies and designs within commodity chains as determinants of chain 
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development, while agri-business scholars place greater emphasis on changes driven 
by exogenous forces in markets and institutions. These are, of course, different sides 
of the same coin. Indeed, while agro-industrialisation may be driven by class 
distinctions and resultant specialisation, supply chain development is unlikely to 
occur in places where greater urban populations and increased demand for higher 
value or processed foods does not exist. In short, value chain development is the 
result of economic growth, but not necessarily the solution as to how to make this 
growth more even, and pro-poor. 
The Limitations of Commodity Chain Analysis and Construction 
Global commodity chain analysis necessarily engages a plurality of disciplines to 
understand the specificities of all dimensions of the commodity chain. These 
disciplines may include: geography, systems analysis, industrial organisation studies, 
institutional economics, management science and Marxist economics, as well as neo-
classical welfare analysis (Raikes et al. 2000). However, at the current time, global 
commodity chain analysis literature appears to lack anthropological or discourse 
analysis. Such approaches are very much needed to widen the applicability of global 
commodity chain analysis as a heuristic tool, and enhance understandings of socially 
embedded commodity chain processes. This lacuna is surprising given that the roots 
of commodity chain analysis lie in a long and illustrious heritage of anthropological 
thinkers on markets and commodities. Beginning with Smith (1759), Marx (1867) 
this heritage extends to include Polanyi (1944), Sahlins (1972), Braudel (1981), 
Granovetter (1985) to more recent writers including Ferguson (1994), Walker 
(1999), (Gudeman, 2001) and Benediktsson (2002). All of these writers emphasise 
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that markets are socially embedded and constructed. While time does not permit a 
full exploration of the works of these writers, it is useful to point out here that all 
have sought to place markets firmly within their social contexts reminding us that 
there is no such thing as relations between people and things, but rather things 
mediate relations between people (Ferguson 1994: 142). As such, any consideration 
of commodity relations must also consider other important forms of exchange which 
mediate relationships bearing on the outcomes of pro-poor development, such as gift 
exchange. Most people are involved in a range of networks of exchange entailing 
more than just commodity relations. Therefore a fuller examination of networks of 
exchange is required to understand how to achieve pro-poor development. 
The Asian region stands out as a testament to the fact that we cannot 
understand agriculture purely in commodity terms, but instead must examine the 
persistence of gift-like economies in which commodity production is embedded. The 
region attests to the fact that global commodity chains are not so easily constructed 
despite compelling economic pressures on farmers. As one of the few regions where 
smallholder farming has not been displaced en masse, despite past and present 
powerful exogenous forces of colonialism, neo-colonialism or economic 
globalisation, there is an undeniable persistence of subsistence-oriented smallholder 
farming and its attendant political and social structures of patron-client relations 
(Bernstein 2003). The Southeast Asian experience suggests that uneven commodity 
production makes gift economies more, not less, viable.  
Rigg (1997) contends that the persistence of smallholder farming, especially 
in Southeast Asia, does not imply the existence of autarchic rural communities 
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impoverished by their lack of access to modern markets, trade and development. 
Indeed, commercialisation in the form of production for the market, monetary 
exchange, sale and rent of land and migration for work all pre-date modernisation in 
the region. He argues (ibid.: 158) that the quintessential perception of Southeast Asia 
as deeply agrarian and comprised of villages of subsistence-oriented farming families 
toiling away in their paddy fields is wrong. Instead, the persistence of smallholder 
agrarian landscapes is inextricably tied to the rural sector’s interdependence on non-
farm economies, trade and urban linkages. He further argues (ibid.: 205) that a 
symbiosis exists between the non-market agricultural sector and the urban industrial 
sector, with subsistence-oriented agricultural production subsidising industrialisation 
through keeping labour costs low, while off-farm wage sources remitted to the rural 
sector help drive productivity investments in mechanisation, fertilisers, improved 
seeds and other labour-saving devices. Thus, while agricultural livelihoods may 
subsidise industry, likewise off-farm wages earned in the industrial sector bolster 
productivity and stabilise rural livelihoods (ibid.: 247). Such symbiosis between rural 
and urban, market and non-market sectors, are often played out at the household 
level between different generations. The young leave the farm to seek their fortunes 
elsewhere, while the old maintain the village base (Rigg 2006).  
This situation has led some to champion the smallholder farm as not only a 
key foundation of social stability under conditions of rapid and uneven economic 
growth, but also as an often-overlooked source of support for economic growth.  
While inequality may drive specialisation and hence value chain development, the 
reverse is also true: inequality of access to opportunities of globalisation, often 
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divided along the lines of class, gender and age may make subsistence-oriented 
farming livelihoods and their attendant social and political structures more, not less, 
viable.  
This viability is aided by the contention that small farms are often far more 
efficient and productive than large farms or plantations (Hazell et al. 2007), 
shattering the widely perceived association between large-scale agriculture, 
economic development and modernity. Instead, numerous studies find that where 
smallholders exist, they often possess inherent productivity advantages relative to 
large farms (Agrifood Consulting 2005: 27). Timmer writes that, 
rural households are often poor, but they are also efficient…Placing more resources at 
the disposal of carefully calculating households usually leads to increases in 
production…In virtually every developing country, an additional dollar of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) created in the agricultural sector has a significantly larger 
impact on the alleviation of poverty than the same dollar earned elsewhere in the 
economy (2001: 101-104).  
High smallholder productivity in Southeast Asia is largely attributable to the Green 
Revolution which despite the fears of its critics, has assisted large numbers of 
smallholders to achieve rice self-sufficiency. Indeed, the fear that the Green 
Revolution would impel the marginalisation of large swathes of rural masses has not 
overall materialised in Southeast Asia (Rigg 1997: 189). Nonetheless, the impact of 
the Green Revolution has tended to be uneven, regionally concentrated and 
incomplete (Goss and Burch 2001: 976). Ahmad and Isvilanonda (2003) demonstrate 
this through their analysis of two distinct regions of Thailand, the central plains and 
the northeast. According to these authors, agro-industrialisation in Thailand firstly 
means intensification of rice, followed by diversification out of rice (de-
intensification of rice). In their study, they find that efforts towards agro-
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industrialisation in rice intensification (northeast) and diversification (central plains) 
are constrained not by a lack of willingness to engage in productive investment or 
marketing, but by lack of access to production factors (irrigation, infrastructure and 
credit) in the northeast and marketing problems (central plains). Consequently, the 
relative advantage of small farms over large is only secured if factors associated with 
production and marketing are overcome. Often this advantage is compromised by a 
range of issues common to developing countries including irrigation, roads, 
communications, credit, input availability, marketing restrictions and unofficial costs 
(Agrifood Consulting 2005: 27). Furthermore, as the average land size of smallholder 
farms has continued to decline since the 1970s due to population growth, the need to 
ensure the competitive advantage of small farms in both productivity and marketing 
coordination is ever more pressing (Timmer 2004: 12). Thus, while Marshall et al. 
(2006) argue that specialisation drives agro-industrialisation, it may also be 
constrained by production and transaction costs specifically associated with 
smallholder farming. Such variable production environments and marketing 
networks can reinforce uneven development patterns, with agro-industrialisation 
occurring in some areas and not others.  
Timmer (2004) emphasises the role of the state in mediating or exacerbating 
such variables. The state may assist in constructing new commodity chains, but in 
doing so it usually sets up new gift-like relations of subsidies and protection to 
farmers. Timmer points out that many East Asian states have intervened in 
agriculture to ensure that the delicate balance between rural income and urban food 
security is met, which Timmer argues, is both politically expedient and conducive to 
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pro-poor growth. Historically, these states enacted policies that encouraged and 
incentivised increased rural production whilst ensuring that food prices were kept 
low enough for newly urban industrial workers. Koppel and James (in Rigg 1997: 
258) contrast this approach with Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Burma where agriculture has historically been exploited to finance 
rapid industrialisation. According to Bates (1981), low market values for agricultural 
commodities reflect low political commitment to rural smallholder constituents. In 
such cases rural/urban inequality may increase, leaving potential economic returns 
from agricultural development unrealised.  
When rural/urban inequalities become too great however, the case for 
greater agricultural protection is generally made. Thailand is often cited as a standout 
example of a country that has exploited agriculture in order to finance urban-biased 
industrialisation (Koppel and James in Rigg 1997: 258). Historically taxes on 
agriculture in Thailand depressed prices, especially for rice, keeping prices low in 
urban areas for low wageworkers. This, coupled with preferential resource allocation 
to urban industry, underwrote the extraction of resources from rural and agricultural 
areas to support urban/industrial development mainly to the benefit of politico-
bureaucrats, the military, and what Goss and Burch refer to as their Chinese business 
collaborators (Rigg 1997: 83; Goss and Burch 2001: 972). However, in recent 
decades much of Thailand’s agricultural sector has transformed from one of rice and 
cash crop monocultures for export towards a diversified agro-exporting country of 
highly processed, high value products. Although Goss and Burch (2001) contend that 
Thailand’s transformation mirrors recent changes in the international agro-food 
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system,5 from one focused on nationally controlled agricultural boards to global, 
trader-driven systems, they highlight the unique political and historical social forces 
in Thailand that accompanied this change. The abolition of absolute monarchy and 
the slow decline of the importance of military patronage are, according to Goss and 
Burch (2001), key factors. Such forces have enabled the one fundamental shift in 
Thailand responsible for moving agriculture from low value, high bulk commodity 
production towards diversified, value-added agro-exporting; that is, a shift from 
taxing the rural economy to subsiding it (Walker 2009). On the whole, Thailand’s 
agricultural transformation has seen substantial rises in living standards among the 
rural population (ibid.). However, this process has not been evenly spread and issues 
of relative equality remain, especially between rural and urban areas, but also among 
rural areas depending on the specifics of geography, environment and rural 
infrastructure.  
Actor Network Theory and Consensus Building in Commodity Chains 
In focusing solely on the structures and actors of commodity exchange, commodity 
chain analysis reproduces the classic gift/commodity dichotomy. However, the above 
brief examination of agricultural development in Southeast Asia finds support for the 
contention of Morgan et al. (2006) that agriculture and especially agro-food systems 
are uniquely shaped not just by markets but also by ecology and culture, people and 
their environments. Ecology and culture form the two fundamental cores that lie at 
the basis of production, marketing and consumption in agro-food systems and they 
                                                           
5 For more on the international agro-food system see Friedmann (1982), Bernstein (2003) and McMichael (2000). 
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are not easily divorced from commodities by disembedding forces of trade and 
industrialisation (ibid.: 7). Although global commodity chain analysis affords a great 
many insights into agricultural value chain development (each chain is treated as 
unique according to the commodity, actors, region, natural, economic and social 
conditions), agricultural value chains are more than simply buyer-driven or trader-
driven. Exogenous forces of the wider economy, whether derived from changes 
impelled by structures or agents, do not always spur rural producers into greater 
agricultural commodity production. In fact, the Southeast Asian experience shows 
that greater exposure to globalisation can have the reverse effect, entrenching some 
further into newly viable subsistence production dependent on the remittance 
subsidies sent back to the farm from the market economy.  
 The characterisation of agricultural value chains as buyer-driven or trader-
driven stems from what Morgan et al. (2006) identify as the central concern of 
political economy approaches, of which global commodity chain analysis is one. 
Within political economy approaches there is a tendency to be concerned with 
agricultural commercialisation and its social consequences, with a focus on top-
down, industrial rationalisation and how this configures relations at the local level 
(Morgan et al. 2006: 16). Such concerns, without a consideration of ecology and 
culture, and without the insertion of locally grounded research are liable to present 
exogenous forces of globalisation and industrialisation as unrelenting; capitalism as 
reified (Morgan et al. 2006: 18).   
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Once again the danger here is one of oppositional thinking, positioning 
global against local, conventional trade against alternative forms, producers against 
traders. Indeed, current popular debates in agriculture, especially regarding agro-food 
products have reached a similarly dull impasse as development debates. This should 
come as no surprise as the public discourse of ‘development’ has been largely 
replaced by private processes of globalisation (Eyben 2000: 12; McMichael 2000: 
149). According to Eyben (2000: 12) “much of the academic concern with what was 
wrong with classic development discourse has been carried over into new thinking 
about globalisation and the processes of exclusion.” Hence, within popular agro-food 
debates, agro-food products are either maligned as artificial, large-scale, industrial, 
exploitative, environmentally destructive and bad for one’s health, or celebrated as 
natural and organic, local, artisanal, socially and environmentally responsible and 
seasonal. Likewise trade structures for agro-products suffer blatant 
oversimplification. Conventional trade is deemed global, hegemonic, disembedding, 
and fraught with commodity fetishism that conceals true social relations of 
production and trade, while alternative trade or local trade is conflated with quality, 
safety, equality, fairness, provenance and de-commoditisation.  
The degree to which most people in their everyday lives are confronted with 
such sharply opposing choices is questionable. As Gudeman (2001: 12) points out, 
most people use different modes within an economy daily, buying some products 
from a supermarket and others from local traders or farmers, and further still growing 
some produce themselves or receiving products through networks of reciprocity and 
gifts. Although this is not to discount the experiences of those living at the extreme 
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ends of agro-food systems –– the purported food deserts of industrial suburbia or 
autarchic farming communities eking out a living in remote hinterlands –– it is 
perhaps mainly for argument’s sake that the tyranny of these extremes is presented to 
emphasise specific ideological positions within agro-industrialisation debates. For 
the majority, however, multiplicity and “impurity is the rule” in procuring daily 
sustenance (Callon in Morgan et al. 2006: 18). 
What is clearly needed is a more subtle view of people and places and how 
they interact with numerous modes, processes, technologies and institutions that 
connect them with local, regional and global markets. Morgan et al. (2006) suggest 
that actor-network theory may be more useful here. Callon defines a network as “a 
coordinated set of heterogeneous actors which interact more or less successfully to 
develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for generating goods and services” 
(in Morgan et al. 2006: 17). Network construction is emphasised as “laboured, 
uncertain, and above all contested”, not easily amenable to simplistic views of 
capitalist world ordering (Morgan et al. 2006: 18). Instead actor-network theorists, 
such as Mosse (2005), Latour (1999) and Callon (1991) stress the struggles wrought 
to construct and maintain relationships on which the powerful base their power 
(Morgan et al. 2006: 18). Under scrutiny in actor-network theory are the strategies 
and effort required to hold alliances, associations and relations together, and stabilise 
networks into cohesive and consolidated pathways. Such an approach is highly 
relevant to the work of development interventions in constructing new commodity 
chains, which above all are characterised as laboured, uncertain and contested, not 
simply buyer or trader driven, as suggested by global commodity chain analysis.  
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Another commonly applied tool of analysis for agro-food systems is 
convention theory. According to this theory, any set of coordination in economic, 
political or social life requires the building of consensus. Agreement to continually 
engage and reproduce a set of actions, if successful, consolidates into a routine set of 
practices resulting in a structure or convention. This analytical approach stands in 
contrast to the “simple imposition of power relations by one dominant party” as 
proposed by global commodity chain approaches (Morgan et al. 2006: 19). Instead, 
emphasis is placed on the relationships between people’s “actions and the actions of 
those on whom they depend to realise their goal” (Morgan et al. 2006: 19). Thus 
Storper (in Morgan et al. 2006: 19-20) states that convention building is part of the 
“intimate history of incorporated behaviours”, requiring ongoing resolution between 
individual interests and differences of interpretation, binding people and their actions 
through mutual expectation.  
The aid industry has long played a central role in efforts to define, construct, 
coordinate and consolidate agricultural trade networks. An analysis of the interaction 
between the aid sector and the agricultural sector, via project and community 
interfaces, cross-cultural work relations, technological solutions and participatory 
practices, illuminates the minutiae of value chain construction in a way that removes 
tendencies towards the reification of development processes. Instead, efforts to 
construct new agricultural value chains to help people trade their way out of poverty 
are comprised of multiple, micro-scaled interactions, struggles and resolutions. 
Although development plans, their logical frameworks and activity schedules may 
seem to present an ‘iron cage’ of rationality, efficiency and bureaucracy, the task of 
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wresting agricultural production and trade from their ecological and cultural footings 
indeed reveals a laboured, uncertain and contested process. This thesis therefore 
takes an extended view of agro-commodity chain development, one that begins not 
simply with producers, but further back within the confounding world of 
international development aid agencies and incorporates not just commodity chain 
analysis, but also actor-network theory and convention theory as key methodological 
and analytical tools.  
Aid Chains 
The provision of aid necessarily enrols a plethora of people, resources, organisations, 
technology, knowledge and ideas within both gift and commodity relations.  Aid 
chains are emerging as a new area of investigation in the field of international 
development studies. Gibson simply defines an aid chain as “a set of linked activities 
with multiple actors” (2005: 61). Gibson states that (2005: 61), understanding how 
these are linked and organised is the key to understanding how foreign aid works. 
Figure 2.1 presents a simple diagrammatic representation of an aid chain. 
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Figure 2.1: The chain of aid delivery  
 
Source: Gibson 2005: 62 
 
A number of different authors have sought to unpick the chain of aid 
activities from different perspectives including anthropology and human geography 
(Silk 2004; Stirrat and Henkel 1997; Bebbington 2004), management (Wallace 
2000), economics (Schabbel 2007) and institutional economics (Martens 2002, 2004; 
Gibson 2005). Overall, such writers note that aid chains are donor-driven, input 
rather than output focused, politically and strategically motivated, path dependent 
(one aid chain begets another), overly conditional, top-down and filled with the 
problems of perverse incentives, moral hazard and adverse selection. The particular 
point I want to make about aid chains is that, while their legitimacy may draw upon 
moral discourses invoked by gift giving in order to alleviate Third World poverty, aid 
chains are comprised of more than just gift relations as some would argue (Hattori 
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2001, 2003; Silk 2004).  Aid chains comprise a range of different relations, including 
gift and commercial relations, recruited to build consensus around specific projects.  
Bilateral donors make up the largest share of foreign aid provisioning, 
accounting for approximately two thirds of worldwide aid flows (Schabbel 2007: 
18).6 Although varied and multiple factors influence these flows,7 the dominant 
determinant of bilateral aid flows lies in geo-political strategic interests. As such, 
geographical proximity, colonial, linguistic and ethnic ties, and political allegiances 
all strongly influence patterns of ‘generosity’. Throughout the history of 
development over the past 60 years, the territory covered by foreign aid chains has 
remained fairly consistent. Hattori (2003: 234) notes that, with the few exceptions of 
OPEC and newly industrialised East Asian states, bilateral donors have remained 
much the same, as have the recipients. Most bilateral donors are members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) which contributes the majority share of foreign aid in 
the world.  
New notable donor states are China and India, neither of which is a member 
of the DAC. Unhindered by regulatory and moral pressure of other DAC members, 
many of China’s actions in the arena of foreign aid have been controversial if not 
outright condemned by DAC members as a form of blatantly irresponsible real 
politiking. The discrediting of Chinese aid stands in contrast to the often implied and 
                                                           
6 This is followed by multilateral donors, which distribute approximately 31 per cent of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) (Schabbel 2007: 22). NGOs and private development flows comprise the final portion 
estimated at $7.3 billion in 2001 (ibid.: 30). 
7 Among bilateral donors, countries with higher real incomes tend to give more “aid as a luxury good”, as do 
countries with larger populations. Peer pressure can also play a role in aid provisioning with giving by one 
donor spurring others to do the same (Schabbel 2007: 24). 
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unshakeable stance of core western DAC members of the high moral and 
humanitarian purpose of foreign aid (Hattori 2003: 229). In contrast to condemned 
Chinese foreign aid, DAC members seek to rationalise and thus stabilise the moral 
foundations of their ‘gift-giving’ through the application of aid effectiveness 
research. Such research is aimed at finding optimal allocation rules and formulating 
normative policy prescriptions. One of the more influential publications of this 
growing body of research is the 1997 study by Burnside and Dollar ‘Aid, Policies 
and Growth’. This study positively associated foreign aid effectiveness with ‘good 
policies’ in recipient countries and economic growth. It has hence been credited for 
stimulating much renewed bilateral donor commitment to ODA funding. On the 
other hand, such research has also increased donor conditionality to ensure that the 
virtuous association between foreign aid, ‘good policies’ and economic growth is 
maintained –– effectiveness ensured. As Pronk and Desai point out  
we impose so many conditions on those countries that receive money: they have to be 
gender sensitive; poor people must participate directly; they must have sustainability; 
they must have environmental friendliness; and they must have transparency, 
accountability, and so on….If we think of our own historical development process or 
that of any developed country, none of the criteria was fulfilled (in Hanlon 2004: 375-
376).    
Numerous papers (Bernstein 2003; Martens 2002; 2004; Gibson 2005; Wallace 
2000) speak of ‘donor-driven’ foreign aid, exercised through excessive aid 
conditionality, strict control over resources and endless reporting schedules. The fact 
that all these conditions exist points to the primary problem with development aid: 
that is, that aid exists to satisfy demands and concerns of donors and taxpayers, not 
the supposed beneficiaries of faraway lands. According to Gibson (2005) it is the 
‘warm glow’ or what Jean Bodin calls the ‘sweet bait of honour’ (in Hattori 2003: 
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237) that drives public support for aid activities to the extent that, even if a project is 
a complete failure, the sense of ‘doing good’ may nonetheless be enough to justify 
the aid dollars spent. In this sense, any development results are simply fringe benefits 
(Gibson 2005: 87-88).  Consequently, there is often no feedback loop or obvious way 
that beneficiaries are able to signal discontent with the implementation or outcomes 
of aid (Martens 2002). Instead, Hattori (2001; 2003) and Gibson (2005) argue that 
most aid chains are structured towards reinforcing donor self-images of 
magnanimity, focusing close scrutiny on aid inputs while directing a rather hazy gaze 
on supposed and often hard to measure outputs or impacts. Indeed, while this may 
prima facie be the case, if donors are only concerned with demonstrating their own 
largesse, then why not simply transfer resources directly to target beneficiaries? Why 
not just give poor people money directly? Hanlon (2004) asks this very question and 
demonstrates that direct wealth transfer can have a notable impact on rural 
development through stimulating rural consumption and production, with 
administration costs as low as five to ten per cent. Given that it is possible just to 
give poor people money and if the aim is simply to appear generous then why do aid 
agencies exist? 
The reason, Martens (2004) argues, is the need to mediate donor and 
recipient interests and preferences, which he contends are likely to differ because of 
their different cultural, social and economic backgrounds. As Martens says, there is a 
need to build consensus.  
Although donors remain the main decision maker in foreign aid, mediation is necessary 
because virtually all aid programmes require some agreement from recipients too, if 
only that they authorise the programme to be implemented on their sovereign 
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territory…there is no need for mediation when donor and recipient interests are fully 
convergent….In that case they both fully agree on how to spend the financial transfer 
and there is no need to negotiate a contract. There is full joint ownership. Mediation 
implies there is no full ownership by either the donor or the recipient….As a result, 
moral hazard and adverse selection are inherent in aid delivery (ibid.: 3). 
The need to mediate aid suggests that far from being all-powerful, donors must build 
consensus and conventions around the delivery and utilisation of aid among recipient 
governments and target beneficiaries. This signals that donors are not simply 
interested in demonstrating ostentatious largesse, as some might think; instead, the 
morality of the donor rests on the degree of success in consensus building achieved 
by donors among development recipients. Building this consensus, ensuring mutual 
understanding surrounding the acceptance and use of development aid, is of course 
an uncertain, labour intensive and contested process, exacerbated by the often 
yawning social, cultural and economic distance between donors and recipients and 
their perceptions of poverty. Carr et al. (1998) and Yapa (1998) argue that donors 
tend to perceive deprivation as a situational rather than distributional issue. Donors 
therefore focus on what they perceive to be the internal choices and behaviours of 
recipients. This perception automatically assumes that foreign aid is likely to be 
misused unless mediated and conditioned. It also makes consensus building among 
recipients difficult, as recipients may not view their poverty as stemming primarily 
from their own actions. Thus, donors work hard to manage what has come to be 
known as, the Samaritan’s dilemma (Gibson 2005), the belief that charity may be 
pivotal to a motivated recipient improving their own circumstances versus the fear 
that charity may come to be depended on indefinitely as a means of survival.  
Furthermore, as development projects are not a single entity but a series of activities, 
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resource flows and inputs, this series must continually be communicated, interpreted, 
mediated and negotiated with recipients.  
The failure of an aid project is often the failure to mediate the long chain of 
relationships that exist between the initial donors and final recipients. Aid contractors 
are typically recruited to perform this mediation on behalf of donor agencies; 
utilising business and even military management techniques (logical frameworks) to 
reduce uncertainty and ensure donor preferences are communicated and upheld 
(Wallace 2000). While this increases the administration or transaction costs of 
‘generosity’, it provides donors with a service that manages uncertainty and the risks 
of potential preference misalignment, adverse selection and moral hazard that donors 
fear in navigating the challenging conditions of cross-cultural gift giving.    
Obviously the communication, interpretation and management of 
information are key functions in any aid chain. Martens (2002) and Gibson (2005) 
place great emphasis on the way in which information is communicated, mediated 
and controlled throughout aid chains and by whom. Both authors note the lead role 
that consultants play in mediating donor-beneficiary relationships. According to these 
authors, consultants inhabit a strategic position within aid chains relaying 
information to both the donor and beneficiary throughout the chain. Consultants 
employed often have a long professional history and many have worked in the 
recipient country or the target development sector longer than the staff based in 
donor agencies in charge of overseeing them. They also often have more intimate 
knowledge of the institutions of recipient governments than citizens may themselves 
have (Gibson 2005: 62). As specific information regarding either the donor or 
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recipient is difficult and time consuming for either end party to collect or monitor, 
the role of the consultant in mediating information about the other is key. Consultants 
typically sell their services on this basis with many a curriculum vitae or expression 
of interest written on the basis of unique and unrivalled expertise and insight into the 
‘problem’ and people at hand.  
Consultants are very much the lifeblood of the development industry and 
typically for-profit aid contractors make their margins on consultant salaries and fees. 
In other words, commercial actors mediate bilateral gift relations. Aid contractors 
maintain databases of specialist consultants ready to deploy for aid implementation. 
Much of a consultant’s expertise is strongly guarded and barriers to entry into this 
lucrative industry are high. Typical job descriptions require PhD qualifications, ten 
years experience and at least two or more languages.8 Martens (2002; 2004) and 
Gibson (2005) are especially critical of the role of international development 
consultants noting that strong, perverse incentives exist for these agents to overstate 
their expertise and distort information both up and down the aid chain. Martens 
(2002) argues that incentives exist for consultants to play up the benefits of a given 
development activity to beneficiaries and play down or obfuscate information to non-
beneficiaries. Indeed, there may be political pressure for consultants to do so 
(Martens 2002: 155). Information distortion is of course not helped by what is 
identified by Martens (2004) as the primary problem that exists within aid chains, the 
lack of feedback loops between donors and recipients. Unlike wealth redistribution 
won through political contestation, in most aid chains, decision makers within donor 
                                                           
8 Numerous consultants I encountered seemed not to possess any of these qualifications, however. 
Chapter Two: Gifts and Commodities in Agricultural Value Chain Development 
  72 
countries remain distant from recipients and their feedback. What Martens (2002) 
calls split constituencies,9 has serious implications for aid effectiveness. Without the 
ability to vote out a donor, there are few effective, formal channels through which 
donors may be held to account by recipients for their actions (Martens 2004).  
Given the lack of feedback loops and a high dependence on consultants who 
may be incentivised to distort information, one could easily characterise aid chains as 
consultant-driven. To say, however, that aid chains are consultant driven would be to 
interpret the development process as reified and power absolute. Consultant power 
within aid chains is far from stable. The key way, however, that consultants may 
build consensus around their activities is through demonstrating the long-term 
sustainability of an aid project after donor funding has ended or through creating the 
illusion of sustainability. In other words, consultant power is reinforced through 
escaping the Samaritan’s dilemma.  
Mosse (2005) details how consultants must constantly rework, resell and 
reinterpret their work in line with changing development policies and theoretical 
trends. In Cultivating Development, he presents ethnographic descriptions of 
consultants falling out of favour with policy makers, lest they repeatedly renegotiate 
the terms on which success and failure is measured. In this sense, successful 
consultants drive the reinvention of aid chains towards path dependence. Because 
most projects or programs have limited timeframes in which to achieve significant 
change, there is a strong tendency for the same consultants to ‘rework’, remodel and 
                                                           
9 Split constituencies refers to a donor’s split responsibilities to both tax-payers in the developed world and 
beneficiaries in the developing world.  
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repackage the ‘problem’ in a new project or program form that appears innovative 
and avoids the dreaded label ‘unsustainable’ (Bebbington 2004).      
The term sustainability in development, although meant to encompass 
social, environmental and economic sustainability, is increasingly narrowed in 
development implementation to mean financial sustainability of the implemented 
project. While the financial sustainability of beneficiaries is stated as desirable, many 
development agencies strive to ensure that a project’s institutional infrastructure 
remains intact. Private sector approaches increasingly dominate in the quest to leave 
reputable legacies that may go on assisting motivated recipients. Indeed, it is a mark 
of donor and consultant pride to bestow upon a developing country a financially 
sustainable institution that runs as it did when the donor was in charge, yet does not 
require indefinite donor funding. It is a mark of pride because it is very hard, if not 
often impossible, to achieve. In sum, although aid is grounded in a morality of gift 
giving, giving gifts, especially across cultural boundaries, is a fraught process 
because it raises anxieties about dependency and sustainability. So aid relations come 
to be mediated by more commercially oriented brokers who are charged with 
ensuring sustainability. 
The Social Life of Aid and Trade 
Aiding private sector institutions is not a straightforward process. Private sector 
development efforts are generally expected to adhere broadly to basic ‘rules of 
engagement’ so that aid does not distort the ‘natural’ functioning of the market 
through ‘crowding out’ other investors, or engaging in other dysfunctional activities. 
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The aid industry’s gifts cannot be permitted to undermine the principles of 
commodity production and exchange. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
an investment and advisory arm of the World Bank, outlines the ‘rules of 
engagement’ in four principles (Ryrie 1997). Principle one refers to additionality. 
Aid should not be invested in areas where private finance is willing to invest on 
reasonable terms. Under this principle ODA must complement, not displace, the 
private market lest it damage the development process and create dependency. The 
second principle states that aid should be used as a catalyst for private sector 
development. That is to say, aid should work to facilitate funds from private markets 
with the least amount of distortion possible. Distortion in this case refers to funds 
spent by the aid sector, which should be spent sparingly and only to ensure the 
operation of markets. Thirdly, aid to the private sector itself should be administered 
differently from other ODA activities, in that it should be ‘business-like’. That is, it 
should work as an efficient business partner with the private sector, be prepared to 
shoulder genuine risk (which also increases efficiency) and be profit oriented. The 
last principle states that aid to the private sector should be on commercial terms, not 
based on grants or subsidies. However, certain concessions can be made here in the 
name of development. Loans should be for longer periods of time than the market 
provides, due to the common market failure of lending for extended times in 
developing countries (Ryrie 1997: 445). In short, aid must tip-toe around the private 
sector in an ‘enabling way’ that does not disturb it or risk seriously impairing its 
‘natural’ development.  
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Key questions of the aid sector seeking to intervene in the private sector 
usually revolve around identifying which markets are missing, how to address such 
gaps and, if addressed, whether this will deter new market entrants? Where are the 
failures and why? If there are failures are there good reasons? Are missing or failing 
markets actually missing or failing or are they informal or part of the ‘natural order’?  
Such questions, focused solely on confirming or denying the existence of 
commodities and their exchange fundamentally miss the point. Commodities are not 
absolute states of being; rather they are just one manifestation of value in what 
Appadurai (1986) terms the ‘social life of things’.  In this view, a commodity is just 
one possible phase in the social life of a thing, as it travels within different regimes 
of value created by society. Things may enter and re-exit the sphere of commodities 
and likewise gifts may do the same. What may appear as a commodity in one 
instance can appear as a gift in another. This is especially the case in developing 
countries where a larger proportion of the society may be considered ‘non-market’. 
As such, the things which may be deemed by aid agencies to be potential 
exchangeable commodities communicate complex, context dependent signals. 
Things can be commodities and gifts at different moments. For example, rice may be 
a gift offered to monks, used as a form of money to pay for goods and services or 
simply sold as a basic commodity. As such, identifying where, how and why to 
intervene in agricultural commodity chains, especially in countries where parts of the 
economy are given over to subsistence production, makes value chain development a 
highly fraught and often speculative activity. This is especially the case where there 
is uncertainty over how exactly agricultural development delivers pro-poor growth. 
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Timmer (2005: 7) writes that, despite a long history of examining the role of 
agriculture in economic development, the topic remains complicated and 
controversial.  
Although scholars of rural development tend to agree that the structural 
transformation of an economy requires agricultural transformation, the process by 
which this takes place is highly variable.  Timmer (2005: 7) outlines the basic steps 
towards agricultural development as: 1) a move out of subsistence, to 2) agricultural 
growth through a variety of linkages, to 3) a lag between the agricultural sector and 
the non-agricultural sector often resulting in political tension, to 4) the final stage 
where agriculture is fully integrated into the rest of the economy. However, the path 
through these basic stages for different countries of the world is highly variable with 
change spurred in different ways. In some cases agricultural transformation may 
occur mainly through linkages to non-farm rural industry, and in other cases through 
migration to urban areas (Timmer 2005). 
Thus, exactly how farmers go from being the impoverished and taxed 
majority to a subsidised minority is largely unknown and is a question that has 
fascinated political scientists and economists for some time (Timmer 2004: 14). 
What is certain, however, is that a fundamental shift occurs in material flows to and 
from the rural economy. Extraction from agriculture, often under systems of tribute, 
gives way to one of subsidising agriculture through government assistance or 
development assistance (personal communication, Andrew Walker 2010). Yet one 
thing is certain: the precariousness of farming, and its dependence on the vagaries of 
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climate and the market means that farmers the world over seek protection where and 
when they can. In the developed world, formal structures of agricultural subsidies 
govern this support; in developing countries interpersonal relations of patron-client 
play a crucial role. In agricultural projects in developing countries funded by First 
World donors aid budgets often become entangled between the two different material 
flows of taxing versus subsidising. Thus, the degree to which development aid may 
faithfully observe the rules of private sector engagement set out by the IFC are 
highly questionable when it comes to interventions in the agricultural sectors of 
developing economies. At least in agriculture, it seems the Samaritan’s dilemma 
presents yet another false dichotomy, as market success by aid recipients in 
agriculture will always be linked to some degree of off-farm support. Although the 
mode of support may change (input provision, farmer marketing collectives, 
diversification support, remittances or patronage), in order to create the illusion of 
sustainability, the need for support to agricultural sectors is ongoing. Countries like 
Cambodia illustrate this point well. In Cambodia, the agricultural sector is 
fundamentally enmeshed in patron-client relations that sacrifice profits for 
protection, while various donors engage a plurality of approaches towards 
constructing agricultural development projects via aid chains.  
Gifts and Commodities 
Aid agencies seek to build consensus around new agricultural commodity chains. 
This occurs not through the private sector but through ‘business-like’ aid chains 
deployed in agricultural sectors of developing countries, usually imbued with gift 
relations. Although global commodity chain analysis presents a convenient way out 
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of the structure/agency conundrums of the development impasse, the impasse is 
reproduced in commodity chain interventions which ignore all other social relations 
except those of market transactions. Commodity chain interventions made in the 
name of economic sustainability reproduces the classic divide between gifts and 
commodities.  
Gifts and commodities are often set out as two distinct and incommensurate 
forms of exchange. A gift is said to be personal, reciprocal, inalienable, emotionally 
driven, and based on non-market exchange between mutually obliged beings. As 
such, gifts are often difficult to refuse. A commodity, on the other hand, is said to be 
impersonal, discrete, alienable from the seller, and exists in a rational exchange 
mediated by the market. Gift exchange, unlike economic exchange or politically 
mandated redistribution, represents a unique form of exchange in human societies 
because the fundamental purpose of giving is not the transfer of material objects but 
the creation and maintenance of social relationships (Mauss 1954). In other words, 
gift giving creates social obligation. As Mauss says giving  
…not only carries with it the obligation to repay gifts received, but it implies two others 
equally important: the obligation to give presents and the obligation to receive 
them….To refuse to give, or fail to invite, is –– like refusing to accept –– the equivalent 
of a declaration of war; it is the refusal of friendship and intercourse (1954: 11). 
Mauss (1969: 11) writes “to give something is to give a part of oneself.”  Thus any 
object exchanged under the social laws of gift relations bears the identity of the 
giver, unlike a commodity it is irreplaceable, just as the person who gave it is 
supposed to be unique and irreplaceable (Carrier 1991: 126). Unlike commodities or 
redistribution, the resource or service given is therefore inalienable from the giver. A 
rejection of a gift is a rejection of a relationship with the giver and thus the giver 
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themselves. Therefore, transactors partaking in gift exchange are not free and 
independent individuals but ‘moral persons’ related to one another through their 
social ties. Within a gift relationship each party has a moral duty of care towards the 
other, and through this they are obligated to give, receive and reciprocate in socially 
appropriate ways. Gregory (1982: 640) states that three primary elements distinguish 
gift exchange from other forms of exchange. These are: 1) the obligatory transfer of 
2) inalienable objects or services between 3) related and mutually obliged 
transactors. The obligatory nature of gift relations establishes a continuous process of 
reciprocation, symbolising the continuity of a relationship.  
Numerous scholars have sought to apply the insights of gift theory to 
foreign aid relations. Hattori (2001; 2003), for instance, argues that aid is primarily a 
relationship of symbolic domination imposed through gift relations of negative 
reciprocity. Negative reciprocity is created through asymmetrical relationships where 
the obligation to reciprocate is suspended (Sahlins 1972). Despite the suspension of 
obligation to reciprocate, the recipient is expected to respond with emotional displays 
of deference, humility and gratitude, thereby bestowing qualities of benevolence, 
magnanimity and virtue upon the giver. The suspension of obligation to reciprocate 
establishes firm social hierarchies in favour of the donor. Over time the suspension 
may naturalise social hierarchy, turning what began as a material hierarchy into a 
moral hierarchy (Hattori 2003). Thus, Bordieu (1977) notes that the unreciprocated 
gift is a form of symbolic domination transforming the powerful into the generous, 
the dominated into the acquiescent (Hattori 2003: 233). Gifts then become powerful, 
covert tools of co-option, quieting potential political demands for reparations or 
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material redistribution and transforming moral outrage over gross material inequality 
into compliant submission. Parry (1986) notes that unreciprocated gifts are often the 
mark of stratified or unequal societies, with gifts used to subtly maintain the status 
quo and serve as a visible, quantifiable measure of a donor’s virtue; an outward 
expression of a donor’s inner beneficence and social ideals. 
Contrary to post development writers who posit development gifts as 
unwanted and inappropriate, gift theory highlights the opposite: According to Hattori 
(2001: 646) Mauss, Sahlins and Bordieu all emphasise that “the symbolic power of 
the gift derives from the fact that it involves real goods and services that fulfill real 
needs and desires, or precisely what donors have and recipients want”. Yet reading 
foreign aid relations as only a form of symbolic domination largely misses the point. 
If symbolic domination were the sole aim of foreign aid, this could easily be 
achieved through simple visible transfers of money and not through the laborious, 
costly and contested processes of project implementation through aid consultants. 
The purpose of aid is not some conspiratorial or disingenuous effort towards keeping 
the poor poor. Prima facie, foreign aid seeks to construct commodity chains to assist 
the poor to trade their way out of poverty. What is contested, however, is how this is 
to be achieved.  
Recipients, via citation of the pure gift, usually invoke resistance regarding 
how aid is to be used. In its ideal form a gift is an object or service given voluntarily, 
unconditionally and often spontaneously, free from the expectation of compensation 
or obligation to reciprocate (Silk 2004; Belk 1979). In this way, the ‘pure gift’ 
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represents true altruism, self-sacrifice and, as such, higher ideals of spirituality and 
possibly salvation (Stirrat and Henkel 1997). While this notion of the ‘pure gift’ is 
morally appealing, in reality few if any donors can be characterised as completely 
disinterested, spontaneous altruists (Titmuss 1979 and Derrida 1992 in Silk 2004). 
Thus the notion of the pure gift stands as an elaborate ideological construct (Carrier 
1991: 123) useful inasmuch as it highlights the degree to which different forms of 
giving and receiving diverge from the abstract ideal and are instead bound within 
social relationships of obligation and reciprocity. Invocation of the ‘pure gift’ by aid 
recipients often acts in such a way to highlight donor self-interest, thereby reducing 
donor claims to magnanimity whilst simultaneously liberating recipients from the 
full onus of conditionality or from expectations of deference and humility. Donors in 
turn may malign relations of negative reciprocity within developing countries, 
especially those noted as being predisposed to patron-client relations. Accusations of 
corruption abound, often while ignoring the destructive impacts of rapid economic 
growth. Here, the personalised nature of gift relations of reciprocity are seen as 
fundamentally at odds with the ‘rational’ and even ‘natural’ functioning of 
disinterested commodity exchange.  However, whether one views gift exchange 
negatively or positively, both perspectives tend to reinforce the dichotomy between 
gifts and commodities.  
Commodity exchange involves a market or institutionally mediated 
exchange of standardised products that are fungible  (substitutable with other 
identical items) and alienable (once sold, they bear no relation to the seller). Unlike 
gift exchange, commodity exchange takes place between supposedly self-interested, 
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free and rational individuals bound only within the limited time frame of their 
contractual agreement. Once the contract is fulfilled, all parties are freed of 
obligation to exchange. Commodity exchange is, therefore, often held as the 
theoretical antonym of gift exchange; it is impersonal, rationally motivated, and 
discontinuous.  
Commodity exchange is based on the elevation of exchange value over that 
of use value. Commodity production is not for the use of the commodity itself but 
rather for it to be exchangeable and therefore able to generate profit for its owner 
over and above the use-value of the eventual end user (Taussig 1980: 25). As an 
exchangeable commodity the components that comprise the commodity (labour, raw 
materials, capital) are qualitatively the same as any other commodity, no matter how 
they may differ, and thus anything, through the symbolic medium of money, may be 
exchanged for any other number of commodities thought (or even imagined) to be 
equivalent to other commodities. Therefore, a bag is equal to a certain amount of 
butter or a piece of gold (Taussig 1980: 26). According to Marx (1867), however, 
what is really being exchanged is human labour. Commodity exchange is actually the 
exchange of human labour mediated by things. In order to maintain the fiction of 
commodity exchange, it is necessary to think of human labour not as the unique 
efforts of individual human beings, but as an abstract of labour-time divisible 
amongst the other costs of production and symbolised by the universal medium of 
money. Far from being the real-time activities of real people, labour then becomes an 
abstract notion of quantifiable units to be compared and traded. Thus a person’s 
labour, their daily human activity, is alienated from them. Under capitalist modes of 
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production, owners of capital may profit from the conjoint factors of nature, humans, 
and land as abstract factors of production from which surplus value may be extracted 
through the application of wage labour. The abstractions upon which commodity 
exchange is based leads to what Marx coined commodity fetishism, a phenomenon 
whereby commodities themselves are attributed with the characteristics of the human 
labour which created them, and are seemingly animate and relational. Accordingly, 
Marxist theories that commodity exchange and capitalist markets require a 
suspension of belief in what is natural and rational –– the inalienable connection 
between human beings, their activities, environments and resources –– and inverts 
this indivisible whole as abstract, unconnected units to be managed according to the 
needs of profit maximisation. It is this system that Marx sought to reveal as a type of 
fetishism requiring much the same suspension of belief in the laws of nature as 
witchcraft, sorcery or superstition.  
Unpicking the dynamics between gift and commodity exchange is a well-
trodden line of enquiry in the social sciences (Malinowski 1922; Polanyi 1944; 
Mauss 1954; Levi Strauss 1969; Sahlins 1972; Bourdieu 1977; Gregory 1982; 
Granovettor 1985; Parry 1986; Carrier 1991; Derrida 1992; Gudeman 2001). It is 
useful to note that much of this work extends analysis and understanding of gift 
exchange in relation to commodity exchange with the underlying intent being to 
“reinstate the morality inherent in gift exchange” into the perceived anomie of 
modern market based societies (Gudeman 2001: 83). Consequently, so called ‘gift 
societies’ are often implicitly portrayed as monetarily poor yet socially rich societies 
bound together through complex moral obligations of reciprocity, personal 
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connection, and power relations, volition and rank (Lapavitsas 2004: 34). Meanwhile 
‘market based’ societies, wrapped up within their ephemeral ghost world of 
commodity fetishism –– living lives dominated by the inanimate objects they created 
–– are commonly illustrated as socially alienated, spiritually devoid but materially 
wealthy. Their lives are guided less through social connection and more through the 
supposed ‘rationality’ of market economics (as opposed to the irrationality of 
interpersonal gift relations), which is believed to bind these secular societies together 
through trade and wage labour. These clichéd notions of ‘gift’ versus ‘commodity’ 
societies pervade many development discussions, be they theory or practice oriented. 
Distinguishing between gifts and commodities is as much a political exercise as it is 
an academic one. Condemnation of gift culture or celebration of it often mark one’s 
own personal views on the market, whether the market is seen as key to delivering 
positive human benefits or whether it is seen to be fundamentally at odds with the 
goals of human development. The charge that a society is ‘gift oriented’ can be an 
evasive way of alleging corruption, while positive comments on gift societies can 
often be read as a commentary on the failings of modern society and capitalism.  
The divide between gifts and commodities is, according to Lapavitsas 
(2004), constructed and unnecessary. Far from being clear-cut, the line between non-
market and market relations, gifts and commodities, is often blurred in several fields 
of economic activity especially in the case of developing countries. Agriculture, 
particularly in the Southeast Asian region, demonstrates the blurring of gifts and 
commodities as an inescapable component of the development process. Protection to 
farmers, whether offered through formal state subsidies or through gift relations of 
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client-patron relations are required to sustain commodity production in uncertain 
environmental and market conditions. Increased commodity production in Southeast 
Asia, while central in efforts towards agro-industrialisation, can also result in making 
non-market livelihoods more viable, not less. Lapavitsas (2004) argues that it is an 
excessive emphasis on exchange value over use value within private sector 
development debates which falsely posits gifts and commodities as opposites. 
Increasing the exchangeability of agricultural products through increased quality and 
standardisation is key to the construction of agricultural commodity chains to help 
the poor trade their way out of poverty. However, the fundamental use value of 
agricultural commodities is inescapable. Ultimately people and nations produce 
agricultural products, foremost for food not commodity exchange. This is especially 
the case for rice in the Asian region. It is for its use value that food production 
continues, no matter how much prices fluctuate or how marginal the profit. It is the 
use value of food which necessitates protection to ensure agricultural production 
either through patron-client relations, subsidies or foreign aid projects. Thus a more 
balanced dialectic of use value and exchange value leads to the conclusion that gift 
relations are required to construct agricultural commodity chains. Any attempt to 
understand development efforts towards the construction of agricultural commodity 
chains must therefore understand both gift and commodity relations.    
Conclusion 
Global commodity chain analysis presents a convenient escape from the 
development impasse and attendant oppositions between structure and agency insofar 
as it focuses evenly on both the actors involved and the chain of activities or 
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structures they create. However, as a primarily political economy approach, it is 
limited in providing insights beyond markets relations. Various forms of gift relation 
are important in agriculture and these must to be brought into commodity chain 
analysis.  
Gift relations of development assistance intervene to construct commodity 
producers out of subsistence producers and build consensus around new trade 
relations. The way in which development aid intervenes to construct new commodity 
chains, form trade relations and build consensus is structured, not by the logic of the 
market, but by the particular functioning of the aid chain in question in which the 
morality of gifts is important. Nonetheless, in attempting to aid private sector 
development, aid agencies seek to subject themselves to specific rules of engagement 
with the private sector, which require aid to become more business-like. Adherence 
to such rules proves difficult because the rules of private sector engagement are at 
odds with the need for aid to build consensus. Consequently, many efforts by aid 
agencies in private sector development result in schisms which are deepened by the 
tendency of all farmers the world over to seek protection from variability in the 
environment and in markets.  
It can be stated, therefore, that the development impasse is predicated not on 
a constructed binary between structures and agents –– this is easily solved through 
multi-scaled approaches such as global commodity chain analysis –– but instead on a 
false binary between gifts and commodities. Within the development impasse the 
false binary may be identified through specific attitudes taken towards gifts and 
commodities. Commodities and their trade may be viewed as income generating and 
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poverty alleviating or socially destructive and environmentally debasing.  Similarly, 
gifts may be viewed as socially binding or socially stifling. Gifts may be identified 
with ‘backwards’ tradition versus commodities that are posed as emancipatory and 
modern. However, it is the ‘modern’ gifts mobilised by the development industry that 
builds consensus around which commodity relations may be sustained. Gifts help 
initiate cross-cultural relations and further understandings around trade relations. 
Both gifts and commodities are enrolled to construct new and existing commodity 
chains towards pro-poor development and to that end both must be understood. 
 Chapter 3 
Tribute, Trade and Foreign Intervention in 
Cambodia 
 
Rich people in our country…have better hearts than rich people in other countries. Rich people in 
Cambodia don't have bad hearts like rich people in France and England. Rich people in 
Cambodia see poor people in need and are happy to distribute land to them or help them have 
equal wealth 
(Uk Bunchheuan, Minister of Justice 1988, Minutes 113, Cabinet, Council of Ministers, June 23–
24, 1988: 9 in Gottesman 2002: 283). 
 
The rich must protect the poor, just as clothing protects the body 
(Cambodian proverb in Chandler 2000: 105). 
 
Three major themes mark Cambodian history: tribute, trade and foreign intervention. 
These themes and how they have played out throughout Cambodian history are essential 
to understanding the modern day context of foreign aid, gift giving and commodity 
chain construction in Cambodia. Prior to French colonisation, Cambodian history was 
dominated by an oscillation between two distinct systems of wealth creation: tribute and 
trade. Tributary systems were based on the extraction of high bulk, low value rice 
surpluses from sophisticated, yet autarkic, irrigated rice production centred on the 
upland shores of the Tonle Sap, Cambodia’s great fresh water lake located in the middle 
of the country (see Figure 3.1). Conversely trade systems built wealth through open 
maritime trade in low bulk, high value forest products in coastal areas closer to what is 
now Phnom Penh. Cambodian elites and foreigners controlled trade, yet unlike the 
tributary system, trade systems largely left the population to its own devices. These two 
systems of wealth creation eventually proved unsustainable, due largely to the country’s 
entanglement in wider geopolitics. Each oscillation between the upland shores of the 
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Tonle Sap and the coastal regions was typically spurred by threats from Siam and 
Vietnam, which nearly tore the country in two. During French colonial rule, 1863 to 
1953, the two systems of tribute and trade were united, and transformed the country into 
a dependent economy, oriented towards the delivery of profits, through the export of 
high bulk, low value commodities such as rice, maize and rubber (Brown and 
Timberman 1998). Cambodian agriculture was ‘developed’, but again primarily for the 
benefit of elites and foreigners. The brief years of the Khmer Rouge aside (1970 to 
1975), Cambodia has since endured decades of foreign intervention and elite patronage 
in efforts aimed at the production and trade of high bulk, low value commodities.  
 What the above paragraph demonstrates is the role of geopolitics in defining the 
dominant mode of accumulation in Cambodia. Under colonialism and the protection of 
foreign patrons the influence of geopolitics in determining the primary mode of 
exchange was ameliorated and the two distinct systems of trade and tribute were united 
whereby low value products perhaps better suited to the non-financial transactions of 
tributary systems were harnessed for export. This has continued under current aid-
driven configurations of neo-colonialism, whereby Cambodia is encouraged to trade its 
way out of poverty via agricultural development.    
Cambodia has a long and intertwined history of tribute and trade, and foreign 
intervention in agriculture is central to this. Today, Cambodia’s high level of aid 
dependence means that more than ever trade and tribute are intertwined. Foreign aid has 
helped to reinforce tribute systems that in turn ensure the domination of trade linkages 
by elites. Rapid, uneven growth and agricultural development are accompanied by 
entrenched inequality and deep pockets of absolute poverty. Foreign aid is inescapably 
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embroiled in the politics of tribute and trade, as foreign aid must ensure consensus 
building among power holders in the pursuit of ‘pro-poor’ value chain development. 
Despite widespread donor attitudes that the gift economy of patron-client relations is 
what ensures poverty and inequality in Cambodia, there is a perceptible denial of the 
way in which the very presence of foreign aid influences the politics of gift and 
commodity relations and therefore development outcomes.  
Figure 3.1: Map of Cambodia 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University. 
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Oscillations Between Trade and Tribute 
Cambodia’s long history of tribute, trade and foreign intervention begins in ancient 
history. Prior to the establishment of Cambodia’s famous temple city, Angkor Wat, in 
the early twelfth century two rival states existed: Chenla and Funan. Funan’s wealth 
derived mainly from its strategic trading location positioned on the coastal reaches of 
the Mekong Delta, on the sea route between India and China (Carrison 2002). While 
flood recession wet rice cultivation probably sustained the population, the kingdom is 
reputed to have derived its wealth mainly from trade in low bulk, high value forest 
products. From this period, several artefacts have been unearthed, which appear to 
confirm the existence of trading ports. These objects include second century Roman 
coins, Indian jewellery, bronze and locally made ceramics (Chandler 2000: 7, 14). To 
the north of Funan a rival kingdom named Chenla existed. Fabled to have been 
established by a wise man named Kambu, it was located on the upland shores of the 
Tonle Sap, with the wealth of this kingdom stemming primarily from the inhabitants’ 
successful mastery of Hindu-styled, highland, irrigation systems and intensive wet rice 
cultivation (Chandler 2000: 29; FAO, 2003).  
These two rival kingdoms exploited Cambodia’s two main ecological zones, 
coastal reaches and upland plains (Mabbett and Chandler 1996). Jayavarman II, founder 
of the Kingdom of Angkor, eventually united them in the ninth century. He located his 
new capital north of the Tonle Sap Lake and far from coastal borders, which were 
vulnerable to invasion and attack by Javanese and Malay marauders (Carrison 2002).   
The establishment of the Angkor kingdom marked a withdrawal from 
dependence on maritime trade and began an increased focus on intensive, irrigated 
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agriculture and empire building. As the wealth and power of Angkor grew, the kingdom 
spread to dominate vast swathes of mainland Southeast Asia, drawing tribute and slaves 
from what is now Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos and the coastal areas of central 
Vietnam, then known as Champa (Chandler 2000: 29).  
The kingdom of Angkor represents a classic example of a tributary society, 
where extraction of subsistence agricultural surpluses occurred “by other than economic 
means” for the benefit of an authoritarian and hierarchical state (Wolf 1982: 267). In 
tribute societies, primary producers who control the means of production are strongly 
obligated through political pressures, to hand over surpluses to a ruling authority. Thus, 
wealth and power are accumulated by the elite through the extraction of tribute, not 
through the exchange of commodities. Resources extracted are centralised and directed 
up. The accumulation of wealth constructs a class system that then helps to construct 
and coordinate large, specialised labour forces. This allows for the development of 
infrastructure (Bampton 1999: 23). As Wolf (1982: 80) points out 
a ruling elite of surplus takers standing at the apex of the power system will be strongest 
when it controls, first, some strategic element in the process of production, such as 
waterworks (Wittfogel 1931), and second, some strategic element of coercion, such as a 
standing army of superior military capability.  
The pyramid-like social structure of tribute societies is usually supported by an ideology 
or theological doctrine that mirrors the hierarchy and discipline evident in wider society 
(Bampton 1999: 23). In Angkor, Jayavarman II introduced a new belief system based on 
the Hindu god-king cult story of the Ramayana (Edwards 2007). Under this belief 
system, the king of Angkor held a divine position as supreme ruler and intermediary 
between Hindu gods and mortals, ensuring soil fertility and protection from drought. As 
patron of agriculture and protector of the social order (the suffix varman translates as 
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armour or protector), the primary role of the Angkor king was to provide divine 
protection to all those under his reign through thwarting enemies, the forces of nature 
and closely overseeing the governing of city temples, the priesthood and the 
construction of large-scale infrastructure (Chandler 2000: 18). The ideology of the 
Ramayana ensured that the population remained beholden to the king. According to 
Derrett (1976: 605), “the agricultural population is fascinated with power, which is 
essential to its very life. The soil cannot be tilled without protection and rain”.  
King Indravarman (877 - 889 AD) was the first Angkor king to sponsor major 
centralised irrigation works that expanded agricultural production which was needed to 
support empire building. Known as barays, the first reservoir named Indratataka 
covered over 300 hectares (Chandler 2000: 37). Successive reigns by Hindu and later 
Buddhist Angkor kings contributed to the network of irrigation by constructing other 
barays capable of supplying some 167,000 hectares in total of rice-growing fields along 
the northern plain of the Tonle Sap basin (Bray 1986). These irrigation systems 
comprised of a network of reservoirs and canals and allowed for the cultivation of at 
least two rice crops per year thereby supplying rice surpluses needed for the 
development of the ancient civilisation to spectacular heights of empire and monument 
building (ibid. 1986). Recent archaeological research around the Angkor area revealed 
that the city temple complex may have sprawled over 3000 square kilometres and 
supported up to half a million residents (BBC 2007).  
Theories abound as to reasons for the decline of Angkor, and while many 
speculate that the decline of the Khmer empire is attributable to the inbuilt obsolescence 
of irrigation systems through steady siltification (Bray 1986), successive invasions and 
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occupations of both the Siamese and Vietnamese, in addition to numerous civil wars for 
the next five centuries, are also likely reasons (Gottesman 2002: 14). The beginning of 
the end for the Angkor empire is closely associated with the Siamese invasion of 1431. 
This invasion set in motion a long period of entanglement between the Siamese and 
Cambodian courts of Ayudhya and Angkor, and saw the steady migration of power, 
knowledge, people and wealth towards the Siamese capital to the west (Chandler 2000: 
48). The two to three annual harvests of rice reported to be grown around Angkor 
ceased. As a result, the centre of political gravity in Cambodia slowly drifted towards 
Phnom Penh, far enough away from the political dominance of the Siamese, but closer 
to the Vietnamese and other seafaring foreign influences (ibid.: 3). 
The shift to Phnom Penh revived Cambodia’s involvement in maritime trade. 
Phnom Penh drew traders from throughout the Southeast Asian region, trading forest 
products from the Cambodian interior for arms and luxury goods (Chandler 2000: 79). 
By the end of the sixteenth century Cambodia was deeply embroiled in the politics and 
trade of the wider world. A multitude of foreign merchants resided in Phnom Penh 
including Chinese, Japanese, Arabs, Spanish, Portuguese, as well as merchants from 
Indonesia and later from Holland and Great Britain. The threat of Siamese invasion of 
Phnom Penh in 1593 further deepened foreign involvement, when the king of Cambodia 
appealed to the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines for protection (ibid.: 84). 
The final years of the sixteenth century were marked by Spanish imperialism in 
Cambodia directed from the Philippines (ibid.: 86).  
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Cambodia’s modern history, centred on the entrepôt of Phnom Penh, attests to 
recurring patterns of Khmer elites courting foreign and often competing sources of 
patronage. Yet the urban politics of the seventeenth century largely excluded the 
majority of Cambodians, who lived in rural villages and engaged in rice farming. 
Clustered around Buddhist monasteries, or around a central pond or stream, rice-
growing villages were linked to urban centres in uneven and sporadic ways: through the 
irregular collection of rice taxes or intermittent incursions by officials looking for 
recruits; through the sangha (monks) who travelled in the dry season; through festivals; 
and through trade with provincial capitals, exchanging rice and forest products for 
metal, cloth and salt (Chandler 2000: 103). In times of crisis such villages were often 
raided for rice and men, spurring villages to seek refuge in the upland forests, or prei 
(wilderness) (ibid.: 103). Based on ethnic specialisation, Khmer rice farmers exchanged 
rice for fish and cattle from ethnic Malay Muslims, and for vegetables from Chinese 
market gardeners (ibid.:100).  
The social structure of patron-client relations is cited as central to 
understanding Cambodian society of this era (Chandler 2000). James Scott (1972: 92) 
defines patron-client political relationships as  
dyadic (two person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual 
of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide 
protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, 
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the 
patron.  
This two-person relationship may extend throughout a society, placing all those engaged 
within it into a pyramid structure of political loyalty and dependence, linking those at 
the lowest tier to those at the highest through a chain of command, which passes 
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resources up, and protection down. Thus, hierarchies inherited from the Angkor era 
typically radiated downwards from the king and capital okyas (high ranking royal 
official), to the sangha (monkhood) and the graded bureaucracy to the villages, and 
finally down to the landless and the debt-slaves living on the edge of the state (Chandler 
2000: 105). Reliant on face-to-face enforcement, typically the closer one was located to 
the king and the centre of power, the more such relations governed one’s life. In the 
capital, wealth was acquired through direct clientship to the king, through buying an 
okya title, which entitled the holder to the loyalty of particular clients. Such titles were 
often awarded to the highest bidder and often carried a large and lucrative client base 
(ibid.: 108). In the kompongs (large provincial capitals) and Phnom Penh where people 
no longer grew their own food, patronage and clientship were important to one’s 
survival and advancement. People with access to money and power accepted as many 
followers or slaves as they could. In many cases, people who had contracted debts to 
their patrons spent their lives working off that debt (ibid.: 105). Nevertheless, Chandler 
(ibid.: 106) maintains that patron-client relations were flexible and open to negotiation 
as “shifting networks of subordination and control, chosen or imposed, benevolent or 
otherwise”, but functional in that they were responsive to the needs of clients in times of 
stress.  
The nature of patron-client relations were far more dilute in rural communities. 
Here a local patron, such as a village chief, was commonly a rice farmer among other 
rice farmers and lived a life similar to the people he influenced. In such circumstances 
the status of patron was not merely a function of power and authority, but also 
popularity. Patrons typically married local women and participated in village activities 
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from festivals, to rice harvests. Considered to be another member of the community, the 
village patron tended to be more sensitive to local issues and often expressed the same 
level of distrust of officials from outside the village in much the same way as villagers 
(Chandler 2000: 106). Indeed, much of a local patron’s power derived from his ability 
to protect villagers from outside threats and defend community interests.  
This loyalty to one’s own community stands in contrast to patron-client 
relations in Phnom Penh where a trend of appealing to foreign protection emerged. This 
trend effectively transformed patron-client structures in Cambodia over time, as elites 
became evermore dependent on foreign patrons as sources of wealth and were freed 
from the need to extract wealth from the countryside (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). 
Indeed, Cambodia’s modern history, centred on the entrepôt of Phnom Penh, attests to 
recurring patterns of Khmer elites courting foreign and often competing sources of 
patronage. According to Chandler, European sources of the time chronicle “a country 
whose capital was isolated from its hinterland; whose royal family was murderous, 
intriguing and unstable, and which was at the mercy of elite factions, national 
catastrophes and invaders, much of the time” (2000: 93). During this era, trade patterns 
were more a function of patronage politics than they were economic structures.  
Colonisation!
In 1626, armies loyal to the Nguyen overlords of Vietnam cut off Cambodia’s south-
eastern seaboard frontier, effectively severing Phnom Penh’s access to international 
trading markets and heralding in another era of Cambodian isolation (Chandler 2000: 
95). It also limited the Cambodian court’s ability to appeal to foreign patrons outside of 
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Siam and Vietnam. As a result the Cambodian royal family became split along pro-Thai 
and pro-Vietnamese lines. The proceeding eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were 
therefore years of repeated invasions from both the Vietnamese and Siamese which 
sparked civil war throughout the country (Chandler 2000: 95). By 1830, the Vietnamese 
succeeded in gaining control of the country (Chandler 2000: 99).  
The Nguyen dynasty saw their mission in Cambodia as primarily a civilising 
one. Seeking to mobilise the Cambodian population and colonise the region, the 
Vietnamese sought to rationalise the country, its agricultural production, bureaucratic 
structures and cultural predilections. The Vietnamese emperor Minh Mang, writing in 
1834, noted that Cambodia was a truly ‘barbarian’ country: “the people do not know the 
proper way to grow food. They use mattocks and hoes, but no oxen. They grow enough 
rice to have two meals a day, but they do not know how to store rice for an emergency" 
(Chandler 2000: 101). Despite Minh Mang’s efforts to reform Cambodian agricultural 
techniques, to quantify and systematise landholdings, agricultural tax payments and 
irrigation works, there is no historical record of the Vietnamese ever achieving any 
success in this sector (Chandler 2000: 126). Instead, most historical documents from 
this era largely record the frustration of Vietnamese officials with Khmer people and 
regional okyas or officials (Gottesman 2002: 14).  
We have tried to punish and reward the Cambodian officials according to their merits and 
demerits. We have asked the king to help us, but he has hesitated to do so. After studying 
the situation, we have decided that Cambodian officials only know how to bribe and be 
bribed. Offices are sold; nobody carries out orders; everyone works for his own 
account...For the last four months nothing has been accomplished (Giang Vietnamese 
General in Chandler 2000: 124).  
The Vietnamese occupation spurred Cambodia’s official classes to appeal to the 
Siamese government for assistance. The Siamese invaded and thus set in motion a series 
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of confrontations between Siamese and Vietnamese forces, with each trying to install 
their own leaders (Chandler 2000: 82). This conflict lasted until a Siamese-backed king 
appealed to Napoleon III and the country became a French protectorate in 1863 
(Chandler 2000: 135).  
By the time the French administration arrived in Cambodia, the country stood 
in a state of crisis. An atmosphere of physical danger and random violence prevailed. 
The population stood at a mere one million people (Chandler 2000: 100). 
Communications between districts were poor; there were few roads, and bandits and 
invading armies carried off what surpluses they could find. Foreign trade was restricted, 
as Phnom Penh was cut off from the outside world by authorities in southern Vietnam. 
Ports that did engage in trade were more integrated into Siamese or Vietnamese 
economies than into a coherent Cambodian one (ibid.: 101). Instability, the low 
population and the threat of invading armies offered little incentive to invest in 
agricultural development.  
French perceptions of Cambodia were predictably much the same as those of 
the preceding Vietnamese colonisers, if somewhat more romanticised. French colonisers 
perceived Cambodians as simple and lazy, with a great but lost civilisation (Gottesman 
2002: 15; Edwards, 2007).  
The people have no knowledge of [advanced] agriculture, using picks and hoes...All these 
shortcomings stem from the laziness of the Cambodians...my instructions to you are these: 
teach them to use oxen, teach them to grow more rice, teach them to raise mulberry trees, 
pigs and ducks...If there is any outdated barbarous custom that can be simplified, or 
repressed, then do so (Delvert in Mabbett and Chandler 1996: 137). 
In order to achieve their goal of ‘civilising’ and ‘developing’ Cambodia, the French 
sought to reform the country’s institutions and laws, land ownership and tax collection 
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structures, as well as abolish slavery (Chandler 2000: 144). For petit Cambodian elites, 
whose power depended on entourages of clients, exploited labour, and taxation of 
harvests (rather than land), planned French reforms struck at the core of their authority 
and power (ibid.: 144). Consequently, the modernisation of Cambodian society was 
resisted, with French efforts failing to transform most sectors of the economy and 
government. The failure of the French to ‘develop’ Cambodia was interpreted by many 
intrepid colonists as attributable to the innate characteristics of Cambodians, their 
attachment to tradition and rejection of superior rationality, which apparently kept them 
immune from modern ideas and inherently hostile to those who tried to implement them 
(ibid.: 156). 
Yet change did eventually come. French authorities persisted with efforts to 
transform the country into an income-generating and profitable colony. They built large 
plantations for the production of rubber and other agricultural commodities for export, 
roads and modern commercial centres (Gottesman 2002: 15). In the rice sector, the 
French developed significant changes in farming technologies in the northwest province 
of Battambang, where large-scale rice plantations were established, as opposed to the 
rest of the country which continued with smallholder rice cultivation (Chandler 2000: 
138). By 1917, Cambodia’s first rice mills opened, getting rid of the country’s 
dependence on millers in Saigon (ibid.: 155). By the 1920s, Cambodia was, in the eyes 
of many, a fairly productive, rice-producing enterprise. This translated into increased 
revenues for the colonial administration and prosperity for French and Chinese 
merchants who monopolised the rice trade. While no noticeable benefits accrued to the 
vast majority of Cambodia’s peasants (ibid.: 139, 155, Gottesman 2002: 15), the 
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population did quadruple from 1863 to 1953 when the country eventually gained its 
independence. Edwards (2007) argues that it was during French rule that the first 
systematic notions of Khmer culture, beyond the village and as a united national identity 
linked to the glory of Angkor were established. Nevertheless, the main material 
transformations during the colonial period were in foreign trade, communications, and 
demography. Rice and corn were grown for the first time for export, as well as rubber, 
which linked Cambodia once again through trade to the world outside. Its economy 
quickly resembled that of a dependent colony. Nothing altered with political 
independence in 1953; most of Cambodia's foreign exchange throughout the 1950s and 
1960s came from export earnings from high bulk primary commodities (Chandler 2000: 
4). It was during this time, the first time in Cambodian history, that the two systems of 
tribute and trade were united. Under French colonialism, the crops of tributary systems 
were tethered to trade structures dominated by elites backed by foreign patrons.  
Civil War, Communism, Cold War  
The French backed king-cum-autocratic dictator, Sihanouk, presided over these decades 
in what is remembered by most older generations as Cambodia’s ‘golden years’. Such 
nostalgia continues despite the fact that the economy only registered any real growth in 
the two years between 1963 and 1965 (Keirnan 2002: 484). However, the country was 
at peace, its economy functioned, albeit inequitably, and under Sihanouk’s policy of 
‘neutrality’ the country received large amounts of aid from France, the US and the Sino-
Soviet Bloc (Gottesman 2002: 18). Operating as the classic Southeast Asian 
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bureaucratic polity,10 Sihanouk used much of this aid to undertake personally 
development projects around the country and reinforce his carefully constructed image 
as a meritous benefactor or saboraschon11 with reference to the Angkor kings of 
antiquity (Hughes 2006). The strategy of playing off Cold War opponents to enhance 
domestic popularity was dubbed the ‘prince’s tightrope’. Yet despite generous social 
spending and appeals to Angkor tradition, Sihanouk could not contain growing 
Communist forces. In order to coopt growing leftist threats and attract popularity away 
from the Communist Party, Sihanouk took radical steps. He cut off US military 
assistance and economic aid, nationalised Cambodia's Chinese-dominated banking 
industry and export/import trade, and attempted to distribute rice through state channels 
(Chandler 2000: 192-194; Gottesman 2002: 20).  
Sihanouk's break with US left him vulnerable to pressures from the left and 
eroded military morale. Furthermore, government control over exports and imports 
encouraged black market trading, with elites and the military clandestinely supplying 
Communists in Cambodia and Vietnam. By 1967, over a quarter of Cambodia's rice 
harvest was being smuggled to Communist forces which paid higher prices than the 
Cambodian government could afford. As a result the government lost revenue from 
                                                           
10 Riggs (1966) first coined the term bureaucratic polity in reference to Thailand, yet it has been used frequently to 
describe authoritarian governments of Southeast Asia. Jackson (1992: 6-7) summarises the key characteristics. To 
paraphrase, bureaucratic polities exist for and of themselves, and are usually comprised of elite members of the 
ruling classes. Decisions are made primarily for the benefit of polity members. Regime change simply changes the 
selective distribution of benefits of government to a competing group. Regime change does not bring about radical 
ideological change as the aim is not to remake society but instead to maintain privilege and power. Usually 
dependent on international support, the polity remains largely isolated from the peasantry and generally uninterested 
and incapable of organising them. The majority thus tolerates the polity because the polity is overall incapable of 
interfering in most spheres of life. The polity defines most problems as administrative problems rather than political 
ones and this averts any serious reform. Overall, the government is often disorganised and unresponsive but 
generally not malevolent, “it bumbles but it lacks any kind of grand vision” (Jackson 1992: 6, 7). 
11 Hughes defines saboraschon as an individual who earns personal merit through making generous contributions to 
communal projects such as the construction or repair of temple buildings (2006: 470). 
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import/export taxes and foreign trade was hampered (Chandler 2000: 201). To stem rice 
smuggling, a decision was made that army units should gather the rice surplus in several 
areas, pay government prices for it, and transport it to government warehouses. In some 
provinces resentment flared into armed conflict as peasants tried to resist the low prices 
paid by government (ibid.: 201). 
By the end of 1967, the Cambodian economy began to falter. In 1970, a US-
backed military general, Lon Nol, deposed Sihanouk and began to launch attacks on 
Communist and North Vietnamese positions throughout the country (Gottesman 2002: 
22). Cambodia slowly fell into civil war. By April 1970, 30,000 US troops and 40,000-
plus South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia seeking to root out Communist 
opposition. With Cambodia firmly engulfed in a wider Indochina war (Heder 2002: 
184), the US began a carpet-bombing campaign, which was eventually to cover the 
entire eastern half of Cambodia (Jenks Clarke 2003: 93). Three times as many tons of 
bombs were dropped on Cambodia’s agricultural heartland than were dropped in total 
on Japan during World War II (Kevin 2000a: 597). The bombings resulted in a lack of 
available farmland, while the civil war drove many to seek refuge in the city. Phnom 
Penh overflowed with refugees living in squalid conditions; the highly corrupt military 
dictatorship of Lon Nol did nothing to curb the crisis. This increased social unrest 
fuelled support for the Communists (Gottesman 2002: 24).  
In 1975, Communist forces began laying mines on the riverine approaches to 
Phnom Penh, thereby preventing shipments of rice and ammunition from reaching the 
capital. US airlifts were not able to drop enough rice to feed Phnom Penh, nor were they 
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able to supply enough military equipment to defend the capital. Exhausted by war and 
corruption, many Cambodians supported a change. On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Rouge 
took the capital (Chandler 2000: 208). The victory of the Khmer Rouge ushered in the 
beginning of what would come to be known as the most brutal and bloodiest 
Communist revolution of the twentieth century. Inspired by the zero tolerance approach 
of Mao’s Cultural Revolution and Stalin’s ideas of rapid collectivisation, the Khmer 
Rouge sought to quickly turn the country into its socialist ideal through implementing a 
series of rapid, severe and ludicrous policies. Within a week of their victory the 
Communists evacuated nearly two million Cambodians from cities and townships into 
the countryside (ibid.: 210). They abolished currency, markets and privately owned 
goods and took control over the distribution of all food (Gottesman 2002: 26). Every 
aspect of daily life was under scrutiny, religion was banned, clothing styles and haircuts 
monitored, books burned (Chandler 2000: 209). Any hint of resistance was severely 
punished.  The regime engaged in continual purges and killings of those with real or 
imagined links with foreign states, counter-revolutionary practices or merely suspicious 
ethnic backgrounds (Gottesman 2002: 27). In total, an estimated two million people 
died either through execution or starvation brought about by the Khmer Rouge’s 
disastrous agricultural policies.  
The Khmer Rouge, inspired by their Chinese counterparts, entitled their 
agricultural plans the ‘great leap forward’ (Edwards 2007). The main aim of this ‘great 
leap’ was to triple agricultural production throughout the country to an average national 
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yield of three metric tons per hectare.12 This aim was to be achieved through extensive 
irrigation, double and triple cropping, longer working hours, and the release of 
revolutionary fervour connected with the people's liberation from exploitation and 
individual concerns (Chandler 2000: 215). By increasing national production of rice and 
exporting the surpluses it was hoped that the government would earn enough hard 
currency to pay for imports and eventually finance industrialisation (ibid.: 211). 
In order to meet unrealistic targets, cadres reduced the amounts of rice 
available for seed and food (Chandler 2000: 216). Any surplus that could mitigate the 
risks of crop failure was trucked off to feed the leadership and army, some was exported 
to China and some was used to pay for Chinese aid and advisors.13 All objects including 
edible plants and fruit was considered communal property; private vegetable gardens 
and livestock were strictly prohibited (Gottesman 2002: 28). As famine slowly broke 
out in many parts of the country, reports of this crisis went unreported to higher levels 
of government as starvation was seen as evidence of treachery by those cadres in charge 
of food distribution (Chandler 2000: 216). Thus, as the new regime began exporting rice 
in 1976, tens of thousands of people died of starvation (Keirnan 2002: 486).  
The Communist regime, known formally and inaptly as Democratic 
Kampuchea, ruled from April 1975 to January 1979. The Khmer Rouge’s rule over the 
country was halted by the invasion of former Khmer Rouge defectors backed by over 
100,000 Vietnamese troops from across the northeast border. The invasion was swift. 
Troops found little resistance and Phnom Penh fell a mere 14 days after the start of the 
                                                           
12 Rice yields during Sihanouk’s era were roughly 1.2 tones per hectare, although they were 50 per cent higher in 
Battambang and Kampong Cham due to higher soil quality (Federal Research Division 2009). 
13 They set about on a disastrous plan to introduce Chinese hybrid varieties (Helmers 1997). 
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invasion. The Vietnamese invasion scattered Cambodians in all directions. Thousands 
went with the retreating Khmer Rouge to Thailand; the rest seized the food stocks of the 
cooperatives. With little thought for the future, people slaughtered pigs, cows and 
buffaloes, took pots and pans, farm tools and anything they could carry and took to the 
road (Gottesman 2002: 38), looking for lost relatives, seeking to return home or hoping 
merely to avoid the fighting (Gottesman 2002: 38). As a result rice fields were left 
fallow and only a small amount of rice seed remained available for the future harvest.  
As famine once again erupted throughout the country, thousands of 
Cambodians headed to the border where humanitarian relief missions distributed food. 
This food aid also helped to resuscitate remnant Khmer Rouge forces, which united with 
Sihanouk’s royalist forces, and Lon Nol’s ex-republican fighters, and backed by the US, 
China and Thailand, continued to fight a guerrilla war with Vietnamese forces. At least 
30 per cent and up to 85 per cent of the food aid distributed in the Khmer Rouge-
dominated camps, went directly into the hands of troops rather than civilians. Military 
commanders then used the food to get hard currency, buy weapons, establish firmer 
control in the camps, and operate raids back into Cambodian territory (Shawcross 1984 
in Chong 2002: 970). As foreign aid stimulated trade, refugee camps also became 
vibrant centres of cross-border trade with gold, precious stones and jewellery exchanged 
in Thailand for consumer goods and rice. On some days, half a million dollars in gold 
came across the Thai/Cambodian border (Gottesman 2002: 89). 
Within Cambodia, all foreign aid was distributed through the Vietnamese-
installed central government (Chong 2002: 968). Lacking the capacity, and some 
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believe the political will,14 much food aid was not distributed to intended beneficiaries 
and instead accumulated in the ports (Gottesman 2002: 83; Chong 2002: 970). As the 
humanitarian crisis slowly abated by the early 1980s, aid efforts shifted towards long-
term development and capacity building. This relationship primarily entailed an 
exploitative exchange of Cambodian rice and primary resources for infrastructure 
development assistance, industrial and manufactured imports and an army of foreign 
technical advisers from Vietnam and the Soviet Bloc. By the mid 1980s, there were 310 
Soviet advisors in Cambodia along with 22 Czech, 11 Cuban, 7 East German, 5 Laos, 4 
Bulgarian, and 3 Indian, working directly with the Cambodian government (Gottesman 
2002: 146). These numbers do not include the vast numbers of Vietnamese advisors also 
installed throughout government departments. By 1985, Cambodia was spending 2 
million rubles a year on Soviet advisors alone (Gottesman 2002: 147). Exports in rice 
helped to pay for these advisors as well as other imports, all of which were channelled 
and regulated by Vietnam. Thus, despite persistent pockets of food shortages throughout 
the country, Cambodia exported thousands of tons of rice to Vietnam throughout the 
1980s (Gottesman 2002: 151).  
Overall the decade of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, saw the failure of 
agricultural collectivisation and state marketing systems, the decentralisation of 
Cambodia-Vietnam cross-border trade, an explosion in black market trade, the re-
emergence of a political and merchant elite in Phnom Penh and an unstoppable drift of 
                                                           
14 The urgency of Cambodia’s economic crisis and the bureaucratic turmoil that accompanied the establishment of a 
new government meant that ministers were free to negotiate economic assistance with various socialist countries. 
Rivalries evolved among Cambodia's patrons, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, as well as political tensions over the 
reception of aid from the West (Gottesman 2002: 82). 
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the country towards a market economy.15 Concomitantly, socialism was replaced with 
charity.  
The break-up of the Soviet Union provided the final impetus for Vietnam’s 
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 (Chong 2002: 972). By this time Cambodia was 
already showing signs of recovery with rice harvests around the country increasing 
every year (Chandler 2000; Gottesman 2002: 85). Shortly after Vietnam’s withdrawal 
all four competing factions16 reached an agreement in Paris to hold multi-party 
elections. The Paris Peace Accord mandated the creation of a United Nations 
protectorate over the country until 1993 when elections were held. This period brought 
US$2 billion in foreign aid into Cambodia as well as 13,000 soldiers and 7,000 civilians 
under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Chong 
2002: 972).  
UNTAC and Foreign Aid 
UNTAC’s mandate was to steer Cambodia towards peace to enable democratic 
elections to be held. To this end, UNTAC was responsible for disarming troops from all 
four factions; repatriating refugees from Thailand; carrying out rehabilitation projects 
and monitoring human rights abuses. UNTAC was also given the authority to take direct 
control of several administrative functions of the state, including foreign affairs, 
defence, finance and information (Brown and Zasloff 1998 in Chong 2002: 972). This 
was no easy task. Although the ten years of Vietnamese occupation had engendered 
                                                           
15 Many state officials conducted black market trade during socialism and were the first to benefit from market 
reforms (see Gottesman 2002). 
16 The competing factions were comprised of the pro-Hanoi government of Cambodia, The People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea against the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea composed of three Cambodian political 
factions who claimed to be a government in exile: Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Funcinpec party, the Party of 
Democratic Kampuchea (the defeated Khmer Rouge) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). 
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some stability, the country was still largely in a state of chaos. Political corruption and 
factionalism were rife and the Khmer Rouge guerrilla movement was still highly active 
in the countryside (Curtis in Chong 2002: 972). Despite UNTAC’s generous budget and 
staff numbers, it failed to bring the country under control without the cooperation and 
assistance of the Vietnamese-backed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)17 who 
had held power in the ten years prior to the Peace Accord and whose own governance 
structures continued to rule the country behind the scenes (Kevin 2000a: 599). 
According to Kevin (2000a) the UNTAC administration saw numerous confrontations 
over issues of governance and human rights between UNTAC officers and monitors and 
the PRK’s middle- and lower-level officials who continued to answer to party bosses 
(Kevin 2000a: 599; Downie and Kingsbury 2001: 55). 
Thus, the main political impact of the UNTAC administration was the 
“development of a dual state in Cambodia” (Hughes 2000: 49). There was a “shell of a 
constitutional state” constructed by foreign aid on imported principles of liberal 
democratic institutions and rule of law existing in tandem with, and often usurped and 
undermined by what Hughes (2000: 49) terms a ‘shadow state’. This ‘shadow state’ was 
organised around a far more manipulated and commoditised form of patronage than 
previously known in Cambodia, and reinforced through outright violence, threats and 
intimidation (Hughes 2000: 49). 
Although judged a success by many observers at the time, UNTAC was 
delayed in deployment, went over budget by a billion US dollars and failed in its 
                                                           
17 Comprised of former eastern front cadres of the Khmer Rouge who defected and then re-entered the country with 
the Vietnamese and were installed in power.  
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mandate to disarm and disable political factions (Chong 2002: 974). During the UNTAC 
period there was an explosion in HIV/AIDs infections as a result of increased 
prostitution in Phnom Penh responding to newly created demand by foreign troops and 
aid workers. Rural-urban imbalances were exacerbated due to the emergence of ‘Dutch 
disease’.18 Some argue that conditions ripe for PRK power consolidation were created. 
Ottaway (in Chong 2002: 974) argues that the rush towards elections meant that no 
national reconciliation took place, and this allowed for the legitimisation of PRK 
authority in a closed-power situation. Indeed, corruption, intimidation and political 
assassinations occurred in the countryside in the lead up to the 1993 elections 
(Gottesman 2002: 352). Gottesman (2002: 350) considers that the rush to hold elections 
reflected the fact that the interests of foreign countries, eager to solve international Cold 
War stand-offs, dictated the timing and terms of the 1993 elections more than the 
interests of ordinary Cambodian people. Nevertheless, the war weary population threw 
aside sceptical pessimism en masse with 90 per cent of the eligible voters casting a vote 
(Chong 2002: 973).  
UNTAC paved the way for a persistent presence of international development 
agencies, NGOs and foreign advisors in Cambodia. As the humanitarian crisis abated, 
the development industry moved from providing emergency assistance towards the 
promotion of slow stream economic development. During the decade from 1998 to 
2008, total development assistance to Cambodia amounted to about US$5.5 billion 
                                                           
18 Dutch disease refers to the orientation of resources away from the tradable goods sector of an economy and 
towards a newly emergent resource boom resulting in lowered long-term and balanced growth. Although typically 
applied to economies with newly discovered mineral resources, the concept is frequently applied to foreign aid 
interventions, especially large-scale operations such as that of UNTAC, where large parts of the economy were 
oriented towards capturing foreign aid. 
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(Chanboreth and Hach 2008). For the last five years, on average, Cambodia has 
received development assistance of around US$600 million per year. Official 
Development Assistance to Cambodia has steadily increased since 2001. Cambodia 
receives above average per capita ODA compared to other less developed countries 
(LDCs). Aid disbursements are mainly in the form of grants which accounted for 75 per 
cent of total aid from 1998 to 2007 (ibid. 2008).    
 
Figure 3.2: Development aid to Cambodia US$ millions   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 8 
 
Cambodia is a highly aid dependent country. Official Development Assistance 
accounts for half of Cambodia’s national budget (DAC 2008). ODA as a percentage of 
Gross National Income (GNI) is approximately 8 per cent; the Low Income Country 
(LIC) average of ODA as a percentage of GNI is 2.9 per cent (Chanboreth and Hach 
2008: 3). Aid measured in per capita terms in 2005 stood at $US38 for Cambodia, again 
much higher than the LIC average of US$17 (ibid. 2008: 3).  
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Bilateral donors account for the largest amount of aid given to Cambodia, 
followed by multilateral agencies and then NGOs which account for around 10 per cent 
of total aid flows to the country (Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 1). In 2006, net ODA 
provided to Cambodia by members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) amounted to US$529 million or around 75 per cent of total aid (ibid. 2008). 
These donors form the Consultative Group, a group of donors who work in cooperation 
and subscribe to DAC member rules (the ‘moral bookkeepers’ of foreign aid). Members 
of this group meet formally each year to pledge aid assistance, as well as review past 
efforts and pressure the government into making fresh commitments to reform. The 
most recent meeting of the Consultative Group in 2009 resulted in an unprecedented 
level of aid pledges of close to one billon US dollars.  
 
Table 3.1: DAC-OECD member ODA flows to Cambodia 
Receipts 2005 2006 2007 
Net ODA (USD millions) 541 529 672 
Bilateral share (gross ODA) 67% 72% 71% 
Net ODA/GNI 9.0% 7.6% 8.3% 
Net Private Flows (USD millions) 2 190 692 
Source: OECD 2009  
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Table 3.2: Top ten donors of Gross ODA to Cambodia (2006-2007 average) 
Countries USD Millions 
1. Japan 112 
2. United States 74 
3.  Asian Development Fund 59 
4. International Monetary Fund (Structural Adjustment Facility, Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility, Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) 
42 
5. European Commission 37 
6. Industrial Development Agency (Ireland) 33 
7. Germany 33 
8. France 32 
9. Australia 30 
10. Korea 25 
Source: OECD 2009 
 
Aid from other non-DAC members, including China, contributes an additional 
US$180 million per year (DAC 2008). Although aid from non-DAC members is 
generally lower, it is considered to be less conditional in regard to demands for 
democratic reform, market liberalisation or other requirements. For example, aid from 
China is typically provided directly to the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and 
demands little from the government except formal support for China’s reunification 
policy (Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 14). Although Cambodia’s leaders make much of 
China’s supposedly unconditional support, especially during Consultative Group 
meetings, the degree to which Chinese aid can truly be characterised as selfless altruism 
is highly disputed. Commentators on Chinese aid to Cambodia emphasise that much of 
its giving to Cambodia is self-interested and aimed to ensure trade and resource flows 
between the two countries. Yet China is not the only country to pursue its own agenda 
for Cambodia. Most development agencies operating in Cambodia provide development 
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assistance based on their preferences and not based on specific plans or requests by the 
government. For example, while China focuses on energy, transport and direct 
government funding, Germany maintains its preference for funding rural development 
and land management. Other potential trade partners like South Korea and Japan place 
resources in transport, while the US continues to push its worldwide agenda of 
governance and administrative reform (ibid. 2008).   
Official Development Assistance flows to Cambodia are highly fragmented. 
Thirty-nine multilateral and bilateral agencies provide the US$529 million allocated by 
DAC members (Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 3).  Many of these donors provide small 
amounts of less than US$5 million. In 2008, 35 development agencies were providing 
support across a range of sectors, financing 1,300 separate projects of which 700 were 
ongoing (ibid.: 23). According to Chanboreth and Hach (2008: 2), more than 400 donor 
missions, reviews and studies are conducted each year in Cambodia. Consequently, 
government officials are estimated to spend at least 50 per cent of their time dealing 
with aid projects.  
The main sectors targeted for assistance by ODA are government and 
administration, health, transportation, education and rural development. From 1998 to 
2007, more than half of all development aid went to social infrastructure (24 per cent), 
economic infrastructure (20 per cent) and physical infrastructure (16 per cent) sectors. 
The remaining funds were disbursed to multi-sectors. Overall, the share of ODA to 
social sectors has decreased in recent years while disbursements to agriculture, 
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governance and administration have risen. This is in line with international ODA trends 
overall. 
Figure 3.3: Development aid to Cambodia by sector 1998-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 8 
 
Up to half of all international development aid in Cambodia is spent on 
technical assistance and capacity building  (Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 23). The aim of 
technical assistance is to build the capacity of Cambodian counterparts to conduct 
development projects or provide government services and hence build greater 
sustainability of aid efforts among recipients. However, the sustainability of such 
approaches is questionable. A large proportion of technical assistance budgets are spent 
on international consultants to build the capacity of local staff. International consultant 
salaries are often high, around US$100,000 per year tax-free. In 2002, an estimated 750 
international staff were employed by various development agencies, accounting for 12.7 
per cent of total aid expenditure in salaries alone (ibid.: 23). Although international 
consultants are meant to work themselves out of a job by gradually transferring skills to 
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counterparts, this has not necessarily been the case in Cambodia. According to a report 
commissioned by the Cambodian Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) and funded 
by AusAID, some consultants can and have spent more than a decade inhabiting 
ministerial offices without training successors (Fitzgerald 2004). Fitzgerald (2005: 4) 
further writes that donors perpetuate the dominance of consultants in Cambodia through 
habitually resorting to “international experts as a first rather than last resort”. Godfrey et 
al. (2002) attribute this habitual reliance on international experts to the main objective 
of foreign aid, for both donors and the Cambodian government:  to facilitate resource 
flows in a manner agreeable to both parties but primarily donors. International 
consultants usually produce higher quality more acceptable reports, assessments and 
plans than those undertaken by Cambodian counterparts. Consultants are generally also 
trusted more to supervise resource flows. In other words, consultants are better at 
building consensus around aid transfers. The trade-off made by both donors and 
government is to forgo long-term capacity building objectives in the interests of rapid 
and sustained resource flows (Godfrey et al. 2002: 356).  
The long-term impact of the trade-off made in favour of sustained and rapid 
resource flows is a lack of capacity building outcomes. Low levels of capacity building 
have perpetuated donor mistrust in recipients’ capacity to efficiently and effectively 
absorb aid resources. Consequently, much technical assistance delivery results in the 
ongoing creation of parallel government structures. The creation of parallel government 
structures was first initiated under UNTAC and is currently replicated under a myriad of 
disharmonised donor projects. The insistence that development projects follow donor 
procedures, not those of the RGC, means that Cambodia has seen a proliferation of 
Aiding Trade 
117 
project implementation units which, in most respects, mirrors government functions, 
albeit on a smaller scale. Depending on the attitude of a particular donor to the 
government, these units may be semi-parallel in nature. Preliminary findings from the 
2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration suggest that 123 parallel project 
implementation units were operating in 2007, of which 40 were focused on agriculture 
and rural development (CRDB/CDC 2008). Parallel structures established according to 
the demands of different donors mean that much of the advice provided by international 
consultants to the government is contradictory. Another often noted dysfunctional 
outcome of parallel units is the poaching of government workers to staff international 
development projects. Overall, foreign aid in Cambodia is often characterised as donor-
driven, fragmented, uncoordinated and therefore duplicate and unnecessarily expensive 
(Chanboreth and Hach 2008; Godfrey et al. 2002; Fitzgerald 2004). 
The Business of Aid and Government 
Indisputably the Khmer Rouge did not succeed in abolishing all of Cambodia’s culture 
and traditions. However, the rhetorical force of the Khmer Rouge’s ‘year zero’ has long 
reinforced a well-documented development industry tendency to define developing 
countries in terms of what they lack (Ferguson 1994). In the case of Cambodia, the 
constant revision of Khmer Rouge history by western scholars and the insistence that in 
the wake of year zero, culture, religion, institutions, intellectual capital, agricultural 
knowledge and so on were completely annihilated, has served for years as justification 
for many foreign development projects which seem happy to ignore the ten years of 
Soviet and Vietnamese assistance provided during the 1980s. While none would dispute 
that the malevolent utopian vision of Democratic Kampuchea inflicted unprecedented 
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death and destruction upon the country, the interpretation that there was simply nothing 
left afterwards is wrong. Contrary to the assertions of Oveson et al. (1996), Cambodia 
did not emerge from this period as an atomised nation of households devoid of social 
linkages, trade and cooperation. Indeed, Gottesman (2002: 188) writes that eight years 
after the Khmer Rouge evacuated Phnom Penh, and four years after the Vietnamese 
invasion that led to their overthrow, the then ruling People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK) party admitted that Cambodia was not a purely rural country. “The provincial 
capitals and the districts have capitals that are, in fact, economic, cultural, and political 
centres" (Minister Fang You 1983 in Gottesman 2002: 188). Despite this admission, it is 
a reality frequently not recognised by many development agencies and government 
officials in Cambodia today. Countless project design documents outlining justifications 
for intervention start by emphasising Cambodia’s deeply agrarian and subsistence 
nature. Although it would be foolish to dispute the centrality of agriculture to many 
Cambodians’ livelihoods, there remains a tendency by development agencies and power 
holders in the country to infer that, beyond a general rurality, nothing much else exists. 
Despite the fact that Cambodia’s capital is once again the thriving entrepôt of Phnom 
Penh, and that trade continued informally in all but the Khmer Rouge years, the myth of 
Cambodia as a primarily subsistence nation persists.  
The belief that prior to the arrival of western aid, no institutions really existed 
is very much part of the development discourse that surrounds the practical business of 
the establishment of parallel government structures. It is a perspective very much based 
on erroneous assumptions as Fitzgerald (2005) notes it was in the disorienting days of 
post-UNTAC that donors first began rejecting the idea that any credible institutions 
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existed other than themselves. It is a perspective that is perpetuated under current aid 
practices. 
The mindset that no credible institutions exist is in many ways a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as the practices of international development in Cambodia ensure the 
continual drain of competent government staff into better paying ‘development’ jobs in 
better equipped offices. Meanwhile, government staff who inhabit often crumbling and 
decrepit state offices are oriented towards fulfilling the demands of donor procedures on 
a fraction of the pay. The orientation of state resources towards the development sector 
occurs at a cultural level too. Few consultants speak Khmer or learn Khmer. Most 
meetings are held in English, as are the voluminous reports that development agencies 
are wont to produce. Procedures, practices and administration follow the demands of 
donors, and few are adapted to suit the Cambodian context. As government services are 
generally oriented towards donors and most social services fail to deliver any tangible 
benefits to ordinary citizens the number of NGOs in the country has proliferated. There 
are currently 1,500 local NGOs and 340 international NGOs registered in Cambodia 
(Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 16).  
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Figure 3.4: NGO disbursements for development projects 1998-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 17 
 
Figure 3.5: Total NGO development project disbursements by sector 1998–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chanboreth and Hach 2008: 18 
 
According to Downie and Kingsbury (2001: 56), this proliferation of NGOs is 
largely the result of external funding by bilateral and multilateral donors, especially 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the US. However there are other compelling 
reasons which support the establishment of NGOs. Favourable tax laws, regulatory 
laxity and other concessions made for NGOs in Cambodia mean that there are a number 
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of NGOs which are by all appearances businesses, yet they maintain NGO status to 
avoid taxation. These NGOs are often established and run by government staff who 
appoint themselves grandiose titles such as ‘president’. Businesses actually registered as 
NGOs help provide supplementary income to the paltry civil service wages. While other 
locally established NGOs may be more sincere in their efforts towards poverty 
alleviation, there is no doubt that among the multitudes of organisations registered as 
NGOs in Cambodia, many combine Uphoff’s (1993: 611) modes of organisational 
power (political, normative and remunerative) in a hybrid form.  Although recent 
government moves to crack down on what has been dubbed ‘NGO heaven’ were 
reported in 2008, observers noted that such a move was aimed not at shutting down 
illegitimate local NGOs but rather at silencing any international NGOs which criticised 
the government over human rights and corruption (Guthrie 2008).  
What stands at the basis of ineffective technical assistance packages, the 
creation of parallel units and Cambodia’s over-supply of NGOs are poor donor/recipient 
relations. They are relationships which Fitzgerald (2004) characterise as low in mutual 
trust, disrespectful and entailing a great deal of private criticism. On numerous 
occasions during my own fieldwork, I was shocked by the attitudes of many expatriate 
consultants to the country and the people. While few openly criticised their own Khmer 
colleagues, generalised comments about the ‘nature’ of Cambodians were not dissimilar 
to the comments of the previous French and Vietnamese colonisers. I frequently 
encountered comments regarding Cambodians’ laziness, inability to ‘think 
conceptually’ and overall corruptness. In hushed tones, some even searched to identify 
innate characteristics within Khmer culture to account for the Khmer Rouge genocide.  
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Poor donor/recipient relations are further perpetuated by the outward 
appearance of tolerance by local staff. Pearson (2005: 5) attributes such tolerance to 
externally imposed power hierarchies that place barangs (white foreigners) in senior 
positions with control over resources. Such power structures, she states, “reflect the 
predominant social construct of patron-client relations, with which many Cambodians 
are comfortable because of its familiarity” (Pearson 2005: 5). Whether or not 
Cambodians are ‘comfortable’ with such hierarchies is beside the point. Typical 
responses such as habitually answering ‘yes’ to any question asked, feigned ignorance, 
or extreme deferral to expatriates on even minor decisions, may be read as either a form 
of resistance, acquiescence or even respectful obedience depending on the circumstance 
and relationship. The point is, however, that such behaviour is a pragmatic approach to 
risk avoidance in the face of uneven power. 
The inability and/or unwillingness of both expatriates and Khmers to confront 
the dysfunctions of their relationships, manifests on both sides as continued support for 
the formal pretence that Cambodia is a helpless subsistence-oriented country with no 
operable institutions or operable markets. This pretence, and the continued focus by 
donors on building parallel structures to what is perceived not to exist, appears to suit 
the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) (the PRK’s descendant) as it provides a 
diversion to its often brutal tactics of political consolidation.  
Gifts and Political Capital  
When in Cambodia it is not uncommon to see images on the evening television news of 
Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, boasting of his ability to garner international 
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development aid funds for the good of the Cambodian people, which he often attributes 
to his own personal charisma (Hughes 2006: 472). Such performances attest to the 
continued tradition in Cambodian politics of the manipulation of foreign patrons and 
their resources to consolidate domestic power. In a 2004 USAID report on corruption in 
Cambodia, writers estimated that between US$300 to US$500 million dollars (roughly 
the annual total ODA from DAC members) was diverted annually from government 
coffers (Calavan et al. 2004). According to this report, although donor funds are subject 
to formal monitoring and evaluation, they are still misused and diverted in numerous 
ways. Development loans usually flow through the Ministry of Finance, which receives 
and allocates much of the money from international institutions and extracts a ‘fee’ for 
transfer to its intended destination (Calavan et al. 2004: 3). In the case of procurements 
for projects using donor funds, bribes may be elicited from vendors to ensure that they 
are awarded the contract. Furthermore, donor-provided commodities may simply be 
sold off on the private market, as was the case in 2004 when the World Food Program 
(WFP) discovered that US$1.2 million dollars worth of rice designated for distribution 
throughout food insecure areas of the country had gone missing (Hay 2008). Calavan et 
al. (2004: 3), cite a case in which donated medicines were found for sale in a shop 
owned by a senior government official. 
The steady influx of foreign aid (and more recently foreign direct investment) 
means that Cambodian elites need not be as dependent on domestic constituents to 
extract wealth. Consequently, observers note that Cambodian elites are less responsive 
to their ‘clients’ than other patrons in Southeast Asian nations where extensive client 
networks remain a key source of wealth and power. Both Calavan et al. (2004) and 
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Ledgerwood and Vijghen (2002) state that much of the wealth accumulated by 
government elites is not reinvested in patron-client relations, rather it is moved out of 
the village, province or country. Indeed, it is a common rumour that many key leaders of 
the CPP have amassed staggering fortunes in Singaporean bank accounts.  
However, since electoral support is now required to ensure the legitimacy of 
the ruling party in a way that foreign patrons previously never demanded, this has 
transformed the nature of Cambodian patron-client relations. Hughes (2006) and 
Ledgerwood and Vijghen (2002) both argue that today, patron-client relations in 
Cambodia are far less flexible and negotiable than they were previously held to be in 
pre-colonial times by Chandler (2000). Instead, control is now largely enforced through 
new, modern forms of bureaucratic power that penetrate far beyond municipal 
boundaries and down towards the remotest of villages through what Hughes (2006) 
characterises as regimenting gift giving. According to Hughes (2006) traditional gift 
giving practices of saboraschon (selfless, meritous giving to the public good by a 
spiritual benefactor) and patron-client networks (khsae) have undergone significant 
reinvention, which while still referring to cultural traditions in order to maintain moral 
leverage, are accompanied by a palpable sense of threat in such a way that it makes 
resistance difficult if not outright dangerous. Hughes argues that gifts given are 
designed to mobilise a powerful sense of surveillance and menace, which underpins the 
stabilisation of insider-outsider distinctions within rural villages and bureaucratic 
regimentation of their inhabitants. Gift-giving offers villagers choice between, on the one 
hand, cooperating with an invented cultural order that offers the security of physical 
protection and the comfort of a link (albeit a strained one) with memories of a happier time 
and, on the other hand, being cast adrift in a militarised and threatening environment. 
Because gift-giving thus operates on a number of discursive, administrative and coercive 
levels, it is difficult to either conceive of or enact resistance (2006: 472). 
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Hughes (2006) considers that gifts given by Hun Sen under the tradition of saboraschon 
invoke the divine public works of Angkor kings, and as such render the giver with 
innate and unassailable spiritual power. Such gifts, whether a school, hospital, bridge or 
irrigation canal are presented as personal gifts from Hun Sen, rather than a modern form 
of post-conflict rebuilding by state ministries funded through public monies (Hughes 
2006: 477). Hughes (2006) argues that this type of giving disguises the extent to which 
modern forms of administration are relied upon, replacing them with nostalgic 
references to bygone days of glory and empire. The gratitude that such gifts demand is 
then enforced through the thoroughly more worldly application of patron-client 
networks. Patron-client networks are embodied in the figure of bong thom (big brother) 
or the ‘strongman’, a figure who typically dominates such networks via personal links 
of protection and favour. Under these networks loyalty is demanded and then further 
enforced through the systematic harnessing of coercive state powers (Hughes 2006: 
470). This includes intimidating surveillance over party registration drives19 and other 
fear-inducing techniques, which according to Hughes (2006), enforce dependence rather 
than negotiate reciprocity. Gifts distributed through patron-client networks tend to be 
tokenistic (small quantities of rice, clothing or MSG), and require in exchange pledges 
of allegiance to the CPP by villagers, lest they risk intimidation or possibly murder.20  
                                                           
19 Hughes writes that membership drives are based upon the explicit message that by accepting gifts villagers agree to 
submit to party organisation of their participation in the poll. In one example given, villagers were placed in groups 
of ten under the auspices of a group leader. Frequently voter registration cards were collected and held by group 
leaders, to be redistributed on the morning of the election, thus ensuring that voters attended the polling station as 
one of the group, rather than alone. Oaths of loyalty to the party were taken in front of a statue of the Buddha and 
used traditional forms of language, implying karmic fall-out should the oath later be violated. Alongside the use of 
written documents to symbolise the threatening bureaucracy of the modern state, reports were widespread of voters 
being required to drink ‘oath water’ from a glass containing a bullet (2006: 481). 
20 Hughes documents one case where an opposition party loyalist was told “you live outside of society now” and was 
murdered ten days prior to the 1998 election (2006: 483).  
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This militarised and bureaucratised structure of gift giving and the culture of 
fear and retribution it inspires is now so firmly lodged in Cambodia that electoral 
tampering is barely needed. In the country’s most recent commune council elections of 
2007, the CPP won 98 per cent of votes, a victory which while passed off by official 
observers as legitimate, was, as one commentator noted, second only to Sadam 
Hussein’s election result prior to American invasion (Colley 2007). Indeed, Cambodia’s 
regime of gift giving has reached Foucauldian proportions that now “tie villagers across 
the territory more tightly to a more interventionist state” (Hughes 2006: 473). This is 
evidenced in the landscape where Hun Sen schools, irrigation canals, bridges, roads and 
other public works and amenities now stand side to side with AusAID canals, JICA 
water towers and ADB bridges. Villages proclaim their loyalty to the CPP with 
billboards at their gates, in much the same way that traditional scarecrows (ting mong) 
are used to protect against evil spirits –– pledges of allegiance to the CPP guard against 
“modern forms of exclusion and punishment, that would not have been available to pre-
modern patrons” (Hughes 2006: 471). 
Hughes’ description of Cambodia’s ‘regimented gift giving’ inevitably works 
to configure economic infrastructure and trade relations. She notes that control over 
roads and bridges commonly means control over resources as government funds are 
deployed to build roads into remote forested hinterlands to speed extraction. She goes 
on to say “control over roads represents control over population, trade, territory and 
jungle” (2006: 478). Indeed, Calavan et al. (2004) refer to the granting of illegal 
concessions by Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries to logging companies 
Aiding Trade 
127 
(many of which are owned by relatives of the ruling party).21 Wealth is also 
accumulated through the control of specific commodities or informal taxing of them 
(Calavan et al 2004). Gift relations also shape petty commodity exchange. For example, 
on a less grand scale of extraction, one informant working for the FAO with fishing 
communities on the Tonle Sap informed me that when he offered the village women 
help with finding another marketing outlet rather than the local patron who purchased 
their fish at below market price, they refused. They explained that while the local patron 
gave them low prices for their fish, he also helped their families in times of need, when 
children required schooling or family members got sick. If the FAO could help them get 
higher prices and help them in times of need, they said, then they would consider it. In 
the minds of the village women, accepting low prices for their fish was a scant trade-off 
for the provision of protection.   
 In this way, gift giving in Cambodia structures the extraction of commodities 
to the benefit of the powerful. Despite attempts by donors to chastise the government, 
development funds are inevitably caught within its culture of ‘regimented gift giving’. 
For example, not long after the World Food Program (WFP) corruption scandal, an 
informant from the organisation told me how government four wheel drives would 
appear out of nowhere to ‘escort’ WFP rice distribution trucks, and make it appear as 
though aid was part of government efforts, to ‘help’ the people. 
Perversely, under current political circumstances, the Cambodian economy has 
grown at an unprecedented rate. In the five years prior to the Global Financial Crisis, 
                                                           
21
 A 2007 report by Global Witness (which resulted in its expulsion from the country) details how Cambodia’s 
natural forest resources are being systematically and criminally logged for the benefit of the ruling CPP elite, many of 
whom are related (Global Witness 2007). 
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the country experienced growth rates of 10 per cent per year (CIA 2009). Nevertheless, 
Cambodia remains in the unfortunate category of least developed country, replete with 
prerequisite abysmal human development indicators as outlined in Table 3.3. Although 
human development indicators have improved in recent years in line with economic 
growth, they have not improved as much as they should have in rural areas with high 
levels of absolute poverty persisting (CDRI 2006). Over the years of economic growth, 
rural and agricultural development have foundered despite significant donor funding.  
Table 3.3: Selected human development indicators for Cambodian and its regional 
neighbours (2006) 
  Life 
Expectancy 
at Birth 
2006 
 Adult literacy 
rate  (% ages 
15 and above) 
2006 
 Combined 
primary, 
secondary and 
tertiary gross 
enrolment ratio 
(%) 2006 
GDP per 
capita (PPP 
US$) 2006 
HDI  
Australia 81 (5) 99 (1=) 114.2 (1) 33,035 (20) 0.965 (4) 
Burma 61.2 (136) 89.9 (66) 56.3 (146) 881 (163) 0.585 (135) 
Cambodia 58.6 (142)  75.6  (101) 58.7 (141) 1619 (142) 0.0575 (136) 
China 72.7 (69) 93 (53)  68.7 (113) 4,682 (104) 0.762 (94) 
Japan 82.4 (8) 99 (1=) 86.6 (40) 31,951 (24) 0.956 (8) 
Laos 63.7 (128) 72.5 (108) 59.6 (139) 1,980 (134) 0.608 (133) 
Thailand 70 (47) 93.9 (47) 78 (67) 7,613 (80) 0.786 (81) 
Vietnam 74 (55) 90.3 (64) 62.3 (127) 2,363 (129) 0.718 (114) 
Source: UNDP 2008  (Number in brackets is ranking) 
 
Much to the chagrin of donors, the government’s agricultural strategy has been 
one of favouring large-scale industry, plantations and concessions, often awarded to 
party affiliates or large-scale foreign investors. This is despite the government’s stated 
National Strategic Development Plans 2006 to 2010, which emphasise the promotion of 
agriculture as an important engine of growth (RGC 2006). Instead, a report on the 
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agrarian structure of Cambodia notes that many senior officials view plantation-led 
development as key to export-led growth, while smallholders are perceived as a dead-
end (Agrifood 2005: 27). Indeed, Cambodia has been at the centre of many new 
international deals, whereby rich nations are buying up large tracts of agricultural lands 
in poor countries. Dubbed the ‘global land grab’ it was reported in grain.org in 2008 that 
the Cambodian government was negotiating up to US$3 billion in agricultural 
investments from rich nations and multinational corporations in return for millions of 
hectares in land concessions, the largest of which is a bilateral deal with Kuwait 
involving a US$546 million loan in exchange for a 70 to 90 year lease covering a large 
area of rice land. Food production from this concession will be exported back to 
Kuwait. This is despite the fact that food security for many individual households 
remains an issue, necessitating continued WFP assistance.  
Slocomb (2007) argues that the current government’s rubber plantation model 
–– capitalistic, rational, bureaucratic, profit-driven and divorced from traditional 
agricultural practices –– first introduced by the French, remains the model for 
indigenous colonisation of agriculture overall by the ruling elite of Cambodia. She adds 
that this model now applies to most agri-business sectors including logging, fisheries 
and other export crops such as rice, palm oil and cashews. Consequently, land 
ownership is concentrating, with a mere 10 per cent of the population now owning 33 
per cent of the land (Shams 2007). Incidences of land grabbing have also made 
international headlines as Cambodian government and business elites have exploited 
insecure land rights and titling (BBC 2009).  
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Peron implicitly blames the aid industry in Cambodia for much of the agri-
business sector’s woes (2007). First, she states that the majority of agricultural aid 
efforts have been focused on production rather than marketing or agri-business 
development. Second, she notes that high inflows of aid money starting from the 1990s 
onwards have not been monitored correctly and in many cases have increased 
corruption levels in the country (Peron 2007). According to Peron, the significant 
proportion of aid funds that has been siphoned off into offshore accounts by high-
ranking officials (2007: 16) has contributed to a scarcity of finance domestically, 
thereby increasing the cost of credit. Despite acknowledgement of this by donors, aid 
funds have continued to flow unabated, further exacerbating corruption. This corruption 
has distorted the land market (Peron 2007). Although official land titles are supposed to 
cost between US$5 and US$20 to obtain, in reality land titles costs US$500 to US$2500 
in ‘additional’ fees. The high cost of land titles has increased the cost of credit, as legal 
land titles –– the traditional form of collateral for borrowing –– are prohibitively high 
for most smallholders and enterprises. As the majority of Cambodians lack a land title, 
this has fuelled land grabbing by powerful officials. This occurs in especially lucrative 
areas, with high productive potential or along paved highways (Peron 2007: 23). Much 
of this land is then sold or leased to larger, often foreign agri-business firms that can 
meet the high capital requirements. Peron (2007) notes that aid has immanent and 
unintended impacts on the agricultural sector. Aid is blamed for corruption, which is 
then blamed for low levels of regulation, high borrowing costs and ineffective 
government, and hence a lack of growth in the agricultural sector (Peron 2007). 
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Under such circumstances, one would expect to find high levels of grassroots 
resistance. However, examples of local agency in Cambodia’s current political climate 
are sparse especially in the current literature dominated by political economists and 
historians. Hughes (2006: 482) documents some minor instances of political resistance, 
such as snide comments made by villagers dubbing the CCP the MSG Party, and 
thereby implying that the gifts received are not a fair exchange for their votes, but these 
examples standout as tactics and weapons of the weak in the face of unrelenting power 
rather than any sort of effective or systematic opposition (Scott 1985, 1990). While 
there are some notable public opponents to ever-consolidating CPP power, it is often 
difficult to know whose support for the party is genuine and whose is feigned. Indeed, 
after centuries of invasions, civil war, occupation, colonisation, bombing campaigns and 
genocide, Cambodian folklore bears many hallmark aphorisms for risk aversion and 
survival in the face of potentially life-threatening power. For instance, the common 
saying, ‘an egg cannot hit with the stone’ (pong moan gom chul ning thmor) presages 
that the weak will never prevail against the strong. There are numerous folktales in 
Cambodia, which unlike European ones, appear to contain no apparent lesson except to 
demonstrate that life is unfair and often ends in death. Becker (1986: 66) draws 
attention to the story of the ‘Devilish Woman’ who tricks and kills numerous people and 
then simply goes home. Similarly, Chhay (2005) refers to the story of Tom Teav of Pich 
Tom Kravel in which everyone except the king ends up dead. 
Such adages and stories illuminate Cambodian attitudes to development. Cross-
cultural observers, Pearson (2005) and Chhay (2005) note that given the country’s war 
ravaged history, change is rarely seen as a good thing; instead it is a potentially 
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disastrous risk to be feared. This is anathema to the discourse of development. 
Furthermore, prevailing Cambodian attitudes insist that change only occurs when 
something or rather, someone, is wrong. Insisting on change, therefore, often leads to a 
loss of face for those involved, something to be avoided, particularly when it involves 
the powerful. Thus it is not uncommon for development consultants to express 
exasperation that participatory techniques seem rarely to engender genuine engagement, 
but rather extreme passivity so as not to aggrieve power holders. Although Downie and 
Kingsbury (2001: 51) write that Cambodians find it difficult to accept the concept of 
neutrality of development organisations, I would contend that it is a pragmatic attitude 
towards power and the way it operates within the country which leads many to 
disbelieve that any non-governmental organisation could actuallys be neutral. In 
Cambodia, it appears that one can only be for the government or against it. Indeed, to 
reiterate Mauss, “to refuse to give, or fail to invite, is –– like refusing to accept –– the 
equivalent of a declaration of war” (1954: 11). The refusal to accept political gifts from 
the ruling party is paramount to a declaration of war.  
In such circumstances it is difficult to see how development aid can foster 
sustainability and ‘ownership’ for projects when the appropriate response to a gift from 
a donor (who for all intents and purposes appears to be a “partner” of the government) is 
increased dependence, deference, and gratitude. Hughes writes that, “gifts are 
specifically intended to differentiate between the power of the giver to get things done 
and the powerlessness of the recipient” (2006: 478). As such, the nightly boasting of 
Hun Sen of his personal capacity to induce the flow of aid monies to Cambodia often 
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circumvents any alternative interpretations or mediations of gift relations intended by 
aid donors. 
This in no way implies, however, that agency does not exist. For instance 
Edwards (2006) documents examples throughout Cambodian history where new 
infrastructure (mainly roads) also provides channels for peasant protest, lobbying and 
resistance as opposed to obligatory gratitude. Similarly, Chandler (2000) notes the 
degree to which roads make bureaucratic power more superficial and fleeting, with 
inspections limited to brief stops on passable roads. Davis (2009) highlights subversive 
reinterpretations of the festival of Pcheum Ben that criticise rural-urban inequalities and 
Ojendal and Sedara (2006) argue that, although current representations of Cambodian 
political culture as crudely authoritarian and violent are indeed valid, since the process 
of decentralisation in Cambodia began in 1996, discourses of participatory development 
are making headway. They detail changes in political language that emphasise 
cooperation, consensus building and transparency and note that there is general 
acknowledgement by local power holders of the need to build consensus among their 
constituents. Furthermore, the proliferation of NGOs in Phnom Penh and around the 
country has helped fuel critical debate by educated Khmers who do not depend on 
traditional patronage networks. Thus beyond the formal pretences of donors and 
government, the polite avoidance and feigned compliance, there is also deviation from 
formal scripts that tenuously mask the rapidly changing realities of Cambodia today. 
Chapter Three: Tribute and Trade in Cambodia 
134 
Conclusion  
Oscillating attitudes towards systems of tribute and trade are perceptible traits of many 
Southeast Asian nations which constantly grapple with the desire to reject trade and the 
foreign influences it brings, and return to a glorified tradition of self-sufficiency or 
embrace foreign trade and influence for the potential bounty of wealth promised. These 
oscillations have been particularly severe in Cambodia. High levels of foreign 
intervention have typically been followed by extreme periods of self-imposed isolation 
drawing upon the constructed history of Angkor Wat for legitimacy. Unwittingly 
bearing witness to Pol Pot’s words  “at certain times in Cambodian history we have not 
needed money” (1978 in Edwards 2007: 2), foreign interventionism and geopolitical 
conflict have often set in motion extreme isolationist movements that have set the 
country apart from the rest of the region (Osborne 2005). The key difference between 
Cambodia and many of its neighbours is, according to Kevin (2000b), the high degree 
of foreign interventionism that Cambodia has experienced extending over at least the 
past three decades, while most other Southeast Asian countries were independently 
shaping their own societies. This has resulted in the very palpable sense within 
Cambodia that the country is in danger of simply disappearing, either through outright 
invasion or slowly through foreign dilution (Edwards 2007; Hughes 2000).  
As the spectre of Cambodia’s disappearance occupies much of modern day 
Cambodian politics, the continued colonisation of the country by Khmer elites reliant 
more on foreign patronage and less on domestic support continues unabated, often 
legitimated by appeals to Angkor tradition (Kevin 2000b: 34). Foreign influence has 
transformed the nature of Cambodian patron-client relations into a far more menacing 
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form of extraction, based not on reciprocity but threat and violence. Gifts redolent with 
Angkor mythology, are enrolled to covertly co-opt protest and consolidate power. Gifts 
also allow for the domination of commodity relations. In this sense, gifts and 
commodities in Cambodia do not bestow power; rather gifts and commodities are 
merely devices of the powerful to build risk averse agreement to their domination. 
Without a consideration of the way that gift-giving operates in the context of a country 
like Cambodia any attempt to ensure pro-poor development via commodity chain 
construction will be seriously compromised.  
 Chapter Four 
Bilateral Rice Seed Companies 
 
Strength and spirit, in the village of Tanue 
With low inputs and costs from farmers 
Following formula for seed bed preparation and transplant 
In line with technical advice, ensure effectiveness in weed control 
All in each farmer’s field, farmers are happy because of good yield 
Learning and applying as we go, though physically exhausted still we try 
AQIP kindly provide with no reservations 
Receiving this support with open arms 
Easy to grow yet with high results, forever we will record in our hearts 
2 –3 cars will timely arrive at the gate dealing freely with all farmers 
AQIP keeps on helping us, no more negotiate with middleman 
Endowed with truth and chasing successful results because of AQIP 
In deep essence and meanings, my sincere apologies to you all 
With great health and forever 
Happiness and success 
 
Source: AQIP Offices. Attributed to farmers in Tanou village, Chambak Commune, Svay Chuum District, Svay Rieng. 
 
This chapter details a traditional bilateral agricultural development project, 
AusAID’s Agricultural Quality Improvement Project (AQIP). It was traditional in the 
sense that development activities followed a classic project model aimed at 
agricultural input improvement. The Agricultural Quality Improvement Project 
resurrected some key characteristics of the Green Revolution that bypassed 
Cambodia due to historical circumstances, albeit with a slightly more sensitised 
ecological approach. Although the project used similar technologies to the Green 
Revolution, including short-duration high-yielding seeds reliant on chemical 
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fertilisers, it also introduced ‘improved’ indigenous varieties adapted to local 
ecologies. Through the dissemination of higher quality seed, the project aimed to 
improve both agricultural production quantity and quality via arms-length discipline 
imposed by transformed, rationalised input supply (Morgan et al. 2006). This 
traditional agricultural development approach was altered, however, by wider 
institutional frameworks governing best practice, especially aid effectiveness ideals. 
These ideals were very much dominated by private sector approaches, which were 
fast becoming the aid industry norm in the late 1990s. Thus the natural tendency of 
bilateral agricultural projects to work directly through or with recipient governments 
to distribute agricultural aid was tempered by the insistence that the recipient 
government, in this case, play a more limited role in ownership and dissemination. 
Instead, greater emphasis was placed on the private sector through the establishment 
of private rice seed companies.  
The tensions inherent in this project were thus between traditional 
government-driven, top-down, bilateral aid project structures and modern, market-led 
requirements. In other words, the tensions of this project represent the classic 
tensions between gifts and commodities. Far from rationalising these two streams of 
exchange into separate and incommensurable relations, this ‘private sector oriented 
development project’ reinforced and transformed a range of different gift and 
commodity relations within the recipient country, strengthening some above others 
and often with perverse outcomes. The dual aims of establishing commercially 
successful rice seed companies and poverty alleviation resulted in both direct sales 
and indirect gifts of seed to farmers, both of which undermined the commercial 
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viability of the seed companies yet ultimately bypassed the poor farmers the project 
set out to help. This outcome then precipitated the need for more donor aid to the 
private companies in the name of poverty alleviation of subsistence farmers. 
Although very little of this aid ended up assisting the target ‘subsistence farmers’, 
this seemed of little consequence to the larger bilateral ‘gift’ relations that the 
farmer’s very existence was enrolled to justify. 
The Agricultural Quality Improvement Project 
The primary purpose of AQIP was to “improve food security and cash income for 
farm households to take them beyond the current levels of marginal subsistence in 
selected districts of selected provinces” (AusAID 1999: 46). To this end the project 
was to spend a total of AU$17.2 million over five years (ACIL 2006a: 3). The major 
vehicle to achieve this objective was the establishment of four rice seed companies in 
four adjacent provinces of Cambodia. These companies were to “improve the 
availability of varieties and quality of rice seed in target provinces” (AusAID 1999: 
57). Although the seed companies comprised just one component of the project, 
which also included irrigation, rice post-harvest improvement, provincial agricultural 
consulting services and fresh fruit and vegetable marketing, the companies were 
considered, by key stakeholders, to be the central output of the project, and absorbed 
the majority of the budget. Table 4.1 shows project costs by component. Seed 
production comprised the highest share of total project costs at 37 per cent followed 
by project management costs at 36 per cent. Thus, the success or failure of these 
companies was central to the success or failure of the overall project.  
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Table 4.1: Total AQIP costs (millions of AUD) 
Component/ 
Year 
2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 Total % 
Seed production 0.530 2.176 0.035 0.510 0.514 0.238 6.002 37 
Post harvest 0.127 0.285 0.263 0.249 0.314 0.141 1.379 8 
Fruit & vegetable 
marketing 
0.002 0.064 0.168 0.102 0.183 0.094 0.613 4 
Irrigation 0.110 0.104 0.140 0.214 0.218 0.022 0.808 5 
Training 0.255 0.249 0.275 0.409 0.346 0.195 1.729 11 
Project 
management 
1.622 0.898 0.938 0.847 0.876 0.710 5.893 36 
Total 2.645 3.777 3.820 2.330 2.451 1.596 16.619 100 
Source: ACIL 2006b. 
 
Furthermore, as the first private companies set up by AusAID in Cambodia, 
the success or failure of the companies stood as an experimental model in private 
sector oriented development aid for this agency’s efforts in the country as a whole. 
Donor stakeholders therefore maintained tentative opinions on the project and its 
potential to deliver systematically benefits to rural producers through private sector 
distribution. When I first began studying this project near the end of the project cycle 
in 2005, the perspective of some donor representatives and the implementing agency 
were doubtful about the degree to which any success could be achieved via 
Cambodia’s somewhat embryonic formal private sector. Doubts were, however, 
tempered with a degree of controlled optimism that at the very least the project 
would lead to further productivity and quality gains in the rice sector.22 In this sense, 
the project stood as an indicative example of a second-generation Green Revolution 
project, but was also a first generation private sector project.  
                                                           
22 Personal communication with lead consultant June 2005. 
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The private sector orientation of AQIP, while contentious among some 
donor representatives, aligned the project with the relevant political and economic 
conditions of a rapidly changing Cambodia as well as the current development 
orthodoxy of sustainability. Since the 1980s and the undeniable failure of central 
planning, the Cambodian government had embarked on a process of market-driven 
reform. Thus, in keeping with the market focus, commercial rice seed companies 
were set up in four selected provinces as primary project beneficiaries, to be jointly 
overseen by provincial government authorities. Commercially successful companies 
were seen as key to the sustainability of Australian efforts to continue to deliver 
systematically high quality seed to farmers after the close of donor funding. Although 
improved seed had previously been distributed via NGOs, government extension and 
on-farm trials, sustainability was interpreted primarily in market terms. Indeed, with 
a cash-strapped Cambodian government and imminent WTO accession which was 
poised to impose tight limitations on agricultural subsidies, circumstances and 
finances left government-sponsored support for improved rice seed distribution 
untenable despite the fact that many of Cambodia’s neighbouring rice-dependent 
countries had maintained steadfast government protection over their national rice 
sectors as a matter of utmost national food security (Timmer 2004). For Cambodia 
the market appeared to be the only hope for improving Cambodian farmers’ seed 
stocks; the private sector offered a discourse of inevitability despite the uncertainty 
of Cambodia’s emerging market economy. 
The target provinces were the neighbouring Takeo, Svay Reing, Prey Veng 
and Kandal, all located in southern Cambodia. These provinces were selected 
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through participatory preference ranking with government, NGOs and international 
organisations. During project design, twenty preferences were identified and ranked 
accordingly. First among the preferences were provinces that displayed the highest 
capacity to take advantage of good quality seed especially in terms of irrigation, land 
tenure, market access and high levels of dry-season rice production, yet were 
nonetheless poor, densely populated and showed high levels of malnourishment, 
coupled with a disproportionate number of female headed households (AusAID 
1999: 40). In short, the provinces were identified as having commercial potential but 
were nevertheless poor.  
Figure 4.1: AQIP’s target provinces 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University. 
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The establishment of the four seed companies was jointly overseen by the 
AQIP project and provincial authorities who were also given a 49 per cent share in 
the companies (one per cent below what would, under Cambodian law, be classed as 
a stated owned enterprise), held in trust by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) under the rationale that in Cambodia’s uncertain business climate 
it was advantageous for the newly establishing enterprises to have robust links with 
central government. The seed companies were situated on land donated by provincial 
authorities as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Australian 
and Cambodian governments. Designed as a token of goodwill and to foster a sense 
of partnership on the part of Cambodia regarding the project, much of the land 
designated by provincial authorities was, in fact, poor quality, easily flooded and in 
some cases contained unexploded ordinances.   
In 2002, the construction of the four seed processing plants, operated under 
four separate companies, was completed. Each seed company housed imported 
European seed cleaning machines, seed driers, generators, a testing room, storerooms 
and a fully equipped office. Each company had a production capacity of 600 tonnes 
of commercially graded seed and 60 tonnes of foundation seed per year.23 Combined, 
the seed companies had the capacity to produce approximately 2500 tonnes of high 
quality seed per year. Each seed company employed between thirty and forty people, 
from the Seed Company Manager to Production Managers, Sales and Marketing 
                                                           
23 Foundation seed is seed produced from high genetic purity breeder seed. Foundation seed production occurs 
under strict supervision and must be approved by a certifying agency. Specific handling techniques are used to 
maintain genetic identity and purity. All foundation seed conforms to certification standards specified for the 
crop and the variety being certified. Certified seed is the progeny of foundation seed. Certified seed production 
requires specific handling to maintain genetic purity according to the standards prescribed for the crop being 
certified.  
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Officers, accountants and down to security guards. Ex-government officials and civil 
servants, especially from MAFF, overwhelmingly held the majority of senior 
positions in the companies, under the rationale that they were, in the post-conflict 
Cambodian context, the only reasonably qualified candidates for the positions. Being 
from government, the majority of employees were men, many of whom had 
conducted the standard practice of filling their positions in government with a ‘seat 
warmer’, a person who maintains their post temporarily in government while the 
civil servant or official goes off to earn money working on a development project. A 
number of seed company staff had been involved in previous Australian aid projects.  
The AQIP seed companies purchased high purity breeder and foundation 
seed from a rice research institute also established by AusAID. Specially selected 
seed growers who were trained, and who were provided with irrigation and inputs by 
the project, then reproduced this seed as certified seed. Each of the four target 
provinces had between 80 to 100 Registered Seed Growers (RSG) these growers 
were formed into associations and promised 51 per cent of the shares in the seed 
companies in order to ensure participation and loyalty to the company.  Each season 
they were contracted to grow a specified amount of rice seed, to a predetermined 
quality at a predetermined price. Seed company staff frequently monitored all seed 
crops. Harvested seed was then transported from seed grower fields to the company 
where it was dried and processed, checked for quality and packaged. In addition, the 
seed companies often hired the seed growers as casual labourers for processing work, 
paying them the standard agricultural salary of 4000 riels per day or US$1.  
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The seed growers produced around twelve to fourteen different types of rice 
seed varieties under contract to the company. All varieties were cross or open-
pollinating, meaning they could be retained and reused over seasons. Doing so, 
however, led to a reduction in genetic purity. Although the companies recommended 
that farmers buy new seed each season, the seed could be used up to three times 
before it lost much of its higher yielding benefits and behaved as ‘unimproved’ 
ordinary seed. The companies sold two main types of seed varieties: improved 
traditional or indigenous varieties and modern short duration varieties. 
AQIP Antecedents 
AQIP comprised just one project in a suite of projects, as part of Australia’s second 
phase of agricultural development efforts in Cambodia. The first phase was 
implemented primarily under the Cambodian-IRRI-Australia Project (CIAP), 
Australia’s first and highly regarded agricultural project in Cambodia. Beginning in 
1987, the goal of the project was to rehabilitate Cambodian agriculture in the post-
conflict environment. The stated aim of CIAP was thus simply “to increase rice 
production and productivity of rice based farm production systems” (Nesbitt 2002). 
It set about doing so primarily through plant variety improvement, soil and pest 
management and agricultural engineering (Nesbitt 2002).  
A key output of the CIAP project was the testing and selective breeding of 
some of Cambodia’s estimated 2000 traditional rice varieties, leading to the 
increased genetic purity of these landraces. Traditional Cambodian varieties were 
collected and pure genetic lines singled out for multiplication. A total of nine 
‘improved’ Cambodian rice varieties were released in Cambodia: three medium-
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duration (CAR1 to CAR 3) and six late-duration (CAR4 to CAR 9) (Javier 1997: 53). 
In addition to the introduction of CAR varieties, CIAP also introduced foreign, 
modern photoperiod sensitive and non-photoperiod sensitive varieties. This included 
the medium-duration santepheap (‘peace’ in Khmer) varieties, santepheap 1, 2 and 3 
and the high yielding short-duration variety IR66. Today, among the 17 modern non-
photoperiod sensitive varieties of rice available in Cambodia, IR66 is one of the most 
popular and is grown widely throughout the country’s lowland areas that permit dry 
season rice cultivation (Mak 2001).  
With the announcement of Cambodia’s first official national rice surpluses 
in 1995, donor post-conflict and emergency relief efforts began to shift towards slow 
stream development, despite the persistence of conflict in the northeast and 
widespread pockets of malnutrition and food deficits throughout the country (FAO 
2004a). By 1998, Australia was looking at options for supporting Cambodia’s long-
term sustainable development (AusAID 1999). Seeking to leverage the investments 
made in CIAP and extend upon the work of the project, CIAP’s core agricultural 
development activities were eventually restructured into three distinct projects: 
Cambodia-Australia Agricultural Extension Project (CAAEP) which sought to build 
capacity within the MAFF’s Department of Agricultural Extension; the Cambodian 
Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI) which maintained the 
project’s work in agricultural research and development especially in rice variety 
selection and breeding and; the AQIP which sought to systematically distribute 
agricultural knowledge and technology and especially improved rice seed from 
CARDI via the construction of commercial seed companies.  
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Figure 4.2: AusAID’s dependent path to seed companies 
 
Source: Author 
 
Drawing on research in Sri Lanka, Yapa (1998: 103) takes a critical view of 
rice development projects, and argues that interventions stem from a narrative of elite 
self-aggrandisement, whereby the powerful imagine themselves as fulfilling a 
historic mission that involves the recreation of authentic, traditional family farming. 
Much of this has to do with the symbolism of rice, according to Yapa (1998), which 
represents culture, restoration and history. The ‘rice bias’ is reinforced through 
excessive public policy approaches including extension, research, credit and 
irrigation, for rice production to the exclusion of other important crops. Within this 
rice-centric framework, rice productivity and quality improvement become symbols 
of modernity and development, despite the fact that rice, as a staple crop is a low 
value, monoculture crop (Yapa 1998: 103). Although Yapa’s (1998) critiques have 
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some resonance with the AQIP approach and previous AusAID approaches 
(Puckeridge 2004), this does not discount the fact that improving input supply for 
rice in Cambodia makes very good sense. As a country with low topographic 
elevation, located in the Mekong delta, rice monocultures are an inescapable 
ecological fit and survival necessity. Improving the quality and quantity of rice 
production has the potential to alleviate poverty to some degree. Part of this equation 
must be access to good quality inputs. 
Rice Production in Cambodia 
If farmers are to improve production and strengthen their position vis a vis other 
actors in commodity chains, they must produce a marketable surplus and for this they 
must have access to good quality inputs, especially seed. Agricultural input supply 
chains in Cambodia are generally informal, fragmented, and often supply poor 
quality inputs. An estimated 75 per cent of Cambodians farm low input, low yielding 
rain-fed rice crops using seed retained from the previous harvest (Agrifood 
Consulting 2002: 13) (see appendix 4.1). Average national yields are approximately 
2.5 tons per hectare, which as Table 4.2 shows are the lowest in the region.  
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Table 4.2: Regional rice yields 2006 (tonnes/hectare) 
Country Tons Per Hectare 
Cambodia 2.49 
China 6.27 
Indonesia 4.77 
Japan 6.34 
Laos 3.5 
South Korea 6.6 
Thailand 2.91 
Vietnam 4.89 
Source: IRRI Social Science Division Statistics Database 2009. 
 
The major exception to these low yields is the growing numbers of farmers 
who, with access to a combination of irrigation, modern non-photoperiod sensitive 
varieties and fertilisers, have expanded production into the dry season. Although the 
total area cultivated during the dry season tends to be smaller, yields are generally 
higher as production utilises higher-yielding modern rice varieties, such as IR66, 
which are usually grown on more fertile soil with better control of water and during 
more beneficial climatic conditions (the dry season typically experiences higher total 
sunshine hours) (Nesbitt and Phaloeun 1997: 19) (see appendix 4.1). In addition to 
favourable environmental conditions, external quality inputs are key to the 
attainment of higher yields. To maximise returns from the cultivation of modern rice 
varieties, use of irrigation, chemical fertilisers, pesticides and fresh pure seed is 
important.  
Rice Commodity Chains in Cambodia 
Traditional and modern rice varieties represent an important split in rice production 
and marketing in Cambodia. Cambodia contains an estimated two thousand different 
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landraces unique to the country. These indigenous rice varieties are well adapted to 
Cambodia’s different agro-ecosystems and rain-fed production (Helmers 1997: 2). 
The majority of traditional rice varieties are strongly photoperiod sensitive and begin 
reproductive growth at pre-determined day lengths (Nesbitt and Phaloeun 1997: 32). 
Photoperiod sensitivity is an adaptive trait responsive to Cambodia’s erratic rainfall 
patterns. For these varieties planting can be delayed up to five months until rainfall is 
adequate (Nesbitt and Phaloeun 1997: 2). This means that planting can take place 
early or late in the season according to rainfall patterns and flowering will still take 
place once the required day length is reached. A crop is generally guaranteed. 
Overall, traditional photoperiod sensitive varieties are preferred for wet-season 
production due to their stress resistance and crop height which means that the rice 
towers above floodwaters (Javier 1997: 41-47). The drawback, however, is that 
yields for traditional varieties tend to be low. Indeed, Sokhen et al. (2004: 17) cite a 
study in Cambodia that correlated the lowest lying land with the tallest rice varieties 
and the poorest families. Nonetheless, Cambodian farmers prefer traditional varieties 
for consumption because they believe it tastes better. Overall, there is little demand 
for traditional varieties outside of the domestic Cambodian market. Foreign buyers 
consider traditional varieties as low purity, low value and low grade. As a result of 
this lack of trade, Cambodian farmers tend to limit cash expenditure on this crop and 
produce their own seeds.  
Modern, short-duration varieties are not as tall, have shorter growing 
periods and are not photoperiod sensitive, meaning flowering is not dependent on 
day length so they can be grown throughout the year. They tend to be grown in the 
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dry season with irrigation and they have higher yields than traditional varieties if 
used in conjunction with fertiliser. Modern varieties are not preferred for food. 
Farmers who grow these varieties tend to treat them as cash crops and sell the 
majority of their harvest. Modern, short-duration varieties are also considered to be 
low grade and low value and are often mixed with surplus traditional varieties when 
sold to foreign buyers. The most popular modern variety in Cambodia is IR66 (Mak 
2001). IR66 seed does not possess the same in-built dormancy as traditional seed, 
which means it cannot be stored as long as traditional seed and must be renewed 
more frequently. This is usually done via exchange with friends and family, or 
occasionally purchased from a farmer rumoured to have extremely good quality, high 
germinating seed. Since farmers expect to sell modern varieties for cash, they are less 
averse to purchasing inputs. The expansion of dry-season rice production of modern, 
short-duration varieties has dramatically increased some household’s annual yields, 
although this has occurred against a background of growing rice surpluses overall in 
Cambodia, resulting in increased trade.  
Most Cambodian households, however, still retain the majority of their rice 
harvest for consumption. Yet subsistence systems in Cambodia, whilst often austere, 
do not entail extreme levels of autarkic household independence. Instead, 
Cambodia’s subsistence systems often involve households within wider networks of 
distribution and exchange. For example, despite the common perception that 
subsistence systems are closed systems, characterised by the expression ‘hand to 
mouth’, Cambodian paddy for consumption circulates in two interrelated exchange 
networks via village millers and in-village female traders.  
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Figure 4.3: Cambodian paddy exchange and sale networks 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Paddy for consumption is commonly stored in a granary or under the house 
and milled intermittently by a village miller who keeps the bran, husk and broken 
rice as payment for service. Milling rates of conversion from paddy to white rice are 
53 per cent, lower than commercial mill rates at around 64 per cent (AusAID 1999: 
21; Agrifood Consulting 2002: 55). Village rice milling in exchange for bran and 
husk provides village millers with the incentive to extract as much bran from rice as 
possible, and this often results in poorly milled rice with a high proportion of broken 
grains. Village milling tends to be horizontally integrated into pig farming and/or 
money-lending, bran selling and perhaps grocery selling (Rozemuller 1998). 
Although some may characterise their activities as exploitative, village millers often 
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play an important socio-economic role in providing milled rice on credit for farmers 
in times of stress and selling bran for animal feed.  
Small amounts of traditional paddy retained for consumption may also be 
exchanged, throughout the year, via female village traders for household goods and 
consumables such as fish sauce, shampoo and other necessary items. These traders 
often integrate their businesses where possible and may engage in village milling 
and/or selling milled rice purchased outside the community. If paddy for household 
consumption is in short supply (as it often is before harvest), and social relations with 
the village trader are good, milled rice and other consumption items may be 
borrowed on credit and repaid in paddy at harvest. Within many village economies, 
paddy and cash are considered commensurate units of exchange and villagers may 
settle debts with either. However, successful traders must manage risks by ensuring 
an intimate knowledge of the households they provide credit to, their production 
capabilities, internal household politics and current livelihood status. Decisions on 
when, to whom and for what purpose household paddy is to be sold or exchanged is 
also generally at the discretion of the female head of the household, most in-village 
business and exchange relations are settled among a village’s women, with the local 
trader’s store often acting as a key site of village gossip.  
The majority of Cambodia’s rice harvest and its various by-products are 
distributed through in-village systems that trickle through gendered exchange, 
contract and credit relations in small, dispersed amounts. This chain is subject to the 
dictates of specific farmer preferences for highly polished, white rice of local long-
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duration, traditional varieties, as well as embedded within specific interpersonal trade 
relations. Among such relations, the production of commercial quality milled rice is 
not the key objective. Patron-client relations between village millers, female traders 
and farmers means that quality standards are less demanding –– creditors and traders 
would rather accept poor quality paddy as payment than no payment at all. 
Larger surpluses of approximately 100 kilograms and up, available directly 
after harvest and usually of modern varieties, are sold for cash to traders. Paddy is 
typically sold on short-term credit to female in-village traders or, less preferably, 
external traders. Prices for paddy immediately after harvest tend to be low, due to 
high volumes of paddy entering the market, yet many farmers sell their paddy 
quickly in order to fulfil long suppressed household needs and service debts acquired 
in the previous ‘hungry months’. The paddy trade in Cambodia mainly bypasses 
commercial millers who cannot compete with the higher prices offered by Thai and 
Vietnamese paddy buyers. These buyers consider modern and traditional varieties as 
the same, and most varieties sold outside of the village, are mixed together and sold 
as low value, impure unprocessed paddy across Cambodia’s borders. Thus, the rice 
value chain in Cambodia is dominated by two distinct production systems, 
subsistence production of traditional varieties and barter trade via female traders and 
surplus production of modern varieties for informal cash sale to commercial buyers 
usually of Thai and/or Vietnamese origin. Although some high quality, fragrant 
variety milled rice has been formally exported by Cambodia, this has largely taken 
place under the auspices of Angkor Gasekgum Roungreung –– a company rumoured 
to have strong government connections especially with MAFF. Overall, the 
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contribution of rice production to GDP is low (rice accounts for 46 per cent of 
agricultural GDP, which overall comprises 37 per cent of GDP) despite the centrality 
of rice production to Cambodia’s economy (Agrifood Consulting 2002; EIC 2006). 
For approximations of margins throughout the rice paddy chain in Cambodia see 
Appendix 4.2. 
The AQIP Constructed Rice Seed Chain 
The AQIP rice seed companies sold both modern and traditional varieties of seed to 
farmers and institutions, which the companies produced to internationally recognised 
standards of seed production. The two types of rice seed varieties –– modern and 
traditional –– also followed two distinct marketing channels.  
 
Figure 4.4: AQIP seed marketing channels 
 
Source: Author. 
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The first sales channel was to farmers via a seed dealer networks. Seed 
dealer networks were established by the seed company sales and marketing officers. 
Seed dealer networks usually enrolled men of stature within villages, such as village 
chiefs, who are also usually Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) members. Typically, 
seed dealers received a daylong sales pitch on the benefits of high quality seed and 
how to sell the seed to farmers. Those eager to sell AQIP company seed signed an 
agreement with a seed company to ensure they followed company policy for storage, 
sale and promotion of the seed. Seed was then given to the dealers on credit at the 
price of 1300 riel per kilogram and sold for 1400 riel per kilogram, with dealers 
keeping the 100 riel or 2.5 US cents commission. These are 2005 prices.24 Around 85 
per cent of sales via seed dealers to farmers were of modern, short-duration varieties, 
mostly IR66.   
The other sales channel was institutional sales to NGOs and government, 
and were mainly of improved, traditional seed varieties. NGOs tended to give 
traditional seed on credit to farmers, as part of other development projects while 
government purchases were often used as part of relief to farmers who had lost their 
seed due to flood or drought. In the first years of the project, institutional sales far 
outweighed farmer sales. Although institutional sales supported the companies in the 
early years of the companies’ establishment, institutional sales were generally seen 
by most involved in the project to undermine the market for seed, as farmers who 
were given seed were obviously far less likely to buy it. However, institutional sales 
                                                           
24 Depending on the Business Development consultant employed by the project, and the different accounting 
variables included, recommended seed prices were often higher or lower depending on whichever variables the 
consultant deemed important to include. If the true establishment costs of the seed were included, however, no 
Cambodian farmer would ever have been able to afford to buy the seed.  
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were seen as useful in terms of the poverty alleviation aims of the project. By the end 
of the project farmer sales increased significantly as market awareness was built and 
institutional sales declined (see Appendix 4.3).  This was of some relief to AusAID as 
sales to farmers were seen as crucial to the long-term commercial viability of the 
seed companies.  
Through the sales of both traditional and modern rice seed varieties, rice 
seed was channelled towards both commercial rice commodity chains and towards 
subsistence systems of farmers in distress. These two different channels were 
interpreted by project managers as conflicting with the seed companies’ goal of 
financial sustainability, despite the fact that the improved traditional seed sold by the 
company to institutions was unlikely to be purchased directly by commercially 
oriented farmers. Consequently, gift relations of aid assistance by NGOs and 
government were interpreted as averse to the long-term interests of commodity chain 
construction, not complementary to it. Further research identified that sales of 
modern rice seed to commercially oriented farmers did not necessarily mean greater 
seed company viability either. However, AQIP seed did impact unevenly on the rice 
commodity chain and farmer livelihoods significantly.  
Rice Seed Company Benefits Study 
In 2005, I conducted field research to establish the uptake of company seed among 
farmers and the impact of this along rice commodity chains.25 As part of the 
Australian Research Council Industry Linkage Grant and agreement was made with 
                                                           
25 This research was undertaken with a volunteer staff member and a paid staff member of AQIP and resulted in a 
small report entitled “AQIP Seed Supply Chain Benefits, Pilot Study Report 2005” (Long et al. 2005). 
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the industry partner to host me within the AQIP project as my first research case 
study. Although project staff were at first reluctant to allow me access to the 
resources and time needed to undertake this study, it was recognised by the Team 
Leader that there were gaps in the understanding of the impact of the project that 
previous efforts to research had not fulfilled. In addition, an Australian Youth 
Ambassador for Development had recently joined the project and it appeared that the 
project staff were unsure how best to deploy her skills. Together the Youth 
Ambassdor, myself and a young Khmer staff member from the Post Harvest Team 
set out to undertake this small-scale study. The primary aim was to understand who 
purchased the seed and who did not; that is to say, which farmers were incorporated 
into seed commodity relations and which farmers were excluded. Research was 
conducted in Prey Veng Province, the province with the highest farmer company 
seed uptake. Within Prey Veng 14 villages were rapidly surveyed to identify villages 
for further in-depth research (see Appendix 4.4).26 Out of the 14 villages surveyed, 
four villages were chosen. The four villages each represented a varying level of 
AQIP company seed use. They were: Prey Ankoing (non-AQIP seed use village), 
Prey T’bal (low AQIP seed use village), T’Lor (medium AQIP seed use village) and 
Chuen Tukor (high AQIP seed use village) (see Figure 4.5). Focus group meetings 
were conducted in each village with around 15 to 20 farmers, during which inputs, 
outputs, preference ranking and distribution of paddy were assessed (see Appendix 
4.5). Since few farmers purchased improved traditional varieties, the study compared 
AQIP IR66 with other non-AQIP seed, (unimproved IR66 and unimproved 
                                                           
26 Village identification was conducted over a one week period from 26 September 2005. 
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traditional varieties).27 Information from focus group sessions was then 
supplemented and supported by 35 surveys with individual farmers (see Appendix 
4.6).28 Finally, information on seed exchange, paddy trading and milling was 
gathered in informal interviews over a week-long period (see Appendices 4.7 and 
4.8).29   
                                                           
27 Focus groups research and farmer surveys were conducted over a four week period from 10 October 2005 to 4 
November 2005. 
28 These surveys were intended to verify the focus group data and collect further detailed information regarding 
seed use, inputs and production methods, outputs and harvest use and perceptions of different seed varieties. 
29 These were conducted from 28 November 2005 to 5 December.  
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Figure 4.5: Map of Prey Veng research villages 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University 
 
Overall, the research found that farmers who purchased and grew AQIP 
company seed experienced yield improvements of between 20 and 40 per cent. This 
was supported by the AQIP 2005 Household Crop Production survey, carried out by 
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the project, which found for all project provinces, over all seasons, there was a 44 per 
cent yield increase with AQIP seed. The variation in yield benefits among AQIP seed 
farmers who used AQIP seed depended on factors such as differential soil quality, 
water supply, production techniques and timely and appropriate use of good quality 
fertiliser. These non-seed variables had the ability to render the benefits of high 
quality seed negligible: one farmer complained that the poor quality fertiliser she 
purchased completely ruined her crop, a common problem in Cambodia’s 
unregulated fertiliser market. Farmers were very aware of the impacts of 
environmental and other factors, and given the high price by Cambodian standards, 
for the company seed, many farmers reported that they tried to provide the seed with 
the best growing conditions possible. They planted it on their best soils, close to 
irrigation sources and generally took greater care. Given this, it was difficult to make 
exact statements about the benefits of company seed alone as a number of other 
factors contributed to its higher yields. Importantly, however, 100 per cent of 
company seed users interviewed perceived the seed to have several positive attributes 
including: higher germination rates (meaning they used less seed); higher yields; 
crop growth was considered stronger and more even; and the resulting paddy was 
perceived as higher quality and therefore easier to sell. 
It is not surprising that the research also found that farmers with better and 
more secure resource endowments were better able to take advantage of company 
seed. The largest benefits were experienced by more commercially oriented farmers 
with good soil, access to water and closer proximity to larger provincial markets. 
Aiding Trade 
161 
From the focus group discussions and farmer surveys a graduated scale of farmers 
was identified. 
Table 4.3: Resource security and seed uptake  
Resource Security 
 
Secure  Insecure 
Commercial large 
scale farmers 
Commercial 
medium scale 
farmers 
Subsistence 
farmer with 
irrigation and 
large paddy 
surplus 
Subsistence 
farmer with 
irrigation and 
small paddy 
surplus 
Subsistence 
farmer with no 
irrigation and no 
surplus 
Grows modern 
varieties ONLY 
Grows modern 
and traditional 
varieties 
Grows modern 
and traditional 
varieties 
Grows modern 
and traditional 
varieties 
Grows modern 
varieties ONLY 
From 1st 
generation AQIP 
seed 
From 1st and 2nd 
generation AQIP 
seed 
From 2nd 
generation AQIP 
seed 
Retains and 
swaps seed 
Retains and 
swaps seed 
Sells 2nd 
generation AQIP 
seed IR66, buys 
traditional rice for 
consumption 
Sells IR66 
surplus, buys 
traditional rice for 
consumption 
Sells IR66 
surplus. Retains 
traditional rice for 
consumption 
Retains IR66 and 
traditional rice for 
consumption 
Retains IR66 for 
consumption 
Source: Long et al. 2005. 
 
In general, large-scale farmers who produced purely for commercial sale, tended to 
use high-quality, modern company seed purchased on a regular basis. They 
intensively produced IR66 and purchased traditional varieties for household 
consumption. Some of these farmers had also moved into the production and 
marketing of second generation company seed for sale to other farmers at a price of 
700 riel per kilogram. These farmers were able to take advantage of the marketing 
efforts of the seed companies, which had built demand for high quality seed, and 
without the overheads they were able to undercut the seed companies by 50 per cent.  
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Second were the slightly less commercialised farmers who produced predominantly 
IR66 and used company seed or second generation company seed for production. 
Generally, they sold at least 50 per cent of their yield. Third were farmers who were 
slightly less resource secure. They tended to have average land parcels with average 
soil quality and used a combination of ordinary IR66 and traditional varieties. They 
consumed and sold a combination of their production of both IR66 and traditional 
varieties. The wealthier among this group ate a greater proportion of traditional 
varieties. Some of these farmers had heard of, or were experimenting with, company 
seed. Lastly were poorer farmers who, with limited land and larger families, tended 
to grow ordinary IR66 continuously from seed that they had obtained from seed 
swaps with other farmers. Despite these households growing up to three crops a year, 
many only just managed to fulfil their consumption needs. Few of these farmers had 
even heard of the rice seed companies. Their poverty and inability to fulfil basic 
subsistence needs meant cultivating modern rice monocultures. Although the 
introduction of IR66 had undoubtedly helped such farmers achieve greater yields and 
therefore food security, without the backup of Cambodia’s traditional varieties, they 
inhabited a precarious position, should crops fail (Dennis 1990 in Oveson et al. 1996: 
23).   
The impacts of the seed companies therefore followed the classic trickle 
down pattern. Wealthier and better-connected farmers were better placed to take 
advantage of the benefits of improved seed and even capture part of market demand 
and value created by the project for high quality seed. They did this by producing and 
selling second generation seed for sale, thereby further improving their position vis a 
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vis other farmers. Wealthier farmers tended to display a number of characteristics of 
industrialised production. For example, they were more likely to use fertiliser but 
used it more efficiently; they were more likely to use pesticides, and hire labour and 
machinery. Middle income farmers were the least productive in terms of yield, 
preferring to grow their own traditional varieties for consumption, despite the lower 
yields, and earn their cash income with the commercial production of IR66. This 
made sense from a household perspective, because traditional varieties are 
differentiated in local markets and cost more to purchase. However, due to the 
dominance of Vietnamese traders’ preferences, when traditional varieties are sold, 
they are typically treated the same as IR66 and given a low price. Unless farmers had 
large parcels of land to achieve economies of scale, it made more sense to grow 
traditional rice for consumption, than to grow all IR66 and buy in traditional 
varieties. Some of these farmers purchased first or second generation AQIP seed to 
enhance their surplus production of IR66. Poorer farmers, who grew IR66 just to 
maintain food security because it is highly productive, had few options to access 
modern company seed which would have helped them move beyond subsistence and 
towards surplus production. Unless they received gifts of modern seed from 
institutions or second-generation company seed as part of an exchange with friends 
and family members, there was little scope them to obtain this seed. None of these 
farmers reported receiving seed from government agencies, NGOs, friends or family.  
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AQIP and The Rice Value Chain 
Obviously the ways in which these farmers were linked to markets varied. Interviews 
with traders and millers identified four different types of traders linking different 
types of farmers to markets in different ways: 
- First were small-scale in-village female traders who sold groceries and 
provided credit to poor subsistence households. These ‘subsistence’ traders 
bought and sold primarily IR66 which they collected throughout the year and 
sold to Cambodian commercial millers. From my calculations it appeared that 
many of these traders operated at a loss or at the most made a marginal profit. 
The small volumes traded and the low quality and grade of IR66 prevented 
them from increasing their profitability. Their trade linkages to Cambodian 
commercial millers rather than foreign paddy traders across the border in 
Vietnam disconnected them from the higher margins available in regional 
markets. They complained of penalties imposed by commercial millers on 
poor quality paddy or paddy with high moisture content.  
- A village miller, in a more resource-secure village, represented the second 
type of trader identified. This trader made high margins through marketing 
traditional milled rice to the small local market. Although her volumes were 
small, her margins were high, and she benefited from high quality AQIP IR66 
paddy through the underhand practice of mixing it with higher value 
traditional paddy varieties such as the fragrant som mali (jasmin rice). She 
noted that the higher quality of AQIP IR66 paddy meant it could be mixed 
with high quality fragrant varieties without being detected by buyers. This 
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trader appeared to make higher profits than a neighbouring large-scale 
commercial miller.  
- The next category of trader identified was a medium-scale trader with the 
highest margins among all traders interviewed. This trader, through her direct 
links to Vietnamese buyers, was beginning to focus on selling only traditional 
fragrant varieties, such as jasmin rice, that fetched high prices. She also sold 
paddy at differentiated costs to different buyers, charging Vietnamese buyers 
the most. She stated that she paid high premiums to farmers who specifically 
grew AQIP traditional fragrant varieties; however, only one farmer she 
purchased from grew this variety. She thus intended to start producing this 
variety herself. She did not pay premium prices for IR66 whether it was 
grown from AQIP seed or not.  
- The final type of trader was represented by two large-scale paddy traders who 
resided in the high AQIP-use village of Cheun Tukor. Although they did not 
have margins as high as the previous quality-focused trader, they displayed 
advanced economies of scale. The more successful of the two differentiated 
on quality and operated on a large scale, sourcing paddy throughout the 
country and traded in amounts of 13 to 40 tonnes per day. Economies of scale 
compensated for the smaller margins.  
Many of the traders, not including the village miller, reported that they passed on 
premiums for high quality paddy to farmers, usually in the order of 5 to 10 riel per 
kilogram. The degree to which these premiums were available appeared to be 
determined by variety and whether the trader had links to Vietnamese buyers. 
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However, there appeared to be few premiums available for IR66, whether it was 
AQIP or non-AQIP. Thus, the primary benefit of AQIP seed was in the form of 
increased volumes of a low value paddy. However, while IR66 did not fetch a price 
premium, better quality IR66, such as that grown from AQIP seed, was easier to sell 
and did not attract as many penalties. As many traders reported that they either 
penalised or simply did not buy bad quality paddy, AQIP seed did help to improve 
the saleability of surplus paddy. Traders who purchased paddy produced from AQIP 
seed perceived the paddy to be of better quality (evenly sized and less defects) than 
ordinary paddy and millers stated that it milled as better quality rice. 
While the primary benefits of AQIP seed accrued mainly to commercialised 
farmers, especially those selling second generation seed, the flow-on effects further 
up the paddy value chain helped to reinforce surplus flows of low value IR66 via 
large-scale traders across the border to Vietnam. Of course, AQIP seed did little to 
alter the low value, neo-colonial dependent nature of paddy trade with Vietnam; 
rather, it reinforced this relationship to the benefit of some farmers and traders able to 
take advantage of economies of scale. With the one exception of the village miller, 
increased seed quality of IR66 did not translate into increased paddy value.  Poorer 
farmers and their female trader/patrons remained excluded from ‘improved’ 
production and marketing chains that increased surpluses, improved paddy quality 
and saleability. So even for those who accessed AQIP seed, flow-on benefits to 
improved value chain development were questionable. What AQIP did achieve was 
to improve the quality of seed on informal markets for those capable of buying 
second-generation seed. However, the poorest of the poor, for whom the yield 
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increases afforded by AQIP seed would have made the biggest livelihood difference, 
remained excluded from access.  
These outcomes resonate with much of the literature assessing seed aid 
effectiveness in post-conflict countries all of which stresses the importance of 
understanding conditions of access. Almekinders et al.’s (1994) assessment of 
informal seed networks in Africa demonstrates that for most staple crops, the share of 
the formal seed system in the total seed system rarely exceeds 10 per cent. They state 
that informal seed systems are much more significant and accessible channels for 
most farmers, which encourage farmer experimentation. However, the authors note 
that informal seed systems show weaknesses in seed diffusion due to cultural or 
geographical barriers. Consequently, Almekinders et al. (1994) argue that formal 
seed systems can compliment informal systems by feeding in new forms of genetic 
material which leads to further farmer experimentation. However, this depends on the 
mode of distribution. Sperling et al. (2008), question the assumption that access to 
seed is reduced during times of crisis, stating that even during extreme states of crisis 
— whether economic, political or environmental — informal seed systems are 
extremely resilient. As such these authors argue that widespread seed handouts or 
‘gifts’ only serve to undermine local seed markets and exchange systems. The 
problem, they argue, is that even if seed is available, poor farmers may not have the 
ability, either financially or socially to access it. In post-crisis agricultural recovery 
the authors found that seed handouts play only a minor role in the total seed used for 
cultivation, and that under or after conditions of crisis, farmers will adapt production 
and varieties accordingly. In the wide range of countries across many continents 
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(including Africa, South America and Asia) studied by these researchers there was a 
lack of access to seed through formal and/or informal channels. This was the 
problem, not a lack of seed per se. They also found that where seed was routinely 
given to farmers, these ‘gifts’ undermined the ability of farmers to grow and procure 
their own seed sources (Sperling et al. 2008). 
Thus, the debate over which of the two modes AQIP used to distribute rice 
seed –– as indirect gifts made through institutional sales or as direct farmer sales –– 
overlooked a fundamental issue in both modes of exchange: that of access. The 
constructed dichotomy between institutional ‘gifts’ or farmer sales and whether or 
not institutional gifts undermined the long-term financial viability of the seed 
companies indicated that the project failed to grapple with the social dynamics of 
seed systems in Cambodia. This was largely due to the project’s denial of class 
difference among Cambodia’s rural farming population. 
The AQIP Aid Chain 
That AQIP seed would primarily benefit a select few of wealthier farmers who could 
afford to purchase the seed and largely bypass poorer farmers is not a surprising 
outcome for private companies in a country where large portions of agriculture are 
given over to subsistence production. What is surprising, however, is that despite not 
meeting the project’s larger goal of poverty alleviation, this pattern of distribution 
was acknowledged with shrugged shoulders of resignation by most who worked on 
the project. Indeed, AusAID’s Independent Completion Report Draft 2 (2007) noted 
that the project still spent too much time grappling with the social objectives instead 
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of achieving the commercial objectives of establishing functioning rice seed 
companies. More specifically under the title of ‘Weaknesses’, the report noted that 
a fundamental weakness in design was the failure to translate the concept behind a 
commercial private sector seed company into a clear strategy to achieve it. The PDD 
[project design document] called for the creation of a private seed company as a joint 
venture between the Provincial Government and Seed Grower Associations. The 
numerous legal, financial, and governance complexities and inherent conflicts 
associated with this thinking were not addressed at design….most efforts during the 
project period were devoted to the establishment of seed companies and the production 
of high quality seed. More should have been done in the early stages of implementation 
to address the long-term institutional and governance issues in partnership with RGC. 
(AusAID 2007: 3). 
 The report cites several instances of failure to address the institutional environment 
required for the establishment of commercially successful seed companies. This 
included the failure to take account of other projects working in seed production, 
especially the World Bank funded Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project 
(APIP), and the assumption that AQIP would help persuade the government to pass 
the seed law designed to ensure that Cambodia’s unique rice seed varieties were 
protected and only reproduced under license. Other problems identified in the 
completion report included: the failure to anticipate that constructing four seed 
companies in close proximity to each other would inevitably lead to their 
competition in the small Cambodian market; and the failure to assess farmer access 
to credit markets to ensure seed access. Also mentioned was the general lack of focus 
on finding the appropriate ownership structure for the companies which led to drawn 
out negotiations with the Cambodian government at the close of AusAID funding.  
Yet, despite the AQIP project’s evident shortcomings, the completion report 
argues that the project should be applauded, “notwithstanding…design weaknesses, 
the project has been an outstanding success in terms of generating benefits for a 
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range of poor farmers” (AusAID 2007: 1). How could this project be celebrated as a 
success when it clearly did not achieve its stated aims and largely bypassed the poor 
farmers it was designed to serve? The interpretation of the project put forth by the 
assessment was of a successful project that was hindered by its social considerations. 
This is an odd conclusion to make for a bilateral development agency that is a 
signatory to the Millennium Development Goals. The conclusion made in the report 
helped to clear the way for AusAID to commit further funds towards ensuring the 
commercial viability of the seed companies. This, it was reasoned in the Independent 
Completion Report, was the correct action because the private seed companies 
should be viewed as a ‘public good’.  
The specification and justification for the AQIP concept was confused at design. Instead 
of justifying AusAID’s support in terms of the project’s contribution to the wider public 
good of high quality rice seed availability, social objectives became confused with the 
necessity of a commercial approach to seed production. A clear separation of this wider 
public good, and the appropriate strategy to contribute to it was necessary (AusAID 
2007: 8). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to debate the vagaries and 
contradictions emergent around the theme of the private delivery of public goods, it 
is at least prudent to note that even in highly developed cash economies such 
approaches are not without their critics, drawbacks and failures to systematically 
provide ‘goods’ to the public.   
The degree to which the conclusion of the Independent Completion Report 
sat uncomfortably among project workers and supporters was detectable in 
statements such as the following: “at least the institutional sales ended up giving seed 
to farmers, ensuring that some seed reached the poor.” It was also mentioned that, 
despite the uneven distribution of benefits, no one could deny that even the 
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“commercial farmers were poor by western standards.” In a bid to retain a degree of 
moral virtue in their roles as paid international consultants exactly which poor 
benefited in particular was inconsequential. Thus, Cambodian farmers were once 
again relegated to an undifferentiated mass of poor farmers. Indeed, the denial of 
class difference among Cambodia’s rural farming population seems necessary if one 
is to justify donor support to private companies as public goods ‘gifted’ to the 
Cambodian government.   
The central critique of the project by the Independent Completion Report 
was not concerned with differential social impacts; rather the main problems lay with 
the “institutional environment and governance issues in partnership with the RGC.” 
In other words, the report argues that too much emphasis was placed on the technical 
aspects of the seed companies and not enough was placed on consensus building 
around the giving of them. What this report fails to note is the degree to which the 
institutional structure of the AusAID/AQIP aid chain itself contributed to the overtly 
technical and commercial approach of this project and its seed companies. This 
structure resulted in the neglect of the institutional environment surrounding the 
project, and arguably in the exclusion of poorer farmers.  
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Figure 4.6: AusAID/ AQIP aid chain 
 
Source: Author. 
 
The funding structure that governs traditional development projects such as 
AQIP is milestone achievement. Within a project design document, milestone targets 
are “identifiable points in the implementation of an activity when a concrete 
achievement has been reached” (AusAID 2005: 2). Typically, contractors do not get 
paid until these milestones are reported on as having been achieved. Within AQIP a 
total of 96 milestones were reported on within the five and a half year life of the 
project. AQIP consultants submitted no less than 151 reports over the lifetime of the 
project, not including the feasibility study, sector review, project design and 
capability statements prior to project commencement (AusAID 2007). Familiarity 
with AusAID reporting procedures and requirements and access to large amounts of 
bridging finance are the two major prerequisites necessary to win a project 
implementation bid. Launching a bid to implement an AusAID project from the first 
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step of submitting an Expression of Interest to contract signing costs on average 
AU$100,000. Even if a firm wins the bid, they are unlikely to be paid until the first 
milestone is achieved, which may be months or even years down the implementation 
track. The finance structure of AusAID means that there are very few firms capable 
of implementing bilateral projects. Consequently, oligopolistic conditions prevail 
within the Australian aid market and there is only a small number of key firms that 
typically bid and win AusAID projects.  
As a result of the high costs involved with designing, bidding on and 
implementing an agricultural development project such as AQIP, projects are often, 
by design, loaded with the expensive and large-scale infrastructural items set as 
milestone targets in the first years in order to retrieve funds and get costly and easily 
completed milestones ticked off the output box as quickly as possible. As one key 
informant noted, it would probably be wiser to build capacity and rally political and 
institutional support for a project first and then build the large-scale infrastructure, 
but this rarely happens.30 Instead such projects often rush ahead first with office set 
up, vehicle procurement, and building of infrastructure in the first years and build 
capacity around such things later. Undoubtedly AusAID is aware of this. One might 
speculate that the high level of activity that takes place at the beginning of a project 
and the building and procurement of highly visible things may well be in the interests 
of AusAID through reinforcing the symbolism of gift giving to the recipient country, 
and leaving sustainability issues until later.  
                                                           
30 Personal communication AusAID Advisor March 2008. 
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Plate 4.1: Hun Sen Prime Minister of Cambodia inspects AQIP rice seed 
 
Source: AQIP project files, unpublished. 
 
Project Endings 
In the closing months of the project, there was a concerted focus on achieving the 
commercial sustainability of the rice seed companies to ensure they would continue 
beyond AusAID funding. The four rice seed companies were merged into one and 
registered as a single commercial entity. As a result, a number of staff members were 
made redundant and proceeded to attempt petty sabotage of the companies’ already 
virus-laden computers. Negotiations with the Cambodian government took place 
over the final corporate structure that left MAFF shares unchanged at 49 per cent and 
seed growers’ associations with a reduced shareholding of 20 per cent, 10 per cent of 
shares went to the newly formed AQIP Association made up of seed company staff 
and the remaining shares were to be sold to a private investor. A trust fund was 
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established to fund the company until the date at which it was forecast to break even 
in 2009 (AusAID 2007:10). A Board of Directors was established and a CEO was 
appointed out of the four seed company managers. In order to ensure that the plan 
towards commercial viability would be met, AusAID set high sales targets for the 
seed company’s new CEO. These targets would best be met through increasing short-
term sales to large institutional buyers. In a desperate scramble to meet these targets 
the newly appointed Khmer CEO paid a small commission to a provincial governor 
who had placed a large seed order to hand out seed to farmers in his province. When 
AusAID found out about this, an inquiry was launched and the newly appointed CEO 
was accused of corruption and fired. This led to other dismissals of Khmer 
employees who did not “support the AQIP vision” or as another informant put it, 
those who questioned why the aid project should be a business and not a ‘gift’ to the 
Khmer people.   
Gossip that surrounded AusAID’s response deemed it to be extremely harsh. 
Indeed it seems odd that sales of seed from a donor-produced seed company to 
NGOs and government to give gifts of seed to farmers was interpreted as a form of 
poverty alleviation; while gifts of cash to Khmer officials to ensure that they buy 
seed and give seed to farmers was considered corrupt. Is this simply the case of a 
double standard? After all, plenty of Australian aid contractors make money out of 
implementing Australia’s aid programs. It seems odd that Australia could really take 
the moral high ground on making money out of gift giving when it only recently 
changed its ‘tied aid’ practices and still de facto perpetuates them (Duxfield and 
Wheen 2007). Perhaps what may be important here is the sequence in which gifts 
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and commodities change hands? This sequence obviously has some bearing on the 
interpretive difference between allegations of corruption and claims to poverty 
alleviation. That there is confusion between what can be claimed as poverty 
alleviation and what can be labelled corruption in a private sector oriented project in 
a developing country such as Cambodia, where the lines between aid, business and 
government are often inextricably blurred, is perhaps understandable. It probably 
will not be the last time that such a conundrum is encountered. 
Conclusion 
The key assumption around which the rice seed companies were constructed was that 
formal private sector seed distribution is more systematic, sustainable and therefore 
beneficial to improving rice seed inputs in Cambodia, than informal markets, 
traditional seed swapping or direct handouts. Although the concept of agricultural 
extension relies on dissemination through farmer sharing and word of mouth, this 
logic was not applied to seed. Instead donors and consultants sought to commoditise 
seed distribution which, it was argued was the most reliable way of distributing seed. 
This chapter demonstrates that private sector approaches to seed distribution are 
inevitably uneven; and although systematic, it is a system which distributes benefits 
according to wealth and advantage, not poverty and need. While market relations 
governed seed distribution, gift relations governed the construction of seed 
companies.  
Gudeman (2001) notes that money can be exchanged ceremonially or 
through trade. The form used depends on an encompassing political order. Individual 
trade takes place only in existing political commitments, whereas ceremonial 
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transactions construct them (Gudeman 2001: 20). AusAID’s bilateral aid ‘gifts’ to 
the government ceremonially constructed commodity relations and helped sustain old 
projects through creating linkages with new projects. Between these projects and 
their established trade networks, commodity relations prevail in the name of project 
sustainability. Cambodia Agricultural Research and Development Institute sold seed 
to AQIP, which sold seed to farmers. Although Australia’s gift relations construct 
political commitments to commodity exchange among various actors, the only gift 
relations that prevail are those that are politically sanctioned by AusAID. Cambodian 
government officials are exhorted to support the sustainability of AusAID’s gifts 
through the display of ‘business-like’ behaviour. The only gifts that are sanctioned 
are those that contribute to the commercial or political sustainability of AusAID 
projects and/or bolster AusAID’s claims to poverty alleviation (such as NGOs buying 
seed and giving it to farmers or gifts of company shares to government). Within these 
relations, the concept of sustainability is continually enrolled to legitimate gifts to 
bygone development projects and their state shareholders.  However, as this case 
study demonstrates, the term sustainability is often narrowly defined in terms of the 
commercial success of aid projects, with the sustainability of farmers themselves 
often overlooked, despite continued aid funding in their name.  
The financial sustainability of Cambodia’s rice cash cropping farmers is 
more likely to emerge from cross-border trade relations, than from the gift-cum-
market relations of an AusAID project. As an ex-AQIP worker who once promoted 
the benefits of AQIP seed to farmers informed me in late 2006, more and more 
farmers were now growing Vietnamese varieties 504, 85 and Nam Combong which 
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they said had even higher yields, bigger grains and were more drought resistant. 
These varieties were also reported to have shorter growing times that IR66. Many of 
these farmers were buying these varieties, despite higher prices, in preference to 
AQIP rice seed, because of guaranteed sales of the harvest to Vietnamese traders. 
This informant, now a project worker for a new IRRI project promoting ‘super bags’ 
for rice seed storage, was also facing the embarrassing task of trying to convince the 
same farmers that they didn’t need to buy the AQIP rice seed at all: if they bought the 
super bags they could grow their own seed and keep it fresh 
. 
 Chapter Five 
The Marketing of Organic Rice and Charity 
 
 
One of the paradoxes of the new global agro-food system is that international 
gourmands now enthuse over agro-food commodities once considered as low quality 
and not suitable for export (see Appendix 5.1). The very characteristics that were once 
thought to contribute to a product’s inferiority –– subsistence orientation, antiquated 
and/or irregular production methods with low or erratic yields –– are now celebrated as 
environmentally sustainable, ‘authentic’, artisanal and superior in taste. With the rise of 
organics and fair trade markets as high value market niches, such products can 
command very high prices in western markets. The premium prices charged are justified 
as necessary to account for the smaller scale of production, which is often explicitly or 
implicitly conflated with greater social responsibility. Thus, access to high value 
organic and fair trade markets is yet another conception of how poor producers might 
trade their way out of poverty, this time through ‘charitable’ commodity chains which 
aim to work in ‘partnership’ with farmers. Such alternative trade arrangements are 
vaunted as reducing the inequality between Third World producers and First World 
consumers in such a way that fuses the fundamental ideals of gifts and commodities in 
products on supermarket shelves. The research described in this chapter reveals, 
however, that constructed ethical commodity chains, for the sake of charity, frequently 
involve unsustainable and imposed ideals, regulations and trade networks that do little 
to assist the poor producers they set out to help. This is because ‘ethical commodities’, 
while they attempt to redress the gift/commodity distinction, tend instead to reinforce it 
through the insistence that inequality and poverty justice be met primarily through the 
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market. As such, ethical commodity chains constructed by donors tend to increase the 
division between gifts and commodities.  
This chapter deals with an international NGO’s attempt at constructing a fair 
trade, organic rice marketing chain to link farmers in Cambodia with ethical consumer 
markets in North America and Europe. It examines how imposed and inappropriate 
notions of agricultural ‘post-productivism’ worked to reinforce the poverty and 
subsistence orientation of Cambodian farmers through promoting cultivation methods 
that did nothing to alleviate production constraints and raise surplus rice production. 
The marketing of meagre rice surpluses of poor producers to ‘ethical consumers’ was 
therefore dubious, not only because of the questionable level of assistance offered to 
farmers but also because of poorly organised trade facilitation on the part of donors. 
Nonetheless, this project found support because organic and fair trade products are key 
selling points for NGOs seeking to bolster their public relations image. Marketing 
‘ethical’ commodities enhances the credibility of NGOs as sustainable providers of 
development assistance and helps to ensure that the public and bilateral donations on 
which they depend for survival keep flowing.  
The Community Co-operative for Rural Development  
The Community Cooperative for Rural Development (CCRD) was just one of the 
‘institutional’ buyers that purchased rice seed from the AusAID funded AQIP rice seed 
companies. This small local NGO (LNGO) was based in Pursat, a province in the 
northwest of Cambodia. The LNGO was formerly a relief project of a larger 
international NGO (INGO), Oxfam Quebec. Being devolved from Oxfam Quebec, the 
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organisation received additional support from a range of bilateral and INGO donors.31 
In its relief phase the organisation focused primarily on food security through the 
establishment of ‘rice banks’ –– a mechanism for ensuring a steady supply of rice for 
members who could deposit surplus grain at harvest and withdraw rice, or ‘borrow’ rice 
when needed. In the general shift from humanitarian relief towards post-conflict 
economic development that occurred in the mid to late 1990s, the organisation was 
restructured and localised into a Cambodian farmers’ cooperative at the behest of the 
majority Oxfam donors. The new organisation, although renamed as a cooperative, did 
not formally register as a cooperative as required by Cambodian law. Instead, it 
remained a local NGO by legal status (Wyman and Wuerffel 2006). Nevertheless, under 
this new organisational structure the so-called cooperative was, under donor guidance, 
to move away from donor dependence and aim towards self-sufficiency and economic 
sustainability, while still providing rural services and extension to its 1189 members. 
These members paid 10,000 riels (US$2.50) in annual fees which gave them access to 
CCRD’s development activities. These activities included: rice banks, self-help groups, 
micro-credit and livestock programs. The fee also gave members ten shares each in the 
cooperative and the eligibility to elect village representatives who helped to select 
Board Members.  
                                                           
31 These included: Oxfam America, Oxfam Great Britain, Oxfam Hong Kong, German Agro-Action, Canadian 
bilateral aid agency, CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) and German bilateral aid agency, GTZ 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit). 
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Figure 5.1: Organisational structure of the Community Cooperative for Rural 
Development 2005 
 
Source: CCRD 2005: 52. (SHG stands for Self Help Group) 
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Having a Board was considered essential to guide the organisation in its 
reinvention as a more entrepreneurial development entity. Established in 2005, the 
Board was in charge of steering CCRD’s strategic direction. It was responsible for 
hiring an English-speaking Managing Director to oversee the day-to-day running of 
operations, help CCRD become financially sustainable, and liaise with donors. As the 
notion of a ‘Board of Directors’ was a fairly new concept, introduced at the instruction 
of donors and comprised primarily of farmers, the hiring of a suitable Managing 
Director proved problematic. No Board Members could recommend an appropriate 
Managing Director with the prerequisite business skills, experience and education level 
demanded by donors. Furthermore, finding a candidate who would be willing to relocate 
to the province of Pursat was difficult. Like donors themselves, qualified Khmer 
professionals prefer to live in urban centres. Eventually donors found a candidate from 
Svay Rieng province, who they recommended to the Board. This candidate was 
accepted, paid US$700 per month, provided with housing, a four-wheel drive 
emblazoned with the Oxfam logo and charged with the mission of making the 
cooperative a sustainable, if not profitable, enterprise achieved through undertaking new 
ventures such as organic rice production and marketing. However, the goal of self-
sufficiency and economic sustainability remained elusive and, much to the donors’ 
frustration, they were obliged to support the cooperative financially and with technical 
assistance. This support ranged from financing its administration and CCRD employee 
salaries to suggesting new and novel ways that CCRD could make money. 
Understandably, donors wanted to move the cooperative towards self-sustaining 
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activities that would help it grow and deliver more benefits to more members in such a 
way that donors could eventually move on to funding new projects. However, moving 
away from gift relations of donor aid towards greater reliance on commodity relations to 
ensure self-sufficiency was met with resistance and suspicion by local staff: they were 
suspicious of the capacity of new business ventures to provide their salaries and 
conditions currently paid by donors.   
The failure of donors to instil a sense of independence in CCRD staff members 
was evident from the first time I attended a CCRD/donor planning meeting. The 
perpetuation of patron-client relations between donors and the cooperative was evident 
in the constant requests by CCRD staff to the donors to provide more office space, new 
computers, digital cameras, video recorders, high tech equipment and study tours to 
Vietnam. At one CCRD/donor meeting I attended in October 2005, every staff member 
from the cashier to the Managing Director stood up, outlined their job description, and 
noted their ‘needs’.  
Donors were reluctant to fund these requests due to the cooperative’s already 
high administration costs. In an effort to signal their desire to distance themselves from 
CCRD’s day-to-day funding, the donors informed the Managing Director that if he 
could devise a sound business plan that justified expenditure on additional office space 
and other requested items in terms of projected new income, they would be more 
willing to provide the necessary funding. Not long after, the Managing Director rented, 
at a high price and with donor funds, a new office in the provincial township and had it 
painted white with the green Oxfam logo. This action was read by donors as a clear 
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signal that the cooperative preferred to remain a franchise of Oxfam, not to function as 
an independent entity. Dismayed that their message of financial sustainability had not 
been heeded, donors tried to reinforce their message of independence and increased 
pressure on the Managing Director to produce a business plan during a routine meeting.  
You must start to think that you are a business. We can fund you for three to four years but 
you need to think of the cooperative as a business….if you do a good business plan and it is 
good enough, then you can use it to get other donors.32 
 
The Managing Director however expressed concern,  
We are worried that if the business plan is not good then you will stop funding CCRD.33 
 
Donors responded with reassurance,  
No we will make sure it is [good] 150 per cent. Otherwise we’re not doing our job. We’re 
committed to funding CCRD, but you’re lucky to have investors who don’t want 
dividends.34 
 
The push towards a business plan was the primary subject of numerous meetings and 
emails and seemed to have a bewildering effect on the Managing Director, who believed 
he had been hired to run an NGO, not a business. Although requests that the cooperative 
move towards a more ‘business-like’ approach appeared rational and justified under the 
donors’ logic of sustainability, resistance by the Managing Director suggested that he 
and other staff members instead believed that their sustainability was under threat. From 
my own point of view it appeared odd to be telling development workers who had found 
post-war employment in Cambodia’s development aid sector to behave in a more 
business-like manner. It is one thing to tell people involved in the private sector to be 
                                                           
32 Personal communication October 2005. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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more business-like, yet the transition from post-conflict assistance to ‘slow stream’ 
economic development had clearly left this organisation and staff members stranded in 
Cambodia’s receding tide of humanitarian aid money. Nevertheless, donors pushed on 
and signalled that they were willing to fund infrastructure and capital investments 
directly related to productive activities such as the cooperative’s fledgling organic rice 
production and marketing project. In other words, development assistance was now to 
be guided by commodity relations, not gift relations.  
The Organic Rice Project 
The expansion into organic rice by CCRD occurred at a time when increased funding 
was available from foreign donors looking to support organic rice projects in line with 
their own development philosophies. In 2004, several donors had committed themselves 
to assist CCRD to expand into organic rice production with existing cooperative 
members. However, at the initial start up of the organic rice project, none of the existing 
cooperative members were interested in converting to organic rice farming. Instead, 
new de facto organic farmers were found in remote districts of Bakan and Phnom 
Kravahn in Pursat province. These farmers were not consciously organic, rather they 
were simply too poor and remote to afford a regular supply of chemical fertilisers. In 
addition, the soils they farmed on were relatively rich soils, attributed by cooperative 
staff to the fact that the land had been recently cleared as forest and settled by ex-Khmer 
Rouge fighters who laid down arms after the Vietnamese invasion in 1979.  
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Figure 5.2: Pursat province with districts  
 
Source: Cartography and GIS, Australian National University. 
 
These farmers lived in districts that were deemed too remote for the delivery of 
existing cooperative livelihood projects and services. Consequently, most of these de 
facto organic farmers did not join the cooperative. Instead they were engaged via 
contract farming arrangements whereby they were provided with training (primarily in 
composting), some inputs (primarily rice seed on credit), rice bank services and a price 
premium for their paddy of between five and twenty per cent above market rates at 
harvest, depending on their organic status.  
In 2004, the first year of the organic rice project, 76 farmers in four villages 
were identified and agreed to join the project. According to European Union organic 
regulations, the process of conversion to full organic status takes three years. However, 
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as many of the farmers were de facto organic, the first farmers to join were categorised 
from the outset as being in their second year of transition to organic production. By 
2005, a total of eight villages and 192 households were involved in CCRD organic rice 
production, all of which were located in Phnom Kravanh district with the exception of 
one village, Khmar, which was located in Bakan District. For this year, a total of 74 
farmers were classified as fully organic, with the rest of farmers in either year one or 
two of transition (CCRD 2005). 
The Organic Rice Study 
In early 2006, I undertook field research over a two month period, focusing on the 2005 
harvest. Through networking I was able to make contact with key informants at Oxfam 
America and Oxfam Quebec who permitted me to study the project in return for a pro 
bono report of my findings. My aim was to examine the differences between the organic 
rice value chain and existing non-organic rice value chains from farmers to millers to 
determine what benefits, if any, were accruing to farmers as a result of their 
involvement with the project. Key guiding questions were:  
- What were the socio-economic dynamics of uptake for farmers wishing to join 
the CCRD organic rice project?  
- What were the overall benefits and impacts for CCRD farmers and other supply 
chain actors in the organic rice value chain from both the organic rice 
commodity chain and the aid chain of benefits passed on from donors?  
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- How sustainable were the different methods of rice production with regard to 
different social, environmental and financial considerations? In other words, 
could social justice truly be met through market relations?  
- What were CCRD farmer perceptions and attitudes?  
The study consisted of three main research activities. First a rapid survey of ten villages 
was undertaken to identify potential case study villages (see Appendix 5.2). Case study 
villages were selected on the basis of willingness to participate and general 
comparability. Four organic villages and two non-organic ‘comparison’ villages were 
chosen. Second, focus groups were held in each village, with the exception of Kandal 
and Ph’teah Rung villages, for which one focus group was held for both due to the close 
proximity of the villages. In these focus groups, basic data regarding differences in rice 
production inputs, outputs and values were recorded. Finally a total of 36 individual 
interviews with farmers, traders and millers were undertaken to verify the results of the 
focus groups and add further detail and insight (see Appendix 5.3 and 5.4).  
Table 5.1: Organic status of villages selected for study 
 Fully organic 
households 
Transition year 2 
households 
Transition year 1 
households 
Non-organic 
households 
CCRD villages 
Prahoa Kabal 10 21 0 131 
Kandal 0 41 0 217 
Ph’teah Rung 0 31 0 200 
O’Heng 0 0 25 157 
     
Non-organic villages 
Lo Lok Sa 0 0 0 103 
Psar Leu 0 0 0 94 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
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Figure 5.3: Map of CCRD ‘organic’ and non-organic villages 
 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University 
 
Case Study Village Characteristics 
Information gathered during the focus group sessions revealed that most CCRD 
households had slightly larger landholdings than other non-organic households in the 
same villages. Overall, CCRD villages were spread across much larger land areas than 
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the non-organic villages, which were more densely settled. In CCRD villages, 
neighbours were often quite far apart. This signalled that rice production was likely to 
be less intensive. 
Table 5.2: CCRD and non-organic village characteristics  
 Total 
population 
Total 
number of 
households 
Average 
household 
size  
Total land 
(hectares) 
Average land 
size per 
household/ ha 
Landless 
households 
CCRD Villages 
Prahoa 
Kabal 
643 131 4.9 120 ha rice 
land 
2.51 (1.81 with 
rice land) 
0 households 
(50 % 
population 
have no rice 
land) 
Kandal 1350 217 6.22 129 ha rice 
land 
1.36 (1.39 with 
rice land) 
15 
Ph’teah 
Rung 
967 200 4.8 180 rice 
land 
1.09 (0.91 with 
rice land) 
3 
O’Heng 778 157 4.99 163 ha (rice 
land 
unspecified) 
1.253 27 
Non-Organic Villages 
Lo Lok Sa 537 103 5.21 70 0.67 0 
Psar Leu 468 94 4.9 210 2.2 6 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
 
During the village identification session the O’Heng village chief stated that he 
was once a chemical fertiliser salesman, selling chemicals on consignment for an 
importer. However he had not been successful. This was attributed to a lack of irrigation 
and modern seeds in the village, which were seen as prerequisites for the use of 
chemical fertilisers. In fact, few CCRD households had access to irrigation or modern 
seeds. Consequently, de facto organic rice production was seen as a prudent strategy, 
under conditions of limited access, to yield enhancing technologies.   
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Production 
All of the selected villages primarily grew one wet season rice crop. A small minority in 
both organic and non-organic villages (4 to 15 households or 2.6 to 10 per cent) also 
typically grew small plots of dry season rice utilising short duration rice varieties, with 
the exception of Ph’teah Rung in which 100 households (50 per cent) grew a dry-season 
crop. Dry-season production was! limited to households with access to irrigation and 
mechanical pumps. In the CCRD villages there were low levels of mechanisation. All 
villagers bemoaned the lack of access to water and mechanical water pumps. Villages in 
the CCRD project grew a greater number of rice varieties on their land. During research 
we identified up to 27 different varieties used among the organic villages as opposed to 
12 different varieties used among the non-organic villages. As is typical of Cambodian 
rice farming, a mix of varieties was grown for the primary wet season crop (known as 
charcar or mixed rice). Non-organic villages displayed slightly higher levels of 
chemical use and higher levels of mechanisation than non-organic farmers that lived 
within the organic villages of Phnom Kravahn. Focus group and survey results showed 
that many farmers in non-organic villages, while using more modern techniques, 
appeared to be farming rice at a loss. This loss was of little consequence, however, as it 
was often subsidised by younger family members earning non-farm wages.  
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Table 5.3: CCRD ‘organic’ and non-organic village production 
 Average 
wet season 
yield tonnes 
per hectare 
Cultivation 
method 
Number of 
rice 
varieties 
used 
Irrigation type Number of 
households 
with 
irrigation 
Soil 
quality 
Mechanisation  
CCRD Villages 
Prahoa 
Kabal 
2 – 2.5 Transplant 15 Small Dam 25 Fair - 
good 
6 pumps 
Kandal 2.5 Transplant 18 Lake 202 Fair - 
good 
18 pumps 
Ph’teah 
Rung 
4 - 5 Transplant 27 Lake 30 Good 2 tractors 
12 pumps 
O’Heng 1.5 - 2 Transplant 16 Road canal 25 Poor 1 thresher 
3 pumps 
Non-Organic Villages 
Lo Lok 
Sa 
2 Transplant 6 Rehabilitated 
Khmer Rouge 
canals 
No 
information 
Fair 2 threshers 
20 pumps 
Psar 
Leu 
1.5 - 2 Transplant 8 River 5 Fair 2 tractors 
1 thresher 
7 pumps 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
 
Marketing 
The Community Cooperative for Rural Development villages displayed low levels of 
market access. Few in-village traders existed, with most villagers relying on the 
intermittent visits by less-trusted large external traders or CCRD. For non-organic 
villages market access was far easier, given their proximity to the provincial centre. 
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Table 5.4: Basic marketing constraints CCRD and non-organic villages 
 Distance to 
local 
market 
Distance to 
provincial 
market 
Road 
access 
Local 
traders 
External 
traders 
Village 
millers 
Commercial 
millers 
CCRD villages 
Prahoa 
Kabal 
6 33 Poor 1 0 6 0 
Kandal 11 31 Fair 0 1 20 0 
Ph’teah 
Rung 
11 31 Fair 0 1 12 0 
O’Heng 3 35 Fair 0 - 9 0 
Non-organic villages 
Lo Lok Sa 0 3 Fair 2 1 4 0 
Psar Leu 2 9 Fair 0 2 2 1 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
 
Other Livelihood Sources 
CCRD villages selected for study were all located in Phnom Kravahn District 
approximately 35 kilometres from Pursat’s provincial township. Many were located 
close to forested areas of the Cardamon Mountains. During my research, many men 
were not present as they collected wood and other products from the forest during the 
dry season (a dangerous livelihood strategy given that much of the area is still dotted 
with land mines). In contrast, the selected non-organic villages were all located in 
Sompov Meas District approximately five to ten kilometres from Pursat township. Both 
non-organic villages had younger family members working off-farm, and many of the 
farmers who participated in the focus group sessions were much older than the farmers 
in organic villages.  
All selected CCRD villages were said to be surplus rice villages (estimated on 
daily paddy requirements of one kilogram of unmilled paddy per person per day) with 
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the exception of Kandal village, which contained larger proportions of mixed crop lands 
or chamcar land on which they grew cash crops such as cashews, oranges and sesame. 
Lolok Sa village theoretically had a rice deficit, however, as the village is close to town 
and many inhabitants were government workers or had other urban occupations. 
Therefore it is unlikely that this shortage was in any way significant. Instead, off-farm 
work appeared to subsidise on-farm losses. CCRD villages had other NGO projects 
operating intermittently in their villages. These were primarily saving and micro-credit 
followed by livestock assistance. A small number of households in each village had 
members working as migrant labourers in Phnom Penh, Thailand and on the Thai 
border. Off-farm work was generally more casual for CCRD villages.  
Table 5.5: Other livelihood sources and assistance for organic and non-organic villages 
 Other sources of income Other development projects 
CCRD villages 
Prahoa Kabal Livestock, fruit and vegetables, remittances 
from migrants, collection of wood and non-
timber forest products (NTFP) 
Micro-credit, agricultural development, livestock 
Kandal Livestock, fruit and vegetables, rice wine 
production, remittances from migrants 
Credit and health programs 
Ph’teah Rung Livestock, fruit and vegetables, rice wine 
production, remittances from migrants 
Credit and demining projects 
O’Heng Livestock, fruit and vegetables, rice wine 
production, remittances from migrants, 
collection of wood and NTFP 
Livestock and credit 
Non-organic villages 
Lo Lok Sa Livestock, fruit and vegetables, remittances 
from garment workers in Phnom Penh, 
government workers, teachers 
None. Government rehabilitation of Khmer 
Rouge irrigation canals 
Psar Leu Livestock, fruit and vegetables, remittances 
from garment workers in Phnom Penh 
3 micro-credit programs 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
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Key Findings  
The CCRD project only purchased medium-duration fragrant rice varieties such as 
Phkar Roumdoul and Phkar Malis. While there are over 2000 different rice varieties in 
Cambodia (Helmers 1997: 2) adapted to different regions and soil types, only a couple 
of fragrant medium-duration rice varieties, similar to Thai jasmine rice, are demanded 
by consumers in Europe and North America. Farmers grew these varieties where they 
could, dependent on the availability of suitable land. Medium-duration varieties are 
grown earlier in the wet season, before the floods, and in medium elevation fields. They 
are not as tall as long-duration varieties and cannot withstand deeper waters where the 
soils are typically the most fertile. As a result, yields for fragrant medium varieties tend 
to be lower than late varieties grown without the application of additional nutrients to 
soils. Even compared with local medium varieties, fragrant medium varieties performed 
poorly. Contracted farmers tended to grow fragrant varieties demanded by CCRD for 
export on some of their land, while reserving the deeply submerged land for late 
varieties.  
All CCRD farmers complained of lower yields from growing medium-duration 
fragrant rice varieties demanded by CCRD. Prior to the project, a number of farmers 
clearly viewed the production of these medium fragrant varieties as uneconomical and 
much of the land that was now given over to de facto organic medium fragrant variety 
cultivation was previously fallow, cropped with higher yielding local medium varieties 
or used for the production of alternative crops such as sesame or in one case, teal raising 
(CCRD 2005). As farmers now grew medium fragrant varieties for CCRD’s organic 
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project on between 30 to 50 per cent of their land, many farmers complained that this 
had led to a reduction in overall paddy yields. Although this total reduction varied 
between villages, for some it was as high as 25 per cent of their total yield. Yield 
reductions of this magnitude were not compensated by organic premiums paid and were 
likely to have far reaching impacts on farm systems as a whole, reducing total paddy 
available for both human consumption and animal feed.  
Inputs 
Focus groups and individual surveys revealed that hardly any CCRD farmers owned 
enough, if any, livestock for manure (see Table 5.6) and none were applying the 
recommended minimum amount of organic matter to ensure soil nutrients cycling and 
therefore soil fertility (around ten tonnes per hectare is recommended).35  
Table 5.6: CCRD villages’ livestock ownership  
Status Village Cows Buffalos Pigs Chickens Ducks 
T0 Prahoa Kbal 7 0 3 60 4 
T0 Prahoa Kbal 6 0 1 5 0 
T0 Prohoa Kbal 4 0 1 20 3 
T0 Prohoa Kbal 4 1 3 5 2 
T2 Kandal 1 0 2 3 0 
T2 Kandal 2 4 3 10 0 
T2 Kandal 2 0 1 2 0 
T2 Ph’teah Rong 1 0 1 10 7 
T2 Ph’teah Rong 0 3 0 6 3 
T1 Ph’teah Rong 2 0 2 6 0 
T1 O’Heng 13 0 5 3 0 
T1 O’Heng 7 0 0 8 0 
T1 O’Heng 2 0 0 2 6 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
                                                           
35 Personal communication witg rice agronomist, February 2006. 
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Table 5.7: Organic fertiliser application in CCRD villages 
Status Village 
Fertiliser plot 1 
tonnes/hectare 
Fertiliser plot 2 
tonnes/hectare 
Fertiliser plot 3 
tonnes/hectare 
T0 Prahoa Kbal 3.75 4 0 
T0 Prahoa Kbal 6 6 1 
T0 Prohoa Kbal 1 1 3.70 
T0 Prohoa Kbal 4 0 4 
T2 Kandal 1 1 0 
T2 Kandal 4 0 0 
T2 Kandal 3 0 0 
T2 Ph’teah Rong 1.71 7.5 6 
T2 Ph’teah Rong 4.5 2 0 
T1 Pth’eah Rong 0 0 1 
T1 O’Heng 6 0 3.70 
T1 O’Heng 0.91 0 4 
T1 O’Heng 0.5 4 0 
Source: Interviews conducted by author. 
 
Most farmers understood organic farming simply to be an absence of chemical 
fertilisers or pesticides, not as a comprehensive and integrated farm management system 
including a high degree of soil management. Indeed, among many Cambodian 
government and NGO organisations this view of organic farming –– as merely the 
absence of chemicals –– prevailed. I was left at times to question the sincerity of efforts 
to increase organic rice production in Cambodia. Many CCRD farmers reported having 
received limited training, usually of around one morning, and few farmers appeared to 
be producing organic fertiliser in sufficient amounts. This raised the possibility that in 
future soil fertility may be depleted. Unlike organic farming systems in developed 
countries, there was a significant scarcity of organic waste within the farm systems of 
Pursat. With low livestock ownership levels and the thrift with which all manner of 
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plant and animal matter is utilised for building materials, animal feed and other uses to 
sustain these households, the scarcity of organic materials at farm level presented a very 
real threat to the sustainability of organic rice farming. 
Labour 
Medium-duration rice varieties flower earlier in the wet season than long-duration 
varieties. They often ripen just when preparation for planting the main wet season crop 
of long-duration rice is taking place. Thus labour demands are high at this point: the 
cultivation and harvesting of medium-duration rice varieties overlap with labour 
demands for the cultivation of long-duration varieties. In addition, because it is often 
raining when medium rice varieties must be harvested, post–harvest processing can be a 
difficult task. Roads are often inundated, making it difficult to reach paddy plots and 
transport the rice panicles. Drying the paddy, which usually occurs outside on mats, is 
also risky because of the high rainfall. Consequently, female-headed households and 
households experiencing labour shortages due to illness of a family member or 
otherwise, either did not join or dropped out of the project. For those who remained in 
the project, higher labour requirements meant less labour available for other livelihood 
options including on-farm diversification.  
Seed 
In addition to increasing labour requirements, organic rice production for CCRD also 
required farmers to use high quality seed purchased on credit from the project. The 
project usually grew this seed itself and sold it to the farmers at a cost price of 700 riels 
per kilogram. However, poor planning on the project’s behalf meant that they ran out of 
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seed early in the season and had to buy seed from the Australian-funded AQIP seed 
companies at a cost of 1400 riel per kilogram. Farmers wishing to supply CCRD with 
organic rice were required to purchase this seed at cost price. This substantially reduced 
the organic premiums received by farmers. This reduction, in addition to the higher 
labour requirements and reduced yields, meant that the compensatory effects of organic 
premiums were reduced even further. By my calculations, in a second year transition 
village, the higher price of seed alone reduced the premium from 10 per cent to 6.6 per 
cent.  
The Importance of Off-farm Income 
Off-farm employment is a key feature of many Cambodian villages, including those in 
Pursat. During fieldwork research with the CCRD de facto organic villages and 
comparison non-organic villages, off-farm employment data were collected. For non-
organic villages, employment tended to be more highly paid, in more secure jobs and 
closer to the local township. Households reported having family members engaged in 
professional occupations in government or educational sectors. For these farmers, 
remittance money subsidised more capital-intensive rice production even at a financial 
loss.  Meanwhile, CCRD villages had a far lower number of migrant workers and 
surveys indicated that when off-farm work was undertaken, it tended to be more 
seasonal or casual, lower paid and less secure. A small number of families indicated that 
members had left permanently to work in Phnom Penh, and a higher number of 
households reported that members had left to work at the Thai border or in lower paid 
manual labour positions, such as construction within Pursat province itself.  Indeed, off-
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farm labour was more important for all farming households to ensure household income 
and increased farm productivity than any kind of changes to rice production methods. 
For CCRD households, however, with limited or intermittent access to the security 
provided by more reliable non-farm wages, production methods were restricted to risk-
averse, low capital input, labour-intensive methods. 
Analysis 
De facto organic rice production of local rice varieties under rain-fed cultivation is a 
prudent strategy pursued by remote and ill-supported farmers in a region prone to both 
drought and flood. Farmer focus group participants reported that in times of inadequate 
rainfall those farmers who used chemical fertilisers were likely to lose their entire crop, 
whereas those who did not use chemicals would at least reap a small harvest. However, 
farmers who received the largest yields during periods of inadequate rainfall were those 
who produced de facto organic local varieties, not de facto organic fragrant varieties for 
CCRD. In terms of the dynamics of farmer uptake of organic rice production for the 
CCRD project, it is clear that only those farmers who were able to bear seed costs and 
yield reductions associated with planting fragrant varieties could successfully 
participate in the project. Households participating in CCRD organic rice production 
also tended to have greater labour resources. For example, the female head of one 
household who had dropped out of the organic rice project informed me that she had 
done so due to the loss of her husband.  
Aside from price premiums, the project offered few additional benefits to 
farmers. As contract farmers, the project did not provide any significant support to 
Chapter Five: NGOs and Organic Rice 
202 
ensure the sustainability of farmers’ capacity to produce rice. This raises the question of 
whether or not the cooperative or donors were actually centrally concerned with 
ensuring the sustainability of farmers. Efforts to support farmers were tokenistic at best. 
Indeed, many farmers were perplexed by the project. The farmers questioned why 
CCRD only demanded the one type of rice variety if they were so concerned with 
helping them. They asked why CCDR could not simply buy all their surplus rice at a 
higher price without such strict quality requirements, if indeed the goal was to improve 
farmer livelihoods.  
Organic Rice Project’s Livelihood Impact 
The project’s official price for organic fragrant rice growers was five per cent premium 
for first year organic (27.5 riel per kilogram or 0.7 US cents per kilogram), 10 per cent 
premium for second year (55 riel per kilogram or 1.3 US cents per kilogram) and 20 per 
cent premium for fully organic rice (110 riel per kilogram or 2.75 US cents per 
kilogram) on top of quoted market prices which at the time were 550 riel per kilogram 
or 14 US cents per kilogram. Throughout this province, as in many others in Cambodia, 
Vietnamese rice traders had long-standing buying relations and farmers reported that 
many had started to offer the same prices as the cooperative, often for lower quality 
rice. While this can be interpreted as a positive impact in some regards for rice farmers 
in the province as a whole, it was not a desirable outcome for the project’s ongoing 
sustainability. With Vietnamese buyers matching prices, farmers did not hesitate to sell 
to these traders who were often better organised and more reliable in prompt pick up 
and payment than the project and less fussy about quality. The cooperative only 
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purchased disease free rice within a strict range of between 12 and 14 per cent moisture 
content. Furthermore, the ease at which Vietnamese buyers matched the relatively small 
price premiums called into question whether or not price premiums, and therefore 
poverty alleviation aims, were in any way significant.  
The ability of organic or even fair trade projects to achieve poverty reduction 
through offering price premiums on subsistence crops is questionable. Cyclic 
agricultural commodity price spikes aside, the standard market rate for a subsistence 
crop like rice tends to be below the true cost of production, given that part of the crop 
goes towards non-market household consumption. Thus the portion consumed, in effect 
subsidises the portion sold as not all food for household consumption needs be 
purchased for cash on the market. This is demonstrated by the fact that farmers rarely 
account for their own labour when calculating the cost of rice production. As such, 
placing a 20 or even 30 per cent premium on a low value crop such as rice is therefore 
unlikely to pull anyone out of poverty. For the 2005 harvest studied, market rates for 
non-organic mixed variety paddy (charcar) were 520 riels per kilogram (US$0.13 per 
kilogram or US$130 per tonne). For fragrant varieties the standard market price in 
Pursat increased to 550 riels per kilogram (US$0.1375 per kilogram or $137.50 per 
tonne). With the additional CCRD price premiums of five (US$6.875), ten (US$13.75) 
and twenty per cent (US$27.50) per tonne, depending on organic status, farmers 
appreciated the extra cash at sale time. However, the additional dollars were not 
significant increases in farmers’ incomes especially after higher labour costs and other 
additional costs were factored in.  
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Furthermore, involvement in the project had left some farmers more reliant on the rice 
bank that the project had established. For some households surveyed, rough calculations 
showed an apparent paddy deficit at the household level as a result of project 
involvement. To increase the reliance of poor farmers on an organisation that did not 
appear to have the best planning skills, to ensure their food security, all for the sake of 
supplying organic fragrant varieties to western markets was hardly beneficial. The 
cooperative structure implemented by donors focused economic sustainability efforts on 
the cooperative itself, not on the farmers. In conflating the cooperative’s sustainability 
with farmer sustainability, the focus remained squarely on the export of certified 
organic rice to western markets rather than on improving farmer livelihoods. 
Under conditions of resource scarcity, there is logic to rice production in 
subsistence-oriented societies that works to maximise yields, avoid risk and build food 
security through surplus production and patronage networks. It is a logic that does not 
readily extend to high quality commodity production. Had a more thorough and 
informed assessment of farmer livelihoods and sustainability in Pursat been undertaken 
prior to project implementation, the sense of expecting poor resource-constrained 
farmers, without the necessary technologies to produce quality organic rice for 
advanced markets, may have been questioned.  However, the project was propelled not 
from a bottom-up concern for farmer livelihoods but from donor responses to new funds 
available for organic rice projects. 
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Marketing Organic Rice - An Exercise in Trade Facilitation 
Despite the questionable beneficial impact on farmer livelihoods, CCRD proceeded 
with the next phase of the project, organic certification. In order to market Cambodian 
organic rice in high-value European and North American markets, organic certification 
is necessary. Organic certification and labelling practices place the onus of meeting 
quality control standards on producers. In order to gain certification, farmers must 
adhere to a strict Internal Control System (ICS). Administered by one trained internal 
inspector per village the ICS details information regarding farmer production methods 
(conversion status, inputs used, field identification, expected yields, compliance with 
organic standards and rice varieties). However, organic certification is expensive 
because certification bodies are established and run solely by the countries that impose 
certification requirements. For European compliance, a qualified European certification 
officer representing an official organic labelling organisation must be paid to survey the 
farmers once a year. Costs for these certifiers are high, and include all accommodation, 
travel, food and translation costs in addition to certification costs. The certifier examines 
the ICS records and then takes a random sample of participating farmers to test for 
chemical residues. If one farmer fails, the whole association fails. The CCRD farmers 
received organic certification that complied with European Council Regulation 2092/91, 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the United States National 
Organic Program (NOP) organic standards (Geoffroy 2006). The German bilateral 
donor GTZ, who had established other organic projects around the country, paid for the 
organic certification costs of all organic farmers in the country, including the Pursat 
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farmers. The total cost amounted to US$10,400 annually. Out of this CCRD’s farmers’ 
share was US$2300 or roughly half of the total premium payment to all CCRD organic 
farmers. This cost was well above what CCRD could affordably pay alone. So although 
the price premiums in western markets can be lucrative, there are high barriers to entry 
for small producers and Third World cooperatives that are unlikely to be overcome 
without continued donor support. 
In addition to organic certification and labelling, donors decided it would also 
be advantageous to seek fair trade labelling thereby allowing the cooperative to access 
additional price premiums of up to 20 per cent. Yet this goal was thwarted, not by high 
costs but this time by poor management, staffing issues and conflicts between donor 
staff and the cooperative’s Managing Director. In order to achieve fair trade certification 
and expedite the export of already certified organic rice to pre-arranged buyers in 
Canada, Oxfam Quebec funded the placement of a Livelihood Specialist and a 
Marketing Consultant. The Livelihood Specialist was expected to live in Pursat 
province to assist CCRD staff and ascertain the requirements for fair trade labelling. 
However, when confronted by the rustic and isolated conditions of Pursat, the 
consultant returned to Canada after one week. This left the Marketing Consultant, a 
London School of Economics graduate of Development Studies, who had volunteered to 
come to Cambodia to fulfil the all-important fieldwork experience crucial to finding 
future paid employment in the development industry. Her task was to facilitate the 
export of the first fully certified organic rice, investigate and gain fair trade status for 
the cooperative’s rice and ensure the overall success of CCRD’s organic rice project. 
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This work included establishing a marketing plan, encouraging CCRD to draft a 
business plan, basic training in accounting, liaising with the other donors, and paying 
CCRD staff salaries. Eventually, another Livelihood Specialist was hired, on a part-time 
basis. This was an expatriate who had previously worked with the cooperative. 
Although he received a salary and free housing in Phnom Penh for this work, I never 
once met him during my fieldwork. I was informed that he had had a falling out with 
CCRD’s Managing Director whom he had accused of ‘wasting his time’ when 
approached over queries regarding the draft business plan. After that the two men 
refused to work together. Furthermore, the Managing Director began casually 
mentioning his own close ties to the ruling CPP, and hinting that he might leave the 
cooperative to pursue fame and fortune in Hun Sen’s executive office. If the point of 
such name-dropping was to intimidate his expatriate ‘partners’ working for Oxfam, this 
was clearly lost on them and the feud continued. Thus, with quarrelling co-workers, 
with no form of transport (the truck had been given to the Managing Director), no 
formal office, and on volunteer wages, many of the tasks of the day-to-day running of 
the cooperative fell on the shoulders of the Marketing Consultant, who regularly caught 
the five hour bus to Pursat to dole out staff salaries and administration costs whilst 
extolling the need for the cooperative’s eventual financial ‘sustainability’. With such 
mixed signals –– exhortations of the need to be more business-like set against a donor 
representative arriving with envelopes stuffed with cash–– the development impasse 
appeared ever wider.  Hushed debates in donor circles ensued which sought to reconcile 
their positive enthusiasm for the capacity of organic rice to assist farmers to trade their 
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way our of poverty with the creeping sense that the gift-like relations in which they 
were embroiled with CCRD would ultimately obstruct their efforts.  
The collection and assessment of harvested organic rice was also problematic. 
The only truck owned by the CCRD was old and broke down regularly. The process of 
checking the rice, ensuring it was labelled correctly and checking moisture content was 
slow and laborious. For some farmers, it was too slow and those that could not afford to 
wait sold their crop to Vietnamese traders. This reduced supply. Furthermore, due to 
heavy rains at the end of the growing season much of the rice was not up to CCRD’s 
required quality. Nonetheless, paddy collection went ahead, but complex discussions 
with other donors, traders and interested buyers took place over how to process, store, 
mill, package and transport the smaller than expected paddy harvest. 
Plate 5.1: CCRD rice collection 
 
 Source: Author’s photograph. 
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Plate 5.2: Transition year 2 rice bags 
  
 Source: Author’s photograph. 
 
The first issue after paddy collection was how to store the paddy to keep it dry 
and safe from pests. True to their promise to fund infrastructure needed for production 
activities, donors released funds for the construction of a storage facility. As donors had 
demanded that CCRD relinquish its lease of the ‘Oxfam’ office, this rental was 
cancelled and a storage house was constructed. To me, however, the ‘storage house’ 
looked very much like an office. 
Another donor, German Agro-Action, paid for the construction of a brand new 
mill to ensure organic rice remained organic during milling and to help the cooperative 
add value to the organic rice. The mill was a large commercial one but given the small 
volume of organic rice it ran at a continued loss. In order to achieve economies of scale 
and mill enough rice to ensure profitability, the project had to mill additional non-
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organic rice under contract. For this, the machine needed to be cleaned entirely after 
milling to maintain organic status. This added to costs. In addition, the mill was run in 
order to produce international quality milled rice. Unlike other local mills it produced a 
high level of unbroken whole rice grains or ‘head rice’. This made it uncompetitive with 
local mills that charged a small milling fee and kept broken grains, bran and husk for 
sale on the local market. It was therefore within their interests to mill the rice ‘clean’, 
removing as much bran as possible while also breaking the rice. With its high quality 
equipment, the CCRD mill produced high proportions of unbroken rice and less bran 
thereby leaving less broken rice and bran to sell on the local market. In order to mill 
non-organic rice under contract profitably, the mill needed to switch to lower quality 
milling methods that produced more bran and less head rice. Thus, while in theory the 
mill was consistent with donor principles of value-adding and technical assistance, in 
practice it was too large and sophisticated for the local market context. 
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Plate 5.3: The CCRD rice mill 
 
Source: Oxfam America. 
 
Adding further value to the milled rice was also a concern. The donors 
reasoned that if the milled rice could be packaged according to buyer preferences, this 
would add further value and place the cooperative in good stead towards fair trade 
certification. Fair trade organisations promote additional value adding in the producer 
country where possible, arguing that the more value adding processes that stay in the 
producing country, the fairer the trade. Thus, the Marketing Consultant investigated 
vacuum packaging machines. However, such machines had to be imported and there 
were no service guarantees if they broke down. Furthermore, there was no readily 
available source of bags for packaging rice in order to meet international export 
standards. The idea was abandoned. 
Chapter Five: NGOs and Organic Rice 
212 
The harvest of 2004 produced no fully organic rice, only transition-organic rice 
and therefore, no international market willing to buy it. This harvest was sold to an 
organic agri-business company, newly established by an ex-Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) consultant from the United States who had been previously 
involved in the implementation of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) throughout 
Cambodia. He reportedly borrowed money from a bilateral German donor, GTZ, in 
order to purchase the rice. This deal was negotiated between foreign consultants and the 
rice was milled at CCRD’s rice mill under the supervision of the AusAID-funded, AQIP 
post-harvest team, which was hired by the organic agri-business company under 
contract. The rice was then packaged in Phnom Penh and distributed to tourist hotels 
and high-end supermarkets in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. Given the small size of the 
Cambodian organic market, much of this rice was left unsold. The deal left the 
cooperative out of pocket, as monies owed for the rice were left unpaid by the agri-
business company.  
The donors were eager not to repeat this mistake and to claim the title of being 
the exporter of Cambodia’s maiden shipment of internationally certified organic rice. 
The marketing of the 2005 harvest involved by complex negotiations among the 
numerous donors who were all striving to make Cambodian organic rice marketing a 
success. The Marketing Consultant and her counterparts at different donor organisations 
worked in collaboration for several months to ‘facilitate’ the sale and delivery of 
organic rice to western buyers. All negotiations were conducted in English between 
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western buyers and donor representatives. Despite their supposed harmonious approach, 
the various donors involved all pursued different strategies.  
One strategy by the larger, more powerful bilateral agency, GTZ, was to form 
the ‘Cambodian Organic Farmers Association’ and combine all organic marketing 
efforts under a ‘public’ organic rice brand to be sold in Cambodia through approved 
channels. Everyone who grew certified chemical free rice in Camnodia could market 
rice under the brand name: Saravan. This association included: the Pursat cooperative, 
an organic farmer cooperative in Battambang previously supported by the Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA) now abandoned, GTZ’s organic projects 
and other farmers trained by a French organisation. The creation of a ‘public’ rice brand 
for organic rice clearly violated the common logic for creating a brand in the first place. 
The primary reason to create a brand is to imprint on a product a clear mark of 
ownership and distinction, in order to create private value not a public good. Branding 
seeks to create value through associating a corporate logo or symbol with specific 
characteristics such as quality, uniqueness and experience, thereby setting a product 
apart from others. Nevertheless, in the name of ‘participation’ aimed at creating a 
collective sense of ownership by organic rice farmers from all around Cambodia, farmer 
representatives from different provinces were regularly ferried back and fourth to GTZ’s 
Phnom Penh office to pick out label wording, designs and bag colours. This proved a 
time-consuming and laborious process given the general reluctance to participate and 
tendency towards silence that most Khmer farmer representatives display when placed 
outside of their comfort zone, such as within the corporate-style boardrooms of the 
Chapter Five: NGOs and Organic Rice 
214 
German bilateral donor. Eventually an identity was crafted which comprised more 
emblems of donor identity than of Cambodian organic rice growers, as evidenced in 
Plate 5.4, a brochure for the rice which contains the logos of six donors.  
 
Plate 5.4: Saravan rice brochure  
                       
 
Source: Oxfam Quebec. 
 
Saravan was marketed by the GTZ sponsored National Marketing Co-
ordinator, a locally engaged marketer who eventually organised the sale of organic 
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transition rice (not suitable for export) at selected upmarket outlets, supermarkets and 
market stalls, such as Lucky’s and the tourist market, Psar Cha in Siem Reap. This rice 
was labelled and packaged so as to compete with local rice prices. As such, much of the 
rice was sold well below the price of packaging and branding and was of variable 
quality, given the lack of vested interest by any one group to ensure brand consistency. 
This called into question the degree to which organic rice production in Cambodia was 
more a symbol of donor magnanimity than a serious attempt at commodity marketing. 
Collective marketing, however, was not in the interests of CCRD. With their 
large-scale donor-funded mill, the Marketing Consultant pushed the cooperative to find 
a way to ensure that not only their paddy, but all organically certified paddy in 
Cambodia was milled in Pursat, to achieve the economies of scale needed to support the 
mill. However, staff and members of the Pursat cooperative wanted to sell to the same 
agri-business company they had sold to in 2004. The primary reason for this was that 
CCRD staff felt socially comfortable dealing with this familiar company, despite having 
lost money in the previous 2004 transaction. The Marketing Consultant strongly advised 
against this. Various other donors tried unsuccessfully to convince different Phnom 
Penh commercial millers to buy the entire crop and export it to donor-arranged organic 
buyers in Europe and North America. None were interested, however, when they 
learned that they had to guarantee organic status all the way to the final destination.  
At the National Conference on Organics and GMO Free Agriculture held in 
Phnom Penh in December 2005, all the donors plus the agri-businessman/consultant 
(who was still under the impression that he could buy the Pursat and other organic rice) 
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tried to sell the same crop of organic rice several times to the same European organic 
trade representatives. At the event, display tables were littered with different 
promotional materials for Cambodian organic rice suppliers: GTZ’s Saravan, the 
organic agri-business, CCRD and the DANIDA-abandoned Battambang organic rice 
producers association, all of which claimed to be potential suppliers of the same rice 
stocks. Collectively, the cross-purposes of these organisations served to create a mirage 
of abundance and diversity of suppliers rather than the reality –– abundant ‘trade 
facilitators’. However, none of the donors, ‘suppliers’ or other associations was either 
mandated or capable of the key requirement to export rice, that is, the capacity to take 
on, manage and absorb the financial risks associated with rice trading. No one was 
willing to buy the rice and sell it to organic traders who had agreed to buy the rice. 
Much to the chagrin and bewilderment of Khmer farmers and onlookers, the obvious 
appearance of wealth and willingness to pay by western donors only extended to 
‘capacity building’ or ‘facilitation’, not towards their stated goal of exporting organic 
rice. Unwillingness to bear such risk was, of course, justified in the name of 
‘sustainability’, a term, which for all its evocations, became increasingly narrowed to 
the financial sustainability of donor sponsored projects.   
The incapacity of donors, either single-handedly or collectively, to ensure the 
sale of already harvested rice appeared even more nonsensical, given the charitable 
attitude of the organic traders. The organic traders present at the conference were known 
to have taken low quality rice shipments from Pakistan which, when unloaded, was 
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found to be infested with bugs. At the conference it was stated by one trade 
representative that 
there was a sample of rice sent from Cambodia two years ago and it was terrible. This rice 
doesn’t stand a chance. No one is waiting for a new fragrant rice variety from a little 
country. But we will try to market [it] out of social responsibility.36  
Social responsibility or not, quick cost calculations made by the Marketing Consultant 
showed that Cambodia’s organic rice was highly competitive. Prices for paddy and 
milled rice were lower than the cost of the Pakistani shipment. This once again proved 
that Cambodia could indeed theoretically supply organic rice at competitive prices to 
international markets. With this optimism in mind, the Marketing Consultant decided 
that it would be best for CCRD to buy all the remaining organic rice in Cambodia, not 
already sold under the Saravan label, and mill it in Pursat, thereby taking advantage of 
the mill’s existence.  
However, CCRD did not have enough money to do this without taking out a 
loan at very high interest rates from the only available rural credit provider in 
Cambodia. Furthermore, foot-dragging on behalf of the Managing Director meant that 
CCRD had not, in fact, registered as a cooperative and still maintained the legal status 
of NGO, which could not under law use its assets to borrow money. Eventually, some 
cash from CCRD, a grant from German-Agro Action and a loan against a CCRD 
employee’s assets were pooled to purchase the rice. There was strong resistance from 
some cooperative farmer members to taking on debt. They continued to perceive the 
cooperative as a donor-funded local NGO and questioned why the donors could not just 
give the cooperative money, as they had done in the past. After some wrangling and 
                                                           
36 National Conference on Organics and GMO Free Agriculture, Phnom Penh, December 2005. 
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negotiation, the loan went through and the donors collectively decided to install two ex-
World Bank business consultants to help the cooperative to devise, finally, a proper 
business plan. In return, donors promised that if CCRD accepted the consultants, had a 
business plan and generally behaved in a more business-like manner, this would give 
the donors confidence and they would pledge more money to support the cooperative.  
The cooperative purchased all the remaining organic rice from all the other 
provinces in Cambodia. This amounted to 161.3 tonnes of fully organic rice and 105.9 
tonnes of transition rice. Meanwhile the business plan was completed. The plan stated 
that, given the implementation of new procedures and cost-cutting measures, the 
cooperative could become sustainable in 18 months time. The Managing Director of 
CCRD was emboldened by the business plan. Being the only person at CCRD who 
could read the English-worded plan, he was able to convince the farmer-comprised 
Board of Directors that the consultants had said the cooperative could be financially 
sustainable immediately. He convinced the Board that they no longer needed the donors. 
He then wrote to all the donors thanking them for their help but informing them that it 
was no longer needed. Cambodia’s entire organic rice crop of 2005 (partially subsidised 
by donors) was sold to Vietnamese traders arranged by the Managing Director (who 
came from a border province and had good trade contacts). The hopes of all donors to 
fulfil their annual milestone reports of being the first to export certified organic 
Cambodian rice were dashed. 
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Figure 5.4: Aid/organic rice value chain 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Organic Agriculture in Cambodia 
Given the questionable benefits to farmers, and the difficulties encountered in exporting 
such a small amount of rice to such faraway markets, it is necessary to ask why there 
was such a great deal of support for organic rice production in Cambodia? While no 
formal organic policy was in place in Cambodia at the time of research, organic 
agriculture was variously supported in a scattering of government strategy documents 
including the National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003), Rectangular Strategy 
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for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency (2004) and other key over-arching 
‘development’ documents (Makarady 2007). More specifically, rice production and 
export was listed as a key strategy of the Cambodian government’s Ministry of 
Commerce to support wider agricultural trade and development. The Ministry’s 
National Export Strategy for 2006-2007 notes  
our vision is to develop the organic rice sector to further enhance economic growth in 
Cambodia as a whole, to generate employment opportunities for the land-less and to reduce 
poverty among the rural population and improve the wellbeing of farmers (Ministry of 
Commerce 2006: 58). 
The report estimates Cambodia’s national surplus paddy for 2004-2005 at 
approximately 650,000 tonnes, a small amount by international standards. For example, 
the world’s largest rice exporter, Thailand, exported eight million metric tonnes in the 
year 2003-2004 (USDA 2009). By most estimates, the majority of the Cambodia surplus 
–– 500,000 tonnes –– was traded informally as unprocessed paddy across Cambodia’s 
borders to Thailand and Vietnam (Boreak 2001; Kurczy 2008; Ministry of Commerce 
2006: 57). This is such a small volume of paddy surplus relative to other rice producing 
nations (even non-traditional producers export more rice than Cambodia). Uruguay 
exported 750,000 tonnes in 2003 to 2004) (USDA 2009). Cambodia is unlikely ever to 
hold a commanding presence on conventional international rice markets. Thus, a 
number of influential multilateral and bilateral organisations37 recommend that 
Cambodia seek out higher value, niche markets, such as organics, for its relatively small 
surpluses.  
                                                           
37 These include the International Trade Centre (ITC), an arm of the World Bankand the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
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 Cambodia is perceived to have a competitive advantage in niche organic rice 
markets for several reasons (McNaughton 2002; Makarady 2007; Perera 2005; 
Rozenkranz 2005). Firstly, as a poor, predominantly rice-producing country, it is 
believed that many farmers already produce de facto organic rice crops, although exact 
numbers are unavailable. Many farmers are unable to invest in productivity-enhancing 
equipment or purchase chemical inputs that may increase yields. Secondly, rural labour 
is seen as an abundant resource. Thus, many believe that the higher labour requirements 
associated with organic rice production could absorb excess rural labour. Given the low 
cost of labour relative to capital in rural Cambodia, the National Export Strategy states 
that conversion to organic rice production is relatively inexpensive compared with the 
investment required to move farmers towards ‘modern’ rice production techniques 
(Ministry of Commerce 2006). Thirdly, the promotion of Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM) in Cambodia, by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
and other aid organisations, is assumed to have impacted on farmers’ behaviour, and it 
is generally believed that many farmers would abstain from chemical inputs even if they 
had access to them.38 Overall, organic proponents in Cambodia hope that the country 
may skip the ‘productivist’ agricultural phase (modern, industrialised production 
epitomised by the Green Revolution) and move straight to ‘post-productivist’, organic 
cultivation.  
                                                           
38 A key argument for the promotion of organic production in Cambodia has been the continued problem of illegally 
mislabeled dangerous farm chemicals such as DDT imported from neighbouring Thailand and Vietnam. A report by 
the French organisation Centre d’Etude et de Development Agricole Cambodgien or CEDAC in 2004 details these 
issues.  
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In the term ‘post-productivism’, some or all elements of conventional or 
‘productivist’ food systems are rejected on the principle of sustainability (Watts et al. 
2005; Wilson and Rigg 2003). Productivist systems are interpreted as environmentally 
destructive, predisposed to economic concentration in the hands of fewer and fewer 
wholesale and retail giants, and socially malignant –– displacing small farmers in favour 
of large-scale plantation production. By contrast, post-productivist practices include 
organic production, local or community-based agricultural projects or associations and 
direct and/or fair trade marketing and labelling. These activities seek to provide 
alternatives to what is perceived as dominant and destructive production, marketing and 
consumption patterns in conventional agro-food systems.  
Wilson and Rigg (2003: 682-683) outline several characteristics typical of post-
productivist systems including: a) a reduction in farming intensity through 
extensification, diversification and dispersion of agricultural production; b) increased 
‘consumption’ of the countryside resulting in greater contestation over its use and 
meaning; c) widening of the agricultural community to include formerly marginal 
actors, such as NGOs, at the core of the policy-making process; d) a weakening of the 
state’s role in policy-making; and e) farming techniques that reduce or abandon the 
application of external inputs (for example organic farming).  
The distinctions made between productivism and post-productivism resonates 
with the false dichotomy of gift/commodity exchange. Productivism, on the one hand, is 
viewed as the inevitable, yet ultimately unsustainable outcome of unbridled commodity 
exchange characteristics of the developed world and capitalism. Post-productivism, 
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however, represents an attempt to reinsert ‘morality’ into the market, through attempting 
to incorporate a range of other social and environmental values, beyond market values 
alone.  Similar to the false binary of gifts and commodities, the distinction made 
between productivism and post-productivism is often presented as an either/or dilemma. 
However, productivism gives rise to post-productivism and both systems of production 
tend to co-exist or even complement each other. Today, few if any nations, communities 
or people rely solely on one form of agriculture to sustain them. To reiterate, 
multiplicity and “impurity is the rule” in procuring daily sustenance (Callon in Morgan 
et al. 2006: 18). 
The Cambodian government, along with other development industry analysts, 
notes that skipping agricultural ‘productivism’ is feasible despite a long list of 
acknowledged obstacles. For example, the National Export Strategy’s analysis lists six 
strengths for organic production: productive land, market access, an entrepreneurial 
business sector, under-utilised value and specialised rice varieties. However, these 
strengths stand against 16 weaknesses, ranging from basic infrastructure to economic 
and social constraints, in addition to administrative and market barriers (see Appendices 
5.4 and 5.5). The ambitious plan to launch Cambodia’s rural development through 
organic exports to international niche markets is certainly not a simple path for a 
country categorised as ‘least developed’ and therefore grappling with building a basic 
supply chain infrastructure. Wilson and Rigg (2003), however, contend that the 
development of food chains should not necessarily be seen as a simple linear process of 
moving predictably through the stages of pre to post-productivism. They argue that least 
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developed countries can successfully import post-productivist systems and ‘leapfrog’ 
the productivist stage, given a clear and accurate understanding of the values, meanings 
and definitions surrounding such a transition. On the other hand, Watts et al. (2005) note 
that fair trade and organic food that is not consumed locally, generally requires the same 
spatially dispersed and co-ordinated supply chains that are usually associated with 
conventional food systems. Thus, under conditions of production for export, these 
‘alternative foods’ often require conventional food supply chain infrastructure to 
become economically viable. Hence ‘leapfrogging’ from subsistence production into 
high value international niche markets, while not impossible, is certainly exceedingly 
difficult without extensive pre-existing trade institutions and infrastructure. Donor 
‘trade facilitation’ is a poor substitute for the existence of core trade infrastructure.  
While the discourse of organics and fair trade projects appears to offer hope by 
way of innovative niche marketing, the key question remains as to whether post-
productivism offers a path beyond the status quo of subsistence farming and poverty. In 
this project, de facto organic farmers were left primarily as de facto organic farmers 
with limited on-farm organic matter, no irrigation or livestock assistance and price 
premiums below what is needed to encourage farm productivity investment. In short, 
the approach taken by these donors was one that championed poverty and subsistence 
and offered a premium for it. This approach seemed largely to find favour with the cash-
strapped Cambodian government which states that, because many Cambodian villagers 
are already de facto organic and as organic rice production requires less external inputs, 
it is a cheaper way to develop the rural sector than following the conventional approach 
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of modernisation via external inputs. Support for such low-input farming in Cambodia 
is disingenuous, given government promotion of large-scale, productivist agricultural 
concessions and contracts. Thus, the discourse of post-productivism offers a convenient 
justification for providing little support to the rural sector while appearing to do 
something. The many conferences, field days and executive meetings surrounding the 
promotion of organic rice production in Cambodia which is estimated to absorb 5000 
farming households at the most out of a total population of 1.8 million households, is a 
case in point (Makarady 2007).  
The commotion that surrounds the promotion and development of Cambodian 
organics appears to be uninformed about what are the known pattern of agrarian 
transition and rural development found throughout Southeast Asia (Rigg 1997: 195; 
Scott 1976; Walker 2008; Timmer 2005). This pattern is one where off-farm labour 
contributes to the modernisation of the farm sector via remittances. Off-farm labour, 
while it represents a loss of labour power on the farm, is a valuable source of cash 
income to farming households and tends to compensate for reduced labour through 
capital investment and labour saving technologies such as mechanical pumps, ploughs 
and chemical fertilisers and pesticides if necessary. Capital investment in small farms 
helps to alleviate any on-farm labour shortages as a result of off-farm employment 
through increasing productivity, thereby permitting the further freeing of labour 
available for the industrial sector. It is this ‘virtuous cycle’ that increases on-farm 
productivity and stimulates rural development. Organic premiums running at 20 per cent 
above market rates of 550 riels per kilogram in 2005 are unlikely ever to compete with a 
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job in the garment factory in Phnom Penh paying minimum wages of US$45 per month.  
Even at the height of the 2007 commodity boom, when rice prices doubled, one tonne of 
organic paddy worth US$330 would still comprise around one third less than could be 
earned in a garment factory (US$540). Given that few farmers even produce one tonne 
of paddy as surplus, a more realistic figure is 360 kilograms worth US$99 per harvest.39 
Although much is made of the ability of organic agriculture to absorb Cambodia's 
apparent excess pool of young labourers, it is not a good strategy for rural development 
overall. 
Because organic rice production is more labour intensive than conventional 
modern farming, only those with large families and limited off-farm employment 
options are likely to pursue it, while wealthier better connected farmers find easier ways 
to farm, thanks in part to remittances. In short, de facto organics is the last resort of poor 
farmers with adequate labour and limited or seasonal off-farm work opportunities and 
no resort at all for those without those assets. In the Southeast Asian context, it is a 
strategy that is better suited to an undiversified, autarkic economy with excess labour 
limited in mobility. This is an absurd thought when one considers Cambodia’s recent 
history.  
In terms of value chain interventions for rural development, this case study 
makes clear, therefore, the need to examine agricultural value chains not only within 
                                                           
39 Calculated by 2005 numbers most farmers produce surpluses of 360 kilograms estimated at 650,000 tonnes/1.8 
million households = 0.361 tonnes. For 2007 figures paddy surpluses are lower. Total estimated paddy yield after 
post-harvest losses is 5,591,572 – 5349993 (paddy needed for domestic consumption estimated at1 kg paddy per 
person per day = 365 x 14,657,515 = 5349993) equals 241579 surplus/2,273,517 households = 0.108 tonnes) 
(calculated using data from the National Institute of Statistics in Cambodia and RGC’s food security website). 
Aiding Trade 
227 
their own existing set of organisations and processes but relative to other livelihood 
options and sectors. The absence of such an examination was a serious failure of this 
project and many others, which, in an effort to ride aboard the development trend for 
organic agricultural development, failed to consider seriously the livelihoods of the 
farmers they purported to help. In order to construct a truly sustainable ‘post-
productivist’ organic rice value chain able to capture the premiums of international 
markets, both production and marketing constraints require serious and considered 
investment, as do farmer livelihoods. Failing that, organic rice promotion is an empty 
policy with questionable motivations.  
Conclusion –– Marketing Charity Through Ethical Commodities 
For NGOs and donors, ethical commodities symbolically address trade injustices 
between First and Third Worlds in such a way that appears in harmony with the 
environment and social concerns. However, alternative trade structures do little to 
ameliorate the power dynamics of existing informal cross-border trade which 
overwhelmingly dominates Cambodian agricultural commodity networks. The trade 
networks imposed by donors operated primarily along their own ethnic lines; deals were 
negotiated between foreign aid workers and European or North American traders and as 
such they were inherently socially unsustainable. No marketing capacity building took 
place to train Khmer staff to maintain imposed trade linkages with European or North 
American organic buyers. Donors tended to ignore existing dominant trade networks 
and relations between neighbouring countries as they were perceived to be low value 
and difficult to understand and deal with. Overall, there was a tendency to overstate the 
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importance of western values and markets to ensure the livelihoods of poor Cambodian 
farmers, while other trade avenues or rural development options were left unexplored. 
Why was the presence of Cambodian organic rice on western supermarket shelves (and 
not Vietnamese ones) of such vital importance? In this case, it obviously has far more to 
do with western consumers and donor requirements than farmer needs. 
Within developed countries the organic and Fair Trade market sectors are 
undeniably associated with consumers of upper-income socio-economic brackets 
(Marsden 2001; Morgan et al. 2006) which equates the ethics of social and 
environmental sustainability with that of superior taste and moral righteousness. Here 
gifts and commodities are fused on supermarket shelves. Consumers in this sector pay 
higher price premiums for ethical products, which demonstrate, by way of labelling, a 
concern for the poor and the environment. While roots of alternative commodities may 
lie within the common fears of food safety and the risks of industrial agricultural 
production, a public concern for decreasing diversity and even a leftist agenda of de-
commoditising food chains, within the ethical market such values may only be afforded 
by a select minority. The consumption of ethical products has not only become a 
cultural marker connoting wealth, high social status and morality, it has been conflated 
with superior taste and refinement. Consumers in this market seek out regional 
‘artisanal’ food in the belief that if the provenance is known then so too the production 
process is known and this is thought to have a bearing on taste (Marsden 2001). This 
results ultimately in the paradox that peasant production methods once maligned as 
‘backward’ are now considered gourmet. Consequently and somewhat perversely, 
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romanticised images of Southeast Asian peasant rice production and subsistence 
lifestyles are perpetuated by the same consumers that seek to help them ‘trade out of 
poverty’, by paying a price premium mediated by INGOs.  
Furthermore, the presence of such products, marketed through NGOs and 
lining the shelves of fair trade shops and selected supermarkets, works to translate 
foreign aid efforts as noble, worthwhile and successful. More specifically, it helps to 
interpret NGO-constructed trade relations as benevolent rather than bumbling. It 
encourages First World awareness of aid projects and potentially further donations 
towards NGO activities. It helps NGOs to be seen to be more than just charities but 
smart business-minded people with a heart, whilst capitalising on and reinforcing 
romantic and unrealistic notions of Third World rural farming communities. In doing so, 
ethical trade imposes high standards of compliance on poor producers and, in a 
marketing twist, transforms this practice into a form of benevolence on behalf of 
western consumers (Hughes 2005). Thus it seems apparent that much of the rise in 
ethical consumerism may be more about making First World consumers feel better as 
moral donors and consumers with refined tastes than providing real benefits to poor 
Southeast Asian farmers.  
Ethical trade systems such as fair trade and organic production in developing countries 
respond to the development impasse through attempting to reconfigure the structural 
inequities of conventional agro-food systems. Yet in doing so alternative trade 
necessarily enrols aid agencies and their attendant gift relations. Gifts are passed 
through donor created trade networks that conflate farmer sustainability with project 
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sustainability. As such, they tend to ignore the true driver of rural development and 
poverty reduction –– symbiosis between on-farm and off-farm employment –– and 
instead attribute the transforming power of development to their own donor-created 
projects.  
  
Chapter Six 
Gender and Vegetables 
 
In this country it is the women who are concerned with commerce…every day, a market 
takes place which begins at six in the morning and ends at noon. There is no market made up 
of shops where people live. Instead people use a piece of matting, which they spread out onto 
the earth. Each has her own location and I believe that fees are charged for these locations.  
 
Zhou Danguan Chinese emissaries to Angkorean thirteenth century in Chandler 2000: 74. 
 
Fresh fruit and vegetables give rise to different food chains than those associated 
with high bulk, low value and storable grains such as rice. Seasonality, perishability 
and quality demands of fresh vegetables are associated with higher levels of 
production and marketing knowledge, coordination and information throughout the 
chain in order to meet market demands for quality and freshness. This chapter 
examines two fresh vegetable projects, each of which represents distinctly different 
approaches to fresh vegetable commodity chain development. The first project, 
Human Resource and Rural Economic Development Organisation (HURREDO) was 
a local NGO, established in 2000 and run by a former government agricultural 
extension officer. As one of the first projects working in the area of vegetable 
production and marketing in Siem Reap, the project initially attracted a great deal of 
donor interest and received several large donor grants but eventually fell out of 
favour with donors when results were not forthcoming. The second project was a 
small component of the AusAID-funded Agricultural Quality Improvement Project. 
This component worked initially to improve the production capacity of existing 
vegetable producers and then focused strongly on improving post-harvest and 
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marketing practices of predominantly female vegetable traders. Although successful 
in its aims, the component did not find wide support among the donor community in 
Cambodia.  
What these two case studies highlight is how development organisations, 
drawing on horticultural development literature, tend to assign fresh fruit and 
vegetables as the medium through which gender equity is achieved. The 
preconception that fresh fruit and vegetables are a ‘women’s activity’ fits well within 
gender and development discourses. This works to legitimate donor giving to fresh 
fruit and vegetable commodity production. In addition, value chain literature often 
overstates distinctions between producers, traders and consumers and then identifies 
power in agricultural commodity chains as residing with traders. Thus, fresh 
vegetable producers, not traders, are the preferred beneficiaries. This rationale and 
the predilection for development projects to work with producer groups, rather than 
individuals, in the name of pro-poor development works to disenfranchise female 
traders in Cambodia who dominate petty fresh fruit and vegetable trade. As such, 
women and their livelihoods tend to be strategically simplified in the category of 
producer, thereby limiting them to passive group recipients of benevolent, technical 
assistance.  
As we shall see in the first case study, the key role of vegetable trader is 
often then appropriated by a development project in the name of capacity building 
marketing ‘know how’. Donors replace female-dominated vegetable marketing 
chains with donor-constructed commodity chains in the name of charity. Donor-
sponsored vegetable projects often erect marketing outlets and distribution channels 
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themselves under the assumption that the poor, and more specifically poor women, 
need to be helped to trade their way out of poverty. Such projects tend to find support 
due to their emphasis on the lowest rung of the supply chain and are lauded as pro-
poor. Their high level of visibility, via donor-branded demonstration farms and 
shops, is also an advantage, since efforts aimed at women in their multiple roles as 
producers/traders/retailers/consumers remain largely imperceptible and inconvenient 
to donors and their needs to make obvious their charitable assistance.  
Such forms of assistance reproduce the development impasse insofar as they 
assume that the poor and disadvantaged are locked out of the market, or if engaged in 
the market, are subject to exploitative conditions by unscrupulous traders, 
necessitating the need for donor-led public marketing. The poor and disadvantaged, 
in particular poor women, are usually supposed to exist primarily within the private, 
non-market sphere of the home in gift or subsistence-oriented economies. Pro-poor 
efforts aimed at women therefore aim to empower women out of the private sphere 
and into the public sphere of the market via collective production and marketing. 
However, these categories of private and public are not ones that necessarily resonate 
in Cambodian society. The reality is that, in Cambodia, women tend already to be 
engaged in trading as part of their duty in maintaining the private sphere of the home; 
efforts towards collective/public production and marketing undermine their crucial 
role as petty traders and therefore their ability to provide for their families. 
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Case Study One: HURREDO Project Description and Aid Chain 
In 2000, HURREDO established a demonstration farm located at Tek Village, in the 
Pouk District of Siem Reap, near the Siem Reap International Airport and close to an 
ancient water canal fed by an Angkor era water reservoir (baray).  
Figure 6.1: HURREDO Siem Reap 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS, Australian National University. 
 
The aim of the project was to assist small rural producers in Pouk District to 
grow organic vegetable varieties to supply to the hotel market of Siem Reap, with 
HURREDO acting as market facilitator and trader.  The burgeoning tourist market of 
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Siem Reap was viewed by many in the agricultural development community as a 
great opportunity for poverty alleviation, whereby poor local farmers could supply 
high quality vegetables to high-end hotels, thereby accessing the kinds of premium 
prices usually only reserved for the most sophisticated producers and suppliers. In 
2006, Siem Reap hotels consumed an estimated five tonnes of vegetables per day in 
the high tourist season, approximately half of which were imported (EIC 2006: 17).   
Initially, the project aimed to assist 250 people who were conveniently 
organised into 25 groups of ten. The project reported that over 60 per cent of these 
people were women, with many participants suffering from physical disabilities, 
social dislocation and family trauma. The remaining 40 per cent were comprised of 
households which contained demobilised soldiers and other disadvantaged or poor 
farmers (HURREDO 2003). Other indirect beneficiaries were said to be an estimated 
300 farming families living in two villages adjacent to the HURREDO demonstration 
farm. These people were assumed to have benefited via proximity to the project and 
their presumed observance of ‘proper’ agricultural techniques. The project expected 
to raise incomes of beneficiaries through providing technical assistance and training 
to farmer groups. Produce was to be transferred to the demonstration farm where 
additional vegetables were grown. The project then planned to store all produce in a 
cold room for distribution via market linkages established by the Project Director. 
The demonstration farm and its facilities were to be run as a cooperative by farmer 
participants and their families.  
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The project enrolled the support of various bilateral and international NGO 
donors to achieve these ends, and spent considerable time writing grants and 
applying for assistance, eventually amassing a rumoured US$200,000 in donor 
support. Donors supplied grants of between US$2,500 and US$25,000 per 
application. Donors also supported the project via training days and educational trips 
for the project’s Director. In addition, the project hosted a number of volunteers from 
donor volunteer programs including New Zealand and Australia. Much of the 
assistance appeared to go towards improvement of the demonstration farm. New 
plots were dug and labelled with donor logos. A truck was purchased and drip 
irrigation systems installed. An intermittent supply of seeds arrived, courtesy of 
NGOs and of local chefs eager to support local supplies of exotic vegetables.  
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Plate 6.1: HURREDO demonstration plot 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
 
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable and Poverty Alleviation 
It is often postulated that the diversification of farmer livelihoods away from cereal 
monocultures and into high value products such as fresh vegetables can play a 
significant role in poverty reduction through addressing the multi-dimensional 
aspects of poverty and disadvantage (Ali 2008: FAO and World Bank in Dorjee et al. 
2003: FAO 2004b: Weinberger and Lumpkin 2005). Vegetable production is thought 
to provide sustainable growth and poverty reduction in a number of ways. First, 
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growing a variety of crops increases on farm agro-biodiversity thereby creating more 
resilient farm systems (Gari and FAO 2003). Diversification is also believed to 
improve food security for farmers over the different seasons, as opposed to relying 
on one major harvest per year as with rice. Increased crop diversity may increase 
household nutrition which is especially important for more vulnerable household 
members including children, pregnant mothers and the aged.   
Beyond the farm gate, marketing fresh fruit and vegetables has one very 
important advantage –– income. Fresh fruit and vegetables are generally defined as 
high value agricultural products along with other perishable products including 
livestock and dairy (FAO 2004b). The higher values attributed to fresh fruit and 
vegetables are derived from their higher levels of perishability and the degree of 
specialisation required in production and marketing (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2005: 
4). Fresh fruit and vegetable production and marketing are more profitable than 
cereal production and undeniably linked with commercialised agriculture. Indeed, 
Dorjee et al. (2003: 1) state that diversification is the first sign of a move away from 
subsistence, while the second move is specialisation for the market. Thus, fresh fruit 
and vegetable production and marketing are thought to represent a significant 
opportunity to increase poor rural producer incomes (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2005; 
Bass 2006).  
Ali (2008) argues that diversification into vegetable production can improve 
on-farm management practices through improved resource allocation, as farmers 
who grow vegetables for commercial markets apply lessons of timely and efficient 
input use throughout their farm systems. In addition, diversification is believed to 
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spread labour inputs more evenly through the year, and create rural employment 
opportunities for the landless and disadvantaged. Ali (2008: 12) states that on 
average horticultural production requires 2.5 times more labour than cereal 
production per labour days per hectare. The additional employment opportunities 
created by fresh fruit and vegetable production is thought to be favourable work for 
women and the disabled; that is to say, it is less physically demanding agricultural 
work with higher returns (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2005). Overall, Ali (2008) states 
that the impacts of what he terms the ‘horticultural revolution’ on poverty alleviation 
are far more effective than the cereal-focused Green Revolution.  
However, access to high value fresh vegetable markets is not without 
hurdles. In order to capture the potentially high values inherent in these markets, 
products must be high quality, safe to eat, well packaged, consistently supplied and in 
line with consumer preferences and price expectations (Epperson and Estes 1999). In 
order to deliver this, a high degree of knowledge and coordination is required 
throughout the commodity chain from producers to consumer (Ali 2008). First, the 
fundamentals of fresh fruit and vegetable production must be in place. This means 
farmers must have access to high quality inputs such as seeds, appropriate land with 
adequate soil quality, irrigation and labour and in some cases access to specific 
technology and therefore capital. 
Production must then be well planned, implemented and managed. This 
generally includes staggered production schedules across a growing season of 
commercial varieties, pest management and mitigation of other environmental 
Chapter Six: Gender and Fresh Vegetable Marketing 
240 
variations where possible. Knowledge of optimal harvest times is also important for 
ensuring optimal prices. Harvesting too late or too early can affect the final sale 
price. Harvest knowledge varies depending on the variety grown and consumer 
preferences.  
Appropriate post-harvest practices are especially crucial for highly 
perishable crops that may quickly deteriorate and lose value. Transportation methods 
are included in post-harvest practices and damage during transport must also be 
mitigated. Appropriate packaging and timing is highly relevant and so therefore is 
rural trade infrastructure. Overall, post-harvest losses in fresh fruit and vegetable 
production in developing countries are around 40 per cent of total harvests, 
representing a significant loss of potential income (FAO 2006). Technology is clearly 
a factor in reducing losses and improving the quality and therefore price of produce. 
Technological improvements are a function of capital investment and therefore of 
rural credit.  
The degree to which all these factors constrain or enable horticultural 
production and trade vary depending on the specifics of a given location (Ahmad and 
Isvilanonda 2003). In many developing countries where complex cold storage 
processing chains do not exist, commercial fresh fruit and vegetable production tends 
to favour suitable peri-urban areas (Moustier 2007). The highly specific demands of 
commercial horticultural production and marketing require a high degree of business 
nous. According to Ali (2008: 25), the requirements of matching market demand with 
available farm resources are so complex that “if farmers can successfully manage a 
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fresh fruit or vegetable farm, they can easily operate a computer shop or any other 
modern business”. 
HURREDO Constructed Vegetable Chain 
In 2003, the marketing of HURREDO vegetables began. At the demonstration plot, 
cherry tomatoes, lettuces, herbs, capsicums, okra and other varieties were cultivated 
on heavily ploughed, and, by and large, poor soils. Initially, poorly conceived order 
forms that listed vegetables by their formal Latin botanical names were sent to hotel 
chefs. This was a failure and no orders were forthcoming. The recently established 
Siem Reap Chefs’ Association then decided to organise a marketing day in order to 
explain to suppliers the quality, consistency and varieties needed by hotels. Still little 
progress was made by HURREDO in marketing vegetables and only intermittent 
supplies of basil and okra were delivered. Planting schedules were obviously an issue 
as the organisation often had either too much or too little produce to sell. On several 
occasions, chefs drove out to the farm to enquire as to what had become of the seeds 
they had supplied. Some had been stolen by so called ‘cooperative’ members; others 
planted on the demonstration plot, but the produce from the seeds left unsold. On one 
occasion chefs arrived at the demonstration plot to find ripe, high quality cherry 
tomatoes growing in abundance, a vegetable with high demand in the hotel market. 
The Project Director however, lamented a lack of buyer interest much to the chefs’ 
frustration. “No one has bought your tomatoes because no one knows they are here,” 
said one chef. Once word of cherry tomatoes got out, all were sold and the hotel 
chefs eagerly awaited the next crop. However, despite the desire of many hotel chefs 
in Siem Reap to buy local produce, which when available was cheaper and better 
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quality, budgetary and purchasing practices of the hotels themselves worked firmly 
against such efforts.  
HURREDO’s Existing Vegetable Chain 
Vegetable purchasing by large hotels in Siem Reap is not controlled by chefs but by 
purchasing officers within centralised Financial Control Offices. Many Purchasing 
Officers employed in these hotels expect to be paid additional money by vegetable 
suppliers for allowing them the privilege of supplying a hotel. This practice 
inevitably inflames the ire of expatriate chefs who see such payments as conflicting 
with their demand for the best quality vegetables. Some local chefs who had risen 
through the ranks to the level of Head or Executive Chef in Cambodian-owned hotels 
supplemented their incomes by establishing their own vegetable supply businesses 
for their own kitchens. Barriers to supplying hotels extended beyond simple ‘rent 
seeking’ behaviour. Hotel payment structures only favoured larger scale suppliers 
who could manage the risks of produce rejection and the delayed payment schedules 
that many hotels adhered to (accounts in hotels are typically settled at the end of 
every month). In addition, much of the produce demanded by hotel kitchens was 
more consistently supplied by imports from cooler climates of Northern Thailand and 
Vietnam. Imports also fulfilled demand for exotic herbs, vegetables, and fruit unable 
to be grown or out of season in Cambodia. Furthermore, many of the local markets 
carried imported products; few varieties were supplied from local sources close to 
Siem Reap, with the exception of kangkong or water spinach in the wet season.  
In this case, the concerns of development theorists that smallholders may be 
locked out of high value fresh fruit and vegetable markets at first appearance seemed 
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to be justified. Hotel purchasing systems and market demands for exotic vegetables 
meant few opportunities for local growers, were they ever to overcome ecological 
constraints to production. However, the concern held by members of the Siem Reap 
development community, that masses of smallholder growers were in some way 
missing out a large and lucrative market, was somewhat overstated.  
Overall, the local and hotel markets of Siem Reap, although increasing in 
size, were relatively small. Some locally owned hotels (owned mostly by 
Cambodia’s top military brass) sourced vegetables from the local wet markets in 
Siem Reap which were often supplied by traders selling produce from Kampong 
Cham and Battambang. Larger international hotels imported the vast majority of 
produce from internationally linked suppliers. An interview with one major 
international hotel supplier –– an ex-UN worker-cum-vegetable trader who supplied 
herbs, baby vegetables and exotic vegetables from his own farm in Dalat in Vietnam 
and other Australian, American and French sources –– stated that his total vegetable 
sales to Siem Reap were in the order of 500 to 800 kilograms per week in 2006. This 
high value produce was all transported into Cambodia by truck from Vietnam. 
However, the total values of these vegetables was little more than US$2000.40 In 
actual fact, the hotel market of Siem Reap was neither all that large nor lucrative, 
especially at the high-end of the market. Nonetheless, the aim of local supply to this 
market continued to transfix donors and government.  
To be supplying the limited tourist market of Siem Reap, or the 
supermarkets of Phnom Penh, was the ultimate mark of vegetable value chain 
                                                           
40 Personal communication with vegetable supplier, 23 August 2006. 
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development achievement in Cambodia. To this end, donors and the RGC justified 
support for the development of a ‘greenbelt’ around Siem Reap to “enable people in 
Siem Reap to cultivate vegetables and subsidiary food crops and to raise livestock in 
order to supply the hotels and restaurants in the province” (Royal Embassy of 
Cambodia Washington DC 2006). Likewise in many of HURREDO’s proposals the 
“ever-expanding tourist and hotel market in Siem Reap and its corresponding 
growing demand for produce” was cited as a good reason to continue subsidising the 
organisation (Dalton 2006: 17).  
Transformed, Sustained, Abandoned? 
For HURREDO, however, prospects were dim. As a local NGO with little project 
management or technical skills, accountability was non-existent. Few records of 
income and expenditure were kept aside from a shoebox stuffed with receipts. No 
monitoring and evaluation took place, except for the occasional official visit or 
promotional photo opportunity used by donors in their newsletters (Williams 2007). 
Over time, donor perceptions of the project began to change and sensing imminent 
failure, the project’s Director enrolled the support of a foreign-run local NGO, Small 
and Medium Enterprise Cambodia (SME Cambodia) who agreed to assist the project 
with strategic direction and accountability needs and to help the Director secure a 
steady supply of seeds. This NGO soon lost interest, as it too fell out of favour with 
larger bilateral donor institutions, and, subsequently reinvented itself as a clean 
energy provider. Continued donor support was vital to HURREDO’s maintenance. 
The centralised marketing chain from farmers to demonstration plot to hotel 
purchasing offices was far too cumbersome and expensive for the relatively small 
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volumes of vegetables being traded from a couple of nearby villages. The 
management structure too, demanded high overheads that mere vegetable selling 
could not sustain. It is not surprising that with limited seed supplies, high 
competition from imports and high barriers to market entry via hotel purchasing 
officers, the HURREDO Project Director often spent more time writing donor 
funding proposals and attending conferences and development workshops than 
actually overseeing vegetable production.  
Revisiting HURREDO at the end of my fieldwork in 2006 revealed that it 
was now using the demonstration plot as a training centre for vegetable production 
and marketing for the International Labour Office (ILO).41 Having honed its skills in 
the art of donor grant proposal writing, in partnership with a volunteer from 
Australia, the NGO had transformed itself into a consulting firm, oriented more 
towards capturing donor funding than towards being a serious seller of fresh 
vegetables, thereby trading up, not through the commodity chain, but rather through 
the aid chain.42  
Fieldwork in 2006 revealed that many of the farmers who were once 
involved in HURREDO were still growing vegetables, as they had done prior to the 
establishment of HURREDO in the first place. With the collapse of HURREDO as a 
marketing linkage, farmers were now marketing vegetables themselves and in some 
cases to large hotels (see Chapter seven). Clearly the idea that farmers needed help to 
trade their way out of poverty via a central marketing system erected by a local NGO 
                                                           
41 A somewhat perplexing activity for this international organisation to be involved in given that it is traditionally 
involved in protecting industrial workers’ rights. 
42 Personal communication with the volunteer, March 2006. 
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and supported by larger bilateral donors was misguided. Nonetheless, HURREDO 
continues to exist as an organisation involved in fresh fruit and vegetable 
‘development’. It still grows and markets vegetables, mainly from the demonstration 
plot but sometimes sourced from surrounding farmers, but in a far more flexible 
manner. Producing and marketing vegetables, however, is not its core business. 
Instead, donor funding continues to support this organisation as a visible emblem of 
donor efforts towards improved vegetable production and marketing. It is through 
marketing its image of an organisation involved in sophisticated vegetable 
production and marketing that the organisation is able to sell itself to donors, leaving 
open the question as to whether HURREDO is a producer and seller of fresh fruit and 
vegetables or a producer and seller of donor proposals and grants. For HURREDO 
the production and marketing of both vegetables and donor reports are inextricably 
linked to the sustainability of both activities.   
The Importance of Intermediaries in Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing 
Key to the successful marketing of vegetables is a high degree of supply chain 
coordination. Cook (2000: 3) states, “when demand and supply are more closely 
coordinated buyers and sellers can work together to stimulate sales, and achieve 
more consistent volumes and quality”. Fresh vegetable supply chains therefore 
require closer and more cooperative business relationships than cereals such as rice. 
Traders play an important role in coordinating supply with demand. Within 
competitive markets the role of traders in communicating consumer preferences, 
values, packaging price information and so on, is indispensable. Their role in 
communicating market intelligence to producers is key to their survival in business 
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and the ability of producers to access higher prices. In this sense, fresh fruit and 
vegetable chains are predominantly trader-driven, as traders flexibly source produce 
from numerous farmers in order to deliver consistent quantities of high quality to the 
market.  
Trader power is not, however, always favourable. In especially poor areas, 
where limited competition exists, trader collusion may occur (Harriss 1981). Power 
may be exerted especially in remote village markets where external competition is 
scarce. Under such conditions producers or local traders may use their market 
dominance to collude, fixing prices for poor quality vegetables to poor village 
consumers with few other market options. When higher quality produce enters a 
market either through improved local production and marketing or through better 
supply of higher quality imports, collusion is unlikely. Instead, producers and traders 
tend to work together to improve production and marketing techniques, meet 
consumer demand and capture market share and values.  
Thus, beyond isolated conditions, fresh vegetable value chains tend towards 
specialisation in production and marketing by dedicated horticulturalists and the 
commercial traders that link them to markets. Trader power via supply chain 
coordination is not always stable either; rather it shifts with location, season, quality 
and farmer. For example, for local traders, buying power is often strongest at the 
height of a harvesting season, eroding slowly as the season wanes and supplies 
dwindle. Trader power is improved through flexibly sourcing vegetables from 
various locations to mitigate the fluctuations of supply associated with seasons. 
Trading fresh fruit and vegetables across provinces, regions and borders is therefore 
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essential to maintaining a trader’s capacity to support local growers and contribute to 
competitive fresh fruit and vegetable markets at low prices to poor consumers. 
Sourcing vegetables from a limited pool of smallholders in one location and 
marketing through a donor-supported NGO is not.  
Aid projects working to assist poor people to trade out of poverty often 
overlook the importance of existing intermediaries, due to the logic that if 
intermediaries do in fact exist, they must be part of the reason that poor producers are 
not benefiting from market access. Aid projects assign themselves the role of 
intermediary or trade facilitator, often bypassing existing intermediaries, thereby 
replacing trade chains with aid chains.  
Case Study Two: Agricultural Quality Improvement Project - Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetable Component  
Acknowledging the crucial link between producers and traders in fresh fruit and 
vegetable marketing, the fresh fruit and vegetable component of the Agricultural 
Quality Improvement Project (AQIP) sought to work with both producers and 
traders. In the initial project design, however, focusing on traders was not a priority. 
The original project design sought to work only with producers to increase their 
incomes to between US$17 and US$32 per member per month. This was to be 
achieved through supporting pre-existing NGOs, similar to HURREDO, with village-
based initiatives requiring low levels of investment. Beyond this, the fresh fruit and 
vegetable component aimed to support fresh fruit and vegetable policy formation and 
implementation at the national level; assist with the establishment of a Marketing 
Information System for this burgeoning trade; and build capacity within the 
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Provincial Departments of Women’s and Veteran Affairs to market fruit and 
vegetables (AusAID 1999).  
Implementation of this component began later than the other AQIP 
components due to the delayed appointment of the fresh fruit and vegetable 
Marketing Advisor. Once on board, this advisor set about redesigning and scaling 
back much of the original plans and designs. The establishment of fresh fruit and 
vegetable marketing information system was scrapped as government counterparts 
advised that this was already in development with another donor. The goal to assist 
with formulating national fresh fruit and vegetable policy was also abandoned, as it 
was declared futile to build the capacity of government counterparts to market 
vegetables when this should be done in the private sector. Instead, the key focus was 
redesigned to be fresh fruit and vegetable production groups and marketing agents 
supported directly by the AQIP project since no suitable NGOs were found. Pre-
existing vegetable producers were identified and provided directly with irrigation and 
technical assistance. These groups then nominated a Group Marketing Agent, usually 
an existing vegetable producer/trader whom all producers knew and trusted. This 
agent was provided with comprehensive business development advice, post-harvest 
training and other marketing tools and tips. In addition, the role of the trader, her 
costs, risks and overheads were carefully explained to farmers supplying her. Much 
of the work done in the initial months was on strengthening relationships between 
farmers and traders.  
The project worked with two categories of vegetable commodity chains: 
provincial local markets and peri-urban markets closer to Phnom Penh. With the 
Chapter Six: Gender and Fresh Vegetable Marketing 
250 
exception of Kandal, the characteristics of vegetable commodity chains for the 
provinces were fairly similar. Prey Veng, Takeo and Svay Reing (see Figure 4.1) 
contain small provincial markets. All provinces are located in low-lying rice 
ecologies, prone to flooding during the wet season, making vegetable production in 
these months difficult. All provinces are close to borders with Vietnam. Research 
conducted by International Development Enterprises on vegetable markets in Prey 
Veng reported numerous physical constraints to production including poor soil, 
limited financial resources, unpredictable rainfall and a lack of horticultural 
knowledge. A small number of farmers in these areas engaged in commercial 
production of specific crops under the encouragement of NGOs. However, imitation 
by other farmers had led to market gluts and price collapses (Roberts 2006). These 
provincial markets displayed high levels of price volatility, given that all were 
subject to rapid over-supply or under-supply depending on the season.43 By contrast, 
Kandal province held a greater competitive advantage and more developed and 
concentrated vegetable commodity chains due to its proximity to Phnom Penh. 
Kandal is a major source of fresh vegetables for Phnom Penh, supplying 
approximately 50 per cent of Phnom Penh wet markets with leafy green varieties 
such as lettuce and choy sum and yard long bean (Sokhen et al. 2004).   
The AQIP Constructed Fresh Vegetable Chain  
The Marketing Advisor was careful to select pre-existing vegetable growers with 
capacity to expand and improve production. All participants chosen had never 
previously been involved in development projects. This, it was explained, was to 
                                                           
43 Personal communication with AQIP Group Marketing Agents, July 2005. 
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avoid any potential problems associated with farmer preconceptions of NGOs as 
‘institutional patrons’. The vegetable growers continued to grow the same varieties 
of vegetables, albeit with expanded production and better techniques, and sell the 
vegetables to the same traders they had previously sold to, albeit with better post-
harvest techniques. Overall, the ‘improved’ fresh vegetable chains enabled more 
consistent and stable production due to the provision of irrigation and training in 
post-harvest. It also ensured the production of safer vegetables due to training 
farmers in organic production or responsible chemical use. However, due to the low-
lying topography of the target provinces, little could be achieved to assist production 
in the wet season. After all, the provinces had been selected due to their high poverty 
rates rather than their horticultural suitability. Nonetheless, the project encouraged 
grower specialisation in the area of highly perishable leafy greens, a market niche in 
which local growers easily obtained a competitive advantage due to their fast 
growing, highly perishable nature.  
The AQIP fresh fruit and vegetable component was considered a great 
success by AusAID, farmers and traders alike. Produce increased in quantity and 
quality, marketing chains improved in efficiency and consumers gained access to 
better, cheaper and safer vegetables. The project increased producer incomes from 
averages of US$115 to US$886 dollars annually and trader incomes from US$425 to 
US$1476 (ACIL 2006a: 15). The largest and most successful female trader from 
Kandal averaged gross profits of US$500 per month in 2005. 
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Semi-structured interviews undertaken with growers and traders confirmed 
the project’s impact on producer and trade incomes. In an interview with one Group 
Marketing Agent from Svay Rieng she stated  
I sell a larger range of vegetables than most people [at the markets]. Before AQIP I 
mainly produced [vegetables] for home consumption. I did not sell much but now I have 
expanded production with the support of irrigation and I grow a lot more now.44 
She also stated that vegetable imports from Vietnam were not a concern for her 
business. 
Vegetables from Vietnam are only the vegetables that don’t grow in this area, cabbage, 
carrots and long life vegetables. The problem in Svay Reing is that it is quick to be 
undersupplied and quick to be over supplied. From Vietnam there is a consistency of 
supply.45  
Another AQIP farmer informed me that, 
Before AQIP we just used to grow the traditional way, but now I have an open mind. 
Before I had to carry water but now we have irrigation. Before we made around 20,000 
riels per season, but now we grow three crops of vegetables a year a make 2,000,000 
riels [US$500]. Other families who did not join the project grow vegetables but only for 
eating. The commune chief lives far from here, he only grows vegetables for eating.46  
 
Although training farmers in quality fruit and vegetable production and supplyin 
irrigation provided the foundation for the project, the work with the Group Marketing 
Agents in managing supply and demand absorbed the majority of the Marketing 
Advisor’s time. The Marketing Advisor met with Group Marketing Agents regularly 
to discuss marketing and accounting techniques, assist with budgets and sales 
forecasts and suggest new methods of post-harvest handling. Much of this work 
included strategising pep talks.  
Market power is with the GMAs at this time, customers really need GMAs service at the 
moment. This is the season that you must do your best. If you have to buy outside the 
grower groups then do so, this is the season to do it. You need to supply more now and 
                                                           
44 Personal communication Group Marketing Agent, 22 July 2005. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Personal communication with vegetable farmer, 22 July 2005. 
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get even in the dry season when there is an oversupply. In terms of growers you need to 
keep them as your friends in the dry season as you will need them in the wet season. In 
the wet season there is more competition and they will sell to others. Use your power to 
negotiate and say “remember I buy off you in the dry season.47 
What the above quote demonstrates is the co-dependent relationship that existed 
between vegetable traders and producers. It was a relationship where relative power 
fluctuated between the seasons. This co-dependence was socially embedded in long-
standing relationships, based to a large degree on trust. The capacity of the agents to 
support the grower groups with marketing services was maintained only through the 
agent’s capacity to source vegetables from other growers if needed. However, the 
quality of vegetables from growers not trained by AQIP was noticeably lower. As 
such the Marketing Advisor enquired whether the largest Group Marketing Agents 
from Kandal would be willing to invest in training more groups in vegetable 
production. 
You could pay trainers to train farmers. Then they would be not an AQIP group but 
your group. The costs would be approximately US$500 over 3 months or US$150 per 
month to train 20 to 30 farmers in a group on quality vegetable production.48  
At the time, this Group Marketing Agent sourced vegetables from three AQIP trained 
groups. With her average income of US$500 per month, each group was worth about 
US$100 to US$150 per month to the agent’s gross income. But the agent was not 
willing to make this investment 
When I sell vegetables that are not AQIP vegetables I explain they are not AQIP so they are not so 
good. I only sell vegetables from non-AQIP sources in exceptional cases. The most I would be 
willing to pay would be US$100 over 3 months to establish new AQIP groups. An extra AQIP 
group of 20 to 30 farmers would add 30 per cent more to my income.49 
                                                           
47 Personal communication AQIP Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Advisor, 12 August 2005. 
48 Personal communication, 12 August 2005. 
49 Ibid. 
Chapter Six: Gender and Fresh Vegetable Marketing 
254 
So despite the high and quick returns available should this trader invest in creating 
new producer groups, expansion of high quality fresh fruit and vegetable production 
was limited without investment by development aid. As a pilot project only, the 
AQIP fresh fruit and vegetable component could not justify further investment in 
expanding the supply of an already successful trader. 
Plate 6.2: AQIP fresh fruit and vegetable group marketing agent field trip Kampong 
Cham August 2008 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
 
AQIP Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Component and Gender 
In the wider scheme of the AQIP project, little attention was paid to the fresh fruit 
and vegetable component. Comprising a mere four per cent of the total project 
budget, the fresh fruit and vegetable component was over-shadowed by the larger, 
more politically important rice seed companies (ACIL 2006a). Indeed, the project’s 
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managing contractors commented that this project component was “originally an 
after-thought”, tacked on to the larger rice seed project as the ‘gender component’ 
despite the fact that women in Cambodia tend to perform over half of the labour for 
rice farming. Thus, vegetables were imagined and then presented as the ‘gender 
sensitive’ component of AQIP. Project managers and contractors were aware of this 
pretence. 
The fruit and vegetable component was added as a PR [public relations] component, in 
order to have a “gender” component. The Department of Women’s Affairs wanted the 
component. They think that women are confined or rather dominate fruit and vegetable 
production, but not really. In rice production and marketing you deal with the whole 
household. Fifty per cent of the fruit and vege component is female. But women tend to 
dominate marketing and household finances.50 
The fruit and vege marketing shouldn’t be there - it is a women’s component but 
women do most of the work on rice fields and are too busy.51 
Although the AQIP project consultants and contractors were well aware that fresh 
fruit and vegetable production in Cambodia was not really all that gender sensitive, 
the pretence was maintained as it helped the wider project appear ‘gender balanced’ 
and worked in line with common misconceptions about gender and vegetables in 
Cambodia.   
Gender and Vegetables 
Whether or not fresh vegetable production contributes towards greater gender equity 
is debatable. A number of studies have noted the trend towards the feminisation of 
agriculture as men move more quickly out of the agricultural sector than women 
(Singh 2003 in Weinberger and Lumpkin 2006). Overall, vegetable production 
requires more labour than cereal production (Dorjee et al. 2003), and as such the 
                                                           
50 Personal communication with project consultant, 18 May 2005. 
51 Personal communication with project consultant, 21 June 2004. 
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responsibility of diversification efforts may fall disproportionately on the shoulders 
of already overburdened rural women. Thus, the long-term impacts of diversification 
may instead entrench gender imbalances (Ardrey et al. 2006). This may be especially 
the case in agrarian societies dependent on the migration of men to find higher paid 
off-farm employment during off-peak the agricultural production cycle. Off-farm 
employment is often more highly paid than fresh vegetable production and 
marketing.  
Earnings differentials between men and women are of concern to 
development agencies, given that women are commonly viewed by these agencies as 
‘holding the keys’ to development. Development reports repeatedly state in their 
introductory sections the importance of addressing gender imbalances to ensure the 
efficacy and equity of development impacts. This stems from numerous research 
findings that demonstrate that improving women’s incomes does more for family and 
community wellbeing than increasing male incomes, due to the fact that women tend 
to spend a greater proportion of their income on household needs, health, education 
and child care (Albee 1996 in Ardrey et al. 2006). As the production of vegetables is 
often perceived as a female activity, the emphasis on diversification into fresh 
vegetables by donors cannot be understated. Typically, donors see their role as one of 
empowering poor rural female farmers vis a vis community power holders and men 
through improving female incomes and bargaining power compared with other actors 
in the vegetable supply chain. So despite the fact that diversification into vegetable 
production and marketing can, in the long-term, entrench gender inequity, improving 
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the immediate incomes of female farmers is often cited as a key positive dimension 
of projects aimed at vegetable commodity chain development.  
Gender and Vegetables in Cambodia 
Nesbitt (1997: 37) states that vegetable cultivation in Cambodia is traditionally 
considered as part of a female’s household duties. Although it is true that some 
agricultural tasks are ‘traditionally’ assigned to a specific gender –– for example, 
women usually transplant rice –– these roles are flexible according to labour 
availability. In fact, a study conducted by Genova et al. (2006: 6) found that men and 
women in Cambodia are equally involved in vegetable production, with the 
exception of part-time work in horticulture that is usually fulfilled by women. So 
although one could suppose that agriculture in Cambodia is feminised, due to the 
migration of males to the cities to find work and the demographic imbalance left by 
the war, migration patterns and demography in Cambodia are rapidly changing. For 
example, fifty per cent of the population is under thirty years of age, meaning the 
majority of people alive today were not alive during the war. As such, the number of 
female-headed households in Cambodia is declining. Furthermore, Cambodia’s 
largest sector of the economy by GDP, the garment industry, has also seen a large 
exodus of women from rural farming communities into factory work (Davis 2009). 
Indeed, in provinces close to garment factories one may often observe men 
transplanting rice. Plainly, labour in agricultural production in Cambodia is fluid and 
flexible according to gender. Vegetable production is no more a female task than it is 
a male one. The gendering of vegetable production in the AQIP project as a women’s 
activity transposed ideas about gender and vegetable production that are not 
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necessarily useful in the Cambodian context. However, women irrefutably play an 
important role in fresh vegetable marketing, outnumbering men at a ratio of two to 
one (Genova et al. 2006: 7).  
Working with female traders was a key focus of the AQIP fresh fruit and 
vegetable component. It was for this work that the project received the most 
attention. It was widely acknowledged among the donor community that the project 
had increased the profits of female traders and therefore the resilience of vegetable 
marketing chains from producer groups to market. What was disputed, however, was 
whether or not this could be interpreted as ‘pro-poor’. Indeed, the project increased 
trader incomes much more than it did those of producers. For this reason the AQIP 
approach was contested and often disliked among a number of development 
organisations that interpreted the strengthening of traders compared with producers 
as anathema to pro-poor development. The Marketing Advisor’s frustration with the 
perceptions of the wider donor community was palpable in many of my discussions 
with him.  
The Group Marketing Agents (GMAs) work on commission. But most donors want 
marketing groups, not agents. With the GMAs we’re creating a market driven model, 
which is ‘seen as natural’. But other NGOs and donors don’t agree and prefer farmer 
cooperatives, [including] CIDA, NZAID and the UNDP.52 
To date, the traditional approach of many donors working in diversification has been 
farmer-focused and, similar to the HURREDO project, aimed towards improving or 
even simply establishing vegetable production, often as a means of improving basic 
rural food security. In such instances, development organisations work to increase 
production, spreading technical assistance as widely as possible. Methods such as 
                                                           
52 Personal communication with Marketing Advisor, 6 June 2005. 
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train the trainer, demonstration farms, farmer field school days, seed dissemination 
and other forms of technical assistance are deployed to boost production. Quantity 
rather than quality production prevails. Early adopters and product innovation are left 
unrewarded without the concomitant development of marketing strategies. 
Production-focused horticultural development is, of course, useful in areas where 
malnutrition is high and markets simply do not exist (Muller 2000). In such places 
production capacity, rather than rural household income, is the key to household 
survival. Yet beyond isolated conditions, farmers must market their produce and 
boost their incomes. Opinions on how this should be achieved vary among 
organisations and depend on the prevailing institutional perceptions of the rural 
sector, poverty and development. Depending on the agency, NGO or ruling 
government’s policies, these may take the form, for example, of promoting state 
marketing boards, collective producer marketing or ‘enabling’ individual producers 
and traders (Abbot 1987). The relative success of these approaches depends on the 
degree to which the chosen approach aligns with existing trade practices and 
structures.  However, in the case of vegetable commodity chains constructed by 
development projects in Cambodia, rarely do they promote the role of individual 
traders who often must market both imported and locally grown vegetables in order 
to stay in business and supply vegetables all year.  
The Cambodian Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Sector 
There is a long-standing perception among agricultural development agencies that 
Cambodia is flooded with cheap vegetable imports from neighbouring Thailand and 
Vietnam that are of better quality than Cambodia can currently produce. 
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Development practitioners often lament the state of Cambodian fresh vegetable 
supply chains as under-developed. The perceived low capacity to produce and 
market fresh vegetables is often attributed to unfair competition from Thailand and 
Vietnam, or unfavourable factors of production including seeds, irrigation, post-
harvest handling, transport infrastructure, rural credit, market intelligence and 
business nous (FAO 2006). The potential for production to be increased is often 
noted, despite the fact that the majority of the population of Cambodia inhabits low-
lying lands susceptible to seasonal flooding and 13 per cent of vegetables and 22 per 
cent of fruit imported are simply not able to be grown in Cambodia (EIC 2006: 19).  
Cambodia is simply not capable of growing all the vegetables required to 
satisfy domestic demand. Imports of fresh fruit and vegetables are needed, despite 
the fact that total demand in Cambodia is still very low compared with other 
countries. In order for most fresh fruit and vegetable traders in Cambodia to stay in 
business, they must source vegetables from both local and imported sources. 
However, reliance on imported vegetables is often interpreted by development 
practitioners as against the interests of local producers and the development of the 
national fruit and vegetable sector overall. I argue that imports are crucial to the 
survival of Cambodia’s female petty fresh fruit and vegetable traders and that 
imports help sustain these traders when domestic supplies are low, thereby enabling 
traders to stay in business and continue supporting local growers. Furthermore, 
small-scale female horticultural traders are in fact more beneficial to the interests of 
smallholder producers than large-scale supermarket buyers.  
Aiding Trade 
261 
Overall, vegetable production Cambodia is seasonal and takes place mainly 
in the early dry season from November to January when the climate is cooler, soils 
are still moist, irrigation water more accessible and pest numbers are lower (Sokhen 
et al. 2004). Vegetable production gets progressively more difficult throughout the 
dry season as water sources decrease. The hot season, from April until June, presents 
significant challenges with soaring temperatures and a lack of water. The wet season 
is equally unsuitable for vegetable production, except for water spinach (kangkong), 
which grows in streams and lakes. Most other vegetables do not grow well during 
this time (Sokhen et al. 2004).  
 
Chapter Six: Gender and Fresh Vegetable Marketing 
262 
Table 6.1: Vegetable Seasons in Cambodia 
 
Description Dry Season Wet Season 
 Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct 
Favourable conditions             
Difficult conditions             
Floods             
Hot Season             
Heavy Rain             
Source: Sokhen et al. 2004: 15. 
 
Despite these constraints, vegetable production is estimated to have increased 50 per 
cent from 320,000 tonnes in 1980 to 481,250 tonnes in 2005, with average growth 
rates of two per cent per year (FAO 2006 in Genova et al. 2006). The total area under 
vegetable cultivation in 2005 was estimated at 77,000 hectares, up from 55,000 
hectares in 1980 (Genova et al. 2006:1).  
Growth in the production and marketing of fresh fruit and vegetable 
products is specifically associated with rising domestic demand as a result of 
economic development, urbanisation and rising incomes of emergent middle classes 
(FAO 2004b; Weinberger and Lumpkin 2005). As incomes rise for some portions of a 
given population, diet preferences change in favour of higher meat, dairy and fresh 
fruit and vegetable consumption. The proportion of cheap staple traditional grains 
consumed, such as rice, typically decreases (Dorjee et al. 2003). This phenomenon 
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has occurred rapidly in recent years in the Asia Pacific region, including Cambodia. 
The majority of growth in vegetable production has occurred on small and medium 
sized farms, which hold a competitive advantage over large farms in vegetable 
production (Agrifood Consulting 2005: 63).  
Top vegetables grown for sale in Cambodia include water spinach, lettuce, 
mustard leaf, beans, eggplant, cabbage, cucumber and tomato (Chand 2003: 9). With 
the exception of water spinach, modern production methods are employed for the 
cultivation of these vegetables. Genova et al. (2006) report that growth in the 
vegetable sector appears to be stagnating in Cambodia, although exactly why this is 
happening is currently unknown. A possible explanation is Cambodia’s low level of 
irrigated arable land. The Economic Institute of Cambodia (2006: 12) notes that only 
seven per cent of Cambodia’s arable land is irrigated compared with 19 per cent in 
Lao PDR, 31 per cent in Thailand and 45 in Vietnam. Furthermore many farmers still 
lack access to basic production tools and credit (EIC 2006: 12) while the risks of 
diversification into horticulture are high as external inputs remain costly, supply 
chain infrastructure undeveloped and vegetable prices fluctuate widely across a 
season and throughout the country (EIC 2006). Although a number of observers 
speculate that the development of Cambodian horticultural sector is severely 
disadvantaged by large volumes of vegetable imports from Thailand and Vietnam, 
research evidence suggests that it is production constraints, not competition, that is 
the main issue (Sokhen et al 2004). Indeed, imports of fresh fruit and vegetables 
from Thailand and Vietnam are very much needed to meet a rising demand that 
Cambodia is currently incapable of fulfilling.   
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Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Consumption 
Vegetable consumption in Cambodia is rising, although it remains low compared 
with other nations (Nandi and Bhattachrjee 2005). Total consumption is around 1.5 
million tonnes per annum, or 20 kilograms per person which according to Chand 
(2003), is so low that even if consumption were twice this level, it would still be 
considered low compared with other countries.53 
Table 6.2: Per capita availability of fruits and vegetable products 2002 
Region and Country Fruits Vegetables 
Southeast Asia Per year (kgs) Per day (g) Per year (kgs) Per day (g) 
Cambodia 22.5 61.6 31 84.9 
Indonesia 36.0 98.6 27.9 76.4 
Lao PDR 36.1 98.9 151.8 415.9 
Malaysia 51.8 141.9 37.6 103.0 
Burma 30.0 82.2 66.8 183.0 
The Philippines 104.9 287.4 62.4 171.0 
Thailand 87.8 240.5 42.1 115.3 
Vietnam 52 142.5 80.1 219.5 
South Asia     
Bangladesh 9.8 26.8 12.2 33.4 
India 37.7 103.3 69.5 190.4 
Maldives 87 238.4 136.6 374.2 
Nepal 22.7 62.2 63.9 175.1 
Pakistan 34 93.2 31.5 86.3 
Sri Lanka 41.8 114.5 33.5 91.8 
Developed Countries     
Australia 93.3 255.6 92.3 252.9 
Japan 56.3 154.2 106.5 291.8 
New Zealand 113 309.6 140.4 384.7 
Source: Nandi and Bhattachrjee 2005: 3 (from selected FAO indicators). 
 
This low level of consumption reflects the overall poverty of the Cambodian 
population (Sokhen et al. 2004). Despite low levels of consumption, aggregated local 
                                                           
53 Recommended consumption is 73 kilograms per annum (Ali 2002 in Hin, year unknown). 
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vegetable supplies currently cannot fulfil all of Cambodia’s domestic demand. 
Cambodia formally imports an estimated US$3 million worth of fruit and vegetables 
per year, although informal estimates are higher (EIC 2006: 17). According to a study 
conducted by the World Vegetable Centre (WVC), vegetable imports from Thailand 
and Vietnam accounted for 23 per cent of average domestic consumption and 37 per 
cent of average household food expenses (Sokhen et al. 2004). This percentage 
fluctuates, however, depending on prevailing weather conditions in Cambodia, with 
imports sometimes fulfilling all or none of market demand. Moustier (2007:61) 
estimates that for Phnom Penh markets overall imports make up around 40 per cent 
of total volumes, with the other 60 per cent fulfilled locally. 
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Figure 6.2: Regional Seasonal Vegetable Flows 
 
Source: Moustier 2007: 5 
 
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Supply Chains 
The commodity chain for different types of vegetables varies greatly depending on 
such factors as the season, location and perishability. For example, poor producers in 
peri-urban areas gather and sell large quantities of kangkong in the wet season –– 
retaining over 50 per cent of the final price and supplying 100 per cent of market 
demand in Phnom Penh (Moustier 2007: 59). The supply chain for this vegetable is 
short and most is transported directly from producer to retailer. This is the main 
vegetable produced in Cambodia during the wet season, and it is of considerable 
importance in the diets of poor consumers (Sokhen et al. 2004). Other local 
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vegetables of high significance, such as lettuce, cucumber, choy sum and long bean, 
are produced in nearby provinces and transported, mainly at night to urban markets. 
By contrast, imports dominate the markets for tomato, cabbage and Chinese cabbage, 
with limited supplies originating in Cambodia (see Appendix 6.1). Supply chains for 
these vegetables are naturally longer, with more supply chain participants involved 
but lower margins for all. 
Consumption of imported vegetables is high especially around the time of 
special festivals and rituals, such as Chinese New Year and Khmer New Year 
(Sokhen et al. 2004). Overall, vegetable imports increase when local supply 
dwindles, at the end of the dry season and during wet and hot seasons. However, 
Sokhen et al. (2004) note that when available at the same time Cambodian vegetables 
compete favourably with imported vegetables on price. Nevertheless, imports fulfil 
important gaps in Cambodian fresh vegetable supply chains, especially out of season 
supply or during instances of significant climatic variation. 
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Figure 6.3: Overview of vegetable supply chain in Cambodia  
 
Source: Genova et al. 2006: 9 
 
In 1997, a MAFF/FAO report characterised Cambodian fresh fruit and 
vegetable markets as disorganised and chaotic. Although there is some evidence of 
increased specialisation, overall fresh vegetable marketing functions are not strictly 
limited to predefined supply chain roles of producer, trader, wholesaler and retailer. 
Supply chain actors typically sell small volumes, often of both local and imported 
vegetables, and frequently combine a number of functions (Sokhen et al. 2004: 18). 
Table 6.3 identifies and describes four main types of traders in Phnom Penh markets. 
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As the Table 6.3 outlines, their roles are flexible with many actors engaging in 
production, collection and marketing. 
Table 6.3: Fresh vegetable supply chain actors, function, market share and volume in 
Phnom Penh markets 
Supply chain actor Function Per cent of market Average volumes 
per day 
Producer Type A Transports and sells own produce. Sells to 
wholesalers, collectors and retailers. 
14 % of producers 150 – 210 kgs per 
day 
Producer Type B/ 
Collector 
Transports own produce and produce of 
other farmers to the market. Sell to 
wholesalers, collectors and retailers. (Of 
72% of sellers, their own produce 
comprised less than half of total sales. For 
10.5% of sellers their own produce 
comprises half of their stock. For 17.5% of 
sellers over half of their stock volumes 
their own). 
86 % of producers 150 – 210 kgs per 
day 
Collector Type A/ 
Mobile 
Mobile collectors who buy vegetables from 
numerous farmers and are often producers 
themselves. They sell local and imported 
vegetables to Phnom Penh traders and 
provincial traders. 
80% of collectors 300 – 360 kgs per 
day 
Collector Type B/ 
Fixed 
These collectors are based in the market 
and collect produce from producers and 
mobile collectors. They sell local and 
imported vegetables to Phnom Penh 
traders. 
20 % of collectors 300 – 360 kgs per 
day 
Wholesalers Buy vegetables from producers and 
collectors and sell to retailers. 
 200 kgs per day 
Retailers Buy from wholesalers, collectors and 
producers and sell to consumers. 
 15 kgs per day 
Source: Sokhen et al. 2004: 18 
 
A study conducted by Moustier (2007: 108) found that although incomes 
and marketing margins are highly variable among traders, few exceed profit margins 
of 25 per cent. These are very low margins. Total quantities traded were also small 
with the highest for wholesalers being around 500 kilograms per day (Sipana and 
Moustier 2004). The most successful traders with the highest incomes were those 
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selling the largest volumes (Sipana and Moustier 2004). Thus, the most stable traders 
are those who consistently source and sell larger volumes of vegetables from a range 
of sources including imports. Post-harvest losses along the supply chain are typically 
high for all actors, with retailers bearing the highest economic losses and producers 
bearing the highest share of overall post-harvest loss (Genova et al. 2006: 39). For 
larger traders, the larger volumes sold mitigate the risks and spoilage losses of 
vegetable marketing.  
Vegetable supply chain participants in Cambodia employ a number of 
strategies to ensure higher margins.  Genova et al. (2006) report that, overall, 
producers and collectors are the most active in seeking information on market prices 
before they sell, as opposed to traders and retailers. Another strategy employed by 
producers is to sell products within their own village. Although final retail prices are 
lower here, producers keep a greater proportion of the final retail price, around 60 
per cent, as opposed to 42 per cent when sold in the markets (Agrisud in Sokhen et 
al. 2004).  
Trader power is especially fragile in Cambodia, and a number of traders stop 
selling at certain periods of the year when supplies dwindle, prices collapse or there 
is a lack of demand (Sipana and Moustier 2004) (see Appendix 6.2). Sokhen et al. 
(2004: 33) estimated the number of traders who cease selling at 33 per cent for 
Phnom Penh markets. Sellers least likely to cease trade are those with the most 
consistent supply chains, that is, those with access to imported vegetables. These are 
the traders with the most robust relationships with both Cambodian and Vietnamese 
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suppliers and consistent consumer markets. Thus, successful fresh vegetable supply 
chains in Cambodia are a function of robust trade relationships over the seasons in 
both local and imported supply chains. The maintenance of these relationships is 
essential if Cambodian petty vegetable traders are to maintain market share of the 
fresh fruit and vegetable market which is starting to show initial signs of market 
concentration. Genova et al. (2006: 7) report that supermarkets in Cambodia now 
have the highest annual turnover for vegetables at US$1.652 million, followed by 
wholesalers at US$65,128, collectors (US$32,446), wet market vendors 
(US$10,553), grocery stores (US$9,599) and street vendors (US$ 5,775). This is an 
ominous sign for both smallholder vegetable farmers and the female vegetable 
traders who link them to markets because supermarkets have a tendency to source 
supplies only from the largest and most coordinated traders and producers.  
The case studies reveal that HURREDO attempted to market fresh 
vegetables against the logic of the vegetable supply chain. With only three sources of 
supply, it could not consistently supply vegetables to large demanding buyers. 
Nevertheless, it coopted the vegetable trade itself rather than enabled existing 
traders; as a result, it continues to exist as a highly visible NGO operating within the 
fresh vegetable NGO sector. Its unsuccessful approach to commodity trading helped 
perpetuate gift relations. On the other hand, while AQIP enabled traders and 
vegetable commodity flows, it was criticised for strengthening traders’ livelihoods 
over and above producers. It was therefore accused of not being ‘pro-poor’. While 
successful at strengthening the vegetable commodity chain, AQIP did not appease the 
development aid logic of gift giving.  
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The Importance of Women in Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing in 
Cambodia 
Female fresh fruit and vegetable traders in Cambodia, although often ignored by 
development projects due to their multiple roles as trader/collector/producer, are 
essential to ensuring the pro-poor marketing of small-scale horticultural produce. The 
marketing of a household’s agricultural produce is traditionally seen as an extension 
of a woman’s duties in managing the household’s finances and providing for the 
family (Frieson 2001). It is a tradition that has long been noted and continues to this 
day (see Appendix 6.3).  
Plate 6.3: Vegetable marketing in Takao 1 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
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Plate 6.4: Vegetable marketing in Siem Reap 2 
 
Source: Author’s photograph 
Plate 6.5: Vegetable marketing in Siem Reap 3 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
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Despite the patriarchy often observed in Cambodian society, conventional 
beliefs and traditional household structures have facilitated a lead role for women in 
everyday business and commerce. Economic primacy has not, however, translated 
into greater political power. Nonetheless, the dominance of Cambodian woman in 
trade has had particularly transformative effects on ‘development’. Ardrey et al. 
(2006) argue that for poor women in Cambodia, restricted by their family 
responsibilities, low status and lower paid occupations, entrepreneurship is often the 
only avenue open to escape the cycle of poverty. If successful in their endeavours, 
women often contribute positively to household and community economies. Ardrey 
et al. (2006) find that in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, women entrepreneurs tend to 
increase family incomes and use that increased income to diversify household 
revenue streams and invest in their families. Yet despite evidence of the positive 
contributions that female entrepreneurs can make to their families, communities and 
even national economic development, these may be unacknowledged by many in the 
development industry due to a proclivity towards working with farmers only. This 
emanates from best practice commodity chain intervention handbooks which stress 
the importance of strengthening producers vis a vis other supply chain actors.  
The AQIP approach was criticised by the wider NGO community on the 
grounds that it worked to strengthen those who were perceived as unscrupulous 
traders compared with poor producers. Although the distinction between traders and 
producers is overstated in Cambodia, many NGOs and donors take the leftist view 
that traders are exploitative, untrustworthy and antagonistic.  This, Gudeman (1992) 
argues, broadly stems from NGO perceived solidarity with farmers who themselves 
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fundamentally misinterpret the activities of traders. He argues that subsistence 
farmers sporadically engaged in trade misunderstand the risks and overheads 
associated with trading and instead extend their model of household frugality on to 
traders. From ‘folk’ perspectives then, traders exploit farmers via their power to buy 
low, sell high and withhold from the market. Their profits are derived from their 
exploitation of household frugality which produces surplus, and not from their ability 
to market efficiently, obtain market intelligence and manage risk. Gudeman (1992: 
130) summarises this view as one which projects the household’s model of thrift 
(economising in order to ensure leftovers) onto the merchant’s capacity to profit. 
In its construction of market processes, the household applies its model of internal 
operations to make sense of the larger market experience and interactions. For the 
people, the implication of this local model of profit is precisely that market exchange 
results in debasement for the house and gain for the trader (Gudeman 1992: 130). 
According to Harriss (1981: 5), perceptions of traders typically fall into one of three 
categories: trader as entrepreneur; trader as powerless agent of stagnation or 
‘subsistence trader’; or trader as powerful agent of under-development –– ‘the 
predatory trader’. All these characterisations are obviously essentialised views of 
traders informed, to a large degree, by ideology. None of the above characterisations 
adequately represents the role of traders in rural economic development. For 
example, disputes with traders over vegetable prices in Cambodia are common. For 
water spinach, a common practice is for a trader/collector to bargain with a farmer 
over the amount and price of a row of plants prior to harvest and the expenditure of 
labour. A trader will offer a farmer a price for that row and, if agreed to, the trader 
will then set about harvesting the vegetables. Thus arguments often occur over how 
large the row is and what quality the vegetables are before harvest. Although farmers 
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often feel aggrieved in this process, many do not understand the risks carried by the 
trader and the fact that making a profit is dependent on a host of factors including 
market demand, minimising post-harvest losses, access to working capital and so on. 
Thus, a study conducted by the EIC (2006: 36) found that while 45 per cent of 
farmers believed the price they received for vegetables was too low, trader profits for 
fresh vegetable trade in Cambodia are amongst the lowest in the region. This means 
that Cambodia’s female traders are providing risky marketing services for farmers at 
very low profits. Nevertheless, the dominant attitude of many NGOs and donors is 
one that views traders as predatory towards farmers.  
Farmer-centric approaches are perceived as unquestionably pro-poor. 
Moreover, collective or producer group models, such as HURREDO are preferred 
and encouraged out of the logic that small-scale farmers can gain greater competitive 
advantage through increased economies of scale and therefore increased bargaining 
power compared with other supply chain actors. Much value chain literature also 
advocates this approach, noting that the structure of agricultural commodity chains 
naturally tends towards trader dominance (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000; Gibbon 
2001). Furthermore, it is easier administratively for donors to work with groups, as it 
reduces transaction costs by targeting more people at once than working with 
individual households. Thus, the traditional agricultural development project model 
of organising and assisting farmer collectives prevails in Cambodia. This occurs 
despite the fact that Cambodian farmers with a strong aversion to such organisational 
forms because of the immense failure of collectives in Cambodia when they were 
enforced by the Khmer Rouge and the subsequent Vietnamese administration.  
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The preference for supporting producer groups is not to say that traditional 
collective agricultural development approaches do not acknowledge the need for 
improved marketing. Here gifts to the poor are supposed to spur commodity 
exchange. In the name of value adding and capacity building, such projects often 
encourage pre-fabricated farmer collectives to market their produce through 
wholesale outlets run and/or subsidised by the NGO itself. In the HURREDO case 
study, for example this model often proves to be ineffective and unsustainable. These 
projects often create parallel trade structures that fall apart without continued donor 
support and the establishment of undesirable donor-farmer/patron-client relations. 
Such models fail to take account of pre-existing trade structures and the significant 
positive contributions that women make through their entrepreneurial roles which 
may in turn spur development and family wellbeing. Ardrey et al. (2006) note such 
impacts are often extremely difficult to monitor as increased profitability is funnelled 
back from the public realm of the market and towards the private and largely 
‘invisible’ realm of the home. The development impasse is therefore replicated due 
to a belief that farmers cannot trade their way out of poverty without the economies 
of scale offered through donor supported public collectives. 
The Public and the Private, Gifts and Commodities 
The question of ‘visibility’ is an important one, as Jacobsen (2008) identifies that 
there remains a ‘western’ predilection with Cartesian distinctions between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’. She argues that preconceptions of power in western philosophy date 
back to the Enlightenment period and are concerned with questions over the control 
of economic and military might which are undeniably associated with the ‘public’ 
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arena. Thus, in order to be judged successful by what Mosse (2005) terms the 
‘interpretative community’ of ‘western’ development practitioners and theorists, 
value chain interventions must prove the economic empowerment of women via the 
public sphere. Logos, banners, branding, collectives and large centralised warehouses 
are all important in this gift economy of development where public displays of 
support for fruit and vegetable production are made in the name of women.  
In much western thought, the public is equated with the impersonal, the 
rational, secular sphere of economic activity and therefore power. Gifts are 
associated with the private, personal sphere of the home. Under this rationale women 
must be drawn into the public economic arena via collectives in order to be 
empowered. Jacobsen (2008) differentiates western conceptions of power from many 
Asian cultures such as Cambodia where power is associated with cosmology and 
supernatural forces. Such power is reinforced through gift giving traditions 
associated with patron-client relations and public merit making. Here the public is 
equated with gifts and gifts with celestial power. Displays of public power and gifts 
tend to be conducted by men. Consequently, drawing women into publicly visible 
producer collectives does little to empower women within private commodity chains 
thought to help them trade out of poverty. Instead, they are relegated to the status of 
recipient in gift giving ceremonies conducted by aid agencies that, unbeknown to the 
agencies, may be interpreted as a form of merit making and power consolidation for 
the donor, not as empowering women as vegetable growers and traders. It is little 
wonder, then, that producer collectives, such as the one that HURREDO attempted to 
establish, were sustainable only within gift economies, not commodity markets. 
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For the AQIP fresh fruit and vegetable project there was little that was 
visible to the donor community. Farmers who previously grew vegetables and sold 
them, grew more vegetables and continued to sell them, often to the same people 
they had sold them to before. Thus vegetables continued to reach the same markets 
via the same vegetable traders, albeit with increased production, better post-harvest 
practices and more efficient marketing chains. Unlike HURREDO, there was no 
large-scale farm adorned with donor flags and logos. There were no visible signs of 
altruism that anyone could claim.  
Clearly, the multiple roles of many women in Cambodia as farmers, 
collectors, traders, wholesalers and even retailers fundamentally compromises their 
ability to gain access to development assistance in traditional agricultural 
development projects due to the maligned status of ‘middleman’. In the discourse of 
rural development wisdom in Cambodia, as long as women are framed within the 
lower strategic rung of ‘producer’ and not ‘trader’, they are more likely to be singled 
out for NGO assistance. Being limited to the category of producer means being 
limited to technical assistance in production methods, often implemented by male 
development workers and/or state workers who are inclined towards dealing 
primarily with other men. Women are thus relegated to being passive recipients of 
‘technology’ handed down from male village leaders from male agricultural 
extension workers from male agricultural development consultants. They are used to 
enhance the merit of benefactors. In a nod towards gender and development 
sensitivities, women are imagined as fresh fruit and vegetable producers. The 
difficulty that many development agencies have in reconciling private sector 
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development aims with pro-poor agendas, the invisibility of the private realm of the 
home and market and traditional ideas surrounding gender, means that many 
agricultural development projects inherently fail to engage meaningfully with rural 
women in the development process in Cambodia. This is typically reinforced through 
the strong links between development organisations and government –– the ‘public’ 
places where power currently resides in Cambodia. This sentiment was summarised 
during a discussion I had with one consultant. 
Vegetable marketing is perhaps the true success story of the project but rice seeds are the 
focus. This is the difference between men and women.54 
 
 
                                                           
54 Personal communication, 14 July 2005 
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Facilitating Agri-business 
 
 
Agricultural small and medium enterprise (SME) development is the key concept 
examined in this chapter. Agricultural processing firms in developing countries 
typically operate in rural towns and peri-urban areas and are primarily household-run as 
part of a multiplicity of livelihood activities. These enterprises! tend to be involved in 
traditional activities such as processing primary commodities and foodstuffs. Although 
there is debate over what exactly how to define SMEs, by definition SMEs employ 
small numbers of people from one to 250. These enterprises often source inputs locally 
from rural smallholders. Likewise, their customers are often rural or peri-urban 
households and businesses (Romijn 2001). Central to this term is the notion that, once 
food security has been achieved, efforts should be made towards raising incomes 
through economic development, specifically through increasing the value of primary 
commodities through processing or value-adding beyond the farm gate.  
This case study focuses on the efforts of the Cambodian Agri-business 
Development Facility (CADF) established under the auspices of New Zealand’s 
bilateral aid agency, NZAID. This project sought to provide business development 
advice and services to suitable clients including chilli sauce producers, master farmers 
and vegetable traders. This would lead to the ‘facilitation’ of technical assistance to 
Chapter Seven: Facilitating Agri-business 
282 
other poorer ‘upstream’ suppliers (suppliers further up the supply chain towards the 
primary production end), thereby improving the coordination and efficiency of on-
farm/off-farm linkages. However, donor stakeholders felt uncomfortable with CADF’s 
individualistic and market-oriented approach and the project’s aim was eventually 
reconfigured towards the ‘facilitation’ of participatory value chain development. In this 
case study, an outright individualistic commodity approach was seen to be at odds with 
pro-poor development. Instead, the ‘facilitation’ of enabling structures for pro-poor 
development, through value chain interventions, helped to strike a balance between the 
structure/agency tensions within the project.  
The methodology undertaken for this case study entailed active participant 
observation, first in my initial contributions to CADF’s strategic direction at donor and 
Governing Board meetings, and later in my role as Monitoring and Evaluation 
consultant. Accepting this short-term contract was the precondition of my research 
access. The majority of my time working as a consultant entailed office work. Although 
confined to the CADF offices, this work permitted close-up consideration of the way in 
which such projects are established and negotiated from the outset. Ethnographic details 
of CADF are presented from this phase of research. At the end of the assignment, I 
conducted research with two of the commodity chains selected for intervention by the 
facility –– vegetables and chilli sauce. I sought to ascertain the degree to which the 
facility’s activities were likely to achieve its aims of poverty alleviation.  
From the outset CADF defined itself in opposition to the development sector, 
which was viewed as having a negative impact on Cambodia’s economic development 
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through the perceived creation of unsustainable producer collectives. The facility’s 
strong emphasis on the private sector and alignment with ‘business-like’ approaches to 
agri-business development implicitly established a false dichotomy between the 
development sector and the private sector that for all intents and purposes remained 
deeply blurred in Cambodia. From the Facility’s perspective the development sector 
was negatively associated with dependency-creating gifts, bureaucracy, inflexibility, 
irrationality, pompous ceremony and dubious links to government patronage. The 
private sector on the other hand was championed as commodity-driven and therefore 
innovative, modern, flexible, independent, and rational. In maintaining this dualistic 
split, and championing the private sector in a generalised way, more nuanced debates 
over the nature of private sector growth in Cambodia were effectively ignored. 
Consequently, the maintenance of this constructed binary proved untenable as the 
Facility’s sole funder, NZAID, expressed considerable discomfort with the Facility’s 
approach and questioned its capacity to demonstrate pro-poor development. 
Agri-business in Cambodia 
Agri-business in Cambodia is considered to be in its early stages. The Economic 
Institute of Cambodia (EIC) (2006) states that the sector is characterised by a lack of 
forward and backward market linkages or integration, thereby leaving the sector 
fragmented and often producing low quality, low value products. This fragmentation is 
also attributed to a lack of consistent input supply, the high cost of credit and limited 
government intervention. The World Bank (2004: 42) reaches many of these same 
conclusions noting that agro-industry is atomistic and dispersed, comprising 21,300 
agri-business firms of which 91 per cent are small, employing less than five people and 
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with typical capital outlays of less than US$1000. Few of these firms are linked to larger 
domestic or multinational firms; rather the majority of their output goes directly to 
individual consumers or informal export, and to a lesser extent other small domestic 
businesses (World Bank 2004: 43). Other key findings of the World Bank (2004: 42-50) 
are that competitive marketing and distribution channels are not in place; licensing 
requirements are excessive but generally ignored; inspection requirements are not that 
onerous; firms usually maintain high stock inventories to guard against uncertainty and 
risk especially in input supply; demand for skilled labour by these firms is low; and 
working capital is used inefficiently and is typically met through non-commercial 
sources. Table 7.1 compares agri-business with the country’s most successful industry, 
garment manufacturing.  
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Table 7.1: Comparison between garment and agro-industry 
 Garment Agro-Industry 
Value added per 
worker 
$1,190 (low by international standards) $462 (extremely low by international 
standards) 
Firm size 600 + employees ~ 7 employees 
Market scope Global markets: US71% EU 38% Local, informal: 70% individual  
Trade-supporting 
institutions 
GSP, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
Labour Law, ILO compliance and monitoring, 
corporate social responsibility norms, quota 
managements systems, ELVIS, certification of 
origin, duty exemptions, tax incentives, 
dispute resolution outside of Cambodia (e.g. 
Singapore) 
None 
Informal/ private 
institutions 
Garment Manufacturer’s Association 
Corporate Networks 
Village and community based 
Quality 
measurement 
CamControl CamControl 
Technology and 
standards 
MIME/ CamControl getting started Some donor funded projects 
Some TA by Thai suppliers 
Dispute 
resolution 
Foreign arbitration used. New York 
Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(1958); ASEAS Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement   
Community-based, informal 
Skills Some firm-provided training No firm-provided training  
Finance 14.1% commercial/ institutional credit 2.7% commercial/ institutional credit 
Policy advocacy Strong business association, government-
private sector forum 
Nascent business associations (rice millers, 
rural electricity)   
Critical constraint High transaction costs due to excessive/ 
overlapping government intervention 
High transaction costs due to absence of trade 
supporting institutions 
Source: World Bank 2004: 49. 
 
Peron (2007) attributes the state of Cambodia’s agri-business sector to the 
country’s overall subsistence orientation and posits that if incomes are to rise then 
greater agri-business processing will need to occur. This, she warns, will only happen 
once Cambodian farmers run their farms as businesses (Peron 2007: 13). Commentators 
on development in Cambodia note the potential economic rewards should the agri-
business sector be developed, specifically towards export markets. This is argued as 
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especially the case for Cambodia as it is signatory to a number of preferential trade 
agreements at low tariff rates (EIC 2006; World Bank 2004). Currently, however, only a 
small handful of larger firms are accessing export markets.  
To date much growth in the agri-business sector of Cambodia stems from large 
firms engaged in plantation production. This raises the prospect of increased land 
concentration and therefore growing landlessness. In 2006, the World Bank estimated 
that landlessness had increased from 12 per cent to 20 per cent since 2004 (EIC 2006: 
8). At present, the Cambodian agricultural landscape is beset by increasing incidences of 
land speculation, land-grabbing and often dubiously obtained land concessions 
connected with the expansion of larger foreign firms and well-connected domestic 
firms.  
The recent boom in land prices has meant that many larger agro-industries in 
Cambodia are capital intensive compared with other industries, with a higher proportion 
of funds locked up in land and buildings than other industrial sectors of Cambodia, such 
as garments (EIC 2006: 22). In this environment of high capital costs, inconsistent and 
poor input supply, limited credit and other obstacles, many small and medium agro-
enterprises struggle to develop. Furthermore, poor infrastructure and a generally 
unsupportive institutional framework (agri-business exporters need five separate 
certificates to export) mean that much of Cambodia’s agricultural surplus is exported 
informally and unprocessed, with potential added value to the Cambodian economy lost 
(Peron 2007).  
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Similarly, a review of the Cambodian agri-business sector, conducted by a team 
of expatriate consultants (including the agri-business/FAO consultant from Chapters 
five and six), profiles the agri-business sector as unsophisticated and under-developed 
(McNaughton et al. 2003). According to this review, the sector is dominated by 
numerous micro-enterprises, with just a small number of larger firms. The review 
designates these two types of organisations as ‘market developers’ and ‘market takers’. 
Market developers are defined as large firms existing in the formal sector, which 
develop highly coordinated commodity chains beginning with crop planning through to 
production, processing and shipping. The review mentions just a handful of firms, 
Medtec, British American Tobacco, Angkor Gasekam (a rice contracting firm rumoured 
to be owned by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) and Mong Rethy 
Group (a company well known for its connections with the ruling party). Market takers 
on the other hand, are defined as all those other actors that exist within the informal 
sector and only participate at specific points in a given commodity chain. These 
organisations are described as adding value through bringing price information, 
accumulating or negotiating sales of products and providing business services such as 
credit (McNaughton et al. 2003: 5). Informality and smallness are described as key to 
their business survival, as any move towards formality or expansion is believed to 
increase their visibility and therefore vulnerability to taxation and rent-seeking by petty 
officials (McNaughton et al. 2003: 5).  
The authors of this review implicitly find fault with the aid industry for the 
agri-business sector’s lack of development. They specifically criticise Cambodia’s vast 
legions of NGO-led projects which they categorise as ‘social capital organisers’ because 
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these projects are aimed at food security and organised around farmer collective models. 
The authors find overall fault with most projects’ lack of market focus and therefore 
long-term prospects of sustainability. This is contrasted with the general characterisation 
of Cambodians as ‘entrepreneurial and opportunistic’ (McNaughton et al. 2003: 5). 
Thus, the report gives the reader a sense of a highly ambitious Cambodian population, 
full of untapped potential, waiting to be unleashed. Unleashed, according to the review, 
in potentially profitable agri-businesses like edible oils, livestock, charcoal production, 
eco-tourism, plantation and non-timber forest product collection, rice milling, rubber-
tapping, silk production and handicrafts –– potential that that the aid industry had thus 
far failed to unleash, if not outright disables. 
The Cambodian Agri-business Development Facility  
The consultants involved in writing the Cambodian agri-business review were also the 
same people who formed a core group of consultants spearheading pro-private sector 
development initiatives in Cambodia, focused on agri-business. Having defined the 
sector and outlined its parameters and failures, they were now well positioned to present 
solutions to it. It was from this small community of like-minded consultants that the 
Cambodian Agri-business Development Facility (CADF) was conceived, designed and 
marketed to NZAID. As some of the few expatriate consultants to applaud the strong 
trader-centric approach of the AQIP fresh fruit and vegetable model, the new facility 
design sought to build upon the AQIP approach by working with traders too, but not just 
any traders. The new design singled out those traders who were defined as ‘one step 
from an end-customer market’ and who were specifically identified as ‘the 
entrepreneurial leading few’ (resulting in the unfortunate acronym ELF). The ‘leading 
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few’ were only to be deemed as such if they demonstrated an “ability to respond to and 
implement business advice” and either had an existing supply chain of Cambodian 
producers or signalled a willingness to develop one (NZAID 2005: 5).  
 
Figure 7.1: Traits of an entrepreneur 
 
Source: CADF 2006 (unpublished file).  
 
These pioneers of agri-business were identified as key to driving the 
development of the agricultural sector, and increasing access and values for agricultural 
produce in competitive markets. They were therefore championed as drivers of 
economic development and poverty alleviation (although it was argued that these 
‘leading few’ also tended to be as poor as their suppliers and customers). The key idea 
here was to provide entrepreneurs with business development services and thereby 
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increase the profitability and efficiency of their businesses, in turn leading to greater 
supply chain coordination. This, it was argued, would lead to poverty alleviation 
outcomes. Assisting these rural enterprises to grow and develop would have favourable 
flow on effects both to the poor employees they hired and the poor rural suppliers from 
whom they procured inputs. Furthermore, this new approach moved directly away from 
the old ‘project’ model of development and towards a new organisational design, that of 
a ‘facility’. This signalled a move away from traditional rural development approaches 
that usually centred on the provision of technical inputs to producers, and towards an 
organisational approach oriented more towards ‘capacity building’ among pro-active 
entrepreneurs. As such, the term ‘facility’ sought to overcome the gift/commodity 
tensions inherent in pro-poor private sector oriented agricultural projects. Thus, rather 
than scaling up the AQIP model of overcoming production constraints and linking 
producers closely with group nominated traders, key ideas from the AQIP fresh fruit and 
vegetable component were appropriated and reinterpreted. 
The reconfiguration of the AQIP approach was essential. As Mosse explains, 
“…a project has to be innovative.  It needs the quality of novelty to mark a new 
beginning” (2005: 36). Indeed, on my first meeting with the head consultant charged 
with the CADF design, he pointed to the ‘Strategic Framework’ document for the 
facility that I carried under my arm and said  
you’ll find some really innovative stuff in there. NZAID is the first donor to really analyse 
the research side of a project…NZAID has commended us for thinking outside the box and 
using a supply chain model. In most post-conflict countries there is a focus on frameworks 
and enabling environments, institution building, that sort of thing (giving people titles and 
trying to recreate western bureaucracies). It doesn’t make sense in a place like 
Cambodia….Agrisud55 is a good example of a private sector development model. Through 
                                                           
55 Agrisud is an international NGO that specialises in agricultural micro-enterprise assistance.  
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crop diversification and intensification they have increased the wealth in specific 
households from $200 to $700 in one year. But they take only the motivated and 
dedicated...only a few projects are working outside the box and doing innovative things, 
AQIP and Agrisud. Most donors focus on production but not marketing. I’m not part of the 
donor sector so I don’t think like a donor.56 
Like all development consultants, the key to this consultant’s livelihood and status was 
the presentation of himself and his ideas as novel, innovative and ‘in touch’ with the 
realities of the country. However, what was different about this consultant compared 
with other development workers I had encountered was a stronger distancing of himself 
from the development sector and government and an alignment of his ideals with that of 
the private sector. He thus positioned CADF towards a stronger private sector emphasis 
thereby signalled a strong disdain, if not rejection of the development sector, its 
perceived inefficiencies, market failures and troubling links with government. Mosse 
(2005: 36) states that, “innovative projects also have to be replicable and involve 
approaches which can, for instance, be taken up by government.” To this it must be 
added, that depending on the development approach the key focus may instead be on 
replicability and ease of take up by the private sector.  
The initial CADF design identified a two-stage approach to supply chain 
development. Stage one was to build business development services. Stage two was the 
provision of technical assistance to other supply chain actors. In stage one, the first 
priority was to provide business development advice and services such as basic 
accounting skills and business plans to identified entrepreneurs. A coined for this work 
was “right product, right buyer, right time, right price”. Of course such a slogan invited 
people to infer that maybe many agri-businesses in Cambodia were in fact selling the 
                                                           
56 Personal communication with consultant 13th July 2005 
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wrong product, to the wrong buyer, at the wrong time, and at the wrong price. Under the 
facility’s guidance, this would not be allowed to happen . It was imagined that providing 
business development services would not only assist the entrepreneurs’ economic 
profitability –– thereby strengthening their businesses and those of upstream suppliers –
– but also create a demand for business development services in the wider economy. 
Thus, cost recovery for the business development services provided was also prioritised 
with the aim of making CADF a self-sustaining facility with potential for making 
ongoing profit. It was in this way the facility aimed for replicability. Cost recovery was 
also to ensure that the CADF remained client-focused and efficient.  
Entrepreneurs were identified as the ‘entry point’ to longer supply chain 
development. Through working with the ‘leading few’ it was believed that other issues 
regarding input suppliers would be identified and remedied. In such instances, the 
facility would ‘facilitate’ technical assistance to suppliers and producers via the ‘sector 
support group’. Echoing the previous agri-business review document, the ‘sector 
support group’ was identified as the wider business and development community 
already working in the agricultural sector. These included: AQIP, HURREDO, MAFF, 
AusAID’s agricultural extension project CAAEP (Cambodia Australia Agricultural 
Extension Project), at the time in its closing phases, the FAO’s Integrated Pest 
Management project, rural credit providers and other NGOs working in target areas. 
These organisations were to be enlisted by CADF from time to time to provide technical 
assistance to upstream suppliers and producers. In this way, it was believed, the Facility 
would ‘institutionally engage’ with the wider business and development community 
thereby avoiding ‘donor disharmony’ and ‘market disintermediation’. The term market 
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disintermediation refers to precluding viable businesses and traders from the market 
through subsidising or providing goods and services for free through an aid project or 
preventing the start up of a business due to a high aid presence in a given sector. The 
fear that aid projects may step beyond the bounds of enabling businesses and instead 
disable them is a central tension in private sector oriented development projects; that is, 
between gifts and commodities. This is what leads many aid agencies towards working 
only with producer groups in gift-like relations. For example, in the case of CADF, if a 
company or NGO already existed that built irrigation wells, CADF would facilitate or 
cover the cost of well construction by such a company or NGO. CADF would not itself 
construct the well. From the facility’ perspective, helping to ‘facilitate’ private sector 
transactions would avoid disabling another NGO or company.   
Figure 7.2: Initial strategic design of the Cambodian Agri-business Development Facility  
 
Source: NZAID 2005: 20 (TA stands for technical assistance) 
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The target provinces for CADF were Siem Reap and Banteay Meanchey. These 
provinces were chosen due to their high incidence of poverty, 54 and 41 per cent of the 
population respectively, and their recent post-conflict status. Both of these provinces 
suffered through Khmer Rouge insurgency fighting until 1998 (NZAID 2005: 16-17).  
Figure 7.3: Map of Siem Reap and Banteay Meanchey with poverty rates 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University  
 
Both the feasibility study and strategic plan for the facility presumed that 
selected entrepreneurs and their supply channels would be geographically defined by 
these provincial boundaries and that any subsequent impact would pertain broadly to 
these areas. Although it was acknowledged that this might not always be the case, it was 
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stated in the Strategic Framework that businesses with the strongest potential impact on 
the local economy would take preference.   
Agri-business Development Theory and Practice  
The World Bank (2008: 136) states that, “agri-business is the off-farm link in agro-food 
value chains. It provides inputs to the farm sector, and it links the farm sector to 
consumers through the handling, processing, transportation, marketing, and distribution 
of food and other agricultural products”. The performance of the agricultural sector is 
supposedly linked to the performance of agri-business, with growth in agri-business 
thought to spur agricultural growth (World Bank 2008). According to the World Bank, 
if the right steps are taken, the total contribution of agriculture will typically decline 
from around 40 per cent of GDP to less than 10 per cent under conditions of economic 
growth. During this transition, agri-businesses’ contribution to GDP will rise from 
under 20 per cent to more than 30 per cent prior to industrialisation, and then fall again 
as the economy moves towards full industrialisation (World Bank 2008: 135). Thus, 
akin to Rostow’s theory of ‘take-off’ (1960), the World Bank (2008) argues that agro-
industrialisation of small and medium scale agri-businesses is a first step towards 
economy-wide industrialisation.  
As agro-industrialisation, “is generally regarded as ushering in periods of 
individual and collective stress, discontinuous change, and economic disorder” (Cook 
and Chaddad 2000: 207), development theorists and practitioners tend to emphasise the 
need to support SMEs involved in agri-business as a means to contribute to more even, 
less disruptive and altogether more ‘sustainable’ development. To elaborate, SMEs are 
generally perceived to be labour intensive and as such are thought capable of absorbing 
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excess rural labour, thereby stemming rural to urban migration, resulting in more even 
development. Smaller firms are also believed to operate with lower levels of labour 
specialisation leading to greater democratic management practices and worker 
flexibility and therefore innovation. Given assistance, it is believed that appropriate 
technology and indigenous design suitable to developing country conditions may 
emerge if assistance is given. Smaller firms are also thought to be more environmentally 
benign, utilising less polluting technologies and chemical processes. In addition, 
smallness is often equated with greater firm flexibility in regard to labour, cost, 
production and output. Support to these firms is also often thought to promote greater 
competition and therefore market efficiency. This, in turn, is believed to assist in 
creating better overall business environments; numerous smaller firms are believed to 
help combat monopolistic market tendencies and better protect consumer choice. 
Assistance to SMEs, through micro-credit programs, is also thought to help improve the 
overall environment for domestic capital availability (Romijn 2001). 
On a macro level, SMEs are championed as a way to promote national 
entrepreneurship, to create diversification of productive capabilities and to provide a 
channel for agricultural output specifically towards export markets (Castel-Branco 
2003: 14). Smaller firms are believed to be well placed to achieve this as they are 
thought to better reflect the factor endowment based competitive advantages of a 
country than large firms, thereby leading to higher economic and social efficiency 
(Castel-Branco 2003: 13). Put another way, their closer links to the basic components of 
production, be it land, labour, capital or entrepreneurship, are thought to engender 
greater economic and social impact than large firms. However, smallness is seen as both 
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a strength and weakness. Although SMEs are commonly perceived as lean, efficient, 
and equitable, the World Bank (2008) states that these characteristics alone do not 
guarantee competitiveness in emerging markets. Instead smallness may leave firms 
vulnerable in the face of increasingly complex, contradictory and concentrated global 
agro-food systems. Development assistance to small and medium agri-business is 
justified on this basis.  
Castel-Branco (2003), however, argues that much of the literature and logic 
applied to SME development is laden with contradictions and schisms emanating from 
the championing of scale over other, possibly more important, variables and their 
outcomes. For example, the degree to which SMEs can provide a solution to rural 
unemployment is questionable. There is an inherent contradiction between the small 
numbers of people usually employed by such small firms and the degree to which they 
may therefore collectively contribute to solving rural unemployment issues. Indeed, the 
very fact that SMEs tend to employ small numbers of people may instead mean that 
these enterprises are capital, not labour intensive (Castel-Branco 2003: 6). Further 
inconsistency in SME debates surrounds the degree to which small firms may be 
assumed to be more localised or better linked to local suppliers, while at the same time 
they are defined as being ‘flexible’ to the changing market and competitive conditions. 
Such a view does not take account of the phenomenon of globalisation, where 
competitive advantage is secured through flexibly sourcing inputs from the cheapest 
most reliable sources whether they are from local or non-local sources (Castel-Branco 
2003: 6). Indeed, there is no definitive evidence to prove that smallholders can actually 
consistently supply quality raw materials to local agri-business firms, especially in 
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developing countries (Castel-Branco 2003: 8). Further contradictions emerge from the 
varying descriptions of small firms. They are seen as flexible entrepreneurial 
organisations, but they are also seen as possibly plagued by problems by owners who 
are described as risk averse and prone to complacency. Smallness is also often assumed 
to be more environmentally benign, but there is no clear evidence to suggest that a 
cluster of small firms pollutes less than one large firm.  
Castel-Branco (2003: 10) argues that many studies are confused by the lack of 
clarity and precision that surrounds SMEs. Groups of firms are defined by the number 
of workers employed and then their performance is compared irrespective of 
technology, management, competitive conditions, business cycles and the specificities 
of different industries. What should be important, according to Castel-Branco (2003), is 
the outcome of a given business activity rather than its organisational size.  For 
example, returns on capital and other financial ratios should be discussed, rather than 
issues of employment, democratic management, market flexibility and so on (Castel-
Branco 2003: 10). Thus, the issue should be not whether firms are small or medium 
firms, but whether they are capable of delivering sustained and even growth (Castel-
Branco 2003: 9). The issue of growth has important implications.  
Small capitalist firms only make sense within the specific context of concrete and real 
processes of capitalist accumulation, and thus are bound by the same dynamics as large 
capitalism. The nature of capitalist accumulation is one of avoiding competition through 
different means: innovation, growing large, mergers and acquisitions, product 
differentiation, combination of scope and scale, and so on (Castel-Branco 2003: 4). 
Thus the belief that the smallness of firms inherently implies a commitment to more 
democratic management practices and contributes to more equal development processes 
is questionable, if not completely unknown, as small firms exist in the same 
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environment and are dominated by the same capitalist forces as large firms. If they are 
to succeed, which according to mainstream economic theory equals grow, the 
maintenance of democratic management practices may be compromised depending on 
the nature of such growth. Quixotically, however, SME proponents rarely discuss the 
nature of capital accumulation by small firms (Castel-Branco 2003: 4). This lacuna is 
especially striking given that the most strident criticism of SME development is their 
questionable link to poverty alleviation. In a cross-country comparison, Beck et al. 
(2005) find that, while a large SME sector is a characteristic of growing economies and 
industrial development, they find no causal correlation between a thriving SME sector 
and poverty alleviation.  
Without a consideration of the nature of capital accumulation by agri-business 
SMEs, growth in this sector is likely to be uneven and therefore contentious. This is 
especially the case as Marshall et al. (2006) point out that much agro-industrialisation 
and upgrading of SME occurs through external linkages to international firms. Indeed, 
Gibbon (2000) points out that the key impetus for agri-business growth is exposure to 
external economic forces forged through export connections with foreign firms. This 
exposure may be doubled-edged, as the entrance of foreign firms into agri-business 
sectors in developing countries may lead to greater uneven development impacts 
(Gibbon 2000; Marshall et al. 2006). Furthermore, supply relationships with larger 
foreign firms may lock small firms into highly dependent supply contracts which stifle 
innovation and may ultimately crumble when foreign firms relocate their sourcing 
operations to cheaper countries (Humphrey 2001). Despite these drawbacks, most of the 
literature concerned with agri-business development is aimed at how to assist SMEs to 
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integrate into the world economy through exporting into value chains dominated by 
foreign firms. The fact is that many agro-industrial clusters in the developing world are 
actually oriented towards the domestic market (Humphrey 2001: 7). Indeed, Timmer 
(2005: 6) writes, “since the 1970s, the development profession has identified ‘market 
demand’ with border prices and international trade, on the assumption that domestic 
markets are saturated, politically manipulated, or not remunerative for producers of 
higher quality products.” Hence, concerted scholarly, donor and government efforts are 
made to move firms further towards export orientation, which McMichael (2000: 42) 
argues, reflects the acceptance of discursive and institutional relationships which define 
the world simply as an economic hierarchy.   
The Facility’s Establishment 
The Cambodian Agri-business Development Facility was to be administered under 
NZAID’s trade and development program, not its bilateral aid relationship which was 
focused on sustainable livelihoods. The NZAID approach for this program was to 
instigate graduated trade development, from local, to regional and then to international 
markets. That is to say, it subscribed to conventional agro-industrialisation views of a 
world economic hierarchy to be climbed by poor producers. To this end, the facility was 
endowed with NZ$5 million over five years, courtesy of NZAID, a relatively small 
budget for a bilateral aid project. This covered CADF office rental and running costs, 
staffing and costs associated with providing business development services and 
technical assistance.  
From the outset CADF aimed at greater cost efficiency not normally associated 
with aid projects in Cambodia. Large air-conditioned offices were not rented; a fleet of 
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white four-wheel vehicles typically found parked outside of large project offices in 
Phnom Penh was forgone. Rather a small office on the ground floor of a residential 
house in Siem Reap was rented and basic office equipment procured. A suitable Khmer 
Team Leader was sought to lead the facility, however, when none was found, an 
American with a Masters in Business Administration (MBA) and previous experience 
working in private sector oriented development in Cambodia was appointed. The new 
Team Leader displayed characteristics common among so many other expatriate 
development consultants in Cambodia with regard to gender, age and appearance, 
except for one small twist. Like the facility itself, the new Team Leader signalled his 
distance from the development sector with the frequent proclamation, “I’m a business 
guy”, a statement that was dually aimed at demonstrating his inventiveness, efficiency 
and no-nonsense approach, and at distancing himself from the usual standards of social 
accountability associated with development project management.  
The Team Leader’s self-identification as a ‘business guy’, the new and 
‘innovative’ facility design, the focus on entrepreneurs and not farmers all helped 
reinforce the identity of the facility as ‘business-like’. This identified the CADF with all 
those attributes commonly associated with the private sector: cost efficient, target-
oriented, service-driven, innovative, modern, flexible, independent and rational. These 
attributes were frequently contrasted with the perceived problems of the aid sector in 
Cambodia: wasteful, unsustainable, dependency creating, inflexible, stifling of 
innovation and irrational. This defining of the CADF in opposition to the development 
sector therefore constructed a false binary between the aid and private sectors that was 
in reality hard to maintain in a country such as Cambodia. As previous case studies in 
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this thesis demonstrate, aid may construct new rice seed, organic rice and vegetable 
commodity chains. The link between the construction of these commodity chains and 
their impact on pro-poor development was questionable. However, the link between aid 
and trade was undeniable.  
The case presented by CADF, its leading staff and project designers was 
implicitly comparative. Key actors supported the view that CADF in its generalised 
private sector approach, was to be more efficient at bringing about rural development 
than donor-sponsored, parastatal institutions or NGO benevolence. While this approach 
was well-meaning such institutions were ultimately misguided in their social objectives 
(Harriss 1981). Because CADF compared itself with real world organisations and not 
specific indicators of organisational efficiency such as productivity per worker, such 
claims at first appeared reasonable. Upon closer inspection however, issues arose. What 
type of private sector development did CADF advocate? What was the nature of the 
capital accumulation that it promoted?  These aspects of development were left 
undefined. Certainly it did not seek to emulate the actual private sector of Cambodia, 
which was variously described as missing, dysfunctional and/or corrupted by the aid 
industry and/or government and therefore in need of CADF’s assistance.  
Given the facility’s vague self-conception, and the role it was to play as a 
donor-sponsored entity aimed at ‘facilitating’ improved business and supply chain 
development, many of the bureaucratic and organisational culture problems perceived to 
plague the development industry and government proved difficult for CADF to avoid. 
From the first meeting it was apparent that, beyond setting up the office, no plan was in 
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place for how to establish the facility. Its only guiding document, the Strategic 
Framework, contained descriptions of the sector and outlined the overall approach of 
working with entrepreneurs, but there were none of the usual guiding features contained 
within most project design documents. There were no logical framework,57 no activity 
schedule and no list of outputs to be achieved. The move towards novelty left the 
facility foundering for direction, and often paralysed by indecision. Bereft of guiding 
targets and plans meant that the key ideas, aims, and even implementation methodology 
for the facility were up for negotiation. At the first meeting with the donor 
representative in late 2005, CADF’s key ideas, assumptions and activities were 
questioned, negotiated and reconfigured in a brain storming session. During this session 
it became patently obvious that NZAID felt ill at ease with the strong private sector 
focus and questioned the potential poverty alleviation impacts of the Facility.  
One hot afternoon in 2006, on the ground floor of a residential building located 
in some rice fields just outside the tourist hub of Siem Reap, the Team Leader, the 
NZAID donor representative and I sat around a white board to figure out the key steps 
and approaches of CADF, one day prior to the convening of its first official Governing 
Board meeting. First wistful statements were made by the donor representative about 
whether or not the facility could be more like another project run in Laos, a collective 
model which helped link farmer groups to markets. Although it was not explicitly stated 
that NZAID wanted to replicate this project, it was expressed that an approach more 
similar to this would be more acceptable. This, it was relayed, was felt to be a more 
                                                           
57A standard tool used in development planning to orient development activities.  The framework considers activities 
from higher-level goals and purposes to the what is needed to meet them. With each goal or activity indicator, 
means of verification and assumptions are listed. This enforces the logic that an activity cannot be defined unless it 
is measured. 
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appropriate approach in line with NZAID’s key objectives of poverty reduction. Other 
issues identified by the donor representative were that no staff or facility performance 
measures were outlined to ensure that the objectives would be met, although it was now 
even less clear exactly what these objectives were. The donor also relayed messages of 
dismay with the Strategic Framework’s small section on monitoring and evaluation, 
which were thought to be inadequate for measuring the facility’s progress in poverty 
alleviation. This, it was felt, was especially problematic due to the CADF’s position as 
neither an NGO nor a business. The brainstorming session inevitably led to a review of 
the Facility’s core aims.  
The stated overarching aims in the Strategic Framework were to “promote 
income generation for poor agricultural supply chain participants, and especially rural 
and peri-urban producer groups in Siem Reap and Banteay Meanchey provinces 
through: linking producers to markets; encouraging and enabling value added activities; 
and improving product quality” (NZAID 2005: 6-7). The overall perception by the 
donor was that the recent tourism boom in the area had not been pro-poor and further 
assistance to these areas was needed to combat uneven development. Debate ensued 
over whether or not tourism had or had not impacted positively on the poor. The donor 
then raised questions as to whether working with leading entrepreneurs would in fact 
lead to more uneven development, by strengthening some entrepreneurs vis a vis poor 
upstream suppliers and other entrepreneurs not targeted by CADF. Finally the 
sustainability of the facility in terms of its cost recovery strategy was questioned. Was 
the aim to ensure the sustainability of the facility or of the clients themselves? Cost 
recovery discussions led to discussions over the creation of dependency. Would 
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providing free services lead to complacency and dependence? This was a question that, 
at this initial stage, no one could answer. 
The overall sentiment agreed upon was that CADF already had overhead costs 
too high to be sustained by the as yet unidentified clients. Yet there was reluctance to 
abandon the idea of cost recovery for fear that if the facility’s services were fully 
subsidised, this might disbar other private companies from entering the business 
development service market. This was despite the fact that no business development 
service providers existed and no study had been undertaken to ascertain demand, 
whether or not a business development service sector was likely to develop 
‘organically’ was unknown. Finally it was argued that aid must subsidise those areas 
where there is unlikely to be investment, places where there is market failure or where 
no market exists. Thus, cost recovery ideas were deemed to be less important than 
creating ‘sustainable business relationships’ throughout a given supply chain. This 
decision was followed with a comment from the Team Leader that the facility should be 
aimed at saying, “Hey Mr Farmer, you’re a business”. This was followed by a 
significantly long pause. However, having finally grasped onto a concept acceptable to 
the donor –– ‘sustainable business relationships’ –– the meeting was adjourned until the 
next day’s Governing Board meeting. 
The following day the first official Governing Board meeting was convened.  
Present at this meeting were the newly appointed staff of CADF, the donor 
representative, the lead design consultant, an NGO representative,58 an Executive Chef 
                                                           
58 Administratively the project was ‘hosted’ by an international non-government organisation, International 
Development Enterprises (IDE). Given that NZAID did not have a formal presence in Cambodia, it was decided 
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from one of Siem Reap’s large international hotels, myself, the Team Leader and Khmer 
female professional who worked for the UNDP. During this meeting the facility’s 
‘strategic direction’ unravelled further. First the Team Leader informed participants that 
the ‘sector support group’ (relevant organisations of the development sector) identified 
as crucial to the facility’s upstream work with poor producers and suppliers, barely 
existed in a coherent form or if they did, they could not provide services outside of their 
own project mandate and target beneficiaries. Many of the projects mentioned in the 
Strategic Framework were drawing to a close, or had lost credibility amongst their main 
donors. HURREDO was cited as an example of this. Despite the acknowledgement that 
many of these organisations were incapable of providing ‘support’, discussion then 
moved to the need for predefined criteria for preferred partner organisations with which 
the facility was to work. This was followed by more debate over the poverty alleviation 
merits of the facility, and yet more pensive statements by the donor representative that 
the project should be like the previously mentioned collective farmer project in Laos or 
more like Agrisud’s project, a similar one in Cambodia.  
At this stage another participant countered that CADF should focus on whole 
supply chains, not just producers or solely entrepreneurs. Yet another mentioned that “it 
is not right for projects to go around forming artificial collectives, they must be 
spontaneous, not donor created for the administrative convenience of delivering aid.” 
Further still, one participant stated that many of the techniques and processes 
implemented by Agrisud had been copied by surrounding farmers and that the values for 
                                                                                                                                                                              
that hosting the facility through IDE would reduce the administration costs associated with starting up a new project 
in Cambodia. 
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the products developed by Agrisud had since collapsed. “How can we call this business 
success if the market has collapsed?”  
Trickle down and multiplier effects were mentioned and everyone appeared 
perplexed until the Team Leader mentioned that the Strategic Framework’s key 
assumption on the poverty alleviation impacts of the Facility were in fact via ‘trickle 
down’. “So long as we have monitoring and evaluation to prove this [trickle down] is 
occurring then that is all that is needed,” said the Team Leader. In which case, the Team 
Leader added, the project simply needed baseline surveys and possibly some control 
groups, “What we want to know is: are there more jobs and what are the outcomes of 
relationships?” But someone else voiced concerns over the merits of creating new 
business relationships versus working with existing ones. “They don’t exist, that is why 
we are doing this,” was the response from another participant whilst gesturing to the 
hot, small office. Yet it was apparent by the unconvinced looks on participant faces that 
no one was actually sure whether they did or did not exist and if they did, what the 
nature of these business relationships were. The Khmer staff who could have given 
insight into the debate remained silent. The phrase ‘import substitution’ was briefly 
imposed on the conversation and hastily ignored, smothered by the donor 
representative’s eagerness to return to the subject of poverty alleviation.  
The day proceeded and vague questions were asked about whether or not 
poverty alleviation could be demonstrated through technical assistance provided 
through the sector support group which, as previously mentioned did not really exist. 
There was palpable frustration in the room over the circular nature of the discussion. 
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Grumblings were made during the coffee break and after the short recess damage 
control over the image of the facility was addressed. Given the confusion surrounding 
the core aims and objectives, sensitivity ran high. It was mentioned by the Team Leader 
that some people in the wider development community had already begun sniggering at 
the facility’s ELF acronym. So it was announced after the break that nothing regarding 
the Facility’s financial details, successes, failures or otherwise were to be 
communicated outside of the Governing Board meetings. Public relations of the facility 
were to be left to the sole discretion of the donor.  
Finally the discussion turned to the actual implementation of CADF’s work. 
Concerns were raised over its capacity to deliver services, which had not been clearly 
thought through. The Strategic Framework stated that ten to fifteen clients, selected 
through the sector support group, should be worked with per year. However, this 
seemed far too onerous a number for the start up phase. It was decided that, in order to 
generate tools and templates and build staff capacity to deliver services, CADF should 
begin with three pilot clients. The donor stated that three months should be adequate to 
achieve this. This, it was hoped, would assist staff to develop their key approaches and 
methodologies and give the facility, time to establish its management systems and 
further refine its ‘strategic direction’. This was indeed prudent as none of the staff 
appeared to have previous experience of providing business development services. 
Thus, in order to establish the facility, it was necessary for all staff members to learn 
how to do their jobs. This further reinforced the abandonment of cost recovery. 
However, it was agreed that the facility should maintain a cost recovery ‘mindset’. 
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In the ensuing months, moving into pilot phase had further surprises in store 
for the staff and stakeholders. Finding appropriate clients to whom to provide business 
development services proved challenging; many entrepreneurs, by definition already 
successful in their businesses, did not see the need for assistance and few had the time 
to spare. The situation led the Team Leader to comment, “Working on the production 
side is easier, farmers are more open but with businesses they are harder, you have to 
think before you go in there.” Finally four pilot clients were selected based on their 
acceptability as clients and their willingness to be involved with CADF. In Siem Reap, 
these were a master vegetable farmer/trader and a large chilli sauce processor. In 
Banteay Meanchey, two vegetable farmer/traders were selected. Again, however, it was 
back to the drawing board as facility staff found that business development service 
provision could not begin without first providing extremely basic numerical and 
budgetary training to clients. Indeed, in some cases staff had to begin with an 
explanation of what a budget was. However, the path was smoothed by the fact the 
selected entrepreneurs had already received NGO training and support by now defunct 
agricultural projects. In this way the CADF constructed ‘entrepreneurs’ out of old 
beneficiaries from past projects.  
Vegetable ELFs 
The path dependent nature of this project eventually navigated my field research full 
circle and back to HURREDO. One of the pilot clients identified by CADF was a 
‘master farmer’, previously trained by Agrisud and other NGOs in vegetable production 
and then later picked up as a supply coordinator for HURREDO. This farmer was 
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located in Krosang village, Pouk District, Siem Reap and stated that he had been in the 
business of growing and selling vegetables for around ten years.  
Figure 7.4: Map of Krasang village, Krabei Riel commune, Pouk district. 
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University. 
 
At the end of the Agrisud project, HURREDO identified him as a key village 
leader and gave him with the task of organising the production of other vegetable 
growers and delivering this to HURREDO. His tasks included handing out seeds and 
equipment and providing farmers with advice on quality practices. Initially, 40 farmers 
were involved but this reduced to eight households over time. Over half the participants 
left because they either stopped growing vegetables to pursue more lucrative livelihood 
options in Siem Reap, such as paid hotel work or construction, or simply sold their own 
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produce to other traders as HURREDO proved incapable of consistently purchasing 
produce at predefined times and prices.  
The interview with this master farmer revealed that he had now gone into the 
business of growing and trading vegetables alone (see Appendix 7.1). This farmer fell 
into a rare category of vegetable farmer that has the capacity to produce vegetables all 
year round. With three different parcels of land suitable for either wet or dry season 
production, or both, he maintained steady production. This farmer was also 
experimenting with greenhouse production and employed five casual labourers. With 
his own production, plus vegetables collected from three other villages, he supplied 
three major customers: an international hotel, a farmers’ marketing collective (that was, 
in reality, a private business), and an organisation called Agricam (another 
business/collective). Nonetheless total sales were small, between 20 to 30 kilograms per 
day (often more in the weekends) of lettuce and other local vegetable varieties. These 
volumes contracted severely in the wet season.  
Preferential supply was given to the highest paying customer, with 60 per cent 
of supply going directly to the hotel (which paid 80 per cent above the market price), 
and the other 20 per cent split between the ‘marketing collective’ (which paid 50 per 
cent above market price) and Agricam (market price). Although the hotel generally 
offered the highest prices, this fluctuated daily. The other two buyers paid more 
consistent, but lower prices. The challenge for this farmer/trader was how to maximise 
profits whilst minimising risks in a highly variable market. A small proportion of 
vegetables was therefore sold at lower prices to HURREDO and other buyers to hedge 
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against uncertain hotel buying practices. The facility promised to assist him with 
marketing and book-keeping skills, help him access capital for production inputs, 
budgeting, quality assurance, business plans and time management skills.  
This farmer’s involvement in previous NGO projects had assisted him in 
building a vegetable supply network. As a designated accountant for the Agrisud 
project, vegetable collector for HURREDO and trainer for other NGOs, he had 
developed new production skills and also been able to forge trust among other producers 
who now supplied him. However, in order to expand his business of supplying to the 
high-value hotel market, this farmer needed to engage other vegetable suppliers in 
quasi-hierarchical contract relations to ensure consistency and quality of supply. 
However, only seven households consistently supplied him with high quality saleable 
vegetables.  
Discussions with other vegetable growers in the village of Krasang revealed 
some of the constraints on the master farmer’s vegetable value chain construction. 
Interviews with two female vegetable producers revealed that, while they too grew 
vegetables all year round (these farmers had received NGO assistance), their marketing 
strategies changed according to the season. Both these producers had previously sold 
vegetables to HURREDO but had stopped participating. They had stopped growing 
exotic vegetable varieties and now only grew local varieties, since they no longer had 
access to exotic seed supplies. During the height of the vegetable season, both farmers 
sold their produce directly at the local market. They preferred this to selling to traders 
who typically offered lower prices at this time. During the wet season their strategies 
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changed. Both farmers sold small quantities of vegetables to different traders during the 
wet season when prices rose. They did this in order to maintain good relationships with 
each of the traders in case they needed them to buy excess vegetables during the less 
profitable dry season. In order to reduce risks, farmers gave preference to traders who 
lived in their own village. Vegetables were sold to traders on one day credit, repaid at 
the end of the day. Traders not based in the village were known to offer higher prices for 
vegetables, only to abscond without paying. The older of the two farmers also stated 
that the additional labour required to achieve high quality vegetables was troublesome 
and unnecessary, given that two of her grown children made good money, one as a 
tourist guide and the other as a teacher in Siem Reap. This farmer was also disinclined 
towards additional labour expenditure on vegetables, given that another aid project was 
employing her as a master handicraft woman to travel around Cambodia and train 
young women in traditional basket weaving. She was very proud of the mobile phone 
they had given her for this work.59 
The selling strategies of both these vegetable producers, while logical for their 
own livelihood strategies, were at odds with the master farmer’s expansionary plans. 
The diversity of their income sources and their marketing flexibility left little need for 
them to supply consistent high quality vegetables to the master farmer. If this farmer 
were to expand his business, he would need to look elsewhere. However, engaging other 
farmers in supply relationships who had not been previously trained by agricultural 
development projects was unlikely to provide the consistent quality and quantities he 
                                                           
59 A recent NZAID Currents article, however, states that farmers in this area have been helped out of dependence on 
low value labour intensive basket weaving by the CADF project through training in horticulture (NZAID 2008: 13).  
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required. In order to construct a larger value chain, the master farmer would need to 
follow the aid chain to lead him to farmers trained in high quality vegetable production, 
yet too remote to diversify their incomes off-farm. Such growers were unlikely to be 
found in Pouk District which was evidently doing well from the tourist boom of Siem 
Reap. Driving to and from the district during the day, the villages of Pouk were largely 
devoid of people and at the end of research each day, driving back into Siem Reap one 
encountered a heavy stream of traffic as a flood of younger people on motorbikes and 
bicycles headed back to the villages from their day jobs in the city. Indeed, the most 
striking aspect of Krasang village was that none of the households reportedly once 
involved in HURREDO was disabled, female-headed or otherwise disadvantaged as per 
HURREDO’s project grant proposals.  
Non-ELF Vegetable Growers 
In order to contrast this NGO-targeted village, another village known for its cultivation 
of vegetables in Siem Reap was selected for research. Having heard of a village that 
locals referred to as the ‘horticulture village’, we followed directions to Kork Srok 
village in Prasat Bakong district, approximately 30 kilometers from Siem Reap. Here 
two semi-structured interviews were conducted with two vegetable growers, one of 
whom had no rice land and was entirely dependent on vegetable production and some 
casual labour in Siem Reap for income. Both interviewees grew vegetables throughout 
the year. This village was patently poor yet had received little assistance from aid 
projects. Unlike the village of Krasang, where large plots of vegetables grew under 
netted shades, here small plots of vegetables were planted densely around the houses.  
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Figure 7.5: Map of Kork Srok village, Prasat Bakong district.  
 
Source: Cartography and GIS Australian National University. 
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Plate 7.1: The road to Kork Srok. 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
 
Plate 7.2: Vegetable cultivation around the house in Kork Srok 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
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Neither of the interviewees sold vegetables to local markets themselves and 
were instead entirely reliant on traders, to whom they sold equal small amounts during 
the wet season in order to maintain good relations in the dry season.  The prices they 
received were considerably lower for non-exotic vegetables. For pak choy, vegetable 
growers received 800 riels per kilogram whilst in Krasang village prices were reported 
at 2000 riel per kilogram. Unlike Krasang village, neither of these farmers had received 
post-harvest training and stated that they had high levels of post-harvest losses. The 
difference between these two villages was stark. Housing, roads and infrastructure were 
all noticeably poorer in Kork Srok. Yet this village had not been identified as a target for 
CADF’s work. Unlinked to a donor-trained master farmer, ‘the entrepreneurial leading 
few’ or to any aid agency identified by CADF as a partner organisation, this village was 
likely to continue being neglected as CADF instead picked the ‘low hanging fruit’ of 
past development projects.  
Chilli Sauce ELFs 
During the start up phase, CADF also selected a chilli sauce producer as a pilot client. 
This producer also made fish sauce, soy sauce and vinegar. He also owned a guesthouse 
and was in the process of constructing a large bottled water and ice factory at a cost of 
US$100,000. This producer was so successful that he was deeply reluctant to participate 
in the project stating that he intended to close down the sauce component of his business 
in order to focus on his tourism and bottled water ventures. However, CADF employees 
convinced him that with their help he could sustain all businesses and they could 
transform his sauce production into a much more profitable enterprise that would be 
worth his while. My own repeated efforts to interview this entrepreneur proved 
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unsuccessful as every time I tried to contact him he was away in Phnom Penh. 
Nevertheless, I endeavoured to investigate the chilli sauce processing sector.  
Plate 7.3: Chilli sauce in a market stall, Siem Reap 
 
Source: CADF’s photograph. 
 
A brief market survey was conducted in the retail markets of Siem Reap 
including Psar Leu, Psar Cha, Psar Gne, and Psar Grolaign. There were at least ten 
different brands of chilli sauce on the market, one of which was from Banteay 
Meanchey and three of which were from Thailand. In general, a dozen bottles of Khmer 
chilli sauce purchased by a trader at wholesale cost were 6000 riels per dozen 
(US$1.50). The sauce was then sold for 6500 riels per dozen (US$1.625), or around 700 
riels (US$0.175) per bottle by retailers. Thai products were considerably more 
expensive at 25,000 riels per dozen (US$6.25), sold at 26,000 riels per dozen (US$6.50) 
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or 2,500 riels per bottle (US$0.625) retail. Cambodian products had a clear price 
advantage and several traders stated that sales of Thai products were declining. 
However, a number complained that there was often not enough Cambodian chilli sauce 
to supply the market. Overall, three local brands of chilli sauce were dominant in the 
Siem Reap market. In order of market dominance, these were Bongkong (prawn), 
Damrei (elephant) and Jongpau (chef). Jongpau was the brand of the larger 
entrepreneur selected by CADF. The address and phone number of the producer of 
Damrei and Bongkong were clearly labelled on each product and these were the same 
for both products.  
After arranging a time to meet the processor of Damrei and Bongkong, myself 
and my research assistant headed to a small processing plant, down a muddy dirt road, 
around the back of Psar Leu, the main provincial market of Siem Reap. The processing 
plant was located at the side of his house in a warehouse that was only partially roofed. 
It was nonetheless very neat and tidy. Fences surrounded the house and warehouse. 
Accompanying us was a staff member from CADF who was keen to discover whether 
this sauce producer was a potential ‘ELF’.  
The processor stated that he did not have a business plan, nor did he see the 
need for one. He did not keep any records of what was bought or sold, or of what was 
produced. He also said that if he was owed anything, records of the debts were 
destroyed when the debts were cleared. He did not want to elaborate as to why this was. 
He only stated that he knew his net income per year, and that he was doing fine. He had 
learnt the business from his parents and they had run it in a similar fashion. Regarding 
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the chilli sauce, he stated that he originally learnt his current production techniques from 
a processor in Thailand. He made a trip to Thailand once a year to meet this mentor and 
learn. He used mostly imported ingredients for chilli sauce production, buying most of 
the fresh ingredients from Psar Leu wholesalers. Prices for these inputs did not fluctuate 
much, he said.  
The label on the bottles read: 29 per cent chilli, 20 per cent sugar, 20 per cent 
garlic, 7 per cent salt and 24 per cent tomato. Sodium benzoate from China was used as 
a preservative. The sauce was manually bottled in recycled bottles that were imported 
from China through Vietnam to Cambodia and then sent back to China for recycling. 
New bottles from Thailand were said to be too expensive to use. Bottles were sterilised 
for six hours in a boiling vat that was fuelled by rice husks. Labels were printed and 
purchased in Phnom Penh, as were the caps. Twenty-five permanent staff worked in the 
factory, most of whom came from Prey Veng, Kampong Thom or other poorer 
provinces. This expanded to 30 or 40 staff in the dry season. All staff were multi-skilled 
and did everything from bottling to processing and transporting goods. They were paid 
US$20 to US$30 per month. Permanent staff were equally split between men and 
women. Casual labour hired in the dry season were usually men. The producer stated 
that it was difficult to find labour from Siem Reap, as most workers from the local area 
would not accept such low salaries.  
On average the processor produced 1,200 dozen bottles of sauce per month 
(1,200 x 12 = 14,400 bottles per month). Production fluctuated, however, according to 
the season, and was constrained by labour and often by infrequent supplies of inputs. 
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According to the processor, many of the inputs were smuggled across the border 
illegally and this could create problems. However, the processor stated that input supply 
was not his major concern. The larger issues that this processor complained of were 
technical and financial difficulties.  
The first issue the processor had was capital investment. He stated that he 
would like to purchase new machinery, specifically a bottle labeller, as labelling was 
currently done by hand. For this he would need to change bottles as the recycled bottles 
were non-standard. He had also recently purchased an acidity tester from Germany at a 
cost of US$1000. However, he stated that investing in his business was difficult because 
of the high cost of interest.  
Second, he noted that he would like to extend the shelf life of his products. 
Unlike Thai products that have a shelf life of up to two years, most Khmer products 
only last five months. Shelf life and sauce stabilisation problems constrained his ability 
to market his product. At the time, he distributed his products to nearby provinces to 
Siem Reap: Kampong Thom, Preah Vihear, and Banteay Meanchey. However, until 
issues of stabilisation and shelf life could be addressed, he said that there is no point in 
extending his distribution into more distant provinces. Nonetheless, he had ambitions to 
export. He proudly showed us certificates obtained from the Ministry of Industry, Mines 
and Energy which cleared his products for export. The Ministry charged him US$10 per 
certificate per product which he then had to renew every three months. The processor 
also made vinegar, fish sauce and soy sauce. He had also been experimenting with 
oyster sauce production. This plan had been suspended until he could better ensure shelf 
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life and stability of his sauces. Along with extending shelf life, he stated that the sauce 
also has problems with emulsification –– water separating from the sauce. “It is difficult 
to find a good formula. People keep it a secret,” he said. Indeed, the processor at first 
was very suspicious of our intentions and informed us that he initially thought we were 
coming to try and steal his recipe.  
Technical problems had led this processor towards shrewd solutions. The 
processor made three brands of chilli sauce:  Elephant (Damrei), Prawn (Bongkong) and 
Four Mothers (Maydteh Bourne). Maydteh Bourne did not contain tomatoes like the 
other two brands and sold for slightly less. For Elephant and Prawn two classes of sauce 
were produced, a premium product and a standard product. The premium product was 
sold at twice the price of the standard product, wholesaling at 12,000 riels per dozen. 
The processor stated that both Elephant and Prawn were the same product with different 
labels. The different labels were used interchangeably depending on the market. He 
stated that if one of his brands developed a bad name or had quality control issues, he 
would quickly change the labels to the other brand. He also stated that in particularly 
poor markets with low levels of literacy, customers see the Elephant label and believe 
that it contains real elephants. So instead of supplying the Elephant label in these 
markets he supplied the Prawn label (Bongkong) that everyone likes to eat.  
Total estimated sales for chilli sauce were 5000 dozen bottles per year (60,000 
bottles or 5000 bottles per month or 34 per cent of total production). The processor 
estimated profit per bottle at five per cent; that is, approximately US$31.25 per month.60 
                                                           
60 Wholesale price 6000 riel per dozen (US$1.50) x 5000 dozen = US$7500 x 0.05 (net profit) = US$375/12 months 
= US$31.25 per month profit.  
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He stated, however, that chilli sauce demand was growing every year by 20 to 30 per 
cent. All of his sauce products were distributed to approximately 100 traders, with 30 
per cent of production distributed outside of the Siem Reap area. Finally, he stated that 
he did not belong to any business associations, formal or informal, and was not 
interested in sharing information with anyone. 
Non-ELF Chilli Sauce Processor 2 
During the market survey a second smaller brand of chilli sauce was identified that 
several traders said had just entered the market. We drove to the location printed on the 
bottle. It was a small shack located in the Prasat Bahkong area, further out of Siem Reap 
and near to the poorer vegetable producers. This chilli sauce producer was also less than 
eager to talk to us. He stated, somewhat irately, that he had so many barangs 
(foreigners) and NGOs come to talk to him that he was sick of it. “They just come and 
go,” he said. Nonetheless, he agreed to an informal interview. He informed us that he 
had been making chilli sauce for two years now. He was a former employee of the 
CADF identified chilli sauce entrepreneur, and left to become a motodop (motorcycle 
taxi) driver. On his travels around Siem Reap, he met with traders, to whom he had once 
distributed sauce products from the large processor. They had suggested he make the 
sauce himself. So he started backyard production and was now selling his products to 
many of his former employer’s customers.  
We inspected his operations which appeared extremely basic and far from 
sterile. This was confirmed when he informed us that he sterilised the bottles in the sun, 
and knew that the quality was good when he looked at it. Nonetheless, he too had 
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certification from the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy. Production was very 
small scale, around 20 dozen bottles per day. He also produced soy sauce, fish sauce, 
and an unidentifiable syrup. For this he employed four fulltime labourers who were paid 
US$12.50 per month. The rest of the labour used was household labour. Inputs were 
sourced from similar supply chains as the larger chilli sauce producer. Preservatives, 
bottles, caps and labels were purchased in Phnom Penh.  
Plate 7.4: Chilli sauce producer 
 
Source: Author’s photograph. 
 
The start-up costs of this small operation were US$4000, which he borrowed 
from relatives and a rural credit bank, and which he was still repaying. He stated that the 
market for chilli sauce was growing but he did not have the capital to expand his 
business and meet market demand. He sold products only in Siem Reap to 
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approximately 30 to 40 wholesale buyers. Total volumes sold had recently increased 
from 20 dozen bottles a day to 30 dozen, nearing the limits of his capacity to supply. He 
distributed all the chilli sauce by himself on a motorbike. He had ambitions, however, to 
buy a truck and a grinder to grind chilli, despite the fact that he often could not afford to 
buy input ingredients. He also stated that he would like to produce numerous 
interchangeable brands. Despite his ambitions, this chilli sauce producer had little 
understanding of his income and guessed that it must be around 1000 riel per dozen 
profit per month on chilli sauce alone, that is around US$6.25. Why he borrowed 
US$4000 in order to make such a small return was not revealed during our interview.  
The Chilli Sauce Commodity Chain 
In order to ascertain the wider parameters of the chilli sauce value chain, further 
research was conducted with input suppliers of the main chilli sauce ingredients: 
chillies, garlic and sugar. 
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Plate 7.5: Chili seller 
 
Source: CADF’s photograph. 
 
Various retail chilli traders in Psar Leu market, stated that they obtained chillies 
from Kampong Cham traders who conducted their business at the back of Psar Samaki 
market. Behind Psar Samaki market stood a whole row of wholesalers who received 
fresh fruit and vegetables, including chillies, ferried in Toyotas from farms in Kampong 
Cham to Siem Reap over night. This transportation attracted 20,000 riels per car trip in 
informal taxes collected by petty officials who operate illegal toll stops along main 
roads in Cambodia at night. These wholesalers stated that the chillies were mainly 
purchased in Phnom Penh from a chilli trader who imported the chillies from Vietnam. 
Other vegetables were purchased in Phnom Penh as well. Chillies and other fresh 
produce were then consolidated in Kampong Cham with the vegetables and chillies 
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produced there and sent forward to northern markets. One trader interviewed estimated 
her total sales volumes to be 200 kilograms of all types of vegetables per day. Chillies 
were purchased for 1000 riels per kilogram in the dry season which increased to 
between 3000 and 3500 riels per kilogram in the wet season. Gross margins were 
around 200 riels per kilogram. Chilli prices fluctuated by 200 or 300 riels during the 
day, depending on supply. Spoilage was her largest complaint. She stated that when 
Siem Reap vegetable producers sell a lot of chillies, this reduced the price dramatically. 
However, she stated that they rarely produced enough for this to occur. She added that 
the tomato trade followed a similar route from Vietnam to Phnom Penh and on to Siem 
Reap. 
For garlic, the value chain appeared to be even more concentrated. A garlic 
trader in the large provincial market, Psar Leu, stated that a large garlic supplier from 
Phnom Penh supplied all the garlic to this market. A truck would arrive three times a 
week from Phnom Penh with one tonne of garlic and each time it would supply one of 
the three garlic sellers in the market with one tonne. This garlic originated from China. 
Garlic was purchased at 2100 riels per kilogram and sold for 2200 to 2300 riels per 
kilogram. Indeed, in a previous interview with an American vegetable supplier from 
Vietnam, it had been mentioned that for major agricultural commodities, especially 
garlic, onions and tomatoes, a strong monopoly was held in place by large-scale, elite 
and well connected traders.61 This agricultural commodity trade, I was informed, was 
based in Phnom Penh, strongly coordinated, highly profitable and literally well 
defended. A similarly concentrated supply chain existed for sugar. After some enquiries, 
                                                           
61 Personal communication with vegetable importer, 23 August 2006. 
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a sugar trader was located in a shop house along the banks of the Siem Reap river. She 
informed me that the sugar trade was dominated by two Khmer companies importing 
sugar across the border at Poipet from Thailand. This being the case, commodity 
exchange in Cambodia cannot be characterised as rational, modern and flexible as is 
typically supposed by free market proponents but as associated with the politics of 
patronage and power.  
The majority of ingredients used for the production of chilli sauce in Cambodia 
originated from high bulk, global commodity chains dominated by ‘hands off’ 
intermediaries who combined the bulk output of numerous producers to supply large-
scale traders. However, as these products were not being sourced from local farmers, 
CADF eventually abandoned the idea of working with chilli sauce producers altogether.  
The decision not to work in value-adding industries that did not demonstrate a 
clear link to the local agricultural sector was made on the basis that working with such 
businesses could not be justified as pro-poor. However, the first chilli sauce producer 
interviewed was clearly a highly flexible entrepreneur, sourcing low cost products from 
highly concentrated global commodity markets to process and to value add. Products 
were then sold to domestic consumers, at much lower prices than imported chilli sauces. 
The decision to abandon chilli sauce processors was somewhat perplexing, given that 
the widespread export of unprocessed Cambodian rice paddy to Vietnam for milling was 
much bemoaned by development consultants who lamented the loss of value adding 
activities. 
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That Cambodia was importing unprocessed agricultural products for processing itself 
was not interpreted as desirable, but rather as a lost opportunity for farmers to produce 
low value agricultural products. Thus, from the facility’s perspective, Cambodia was to 
be placed at the bottom of the global economic hierarchy, entrepreneurialism and 
opportunism only to be unleashed from the very bottom up, not, however, to be 
developed using imports from global commodity chains. This insistence that value 
added processing should utilise local products is at odds with the way that agro-
processing firms operate around the world. An inspection of product labels anywhere in 
the world reveals that most products are made from local and imported ingredients. For 
example, Thailand is a net importer of chilli, yet a net exporter of value added chilli 
sauces and other chilli preparations (Ali 2006). 
Transformed, Sustained, Abandoned?  
Meanwhile back at CADF, the ‘strategic direction’ of the project remained in constant 
negotiation, primarily over whether or not intended activities could be considered pro-
poor. It was becoming increasingly difficult for anyone involved to justify the approach 
on decidedly ‘pro-poor’ grounds, aside from stating the obvious, unsubstantiated 
impacts of ‘trickle down’. Thus, the NZAID representative continued to urge the facility 
to work more with producer groups in a fashion similar to the Laos project he had 
observed. Confusion reigned over whether and how to work with producer groups. “Do 
we treat them the same as individual clients?” was the question asked. But this, it was 
noted, may not be wise as it was speculated that within each group differences in 
resources, capacities, organisational structures and decision-making would vary. There 
were further concerns from the design consultant over working with NGO-supported 
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producer groups as clients. “We shouldn’t respond to the donor created environment, 
but to the actual environment”. Thus, it was decided that a group client strategy should 
to be developed to appease the donor. The onus to prove the poverty alleviation impact 
of the facility was laid squarely on the shoulders of the M&E Officer, a fresh-faced, 
Khmer, female university graduate with no former training in development assessment 
and myself, the three month consultant hired to set up CADF’s M&E Framework and 
train the M&E Officer to implement it.  
During my time as monitoring and evaluation consultant for CADF I found that 
the process of formulating a monitoring and evaluation framework for the facility was 
more about balancing the various demands and perceptions of the Team Leader, design 
consultant and donor and matching them with the ever-evolving ‘strategic approach’, 
than it was about the actual problem of measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of 
NZAID’s activities for poverty alleviation. Part of this balancing was to bring together 
differing perspectives on whether monitoring and evaluation should focus on 
participatory evaluations including all stakeholders from national government, 
community and the development sector, as advocated by NZAID, or focus on 
quantitative measurements of increased income which was advocated by the staff and 
design consultants. In a bid to satisfy all parties involved, I redesigned the project to 
graduate from providing both individuals and producer groups with business 
development services and technical assistance to their suppliers, and towards gradual 
participatory value chain development involving all value chain actors. Knowing it was 
the newly emerging trend in agricultural development, I hoped that such an approach 
would satisfy the all-competing demands. This approach, I reasoned, would also help 
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solve the problem of how to engender wider ‘institutional engagement’ once assigned to 
the now defunct ‘sector support group’. The new approach would begin with clients, 
move to producer groups and end with a form of participatory supply chain problem 
solving that could double as participatory monitoring and evaluation. This solved the 
issue of whether to work with supposed agents of business development, ELFs, or the 
structural issues surrounding business. Furthermore, by attaching the word 
‘participatory’ to value chain development the concerns that the facility would be too 
producer or trader-oriented were addressed. In this new development lexicon, the words 
‘value chain development’ averted conundrums over the structure/agency dimensions of 
the development impasse, while the word ‘participatory’ evaded the apparent tension 
between gifts and commodities, between whether to ‘give’ assistance to poor producer 
collectives versus whether to ‘sell’ business development services to entrepreneurs. I 
submitted my new ‘Strategic Framework’, along with a fully redesigned monitoring and 
evaluation section and completed my consultancy, expecting that it would be ignored. 
For a short while, the project extended its business development work with producer 
groups (silk and honey) and with other ‘entrepreneurs’ (livestock breeders and 
mushroom cultivators). Ideological dilemmas over working with producer collectives 
versus individual entrepreneurs were suspended. The NZAID official, from Wellington, 
in charge of the project left for another post in the Solomon Islands. He was temporarily 
replaced by an aid official from the Bangkok Embassy office, an ex-school teacher who 
had a proclivity to fall asleep at Governing Board Meetings, much to the relief of other 
members.  
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At this point I also ended fieldwork. However, I was informed a year later that 
the project had been reconfigured and was now focused solely on ‘participatory value 
chain development’. In the years since the CADF had been conceived, established and 
implemented development trends had shifted rapidly. The newest and most innovative 
approach was now value chain development, leaving business development provision to 
SMEs relegated to the box of passé development tools labelled ‘1990s’. Since early 
2000, the move to value chain development had gained considerable momentum within 
agricultural development theory, and it is likely that moving to this approach would 
have given the facility a whole new level of legitimacy. However, in the eyes of some, 
the facility’s long gestation phase, from pilot clients to producer groups, and on to 
reinvention in value chain development, was to be viewed with scepticism. This led one 
informant to describe the Facility’s leading stakeholders as “arrogant theorists stuck in a 
perpetual start up phase, achieving nothing”, a comment that was later requested to be 
withdrawn from my records due to high sensitivity surrounding this representation of 
the facility to the wider public. 
Whether CADF has any noticeable impact on the agri-business sector of Siem 
Reap and Banteay Meanchey remains to be seen. Given the donor’s intense sensitivity 
about the public becoming aware of the facility’s success or failure, it may never be 
known. Nevertheless, rapid change is taking place in Cambodia. This was most evident 
on a recent trip I made to Cambodia, at the beginning of 2009. First I was informed that 
a large private company rumoured to be in league with MAFF was buying up large 
tracts of land to begin organic vegetable production. Later, friends who had grown up 
and lived in the Pouk District where Krasang village is located reported that, despite the 
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existence of successful horticulturists in this area, many of the farmers had sold their 
land in the 2008 land price boom, and moved into Siem Reap township to work in 
construction. Others had simply been illegally evicted from their land by the 
government.  
Conclusion 
Castel-Branco (2003: 14) states that “on the whole, most SME-driven programs try not 
to have to address the more general dynamics of the economy, either because of the 
assumption that markets know better, or because SMEs are seen as a way to balance the 
power of more general dynamics; or simply because such dynamics are not 
understood.” Instead Castel-Branco (2003) argues that programs to support private 
enterprises usually lack clear industrial strategies or even clear sets of priorities in 
capacity building. Training and institutional facilitation to interested firms is usually the 
fullest extent of engagement, and remains deeply inadequate for the real issues 
confronting private enterprise development in developing countries. These statements 
resonate strongly with the preceding case study of CADF. On the whole, while CADF 
championed the ‘market’ as an amorphous whole, it did little to address the very real 
and pressing issues central to its structure. Land titling, foreign investment laws and 
corruption were swept aside. The ‘market’ was depoliticised to the simplistic challenge 
of business development service provision to clients. In the Cambodian business 
environment, these clients were unlikely to adhere to what CADF advocated –– 
formalised business practices of budgeting, business plans and management systems, all 
of which would have likely incurred greater vulnerability to rent-seeking officials  
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CADF’s key expatriate advisors’ and staffs’ disdain for the development 
industry too, left it ignorant of the dynamics that CADF left in its wake. For the master 
farmer to achieve the status of ‘market developer’ and construct a robust value chain of 
vegetable growers, previous NGO beneficiaries needed to be enrolled. However, 
involvement in such programs, in addition to the growth of Siem Reap, had unshackled 
beneficiaries from sole reliance on vegetable production and instead diversified their 
livelihood options. Poorer, more remote vegetable growers, with the least livelihood 
options were more likely to want to supply vegetables consistently and at higher prices 
to the master farmer; given their lack of training by NGOs, however, they were 
unsuitable candidates. In theory, these growers could have been ‘developed’ by the 
sector support group of NGOs and donors, but often these organisations had their own 
mandates, beneficiary identification strategies and approaches which may or may not 
have been useful to the master farmer. The uneven pattern of donor intervention also 
made it unlikely that local chilli sauce producers could have developed local supply 
chains. Yet this lack of links to the local market meant that CADF abandoned the idea of 
providing assistance to these processors. Even if chilli sauce producers accepted local 
produce, they were unlikely to find the producers capable of supplying the quantity and 
qualities needed.  
Overall, the importance of linking agriculture to agri-business is overstated in 
developing countries such as Cambodia. Value-adding, whether to local or imported 
ingredients, should be considered important in its own right. The fact that it was not, left 
potentially successful agro-processors without the technical assistance they needed to 
expand sales provincially, let along nationally or internationally. The key issue here is 
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not whether economic development and poverty alleviation are in fact coterminous, but 
how they may be. Linking the two is not a simple path from facilitating improved 
agricultural production, to agro-processing to export markets. Instead, it involves a 
range of activities and relations, not just commercial but charitable also. In this case, 
some NGOs improved farmers’ capacity to grow vegetables. This led some farmers to 
pursue other more lucrative or varied livelihood options. For other farmers it meant 
abandoning their farms. For chilli sauce, agro-processing did not require a strong 
linkage to all the factor endowment based competitive advantages of Cambodia, rather 
it needed access to more reliable, cheaper global commodity chains dominated by elite 
patrons, combined with cheap rural labour that allowed for the production of 
competitively priced products for the domestic market. 
 
  
Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
The Problem with Global Commodity Chain Analysis in Pro-
poor Development 
 
We need to understand gift relations, not just commodity relations, in agricultural 
commodity chain interventions aimed at pro-poor development. This applies to gift 
relations within a developing country and the gift relations of foreign aid interventions. 
Agriculture, whether in the developed or developing world, is a sector in which 
producers are uniquely predisposed to seek protection, either formally through state 
subsidies or informally through the construction and maintenance of patron-client 
relations, which is what characterises many developing countries as gift rather than 
commodity-driven. The precarious and uncertain nature of the environment and 
markets, and the low prices of agricultural commodities compared with other goods and 
services, mean that farmers the world over tend to seek protection. This persists despite 
the fact that farmers are increasingly compelled by development and state agencies to 
rely on commodity markets alone to ensure their livelihoods. This thesis has examined 
the gift relations of foreign aid interventions surrounding commodity chain 
development.  
Agricultural value chain development works to help the ‘poor’ trade their way 
out of poverty through the construction and reconstruction of commodity relations. It is 
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through the exchange value of agricultural commodity production and marketing that 
people are supposed to upgrade their livelihoods. However, this is not always the case. 
People, engaged in a range of social relations of exchange, including gifts and 
commodities, enrol a range of relations to assist them in their efforts to ‘upgrade’. 
Consequently, what may be considered a fair exchange is the sale of agricultural surplus 
or surplus labour at low market values, in return for guarantees of protection and 
patronage. Commodities may be exchanged for the ongoing provision of gifts in a 
transaction that is considered by participants as commensurate, if not by outsiders. The 
example has been used of a farmer willing to sell below market price rice to his or her 
patron if the promise of ongoing protection is made. As such, in the construction and 
reconstruction of new and existing commodity chains, a combination of both gifts and 
commodity relations must be enrolled if development interventions in agriculture are 
effectively to help the poor. A focus on commodity relations alone will not ensure pro-
poor development outcomes.  
Nevertheless, current agricultural value chain development efforts tend to focus 
solely on commodity relations, and although uneven power relations are to some extent 
better conceptualised in methods such as global commodity chain analysis than 
simplistic neo-liberal models of trade, such approaches still do not fully integrate the 
important notion of power, how it is maintained and reproduced. In order to be 
effective, and fully understand the uneven power relations inherent in agricultural 
commodity chains, we must examine social life outside of commodity relations and take 
account of the full gamut of relations that come to bear on the construction of emerging 
market linkages. At the present time, value chain literature defines power by profits and 
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profits are defined by market access. Thus, particular nodes inhabiting positions of 
strategic market access within a commodity chain represent higher profit margins and 
therefore greater levels of strategic power. It is in these areas that many scholars of 
global commodity chain analysis argue that power tends to accumulate. Commodity 
chains are therefore often overemphasised as trader or buyer driven.  
The generalisation of commodity chains as either trader or buyer-driven is an 
inadequate explanation of how power works to construct and maintain commodity 
chains. The idea that commodity chains operate under simplistic power relations driven 
merely by a strategically positioned trader leads towards the development impasse. In 
the development impasse, development theorists determine that the poor may not trade 
their way out of poverty due to the innate structure of commodity chains held in place 
by strategic actors such as traders. This stands in contrast to the view of development 
practitioners who argue that, given greater strategic market access, the poor may be 
empowered in relation to traders or buyers.   
Such simplistic explanations do not take account of the range of political, 
social, environmental and historical factors that contribute to specific power 
constellations within trade relations and how these power constellations are continually 
reproduced through ongoing relationships. Agrarian transition in Southeast Asia 
provides a case in point. In the Southeast Asian region, trade linkages are more than 
simply a matter of market access, they are a function of state intervention, ecology, 
historic trading ties and existing social and political relations, recent technological 
innovations such as the Green Revolution and uneven development. Commodity chains 
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are spurred not merely by powerful strategic commodity chain actors but also through 
the symbiotic relationships that exist between the market and non-market whereby 
inequality stimulates greater class distinction and therefore specialisation and agro-
industrialisation, but equally may induce greater viability of subsistence-oriented 
production and attendant political patronage structures. Traditionally, trader power in 
Southeast Asia is derived not merely from market access but through the ability to 
navigate a range of social, political, ecological, technological and even cosmological 
complexities. Trader power may often be weak, variable and seasonal. Trader or buyer-
driven models predicated on power derived from market access do not alone explain 
issues of uneven market access, nor do they necessarily suggest immediate remedies to 
it. Instead, as described in Chapter six, such suggestions may lead development 
agencies to target unfairly petty female fresh fruit and vegetable traders as the cause of 
uneven development. In short, models based around examining market relations and 
functions alone are inadequate for understanding uneven market access. By extension, 
therefore, models such as value chain interventions are also inadequate for remedying 
uneven access.  
The construction of new commodity chains is laboured, contested and 
uncertain. A range of relations, including gift and commodity relations, contribute to the 
construction of new commodity chains, primarily through efforts to build consensus. 
Consensus building around a set of activities and practices occurs until such practices 
become routine, resulting in a structure or convention (Morgan et al. 2006). A key way 
through which consensus is built is the practice of gift giving. While gift giving is 
especially associated with non-market, subsistence-oriented agricultural production, 
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traditionally in the form of patronage, there are modern forms of gift giving which 
include more formalised agricultural subsidies and agricultural development programs 
operated by foreign aid agencies. The key function of giving to the agricultural sector is 
to build consensus around the production and marketing of agricultural commodities 
that are valued as exchangeable and often exportable commodities. This is no easy task 
and is especially challenging across cultures that may hold differing perceptions of 
quality and value. In the arena of international development, aid agencies exist to 
mediate aid flows aimed at consensus building within cross-cultural contexts.  
However, the degree to which aid may successfully achieve consensus around 
newly constructed or reconstructed commodity chains is typically hindered by the 
specific principles of private sector engagement. Consensus building is restricted to only 
those activities that conform to the logic of commodity exchange. Aid is enjoined to 
become more business-like lest it undermine exchange values, despite the fact that gift 
giving may help to construct more exchangeable commodities. Nonetheless, the logic of 
the gift in development assistance efforts is not so easily overwhelmed by the logic of 
commodity relations. Because aid relations are often deployed in areas of high 
geopolitical and historic importance, just as they are of economic importance, high 
levels of foreign assistance may continue despite contrary evidence of its effectiveness 
in constructing sustainable trade linkages. Consequently, deep schisms often emerge in 
aid projects aimed at constructing commodity chains, as high levels of ‘business-like’ 
aid assistance inundate highly aid-dependent countries, often with a propensity towards 
elite capture. This leads to the conclusion that the development impasse (in trade 
debates, oppositional positions over whether one can trade their way our of poverty or 
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not) is predicated not just on the unnecessarily constructed binary of structure versus 
agency but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the false binary of gifts and 
commodities.  
Cambodia is an especially fecund location for investigations into how 
development interventions construct and reconstruct new trade linkages in agriculture. It 
is a country with a long history of agricultural trade and tribute and foreign intervention 
which has occurred mostly to the benefit of elites. These elites have used their power, 
often amassed through the threat of violent force, to consolidate dominance over 
specific commodity chains and aid chains. Wealth extracted from foreign aid, patronage 
networks and heavily concentrated and well-defended commodity chains erect material 
hierarchies which, through the use of gifts to supporters transform these material 
hierarchies into moral hierarchies (Hattori 2003), thereby reaffirming theological or 
spiritual claims to legitimate power (Hughes 2006).  
Uneven power in Cambodia is more than merely a function of uneven market 
access. This means that to tackle issues of uneven market access, in the name of pro-
poor development, other wider dynamics of politics, society, culture, history and 
religion need be examined as well. Most development aid attempts in Cambodia, 
however, fail to do this. Private sector oriented projects in the name of pro-poor 
development instead focus their attention solely on the private sector and market 
relations and work to ensure that their interventions remain ‘business-like’. As such, 
they fail to take account of their own culpability in reproducing uneven development in 
Cambodia. Business-like private sector development interventions, of which there are 
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growing numbers in Cambodia in the name of sustainability, deny their own role in 
creating gift relations, resulting in private sector oriented development projects which 
may work against their own stated aims. This often results in an identity crisis for the 
aid organisation in question as to whether promoting business and pro-poor 
development at the same time achievable. Consequently, while aid agencies desperately 
seek to reconcile their pro-poor agendas with business-like approaches, Cambodian 
elites continue to consolidate wealth and power, leading to evermore pressing pleas by 
elites on behalf of the poor for more aid funds to be dispersed. Despite the undeniable, 
yet generally improvable, problem that aid budgets are siphoned off by state officials, it 
is the poor who are deplored for aid dependency and subjected to private sector oriented 
development projects. Meanwhile, state ministries and their employees are ‘gifted’ with 
rice seed companies and well-paid jobs in the development sector. The sponsorship of 
development workers, hand-picked from Cambodia’s educated elite, stands in stark 
contrast to the often imposed contract relations that exist between aid agencies and their 
so called farmer-beneficiaries who are exhorted to pull themselves out of subsistence 
through becoming more ‘business-like’. The organic rice project demonstrates this, with 
gift relations continuing between donors and the local NGO and contract relations 
between the local NGO and organic rice farmers.  
Private sector oriented development interventions in Cambodia are perhaps 
summarised best in the guileless words of one informant, “We need to get out there and 
say ‘hey, Mr Farmer, you’re a business”. This is a statement which makes the 
assumption that subsistence-oriented producers in Cambodia remain delinked from the 
market and locked within the stifling confines of non-market gift-relations of patronage 
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unless aid agencies intervene. The statement overlooks three basic facts of Cambodia: 
first trade linkages do exist and have done so for many years; second small ‘business’ is 
mostly conducted by women; and third, despite the fact that women are the main agents 
of petty agricultural trade, this has not necessarily translated into greater political, social 
or cultural empowerment for them.    
This last fact points to the crux of this thesis: that trade alone is not the only 
source of economic power and that economic power alone is not sufficient to engender 
wider developmental change. Trading one’s way out of poverty requires more than just 
commodity exchange; it also requires gift exchange. Development agencies seek to 
construct and reconstruct new and existing commodity chains intervening in economic 
relations only. Consequently, many interventions remain ineffective. Greater attention 
needs to be paid to the full gamut of relations that surround market relations. The 
development impasse is predicated on a false split between gifts and commodities. This 
impasse will not be broken by different scales of economic analysis aimed at 
understanding the structure of commodity exchange or the agents within it (Rigg 1997). 
It needs a much wider the scope of analysis, one that goes beyond economics alone.  
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Appendices 
Appendices Chapter Four 
Appendix 4.1: Rice Ecosystems of Cambodia 
Rice production system Characteristics 
Rain-fed upland rice < 2% of wet season rice cultivation. Mainly in the provinces of Ratanak 
Kiri, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap, Mondul Kiri, Kampong Thom, Koh 
Kong, Kampot, Kandal, Preah Vihear and Stung Treng. In Ratanak Kiri 
and Mondul Kiri upland rice is the major rice ecosystem and in Ratanak 
Kiri the upland rice area is more than twice the area for rainfed lowland 
rice 
Rain-fed lowland rice 90% of wet season rice cultivation. Mainly in the flat plain of the Tonle 
Sap Lake, Mekong River and Tonle Bassac River. The early varieties are 
grown on high fields, medium varieties in middle fields, and late varieties 
in low fields of the rainfed lowland areas. In general, the high fields are 
more drought prone while the low fields are more flood prone. 
Early Duration Rice – 20% of total rainfed lowland rice area. 
Photoperiod insensitive, less than 120 day maturation. Photoperiod 
insensitive mainly grown at the beginning of the rainy season enabling 
farmers to plant medium or late varieties after harvesting, or at flood 
recession (recession rice) 
Medium Duration Rice - 41% of total rainfed lowland rice area. 
Photoperiod insensitive or weakly sensitive. 120 – 150 day maturation. 
Late Duration Rice – 39% of total rainfed lowland rice area. Photoperiod 
sensitive. 
Deepwater/floating rice 4% of total rice area. Grown on low-lying areas that accumulate 
floodwater at a depth of 50 cm or more and in some places reaching 
depths of 4 meters. The floodwaters comes from the Tonle Sap, Mekong 
and Bassac rivers. Seeding time is the southern provinces including 
Takaev, Prey Veang and Kandal is usually from late April to May, while in 
the northern provinces such as Bat Dambang, Banteay Meanchey and 
Siem Reap it is from May to mid-June. 
Dry season rice  8 to 13% of the total cultivated rice area. Photoperiod insensitive varieties 
that mature not more than 120 days. Its high productivity associated with 
better water control, higher light intensity during crop growth, 
development and cultivation of fertiliser-responsive high-yielding varieties 
like IR66, Kru and IR Kesar.  
 
Source: GFA Consulting 2006. 
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Appendix 4.2: Average prices and gross margins for mixed paddy along the domestic rice value 
chain 
 
Price Wet 
Season 
(riel/kg) 
Wet 
Season  
($/t) 
% Increase Dry Season 
(riel/kg) 
Dry 
Season  
($/t) 
% Increase 
Farmer (paddy) 660 165  600 150  
Trader (paddy)  690 172.5 4.5% 620 155 3.3% 
Miller (paddy) 700 175 1.4% 630 157.5 1.6% 
Wholesaler (rice) 1200 
300 
6.3%* 
(71.4%)  
950 
237.5 50.8% 
Retailer (rice) 1250 312.5 4.2% 960 240 1.1% 
Consumer (rice) 1300 325 4.0% 1000 250 4.2% 
*The conversion of paddy to rice is about 62% in Cambodia, the real increase is only about 6%. 
Source: Commercial Miller Workshop, 2005, Agricultural Quality Improvement Project Closing Workshop, Kompong Som.  
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Appendix 4.3: AQIP Seed Sales 2005 
Source: AQIP  
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Appendix 4.4: AQIP Research Project  – Village Identification 
1. Village Identification Questions for Village Chiefs 
 
Village name: 
Total land: 
Number of households 
Commune: 
Total population: 
Landholding – smallest: 
Landholding - average 
 
Landholding - biggest 
 
 
WET SEASON RICE  
Wet season average yield: 
Wet season number of farmers: 
Wet season varieties: 
Wet season broadcast/transplant: 
 
Wet season number of crops 
Wet season number of AQIP farmers 
Wet season varieties AQIP: 
EARLY WET SEASON (EWS) RICE (IRRIGATED OR FLOOD RECESSION) 
EWS average yield: 
EWS no. farmers using AQIP: 
EWS varieties: 
EWS no. farmers: 
EWS broadcast/transplant: 
EWS varieties AQIP: 
DRY SEASON (DS) RICE (IRRIGATED) 
DS average yield: 
DS no. farmers AQIP: 
 
DS no. farmers: 
DS broadcast/transplant 
 
Overall soil fertility:   No. and type of irrigation: 
MARKETING 
Distance to large market: 
Road access 
Distance small market: 
 
Other farm activities 
Level only: 
Other development activities: 
 
Proportion of households at subsistence  
 
Total AQIP users 
Other notes 
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Appendix 4.5: AQIP Research Project Methods – Village Focus Group Sessions 
 
1. Inputs in Production: farmers were asked to identify inputs into rice production and nominate for each input how 
much it comprised of their total budget.  A table was produced for AQIP IR66 (if the village was an AQIP using village), 
IR66 non-AQIP and the traditional variety farmed in the village.  Where applicable the table included percentages for 
broadcasted and transplanted production.  Generally the data was for the early wet season (EWS), however for some 
villages information for wet season (WS) was also collected.  It was in this exercise where an indication of yields was 
also sought. An example of how data was collected is presented below: 
 
Wet season production comparison: AQIP IR66, non-AQIP IR66 and traditional 
Variety IR66 AQIP IR66, non-AQIP Traditional (mong mang) 
Seed 5% 0% 0% 
Labor 50% 50% 50% 
Fertilizer 20% 22% 22% 
Pesticide 5% 5% 5% 
Water (diesel for pump) 20% 23% 23% 
Yield 3.75-4.3t 3.2t 2-2.5t 
 
2. Distribution of Output: farmers made a list of destinations for their output and then identified what percentage of 
their total rice paddy crop went to each of these.  This was done for AQIP IR66, IR66 nonAQIP and a traditional crop 
separately.  An example is below. 
 
Sell to IR66 Traditional 
Commercial mill 74% 45% 
Open Paddy Market 1% 1% 
Village dealers 4% 3% 
Consumption 20% 50% 
Villagers 0.75% 0.75% 
Exchange 0.25% 0.25% 
 
3. Preference Ranking for the characteristics of seed: farmers put together a range of criteria regarding seed and 
then ranked AQIP IR66, IR66 non AQIP and a traditional variety.  The rankings were on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 5 was 
“very good” and 1 was “very bad”.  A score of 3 indicates an average performance).  
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+Advantage: 
Characteristics IR66 AQIP IR66 non-AQIP Traditional 
Yield 5 3 2 
Germination 5 3 3-5 
Less Seed 5 1 3 
Fast growth 5 3 2 
Evenness growth 5 3 4 
Easy to sell 5 4 5 
 
+Disadvantage: 
Characteristics IR66 AQIP IR66 non-AQIP Traditional 
High Price 1 4 3 
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Appendix 4.6: AQIP Research – Individual Farmer Surveys  
 
Interview Date: Farmer name: 
Interviewer: Village: 
Interview code:  Province: 
Commune: District: 
 
1. Household Data:  
 
HOUSEHOLD MEMBER   #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 
Gender (m/f)         
Age         
Ability to read and write? 
(poor/average/good) 
        
Occupation         
 
Number of Females in household: 
Number of Males in household:  
Total in Household:  
 
Comments on household data discussion  
 
 
2. Labour and Income: 
 
ON-FARM EMPLOYMENT 
Number of household members who work on farm: 
 
OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT 
Number of household members who work off-farm: 
 
Type of employment:   Labour  Construction  Garment factory   Migrant worker 
  Transport   Retail   Other  
 
Details: 
 
INCOME 
Did the household purchase rice for consumption during the past year:    Yes   No 
! if Yes: How much? _________________kgs 
 
Is the household currently in debt and who to?  
 
! If yes: 
For how long has the debt been outstanding _________ months 
How much do they owe    $USD _________ 
How much is the interest rate: __________ % 
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Actual yearly income WS 2004 – EWS 
2005 
Expected income WS 2005 
Income Unit Price (riels) Total Unit Price (riels) Total 
Rice production       
Sales of paddy        
EWS 2005  (a)     
DS 2004-05  (b)     
WS 2004  (b)     
       
Sales of milled rice       
EWS 2005  (d)     
DS 2004-05  (e)     
WS 2004  (f)     
       
Sales of seed        
EWS 2005       
DS 2004-05       
WS 2004       
       
Other rice sales       
Other farm activities 
(specify) 
      
Activity 1        
Activity 2       
Activity 3       
       
Off-farm income 
(specify) 
      
Off-farm 1       
Off-farm 2       
Off-farm 3       
       
Other       
TOTAL       
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Are the income amounts entered for WS 2004 to EWS 2005 your usual income?   
 Yes     No 
 
! If No, Why not?  
Comments on Labour and Income discussion  
 
 
 
3. Production and Land 
 
LAND 
How much land do you own ____________________ ha 
How much land is dedicated to rice production ______________________ ha 
 
Is your field graded?     Yes    No 
 
Do you rent any land for seed production?   Yes    No 
 
Soil quality:     High    Average    Low 
 
How many crops do you grow a year ? 
 
PRODUCTION 
Do you own oxen, if so how many? 
 
Do you own a plough?    Yes    No 
 
How many times do you plough your fields  
 
Do you have access to irrigation?    Yes    No 
 
Is this access through   Government   Water User Group   Aid  
  
 Other  
 
Do you broadcast or transplant:    
Early Wet Season 2005  Yes   No 
Dry Season2004/05  Yes   No 
Wet Season 2004   Yes    No 
      
What is the total yield (t/ha)    
Early Wet Season  2005 
Dry Season 2004/05  
Wet Season 2004  
(See CALC tables to check yield response) 
 
SEED USE 
What seed variety do you use:  
Early Wet Season 2005 
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Dry Season  2004/05 
Wet Season 2004 
 
Why do you use this seed variety? 
 
 
How many times have you used AQIP seed? 
 
 
Are you happy with the performance of AQIP seed ?  
 
 
Why do you use AQIP seed?  
 
 
 
What do you think are the advantages of using AQIP seed?  
 
 
 
What do you think are the disadvantages of using AQIP seed?  
 
 
 
How did you hear about AQIP seed?    
 
 Other farmer  Radio    Television   Newspaper   Other 
 
Do you think other members of the village are aware of AQIP seed?   Yes  No 
 
Comments  
 
 
Previous to using AQIP Seed where did you get your seed from?  
 
 Retained   Seed exchange     Other farmer         Given by org                 Other ______________ 
 
Do you receive a higher price for paddy that is grown from AQIP seed? 
 
Early Wet Season 2005  Yes   No           Price __________R/kg  Check (a) 
Dry Season 2004/05  Yes   No           Price __________R/kg  Check (b) 
Wet Season 2004   Yes    No           Price __________R/kg   Check (c) 
 
Do you receive a higher price for milled rice that is grown from AQIP seed? 
 
Early Wet Season 2005  Yes   No           Price __________R/kg  Check (d) 
Dry Season 2004/05  Yes   No           Price __________R/kg  Check (e) 
Wet Season 2004   Yes    No           Price __________R/kg   Check (f) 
 
Table 2 
Table 2 
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INPUTS 
Did you borrow money for inputs, if so from whom?  
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INPUTS Unit Type EWS 2005 DS 2004/05  WS 2004 
  Amount  
(units) 
Cost  
(riels per 
unit) 
Total Cost 
 
Amount  
(units) 
Cost  
(riels per 
unit) 
Total Cost 
 
Amount  
(units) 
Cost  
(riels per 
unit) 
Total Cost 
 
How much seed do you use 
(see CALC tables to double 
check) 
          
How much fertiliser did you 
use? What type? (specify 
below) 
          
Type 1           
Type 2           
Type 3           
Did you use pesticide?           
Type 1           
Type 2           
What labour did you use (both 
hired and family; indicate if 
hired). 
          
Land preparation           
Sowing           
Seeding           
Transplanting           
Fertilising           
Watering           
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Spraying chemicals           
Harvesting           
Threshing           
Other           
Did you hire or use any 
machinery and equipment? 
          
Land Preparation           
Sowing           
Seeding           
Transplanting           
Harvesting           
Threshing           
Transport           
           
Irrigation           
           
Other inputs used?           
Appendices 
378 
Comments on production and land discussion  
 
 
 
4. Post Harvest 
 
Do you:   
 hand thresh   
 mechanical thresher ! where do you get from?  
 
How do you store your seed:   
 in the house   silo   under the house   other ________________  
 in plastic bag   in rice bag  
 
How long do you store your seed for:   Early Wet 2005 ______________ months 
    Dry Season 2004/05 ___________ months 
    Wet Season 2004 _____________  months 
 
What percentage was lost due to rats / pests / moisture? 
Early Wet 2005 ______________ %   due to ________________________ 
Dry Season 2004/05 ___________ % due to ________________________ 
Wet Season 2004 _____________ % due to ________________________ 
 
 EWS 2005 DS 2004/05 WS 2004 
Product Quantity 
(kgs) 
Price 
(riels/kg) 
Quantity 
(kgs) 
Price 
(riels/kg) 
Quantity 
(kgs) 
Price 
(riels/kg) 
Paddy sold       
Paddy milled (g)  (h)  (i)  
Paddy 
retained as 
seed 
      
Other       
Total       
       
Milled rice 
retained 
      
Milled rice 
sold 
      
Total 
 equal (g) 
 
equal (h) 
 
equal (i) 
 
 
NOTE: Cross check prices and quantities in this table with Table 2 
 
Do you own a mill:   Yes    No 
 
! If Yes 
 
What is the maximum capacity of your mill (in paddy)? ______kg/hour  (50-3,000kg/hr) 
 
Mill Type:    Fuel    Electricity 
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Horsepower _____________________ (5-300HP) 
Year bought _____________________ 
 
What do you charge for milling? 
 
   
 
! If No  
Do you mill:    in village       
 
What are the costs of milling? 
 
How much rice did you mill     EWS 2005________________ kgs 
      DS 2004/05 _______________kgs 
      WS 2004 _________________kgs 
 
Do you sell the milled rice to:   
 
EWS 2005   collector  in the market  wholesaler 
Please give details  
 
DS 2004/05   collector  in the market  wholesaler 
Please give details  
 
WS 2004    collector  in the market  wholesaler 
Please give details  
 
What costs are involved in selling milled rice (e.g. transport)  
 
 
What price do you receive for your milled rice  EWS 2005_____________riels/kg 
     DS 2004/05 ____________riels/kg 
     WS 2004 ______________riels/kg 
 
How much rice did you sell   EWS 2005________________ kgs 
     DS 2004/05 _______________kgs 
     WS 2004 _________________kgs 
Do you sell the paddy:   
 
EWS 2005   to a collector  directly to mill 
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Please give details  
 
 
 
DS 2004/05   to a collector  directly to mill 
 
Please give details  
 
 
WS 2004    to a collector  directly to mill 
 
Please give details  
 
 
What price do you receive for your paddy?   EWS 2005_____________riels/kg 
      DS 2004/05 ____________riels/kg 
      WS 2004 ______________riels/kg  
 
!    Other  
 
Are there any by-products from the milling process:    Yes   No 
 
! If Yes 
Bran   ___________________________  value ____________________  
Husk   ___________________________  value ____________________ 
 
In general, what mill results do you get from your paddy: 
 
Mill product Percentage % 
Whole rice  
Large brokens  
Medium brokens  
Small brokens  
Bran  
Husks  
Total 100% 
 
Do you find that you receive more whole-rice when milling paddy grown from AQIP seed?    
 Yes   No 
 
Are there any other differences that you notice when milling paddy grown from AQIP seed?  
 
Comments on post-harvest discussion  
 
 
 
5. Associations and Projects 
 
Are you involved in any other projects and if so what?  
 
Have you received any extension training? 
Check adds up to 100% 
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Are you involved in any associations? 
 
Comments on associations and projects discussion  
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CALCULATION TABLES FOR CHECKING RESPONSES 
    Quantity of seed used (kgs) 
    200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 
3 67 60 53 47 40 33 27 20 13 7 
2.5 80 72 64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 
2 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 
1.5 133 120 107 93 80 67 53 40 27 13 
1 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 
0.9 222 200 178 156 133 111 89 67 44 22 
0.8 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 
0.7 286 257 229 200 171 143 114 86 57 29 
0.6 333 300 267 233 200 167 133 100 67 33 
0.5 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 
0.4 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 
0.3 667 600 533 467 400 333 267 200 133 67 
0.2 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 
h
e
c
ta
re
s
 
0.1 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 
 
Aiding Trade 
383 
 
 
    Yield tonnes of paddy produced 
    15 10 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 
3 5.0 3.3 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 
2.5 6.0 4.0 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
2 7.5 5.0 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 
1.5 10.0 6.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.3 
1 15.0 10.0 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 
0.9 16.7 11.1 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.1 0.6 
0.8 18.8 12.5 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.3 0.6 
0.7 21.4 14.3 7.1 6.4 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.6 2.9 2.1 1.4 0.7 
0.6 25.0 16.7 8.3 7.5 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.2 3.3 2.5 1.7 0.8 
0.5 30.0 20.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
0.4 37.5 25.0 12.5 11.3 10.0 8.8 7.5 6.3 5.0 3.8 2.5 1.3 
0.3 50.0 33.3 16.7 15.0 13.3 11.7 10.0 8.3 6.7 5.0 3.3 1.7 
0.2 75.0 50.0 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 
h
e
c
ta
re
s
 
0.1 150.0 100.0 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
  
Appendix 4.7: AQIP Research Project Methods – Trader Survey 
Date:  Interview No:  
Participant Name:  M F Researcher:  
Participant Code:  Age  Value Chain Code: IS 
Village Name:  Verbal Consent Gained:  Y/ N 
Commune:    
District:    
Province:  Prey Veng   
 
Background Information: 
How did you become a trader? 
 
 
How long have you been a trader? 
 
 
Do you only trade or do you also grow rice? 
 
 
Do you trade any other products? 
 
 
Do you also farm? 
 
 
If farmer, how much land do you own: 
 
 
How, much is dedicated to rice? 
 
 
How many crops per year? 
 
 
What seed varieties do you use? 
 
 
 
PADDY BUYING 
Do you trade paddy throughout the year? 
 
 
How many villages do you buy paddy from? 
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 Number of Villages Number of Farmers 
Early wet   
Wet   
Recession   
Dry season   
 
How many villages and farmers do you purchase paddy off that grow AQIP rice varieties? 
 
AQIP varieties Villages Farmers 
AQIP dry   
AQIP wet   
 
Do you separate AQIP seed and non-AQIP seed and why or why not? Yes/ No 
 
How much rice did you purchase in total last year? 
Variety 
 
 Qty (kg/year) 
 
Price paid  
 
Early wet (total)   
Mixed variety   
Local/ traditional   
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Wet season (total)   
Mixed variety   
Local/ traditional   
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Dry season (total)   
Mixed variety   
Local traditional   
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Total   
 
How do you assess quality? 
 
Do you pay a premium according to quality? 
 
 
If so how much? 
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Do you pay a premium according to variety? 
 
 
If so how much and for which varieties? 
 
 
Do you buy on credit? 
 
 
Do you store any paddy? 
 
 
How do you store rice?  
 
 
How much paddy and milled rice did you loose in storage last year? 
 
 
 
Product Loss (kgs) 
Paddy  
Milled rice  
 
Rank your top three causes of paddy and milled rice loss for the last year (Tick 3 only) 
 
Reason for loss Rank paddy losses Rank milled rice losses 
Milling losses (technical losses)   
Yellow kernels   
Fungus and mould   
Insect damage   
Rats and mice   
Other   
 
PACKAGING 
How do you package the rice paddy? 
 
What is the cost of packaging? 
 
 
LABOUR 
Do you hire additional labour? 
 
How many people per day in what seasons? 
 
How much do you pay? 
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TRANSPORTATION 
How do you transport the rice paddy? 
 
How much does it cost to transport the paddy per tonne? 
 
Do you own your own transportation? 
 
If not who do you hire to transport the rice and how much does it cost to transport the rice X kilometres? 
 
 
MARKET ACCESS 
Distance to commercial miller sold to? 
 
Distance to Open Paddy Market? 
 
Distance to local market 
 
Conditions of road 
 
 
TRADE LINKAGES 
Who do you sell to? 
 
Do buyers pay a premium according to quality or type? 
 
Do you always sell to the same miller or trader and if so why? 
 
 
Type of customer No. of customers Variety demanded Quantity sold Price  
Vietnamese trader     
Commercial miller     
Exporter     
Other     
 
Do you sell any milled rice? 
 
Type of customer No. of customers Variety demanded Quantity sold Price  
Villager/ 
household 
    
Local trader     
Vietnamese 
trader 
    
Exporter     
Restaurant/ 
retailer 
    
Wholesaler 
provincial town 
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Wholesaler 
Phnom Penh 
    
Other     
 
 
Did you sell any bran last year? 
Type of customer No.  of customers Quantity sold Price  
Villager/ household    
Local trader    
Pig/chicken/duck/fish 
farmers  
   
Wholesaler provincial 
town 
   
Wholesaler Phnom 
Penh 
   
Exporter    
Other    
 
Did you provide any farmers with crop production inputs last year? Yes/ No 
 
If yes, what type of inputs and how many farmers did you supply? 
 
 
Input supplied No. of farmers Total quantity supplied 
Seed  kg 
Fertiliser  Kg 
Credit  $ 
Training  days 
Other   
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Appendix 4.8: AQIP Research Project  – Miller Survey 
 
 
Date:  Interview no:  
Owner/participant name:  M F Researcher:  
Date of birth:  Value chain code: IS 
Mill enterprise name:  Participant code: CM 
Building number  Verbal consent gained:  Y/ N 
Village name:    
Commune:    
District:    
Province:  Prey Veng   
Comments:  
 
1. General Information: 
 
How did you become a commercial miller:  
 
How long have you been a commercial miller:  _____________________ years 
 
3 Do you do anything else besides milling? (Tick if applicable) 
 
Activity Tick if applicable 
Farming  
Livestock raising  
Alcohol production  
Noodle making  
Other___________  
Other___________  
 
! If farmer: 
 
How much land do you own:  _____________________ha 
How, much is dedicated to rice:  __________________ ha 
How many crops per year:    " WS  " EWS  " DS  " ________________ 
 
What seed varieties do you use:   WS _____________________________________ 
    EWS ____________________________________ 
    DS ______________________________________ 
    RC______________________________________ 
 
 
3 f Have you ever used any seed bought from AQIP?  (please circle)  YES / NO 
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3 g If yes, which AQIP seed varieties did you buy? (Please circle) 
 
IR66   Sen Pidour   Phcar Roumdoul   
 
Other: 
 
 
 
INPUTS 
 
4. What was the price of your mill when you first bought it? $ 
 
5. What is the maximum milling capacity of your mill in kilograms of paddy milled per hour? kg/ hour 
 
6. How old is your mill?______________ years 
 
7. How would you rate the overall condition of your mill? (please circle) 
 
poor   medium   high 
 
8. How many people including yourself run the mill?__ _persons 
 
8 a Are any of these people paid? (please circle) YES / NO 
 
8 b If yes, how many people are paid?______ _persons 
 
8 c How much do you pay these people?______ _$/hour 
 
9. What were your main operating costs last year? 
 
Cost category Amount spent ($/year) 
Diesel  
Lubricating oil  
Labour  
Bags and packing  
Transportation  
Administration  
Taxes and fees paid to government  
Interest on loans  
Maintenance and repairs  
Other expenses  
 
10. Do you require credit to operate your business? (please circle)  YES / NO 
 
10 a If yes, what type of credit do you require? 
 
Type of credit Total amount required 
Short term (less than one year)  
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Long term (longer than one year)  
 
10 b What are the main purposes for which you require the credit? 
 
Purpose Tick if relevant 
To purchase paddy  
To purchase or upgrade mill equipment  
To repay loans  
To provide credit to farmers  
Other  
 
Did you receive any fee for service milling (milling done for someone else last year?) Yes/ No 
 
If yes, how many customers? 
 
Average price charged per tonne?  
 
 
Did you mill rice for any farmers that grew AQIP seed?   
 
 
If yes, how many? 
 
Number of Traditional Seed Farmers  
 
 
Did you provide any farmers with crop production inputs last year? Yes/ No 
 
If yes, what type of inputs and how many farmers did you supply? 
 
Input supplied No. of farmers Total quantity supplied 
Seed  kg 
Fertiliser  Kg 
Credit  $ 
Training  days 
Other   
 
Outputs 
 
2. Paddy Milled Last Year: 
 Quantity milled (t/year) Quantity milled (% of total) 
Paddy purchased by mill for milling   
Paddy milled on contract   
Paddy produced from own farm   
Total   100% 
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3. Paddy Suppliers: 
Suppliers AQIP Seed Non-AQIP Total 
Local Trader    
Contractors (Fee for 
Service) 
   
Other    
 
4. Trader Locations and Relationships: 
Trader 1 : ___________________________  Relationship:  " Friend " Family " Other  
 
Trader 2 : ___________________________  Relationship: " Friend " Family " Other  
 
Trader 3 : ___________________________  Relationship:  " Friend " Family " Other 
 
Trader 4 : ___________________________  Relationship:  " Friend " Family " Other 
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5. What varieties of paddy did you purchase last year: 
Variety Quantity purchases (t/y) Average price paid ($/t) 
Early wet (total)   
Mixed variety   
Local/traditional   
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Wet season total   
Mixed variety   
Local/traditional   
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Recession total   
Mixed variety   
Local/traditional    
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Dry season total   
Mixed variety   
Local traditional   
Improved   
AQIP traditional   
AQIP improved   
Total   
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6. Milling rates: 
Variety % Head rice 
% Large 
broken 
% Medium 
broken 
% Small 
broken 
% Bran % Husk 100% 
Early wet (total) XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 100 
Mixed variety        
Local/traditional        
Improved        
AQIP traditional        
AQIP improved        
Wet season total        
Mixed variety        
Local/traditional        
Improved        
AQIP traditional        
AQIP improved        
Recession total        
Mixed variety        
Local/traditional         
Improved        
AQIP traditional        
AQIP improved        
Dry season total        
Mixed variety        
Local traditional        
Improved        
AQIP traditional        
AQIP improved        
Total        
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7. Milled rice sales last year: 
Customer 
No. of 
customers 
Quantity 
Variety 
preferred/ 
demanded 
Quality grade? Average price 
Wholesaler 
(Phnom Penh) 
     
Wholesaler 
local provincial 
town 
     
Wholesaler 
other provincial 
town 
     
Retailer or 
restaurant 
     
Factory       
Cross-border 
trader 
     
Formal exporter      
Household      
 
Do you also sell milled rice not from the Province? I.e. from Battambang    
" No    " Yes __________________________________________________________  
 
8. Broken rice sales last year: 
Customer 
No. of 
customers 
Quantity 
Variety 
preferred/ 
demanded 
Quality grade? Average price 
Wholesaler 
(Phnom Penh) 
     
Wholesaler local 
provincial town 
     
Wholesaler 
other provincial 
town 
     
Retailer or 
restaurant 
 
     
Factory       
Cross-border 
trader 
     
Formal exporter      
Household      
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9. Paddy sales last year: 
Customer 
No of. 
customers 
Quantity 
Variety 
preferred/ 
demanded 
Quality grade? Average price 
Wholesaler (Phnom 
Penh) 
     
Wholesaler local 
provincial town 
     
Wholesaler other 
provincial town 
     
Factory       
Cross-border trader      
Formal exporter      
Household      
 
 
10. Bran sales last year: 
Customer No. of customers Quantity Average price 
Wholesaler (Phnom Penh)    
Wholesaler local Provincial 
town 
   
Wholesaler other provincial 
town 
   
Factory     
Cross-border trader    
Formal exporter    
Household/chicken/duck/fish 
farmers 
   
 
11. Husk sales last year: 
Customer No. of customers 
Quantity 
(per jute bag) 
Variety preferred/ 
demanded 
Quality grade? Average price 
Wholesaler 
(Phnom Penh) 
     
Wholesaler local 
provincial town 
     
Wholesaler other 
provincial town 
     
Factory       
Cross-border 
trader 
     
Formal exporter      
Household/ 
farmer 
     
 
 
12. Taxes: 
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Proportion of revenue? (not sure here) 
 
 
Formal Taxes:  
 
Informal Taxes:  
 
If transportation owned, transport taxes:  
 
 
13. Packaging and Prices: 
 
For Paddy: details  
  Price ________________________ Riels / $USD per tonne / bag / _________ 
 
For Milled Rice: details 
  Price ________________________ Riels / $USD per tonne / bag / _________ 
 
For Bran:  details  
  Price ________________________ Riels / $USD per tonne / bag / _________ 
 
For Husk: details  
  Price ________________________ Riels / $USD per tonne / bag / _________ 
 
14. Quality Perceptions: 
 
How do you perceive the milling qualities of AQIP rice as opposed to improved rice seed paddy and traditional rice 
seed paddy?  
 
 
What impact has this had on your business?  
 
 
What benefits do you believe there is for milling pure improved paddy?  
 
 
Why do you not mill (or only mill small amounts of) pure paddy lines?  
 
 
15. Value Chain Perceptions 
 
Constraints in the value chain:   
 
 
Export constraints FOB price Phnom Penh:  
 
 
Government policies that affect the business:  
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Competitors Total Number:   
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Appendices Chapter Five 
Appendix 5.1: Gourmet Magazine  
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Appendix 5.1: Village Identification Questions 
1. Village Identification Questions for Village Chiefs 
 
Village Name: 
Number of Years Established:  
Total land: 
Number of Households 
Commune: 
Total population: 
Organic Status:  
Total Landless Households 
Smallest Landholding Size 
No. Households  
Average Landholding # 
No. Households  
 
Largest Landholding # 
No. Households  
 
 
 
CROPS TRANSPLANT/ BROADCAST 
No. Crops Per Year  
EWS 
WS 
DS 
 
EWS 
WS 
DS 
 
WET SEASON RICE  
Wet Season Average Yield: 
Wet Season Number of Farmers: 
Wet Season Varieties: 
 
Wet Season Number of Crops 
Wet Season Number of Organic Farmers 
 
EARLY WET SEASON (EWS) RICE (IRRIGATED OR FLOOD RECESSION) 
EWS Average Yield: 
EWS No. Organic Farmers: 
EWS Varieties: 
EWS No. Farmers: 
EWS Broadcast or Transplant: 
 
DRY SEASON (DS) RICE (IRRIGATED) 
DS Average Yield: 
DS No. of Farmers AQIP: 
 
DS No. of Farmers: 
DS Broadcast or Transplant 
 
Soil and Irrigation  
Overall Soil Fertility: 
Poor 
Medium 
Good 
No. Households  
Poor  
Medium  
Good 
    
No. and Type of Irrigation: 
Total Land Area Under Irrigation 
No. Households w/ Access to Irrigation 
 
MECHANISATION 
No. Tractors in Village 
No. Mechanical Threshers 
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No. Mechanical Water Pumps 
 
MARKETING 
Distance Large Market kms 
Distance Small Market kms 
Road Access to Village 
No. Households Not Able to Sell Paddy 
 
No. In-Village Traders 
No. External Traders 
No. Village Millers 
No. Commercial Millers 
OTHER FARM ACTIVITIES  
Livestock No. Households 
Fruit and Vegetables No. Households 
 
Other_____________ No. Households 
Other_____________ No. Households 
Other_____________ No. Households 
OTHER NON-FARM INCOME ACTIVITIES  
Other Non-Farm Activities List: 
Total No. Migrant Workers 
 
 
FERTILISER & PESTICIDE USE  
No. Households Use Chemical Pesticides or 
Fertilisers 
Average Fertiliser Use Per Hectare 
Average Pesticide Use Per Hectare 
 
No. Households Experience Serious Health Conditions 
No. Households Experience Crop Failure 
 
OTHER DEVELOPMENT  
Other Projects Operating in Village  
FOR ORGANIC VILLAGES ONLY  
No. Organic Households 
Total land under organic production 
Agreement for involvement in further 
research? 
 
Other Notes 
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Appendix 5.2: Farmer Surveys  
Date:  Interview No:  
Interviewee name:  Researcher:  
Date of birth:  M F Village type: Organic Non-Org 
Number in 
household: 
 Farmer type: T0 T2 T1 Non 
Average yearly 
income: 
 Year village established  
Village name:  No. years @ address  
Commune:  Electricity Y / N 
District:  Access to clean water Y / N 
Province:   TV /Radio/Telephone  
Observations:  
Condition of house:   
Proximity to main road: 
Proximity to school 
 
Comments: 
 
 
PART A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Please list the members of your household, age and occupation: 
 
Family member Age Sex Occupation 
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
6.    
7.    
8.    
9.    
10.    
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PART B: HOUSEHOLD INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES 
 
Land 
What is the total amount of land that you own and/or rent?_________________________ha 
 
Soil quality  Ha Own/ 
rent 
No. Years  
owned/rent P M G 
Irrigated 
(!) 
Inherit 
(!) 
Buy 
riel 
Cleared 
(!) 
Household 
land 
            
Rice land             
Plantation 
land 
            
Vegetable 
land 
            
Other:             
Total             
 
If land is rented please give the total cost? 
 
 
Please give detail as to your household’s income generating activities: 
 
 
Livestock 
 (!) No. 
Owned 
Acquired 
From 
Cost 
Price 
Consume 
 
Sell 
 
Price R Estimate
d yearly 
income 
Cows         
Pigs         
Chickens         
Ducks         
Fish         
Other:_____         
 
Fruit/ plantation  
 (!) Total ha Total 
tonnes 
Consume 
kgs 
Sell 
kgs 
Price R/kg 
 
Estimated 
yearly 
income 
Oranges        
Mangos        
Coconut        
Banana        
Sugar Cane        
Sesame        
Peanut        
Other:____        
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Other:____        
 
Vegetable growing (large and small) 
 (!) Total ha Total 
tonnes 
Consume 
kgs 
 
Sell kgs Price R/kg Estimated 
yearly 
income 
Cucumber        
Pumpkin        
Tomatoes        
Potatoes        
Eggplant        
Watermelon        
Onions        
Spring onions        
Leafy greens        
Other:________        
Other:_________        
 
Agricultural labour 
 (!) Total no. days Estimated yearly income 
Part-time    
Full-time    
 
Off-farm labour 
 (!) FT/ PT Estimated yearly 
income 
Remittance/ year 
Garment      
Construction     
Taxi     
Road. worker     
Government     
Police     
Thailand     
Thai border     
Other:________     
Other:________     
 
Other  
 (!) FT/ PT Estimated yearly 
income 
Remittance 
Paddy trading     
Store owner     
Rice milling     
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Rice wine      
Gather from jungle     
Other:________     
 
ASSETS 
 
Do you own any of the following?   YES !  NO ! 
 
And if YES, do you hire these to other people? 
 
Asset (!) Age Cost of 
asset 
Rental unit Total hire 
units /year 
Est. yearly 
income 
Rice mill       
Tractor       
Thresher       
Water pump       
Motorcycle       
Truck       
Horse & cart       
Ox/buffalo & plough       
Other:__________       
 
If NO, do you hire any of these from other people? 
 
Asset (!) Rental unit Total hire no. 
days/year 
Total cost /year 
Rice mill     
Tractor     
Thresher     
Water pump     
Motorcycle     
Truck     
Horse & cart     
Ox/buffalo & plough     
Other:________     
Other:________     
 
 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT 
Do you currently owe anyone money?  YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, who do you owe money to? 
Person Amount Owed Interest /month % Purpose for loan 
Local money 
lender 
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MILLED RICE PURCHASES 
 
In the past year did your household purchase any milled rice? YES ! NO ! 
 
If YES who did you purchase from? In-Village ! External Trader ! Local Market ! 
 
Other:_______________!  
 
If NO, did you borrow any milled rice or paddy?   YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, who did you borrow milled rice from?  Family ! Friend ! Other________! 
 
Please give details on milled rice borrowed or bought: 
 
Month Variety Buy 
! 
Borrow 
! 
Milled 
! 
Paddy 
! 
Qty R/kg  Price 
R/kg 
Jan        
Feb        
March        
April        
May        
June        
July        
August        
September        
October        
November        
December        
 
INPUTS 
How many crops of rice do you NORMALLY grow a year ? 
How many separate plots of rice land do you own or rent? 
Family member    
Friend    
Bank    
Credit 
association 
   
Other:______    
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Please detail the total number of rice land plots owned and cultivated 
 
Season Status 
 
Fertiliser Own/ 
rent $ 
Soil quality  Ha 
O R P M G 
EW
S 
WS
1 
WS
2 
DS 
Kms from 
House 
Variety Seed 
kg/ha 
Org Non 
Pesticide Total 
yield 
T0 T2 T1 Non De 
facto 
Plot 
1 
 
                      
Plot 
2 
 
                      
Plot 
3 
 
                      
Plot 
4 
 
                      
Plot 
5 
 
                      
Plot 
6 
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SEED 
 
Did you purchase any seed in the last year?  YES !  NO !  
 
If YES, who did you purchase the seed from? 
 
Why did you purchase seed?  
 
 
 Variety Amount Cost/kg Total 
EWS  
 
   
WS  
 
   
WS2  
 
   
DS  
 
   
Total     
 
 
If NO, were you given any seed?   YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, who gave you the seed?  
 
Exchange !  Government !  Aid !   Other:______! 
 
How many years have you retained your other seed? 
 
Variety1:___________Yrs___ Variety 2:___________Yrs___  
 
Variety 3:__________Yrs___  Variety 4:___________Yrs___  
 
 
How much seed do you store?_______________________kgs 
 
How do you store seed? (please circle) 
 
In the house  Silo  Under the house  in plastic bag  
 
in rice bag  Other 
 
How much seed do you typically loose in storage?_____________________kgs 
 
LABOUR SPENDING 
Please detail labour spending on your rice crop 
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EWS Total number 
of days 
Household 
labour 
no. people 
Exchanged 
labour no. 
people 
Hired labour/ 
equipment 
no. days 
Hire cost per 
day 
Total 
Ploughing       
Sowing       
Broadcasting       
Transplanting       
Weeding       
Watering       
Fertilising       
Apply Pest       
Weeding        
Harvesting       
Transporting       
Hand threshing       
Drying       
Total        
 
WS 1 Total 
number of 
days 
Household 
labour 
no. people 
Exchanged labour 
no. people 
Hired labour/ 
equipment no. 
days 
Hire cost per 
day 
Total 
Ploughing       
Sowing       
Broadcasting       
Transplanting       
Weeding       
Watering       
Fertilising       
Apply Pest       
Weeding        
Harvesting       
Transporting       
Hand threshing       
Drying       
Total        
 
WS 2 Total number 
of days 
Household 
labour 
no. people 
Exchanged 
labour no. 
people 
Hired labour/ 
equipment 
no. days 
Hire cost per 
day 
Total 
Ploughing       
Sowing       
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Broadcasting       
Transplanting       
Weeding       
Watering       
Fertilising       
Apply pesticide       
Weeding        
Harvesting       
Transporting       
Hand threshing       
Drying       
Total        
 
 
DS Total number 
of days 
Household 
labour 
no. people 
Exchanged 
labour no. 
people 
Hired labour/ 
equipment 
no. days 
Hire cost per 
day 
Total 
Ploughing       
Sowing       
Broadcasting       
Transplanting       
Weeding       
Watering       
Fertilising       
Apply pesticide       
Weeding        
Harvesting       
Transporting       
Hand threshing       
Drying       
Total        
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IRRIGATION 
 
Do you have access to irrigation?   YES !   NO ! 
 
If YES, please circle: 
 
River  Lake  Canal  Dam  Tropeang   
 
Well  Other:_________________ 
 
How long have you had access to irrigation?__________________________years 
 
Does this irrigation provide enough water? YES !  NO ! 
 
Was the irrigation provided by any of the following?   
 
! Government  ! Water User Group  ! Aid   ! Other  
 
Do you pay to have access to irrigation?  YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, what is the total cost? 
 
FERTILISER 
 
 Type Home 
produced ! 
Bought ! Qty Cost/kg 
Chemical      
Type 1.      
Type 2.       
Type 3.       
Type 4.       
Organic      
Type 1.      
Type 2.      
Type 3.       
 
Have you or any members of your household been sick from using chemical fertilisers?  
 
YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, please explain 
_ 
 
Have you experienced crop failure as a result of using bad quality fertiliser?  
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YES !  NO! 
 
If YES, please give details 
 
 
PESTICIDE 
 
 Type Home 
produced ! 
Bought ! Qty Cost/kg 
Chemical      
Type 1.      
Type 2.       
Type 3.       
Type 4.       
Organic      
Type 1.      
Type 2.      
Type 3.       
 
Have you or any members of your household been sick from using chemical pesticides?  
 
YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, please explain 
 
Have you experienced crop failure as a result of using bad quality pesticide?   
 
YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, please give details 
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HERBICIDE 
 
 Type Home 
Produced ! 
Bought ! Qty Cost/kg 
Chemical      
Type 1.      
Type 2.       
Type 3.       
Type 4.       
 
 
Have you or any members of your household been sick from using herbicide pesticides?  
 
YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, please explain 
 
 
Have you experienced crop failure as a result of using bad quality herbicide?   
 
YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, please give details 
 
 
 
DRYING 
 
How do you dry your paddy? Please circle 
 
On the road  On woven mats  On plastic  On dirt ground 
 
 
STORAGE 
 
How much paddy do you store?_______________________tonnes 
How long do you store paddy for?_____________________months 
 
How do you store your paddy? 
 
In the house  Silo  Under the house  in plastic bag  
  
in rice bag  Other 
 
How much rice do you estimate that you loose per year in storage? 
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OTHER COSTS 
 
How many rice bags do you buy per year? 
How much is one bag?_______________________________________________R/bag 
 
 
TRAINING/ AID 
 
Do you receive any support from any aid organizations?  YES !  NO ! 
 
Please circle 
 
Microcredit  Livestock  Irrigation  Health   
 
Food Security  Agricultural Training/ Inputs    Other:________ 
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
Have you received any agricultural training from aid projects? YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES please state what type of training?  
 
 
 
Total number of training days attended_________________________________days 
 
Do you receive any other agricultural inputs or support from aid projects?   
 
 YES !  NO ! 
 
Please list:   
1._______________________________________________________ 
  2._______________________________________________________ 
  3._______________________________________________________ 
  4._______________________________________________________ 
  
In your opinion has the training and inputs provided been beneficial to you and your families income? 
 
 
 
If YES, how much do you estimate it has increased your income by?____________________R/years 
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OUPUT 
Please detail total paddy output and what it was used for? 
 
EWS 
Variety (!)  
Early Med Late 
Qty Price/kg 
Consumption      
Used for other product production      
Feed to animals      
Retain seed      
Internal village trader      
External village trader      
CCRD      
Commercial miller      
Exchanged for goods      
Exchanged for credit      
Given to wat       
Given to friends/ family      
Other      
Total      
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WS 1 
Variety (!)  
Early Med Late 
Qty Price/kg 
Consumption      
Used for other product production      
Feed to animals      
Retain seed      
Internal village trader      
External village trader      
CCRD      
Commercial miller      
Exchanged for goods      
Exchanged for credit      
Given to wat       
Given to friends/ family      
Other      
Total      
 
WS2 
Variety (!)  
Early Med Late 
Qty Price/kg 
Consumption      
Used for other product production      
Feed to animals      
Retain seed      
Internal village trader      
External village trader      
CCRD      
Commercial miller      
Exchanged for goods      
Exchanged for credit      
Given to wat       
Given to friends/ family      
Other      
Total      
 
 
 
Aiding Trade 
                417 
DS 2005 
Variety (!)  
Early Med Late 
Qty Price/kg 
Consumption      
Used for other product production      
Feed to animals      
Retain seed      
Internal village trader      
External village trader      
CCRD      
Commercial miller      
Exchanged for goods      
Exchanged for credit      
Given to wat       
Given to friends/ family      
Other      
Total      
 
PERCEPTIONS FOR ORGANIC FARMERS ONLY 
 
What is your opinion of organic rice production?  
 
 
What do you think are the benefits and problems with organic rice production?  
 
 
What do you think are the two biggest advantages of growing organically?  
1.  
2.  
 
What do you think are the two biggest disadvantages of growing organically?  
1.  
2.   
 
How did you hear about organic rice growing methods? 
 
  Other farmer  Radio   Television   Newspaper   Other 
 
Why do other people in the village not grow organic rice?  
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PERCEPTIONS FOR NON-ORGANIC VILLAGES 
 
What is your opinion of organic rice production?  
 
 
 
What do you think are the two biggest advantages of using chemicals?  
1.  
2.  
 
What do you think are the two biggest disadvantages of using chemicals?  
1.  
2.   
 
Would you ever consider growing organic rice in the future   YES !  NO ! 
 
Why or why not 
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Appendix 5.3: Trader Survey 
 
Date:  Interview No:  
Interviewee Name:  Researcher:  
Date of Birth:  M F Village Type:  
Number in Family:  Farmer Type:  
Average Yearly Income:  Year Village Est  
Village Name:  No. Years @ Address  
Commune:  Electricity Y / N 
District:  Access to Clean Water Y / N 
Province:   TV / Radio / Telephone  
Observations:  
Condition of house:   
Proximity to main road: 
Proximity to school 
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
PART A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
How did you become a trader?  
 
 
How long have you been a trader? ________________________________years 
 
Please list the members of your household, age and occupation: 
 
Family Member Age Sex Occupation 
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
6.    
7.    
8.    
 
PART B: HOUSEHOLD INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES 
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Land 
What is the total amount of land that you own and/or rent?____________________ha 
 
 Ha Own/Ren
t 
No. Yrs 
Owned/ 
Rent 
Soil 
Quality 
Irrigated 
(!) 
Inherited 
(!) 
Bought $ Cleared 
(!) 
Household Land         
Rice Land         
Plantation Land         
Vegetable Land         
Other:______         
 
If you are a rice farmer, please give the following detail. 
 
 Ha Variety Bought/ 
Retained 
Irrigated Soil Quality Organic ! Yield 
EWS 
 
 
       
WS1 
 
 
       
WS2 
 
 
       
DS 
 
 
       
Total         
 
Please give detail as to your household’s other income generating activities: 
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Livestock 
 
 (!) No. Owned Acquired From Estimated Yearly 
Income 
Cows     
Pigs     
Chickens     
Ducks     
Fish     
Other:_____     
 
Fruit/ Plantation 
 
 (!) Ha. Owned Ha. Hired Estimated Yearly 
Income 
Oranges     
Mangos     
Coconut     
Banana     
Sugar Cane     
Sesame     
Peanut     
Other:____     
Other:____     
Other:_____     
Other:_____     
 
Vegetable Growing 
 
 (!) Total Ha Consume/ Sell R/kg Estimated Yearly 
Income 
Cucumber     
Pumpkin     
Tomatoes     
Potatoes     
Eggplant     
Watermelon     
Onions     
Spring onions     
Leafy greens     
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Other:________     
Other:_________     
 
On-Farm Labour 
 
 (!) Total No Days Estimated Yearly Income 
Casual    
Full-time    
 
Off-Farm Labour 
 
 (!) FT/ PT Estimated Yearly 
Income 
Remittance 
Garment      
Construction     
Taxi     
Road. Worker     
Government     
Police     
Thailand     
Thai Border     
Other:________     
Other:________     
 
Other  
 
 (!) FT/ PT Estimated Yearly 
Income 
Remittance 
Paddy Trading     
Store Owner     
Rice Milling     
Rice Wine      
Gather from Jungle     
Other:________     
 
ASSETS 
 
Do you own any of the following?   YES !  NO ! 
 
And if YES, do you hire these to other people? 
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Asset (!) Age Cost of Asset Rental Price/ 
Day 
Total Hire No. 
Days/ Year 
Est. Yearly 
Income 
Rice Mill       
Tractor       
Thresher       
Water Pump       
Motorcycle       
Truck       
Horse & Cart       
Ox/ Buffalo & plough       
Other:__________       
Other:__________       
 
If NO, do you hire any of these from other people? 
 
Asset (!) Rental Price/ Day Total Hire No. Days/ 
Year 
Total Cost / Year 
Rice Mill     
Tractor     
Thresher     
Water Pump     
Motorcycle     
Truck     
Horse & Cart     
Ox/ Buffalo & Plough     
Other:________     
Other:________     
 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT 
 
Do you currently owe anyone money?  YES !  NO ! 
 
If YES, who do you owe money to? 
 
Person Amount Owed Interest /month Purpose for loan 
Local Money 
Lender 
   
Family Member    
Friend    
Bank    
Credit 
Association 
   
Other:______    
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Does anyone currently owe you money or paddy? YES ! NO ! 
 
If YES, who? 
 
TRADING 
What total number of villages and household do you usually source the paddy from? 
Number of villages Number of farmers  
Organic Non-Organic Organic Non-Organic 
Early wet     
Wet     
Dry season     
 
How much PADDY did you purchase in total last year? 
Variety 
 
  
Non-Org 
T1 
 
T2 
 
T3 
 
 
Qty 
Price 
bought  
 
Price 
sold 
Early wet total        
Mixed variety        
Traditional        
IR66/ Sen Pidal        
Wet season total        
Mixed variety        
Local/ traditional        
Improved        
Dry season total        
Mixed variety        
Local traditional        
Improved        
Total        
 
Person No. People Total Amount Owed Interest / Month Purpose for loan 
Family Member     
Friend     
Other:______     
Other: 
____________ 
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QUALITY 
How do you assess quality? (tick if applicable) 
 
Biting !  Colour !  Size !   Moisture Meter ! 
 
Do you pay a premium according to quality?  YES ! NO ! 
If YES, how much do you pay?____________________________________? 
BUYING ARRANGEMENTS 
Do you buy paddy on credit?  YES ! NO ! 
If YES, how many farmers do you buy on credit from?_________________________ 
What is the smallest amount that you can buy on credit?_______________________ 
What is the largest amount that you can buy directly for cash?___________________ 
 
STORAGE 
Do you store any paddy? YES ! NO ! 
If YES, how much paddy do you store at any one time?__________________ 
How do you store paddy? Please circle 
 
In the house  Silo  Under the house  in plastic bag  
 
in rice bag  Other 
 
How much paddy do you typically loose in storage per year?_____________kgs 
 
Do you store any milled rice?  YES ! NO ! 
If YES, how much milled rice do you store at any one time? 
How do you store milled rice?  
 
In the house  Silo  Under the house  in plastic bag  
 
in rice bag  Other 
 
How much paddy and milled rice did you loose in storage last year?____________kgs 
 
PACKAGING  
How do you package the paddy? Plastic Bags  Rice Bags 
What is the cost of packaging per bag?_____________________________________R 
 
LABOUR 
Do you hire additional labour? YES ! NO ! 
If YES, please detail 
 
 Total No. Days Total No. People Cost/ Day Total  
EWS     
WS     
DS     
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TRANSPORTATION 
Do you transport paddy yourself?  YES ! NO ! 
If YES, how do you transport the paddy? 
 
 Capacity Own Hire cost Distance Fuel/ trip Cost/tonne 
Moto       
Ramok       
Horse & cart       
Tractor       
Truck       
Other:       
 
 If NO, then please explain how paddy is transported?  
 
 
 
TRADE LINKAGES 
Who did you sell paddy to last year? 
 
Type of customer No. 
Customers 
Variety  Organic 
! 
Distance Quantity 
sold 
Price  
Local trader       
Phnom Penh trader       
Vietnamese trader       
Village miller       
Commercial miller       
Exporter       
Other       
 
Do any of these buyers pay a premium according to quality or type?  YES !  NO ! 
If YES, how much do they pay?_ 
 
Do you always sell to the same people? YES !  NO ! 
Why or why not? 
Did you sell any milled rice last ? YES !  NO ! 
If YES, please detail 
 
Type of customer No. of 
customers 
Variety Organic ! Quantity sold Price  
Villager/household      
Local trader      
Vietnamese trader      
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Exporter      
Restaurant/retailer      
Wholesaler provincial 
town 
     
Wholesaler Phnom 
Penh 
     
Other      
 
Did you sell any bran last year? YES !  NO ! 
If, YES please detail 
 
Type of customer No. of customers Quantity sold Price  
Villager/household    
Local trader    
Pig/chicken/duck/fish 
farmers  
   
Wholesaler provincial town    
Wholesaler Phnom Penh    
Exporter    
Other    
 
Did you sell any husk last year? YES !  NO ! 
If, YES please detail 
 
Type of customer No. of customers Quantity sold Price  
Villager/household    
Local trader    
Pig/chicken/duck/fish 
farmers  
   
Wholesaler provincial town    
Wholesaler Phnom Penh    
Other:    
Other:    
 
 
Do you sell anything else aside from rice products?  YES ! NO ! 
If YES, please detail 
 
 No. of customer Quantity sold Price 
Household 
goods 
   
Rice wine    
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Other:    
Other:    
Other:    
 
TAX 
 
Did you pay tax on any of your business activities last year? YES ! NO ! 
If YES, please detail 
 
 Product/ Activity Total cost 
Formal tax   
Informal tax   
 
 
PROBLEMS 
 
What are the main problems you have in trading paddy? 
 
 
What are the main problems you have in selling other products? 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 5.4: Organic Rice Sector SWOT Analysis 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Large and productive arable land with low population 
density (72 inhabitants per square km) 
Market access (i.e. China and other GSP granting 
countries) 
Entrepreneurial business sector driving the movement 
towards value-addition and retention 
Extensive under-utilized capacity to add value (i.e. 
organic rice) 
Making conversion to organic farming for export market 
relatively more profitable than conventional method of 
farming 
Specialised varieties, e.g. Neang Malis 
Inadequate farming experience, improper handling of 
crops, branding practices 
No commercial incentives to improve quality for 
domestic market (i.e. organic rice sector) 
Lack of property right 
Grossly inadequate enforcement of legislation and 
regulations 
Remoteness and poor transportation infrastructure 
Lack of inter-industry/ sector linkages and few facilities 
and/or silo, and policy impediments to backward and/or 
forward linkage development 
Urgent need to develop and rehabilitate/ modernise 
irrigation systems  
Inadequate, cumbersome and expensive credit facilities 
(limited intermediate-, short-, and long-term facilities) 
Extensive smuggling unto Vietnam and Thailand 
No FDI lead investors in the organic rice 
Low levels of human resource development and low 
skill base resulting in low productivity and higher than 
necessary costs 
Poor market information 
Lack of clarity regarding leadership and coordination 
(within the public/private/donors) within the sector 
Minimal and largely unexploited value addition and 
retention 
Rampant official and unofficial transactions costs, 
whether for export processed goods or import of inputs 
High costs of utilities, e.g. electricity    
Opportunities  Threats 
Renewed government commitment to support 
development of agriculture sector through enforcement 
of laws on land concession and personal property 
rights and upgrading of rural extension services 
Organic agriculture and agro-processing under 
Government consideration to become “lead” industry 
for export market (i.e. organic rice to EU, EU’s EBA, 
China early harvest, etc)  
Government priority to strengthen trade facilitation 
system is underway  
Domestic production of seed provides new value 
retention and development of organic rice to meet 
increases [sic] export market demands 
Environmental / health concerns stimulating worldwide 
demand for organic products from all corner [sic] of the 
globe 
Absence of solidarity among the major private sector 
players in the sector  
Performance of competitor countries in conventional 
agriculture (i.e. Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, etc.) 
Lack of financial rewards to peasants likely to 
undermine move to upgrade quality of products for 
domestic consumption and export 
Indifferent policing of existing laws and regulations 
undermines drive towards value addition and retention  
Unwillingness of FDI to enter the agriculture sector 
Extremely poor business environment due to corruption 
and myriad of formal and informal costs of doing 
business and transaction costs. Results in negative 
impact and undermine [sic] FDI prospects, particularly 
in light of limitations on domestic commercial 
opportunities due to small local market  
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Synergy among international aid agencies to assist 
development of rural private sector (i.e. World Bank, 
EU, ITC, AQIP, GTZ, AFD, CIRAD, etc) 
Joint public-private sector initiative to establish and 
develop an exchange markets [sic] along the major 
border trading posts  
Open access to foreign markets, reinforced by 
membership such as WTO, ASEAN, AISP and “EU 
Everything But Arms” 
Potential to enhance the productivity of the rural labour 
force through training and better human resource [sic] 
Buyer agent offer below market price due to 
government lack of policy initiative    
Source: Ministry of Commerce, 2005: 64-65 
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Appendix 5.5: Administrative and Market Barriers to Competitiveness  
 Critical issues Impact 
Business environment High import clearance charges 
Lack of regulatory enforcement 
Poor access to finance 
High export clearance 
Lack of certification 
 
High cost of fertiliser 
Large unofficial outflow of paddy to 
Vietnam and Thailand 
High production costs, low yields, 
poor quality or inadequate use of 
agricultural inputs reduces the 
competitiveness of organic rice 
Investment in expanding milling 
capacity are discouraged 
Supply chain Lack of investment in commercial 
milling capacity  
Absence of business and technical 
support structure  
Deficit in milling capacity  
High cost of support services 
Poor on-farm labour skills 
Infrastructure Uncompetitive energy pricing policy 
High cost of electricity 
High cost of diesel 
High milling cost 
High transplanting cost and high 
milling cost for self-generating 
electricity 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, 2005: 63  
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Appendices Chapter Six 
 
Appendix 6.1 Origin of Vegetables Representing More than 90% of Flows 
Phnom Penh vegetables Kandal vegetables Vietnam vegetables 
0 – 20 kms 20 – 40 kms 400 kms 
Kangkong  Choy Sum 
Lettuce 
Yard long bean 
Tomato 
Cabbage 
Chinese cabbage 
 
Source: Sokhen et al. 2004.  '  
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Appendix 6.2: Reasons for periodically stopping vegetable sales 
 Price too low Note enough 
products to sell 
Business is slow Other 
Producers 10 78 4 8 
Collectors 16 45 5 34 
Wholesalers 6 41  53 
Retailers 9 38 1 52 
Average 10 49 3 38 
Source: Sokhen et al. 2004: 33 
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Appendix 6.3: Gender Profile of Vegetable Supply Chain Actors in Cambodia 
 
Male Female Total Supply 
chain actor N % N % N % 
Farmer 44 69 20 31 64 32 
Collector 10 38 16 62 26 13 
Wholesaler 14 35 26 65 40 20 
Retailer 5 7 65 93 70 35 
Total 73 37 127 64 200 100 
 
Source: Genova et al. 2006.  
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Appendices Chapter Seven  
Appendix 7.1: Question List – Siem Reap Agri-processors 
 
Process Question List  Comment 
Planning  Do you make any business or production plan to help project 
demand or production need? 
 
Implementing Do you keep any records of inputs, outputs or sales?  
Monitoring Do you have a system to review your business and assess 
business performance? 
 
Capability   
Quality Capabilities/ Constraints  
Do you have any problems with the quality of inputs? 
How do you make sure input quality? 
Do you have any problem with the quality of production and 
processing?  
How would you rate the quality of your product? 
What other quality control methods do you use to ensure quality?  
 Production 
Quantity Capabilities/ Constraints 
What is the maximum amount you can produce? 
How much do you produce usually? 
Consistency Capabilities/ Constraints   
Variation of quality?  
Variation of quantity? 
Reason for variations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marketing Marketing Capabilities/ Constraints 
How do you market your product? 
E.g. Sell to other villagers, Sell to trader, Road side selling, Market 
retailing 
Branding? 
Advertising? 
How is product transported? 
Who transports? How much cost? 
Where do you get marketing Information/ knowledge? 
What problems do you have in marketing? 
 
Technological  Technological Capabilities/ Constraints  
What type of technology is used? 
Has the business recently adopted any new business technologies, 
what, why and how? 
 
Financial  Financial Capabilities/ Constraints  
Any investments in supply chain improvements? 
Any investment in production improvements? 
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What sort of financial investments has the person made? 
Owe money? Who, why amount? 
Access to credit? What sort of credit? Interest per month? 
Organisational Structure Capabilities/ Constraints: 
What is the structure of the business? 
E.g. Family-owned, Owner-operator, Cooperative? 
What is the organisational type? 
E.g. Subsistence and seasonal selling, Home processing, SME, 
Corporation 
What is the division of labour in the business? 
specialisation/ multi-skilling by workers? 
Organisational Culture Capabilities/ Constraints:  
What are the client’s core business values? 
E.g. Subsistence ethic/ surplus selling, Entrepreneurial, 
Development-induced 
Leadership Capabilities/ Constraints:  
What are the qualifications and managerial skills of leader/ owner? 
How are decisions made?   
Who makes decisions and based on what information? 
Information and Communication Capabilities/ Constraints: 
How does decision maker get information?  
What business networks is the person involved in? 
How is knowledge passed on with the business - formal 
apprenticeships, mentoring, informally to family? 
How is information passed on through the  organisation?  
Problem Solving/ Innovative Capabilities/ Constraints: 
What are some of the major problems encountered by the person 
over the past 5 years and how were they solved? 
What problems is the business currently encountering and how do 
they hope to solve them? 
 
Indirect Beneficiaries  
Downstream  Number of customers/ buyers? 
Retail 
Wholesale 
Has this number increased or decreased over the past year?  
 
Upstream Total number of employees? 
Age, Gender, Pay and work conditions 
Total number of local input suppliers  
Gender, Supply conditions, Payment conditions 
Total number of other suppliers 
Gender, Supply conditions, Payment conditions 
 
Financial  
Income Total sales per month 
Prices range received  
retail 
wholesale 
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Cost Total costs of production per unit 
Total fixed costs 
Total variable costs 
Other costs 
 
Value Chain   
Volume Total Volume of Client’s Business  
Total volume produced per year 
Total volume sold per year 
 
Value Total Value of Client’s Business  
Total value of products produced 
Total value of sales 
Do Not Ask. Can calculate 
later 
Intensity Labour Intensity  
Total labour employed or used divided by total production 
Capital Intensity 
Total capital invested/ total production 
Input Intensity  
Total inputs used per unit of production  
Do Not Ask. Calculate later 
Sustainability Environmental Sustainability 
Use of toxic chemicals or other dangerous substances? 
What by-products/ waste is produced? 
Type? 
Amount? 
How do you dispose? 
Sustainability of business or production practices including 
recycling, nutrient cycling, organic production, sustainable 
harvesting etc 
Social Sustainability  
Safe working and fair labour conditions? 
Produces/ sells products safe for consumption? Is the product 
certified? 
Economic Sustainability 
Has the business grown over time?  
 
 
Stability Client Business  
Number of products/ other ways to make money? 
Other livelihood strategies engaged 
Client Market  
Price volatility of final markets? 
Price volatility of inputs? 
Supply volatility of inputs? 
 
Multiplier 
Effects 
Number of competitors in market? 
Number of new entrants? 
Make any new products for sale or sell to new markets? 
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